Well, this is already dependent on what you consider to be part of a moral system: the actual decision to do something, or, after it's decided, a way to justify or condemn, to evaluate it. If a moral system fundamentally is about the ability to make decisions, than to say something is the right thing to do is the same as to say that I decided to do it (whether or not my will comes to pass), and in this way, it is more than an understatement that I merely consider; it's an act, in the very theory, a speech act of commandment to the self if you will. On the other hand, if I consider a moral theory to merely be an post hoc consideration of value, it in a way becomes an aesthetic theory, a theory of value; that doesn't mean it's unimportant in any way, but that it's inconsequential to decisions, but merely offers reasons, upon which I still have to decide (the same way I also consider factual information or taste in my decision, but don't consider them equal or necessary or even determinative to it). This marks the fundamental difference between morality proper and what I would call the theory of moral values, or ethical aesthetics.Leontiskos wrote: ↑February 25th, 2022, 2:58 amSo what are some of the ways that moral systems are crucially different from epistemological ones, and how would those differences lead a mathematical reasoner to reconsider the plausibility of absolute morality?Hypatia wrote: ↑February 23rd, 2022, 5:26 am I think here we have to distinguish between two levels of discussion, to understand what is even meant with the question: Do you mean that you have an absolute, clear, and irrefutable knowledge of moral righteousness, or do you believe that any action is in principle either right or wrong, although you might never be able to know?
The first theory requires the answers given thus far; for the second, the question rather is, whether or not moral statements have a truth value, reality, or if they are a mere decision and even one, that can be internally contradictory. This clearly can only be examined in a discussion of the idea of morality, and how moral systems are different from epistemological ones, but it does seem clear to me that one cannot simply copy the mathematical reasoning over to ethics and expect it to just work out, even though countless people do exactly that (or, similarly reasonless, negate it, and call it "emotive"; a term that, as already Schopenhauer pointed out, has only a negative definition, and therefore generally no justification of use).
I do think that there is no absolute theory of ethical values, because value, aesthetics, are fundamentally about ambivalence, dissonance. But a moral decision can be absolute. I can be unsure about the justification and value theory of the sanctity of life - and indeed I think most, if not all, justifications of suffering, and condemnations of death are false and not argued to the extent that they needed to be to be sound and logically necessary - but that does not change that my decision, not to kill myself, isn't absolute. I may not have the perfect framework of reasoning, but within that framework, epistemological doubts and aesthetic ambivalence does not lead straight to suicide, or the consideration of it. I think this example is illustrative, and shows, that even without absolute knowledge absolute decisions are possible, and therefore an idea of a theory that could structure and understand them (absolute morality, morality proper).