Animal Emotions

[Consul]

Given the way their conceptual distinction is formulated, it does have ontological implications, in the sense that an identity of emotions (qua "measurable physiological and/or neural states that are often reflected in behavior") and feelings is ruled out by definition: Emotions can be associated by feelings, but they are not feelings themselves.

It follows that emotional states "such as fear, anger, disgust" can occur without any subjective emotional experiences, such that being in fear/anger/digust doesn't entail feeling fear/anger/disgust. Unfelt or unexperienced emotions in those authors' sense are "objective emotions" defined in purely neurophysiological or ethological (behavioral) terms; but I think such objective emotions do not deserve to be called emotions at all, because all we have here are corporeal motions or (re)actions.

[GE Morton]

It follows that emotional states "such as fear, anger, disgust" can occur without any subjective emotional experiences, such that being in fear/anger/digust doesn't entail feeling fear/anger/disgust.

Yes, that is the "philosophical zombie" argument. Since such "emotional behaviors" can, conceivably, be exhibited without any subjective correlates, the presence of the latter must be inferred; they cannot be logically derived or empirically confirmed. But unless that inference is made we're stuck in solipsism and the behaviors become wholly inexplicable and uninteresting.

[Consul]

It follows that emotional states "such as fear, anger, disgust" can occur without any subjective emotional experiences, such that being in fear/anger/digust doesn't entail feeling fear/anger/disgust.

Yes, that is the "philosophical zombie" argument. Since such "emotional behaviors" can, conceivably, be exhibited without any subjective correlates, the presence of the latter must be inferred; they cannot be logically derived or empirically confirmed. But unless that inference is made we're stuck in solipsism and the behaviors become wholly inexplicable and uninteresting.

Whether those nonconscious/nonexperiential corporeal (re)actions which are called emotions by those authors are properly called so is one question; but no matter whether they are or not, another question is whether those so-called emotions can occur independently of any subjective feelings. If they can, then their observed constant conjunction in humans may be absent from other species. However, the mere logical possibility of feelingless emotions in nonhuman species is no good reason to reject all analogical inferences to nonhuman feelings, because it may well be a nomological necessity, i.e. a transhumanly valid law of nature, that certain types of (objective) emotions are associated with certain types of (subjective) feelings.

[GE Morton]

Whether those nonconscious/nonexperiential corporeal (re)actions which are called emotions by those authors are properly called so is one question; but no matter whether they are or not, another question is whether those so-called emotions can occur independently of any subjective feelings.

Oh, I think we can answer whether "nonconscious/nonexperiential corporeal (re)actions which are called emotions by those authors are properly called so." No, they're not properly so-called, if we're following Wittgenstein and accept that the "proper" meaning of a word is to be found in the way it is ordinarily used. But proposing not-quite-proper stipulative definitions of common words is also acceptable, provided those definitions are clear and have some explanatory utility in some context.

If they can, then their observed constant conjunction in humans may be absent from other species. However, the mere logical possibility of feelingless emotions in nonhuman species is no good reason to reject all analogical inferences to nonhuman feelings, because it may well be a nomological necessity, i.e. a transhumanly valid law of nature, that certain types of (objective) emotions are associated with certain types of (subjective) feelings.

I don't think the authors reject the possibility of feelings in non-humans. Indeed, I think they're trying to persuade us they have them, and pointing out that the evidence which supports that inference for humans should also suffice to support it for non-humans. I.e., we don't have to resort to nomological necessity or "transhuman laws of nature" to justify that inference.

[Pattern-chaser]

Since such "emotional behaviors" can, conceivably, be exhibited without any subjective correlates, the presence of the latter must be inferred; they cannot be logically derived or empirically confirmed. But unless that inference is made we're stuck in solipsism and the behaviors become wholly inexplicable and uninteresting.

It looks like your underlying theme here is that uncertainty must be overcome, or we are doomed to solipsism. Binary thinking at its best/worst. RL is rife with uncertainty; that's life!

[GE Morton]

Since such "emotional behaviors" can, conceivably, be exhibited without any subjective correlates, the presence of the latter must be inferred; they cannot be logically derived or empirically confirmed. But unless that inference is made we're stuck in solipsism and the behaviors become wholly inexplicable and uninteresting.

It looks like your underlying theme here is that uncertainty must be overcome, or we are doomed to solipsism. Binary thinking at its best/worst. RL is rife with uncertainty; that's life!

There is no uncertainty that feelings (in others) are subjective and thus not objectively verifiable. So we can either assume they have them, or that they don't. There is no third option. If we opt for the latter, we've settled for solipsism.

Criticisms of "binary thinking" are generally offered by someone caught in a contradiction and trying to escape it by dismissing the rules of logic.

[Pattern-chaser]

Since such "emotional behaviors" can, conceivably, be exhibited without any subjective correlates, the presence of the latter must be inferred; they cannot be logically derived or empirically confirmed. But unless that inference is made we're stuck in solipsism and the behaviors become wholly inexplicable and uninteresting.

It looks like your underlying theme here is that uncertainty must be overcome, or we are doomed to solipsism. Binary thinking at its best/worst. RL is rife with uncertainty; that's life!

There is no uncertainty that feelings (in others) are subjective and thus not objectively verifiable. So we can either assume they have them, or that they don't. There is no third option. If we opt for the latter, we've settled for solipsism.

A defining characteristic of subjectivity is that it is unpredictable or uncertain. However, I'm sorry if I misinterpreted your intended meaning. But I wonder if, instead of carefully constructing a binary conclusion, it might have been easier and clearer just to say "we don't know"?

Criticisms of "binary thinking" are generally offered by someone caught in a contradiction and trying to escape it by dismissing the rules of logic.

Binary thinking is one mode of thought. It has proved its usefulness. But there are other modes of thought too, and they are (very) often neglected. I think that criticisms that seem to target binary thinking are often just saying that it should not be inappropriately applied, especially when another mode of thought would suit the situation better.

[Leontiskos]

However, the mere logical possibility of feelingless emotions in nonhuman species is no good reason to reject all analogical inferences to nonhuman feelings...

I agree with what you've said in the thread. I would add that Morton's claim that we can only infer human "feelings" from human "emotions" is quite strange. In humans the connecting bridge between physical manifestations and subjective states is language, which is used both to establish and verify the connections.

Regarding the article, it seems to present a vague attempt to access non-human subjectivity through purely objective means, which obviously cannot be done. The false inference you have identified is the epitome of that attempt.

As Walker Percy said, we are "Lost in the Cosmos," a lonely species desperate to find another like us.

[GE Morton]

However, the mere logical possibility of feelingless emotions in nonhuman species is no good reason to reject all analogical inferences to nonhuman feelings...

I agree with what you've said in the thread. I would add that Morton's claim that we can only infer human "feelings" from human "emotions" is quite strange. In humans the connecting bridge between physical manifestations and subjective states is language, which is used both to establish and verify the connections.

My claim is that we can only infer emotions (understood as feelings, other than our own) from human behavior. And, no, language cannot possibly "verify" any connection between that behavior and subjective states inferred from it. It can only express the connections we assume a priori. Keep in mind that we impute emotions (feelings) to mute humans as well, not to mention most other mammals.

Regarding the article, it seems to present a vague attempt to access non-human subjectivity through purely objective means, which obviously cannot be done. The false inference you have identified is the epitome of that attempt.

No, that is not the thrust of the article. Their argument is that the criteria which justifies making that inference in humans (and most other mammals) should also justify it for other classes of animals.

But I'm wondering what inference you consider false. That other humans have subjective states ("feelings")?

[Leontiskos]

However, the mere logical possibility of feelingless emotions in nonhuman species is no good reason to reject all analogical inferences to nonhuman feelings...

I agree with what you've said in the thread. I would add that Morton's claim that we can only infer human "feelings" from human "emotions" is quite strange. In humans the connecting bridge between physical manifestations and subjective states is language, which is used both to establish and verify the connections.

My claim is that we can only infer emotions (understood as feelings, other than our own) from human behavior.

You are failing to make the crucial distinction between the behavior of using language and other sorts of behavior.

And, no, language cannot possibly "verify" any connection between that behavior and subjective states inferred from it. It can only express the connections we assume a priori.

Language is precisely what gives us insight into the subjectivity of others. Things like distress and aversion (a subset of what the article labels "emotion") can be objectively verified, but they are not per se subjective manifestations. The only per se subjective manifestations are found in expressions of subjects qua subjects; in subjects intentionally expressing their own subjectivity. This is only done through language (i.e. spoken words, written words, signs, etc.).

Keep in mind that we impute emotions (feelings) to mute humans as well, not to mention most other mammals.

That is because we can recognize human beings and we know that human beings are capable of language. That's why Anne Sullivan spent so much time and effort with Helen Keller, and eventually succeeded in bringing Helen into the world of active language-users from the world of potential language-users.

Regarding the article, it seems to present a vague attempt to access non-human subjectivity through purely objective means, which obviously cannot be done. The false inference you have identified is the epitome of that attempt.

No, that is not the thrust of the article. Their argument is that the criteria which justifies making that inference in humans (and most other mammals) should also justify it for other classes of animals.

The necessary conditions which justify the inference in humans are simply not present in other animals. The scientists who wrote the article are involving themselves in logical fallacies due to their lack of understanding of philosophy and subjectivity.

But I'm wondering what inference you consider false. That other humans have subjective states ("feelings")?

Consul identified it in his first post (link).

[GE Morton]

You are failing to make the crucial distinction between the behavior of using language and other sorts of behavior.

Not a failing. Speech is still behavior.

And, no, language cannot possibly "verify" any connection between that behavior and subjective states inferred from it. It can only express the connections we assume a priori.

Language is precisely what gives us insight into the subjectivity of others. Things like distress and aversion (a subset of what the article labels "emotion") can be objectively verified, but they are not per se subjective manifestations. The only per se subjective manifestations are found in expressions of subjects qua subjects; in subjects intentionally expressing their own subjectivity. This is only done through language (i.e. spoken words, written words, signs, etc.).

No, speech is not a "subjective manifestation." It is an objective manifestation of an ability to utter meaningful, grammatically correct sentences, but not of any subjective states. Turing's computer could also manifest that ability. But we take that ability to be grounds for imputing subjective states to the speaker --- and to Turing's computer (in his view).

That is because we can recognize human beings and we know that human beings are capable of language. That's why Anne Sullivan spent so much time and effort with Helen Keller, and eventually succeeded in bringing Helen into the world of active language-users from the world of potential language-users.

Yes, we can know humans are capable of language. The evidence for that is objective. But that there are subjective states accompanying that objective capability is an inference, not empirically confirmable knowledge.

The necessary conditions which justify the inference in humans are simply not present in other animals. The scientists who wrote the article are involving themselves in logical fallacies due to their lack of understanding of philosophy and subjectivity.

Are you suggesting that we're not justified in imputing emotions (subjective states) to animals who lack speech? I'm pretty sure anyone who has lived with a dog or cat would disagree with you.

But I'm wondering what inference you consider false. That other humans have subjective states ("feelings")?

Consul identified it in his first post (link).

In that post Consul wrote, "Given the above distinction between emotions and (subjective) feelings, having emotions doesn't entail having (subjective) feelings!"

That's correct. Having emotions (as defined in the article) doesn't deductively entail having feelings. But they justify inductively inferring that they do.

[Leontiskos]

You are failing to make the crucial distinction between the behavior of using language and other sorts of behavior.

Not a failing. Speech is still behavior.

It is a failure to address the counterargument I have put forward, a counterargument which makes a distinction between different kinds of behavior.

And, no, language cannot possibly "verify" any connection between that behavior and subjective states inferred from it. It can only express the connections we assume a priori.

Language is precisely what gives us insight into the subjectivity of others. Things like distress and aversion (a subset of what the article labels "emotion") can be objectively verified, but they are not per se subjective manifestations. The only per se subjective manifestations are found in expressions of subjects qua subjects; in subjects intentionally expressing their own subjectivity. This is only done through language (i.e. spoken words, written words, signs, etc.).

No, speech is not a "subjective manifestation." It is an objective manifestation of an ability to utter meaningful, grammatically correct sentences, but not of any subjective states.

Language is an intentional manifestation and communication of the subject's abstract perception of the world. The intentional manifestation of a subject's abstract perception is a subjective manifestation. So yes, language is clearly a subjective manifestation. The subjectivity can be manifested directly, in the object of the language, or indirectly, as the necessary condition of language, but either way it's there.

The event of the pain that arises when you poke me is substantially different from the speech act where I intentionally express my subjective state in an objectively communicable and abstracted form, "I am experiencing pain." In short, the primary reason we know humans have subjective as opposed to mere sensory experiences is because they tell us. Sensory experience and subjective experience are not actually the same thing.

The necessary conditions which justify the inference in humans are simply not present in other animals. The scientists who wrote the article are involving themselves in logical fallacies due to their lack of understanding of philosophy and subjectivity.

Are you suggesting that we're not justified in imputing emotions (subjective states) to animals who lack speech? I'm pretty sure anyone who has lived with a dog or cat would disagree with you.

But now you are becoming mixed up by the strange verbiage of your own article. The article does not use "emotion" to indicate a subjective state. It uses "feeling" to indicate a subjective state. Your terms themselves are muddy, and these sorts of equivocations are at the heart of the problem.

That's correct. Having emotions (as defined in the article) doesn't deductively entail having feelings. But they justify inductively inferring that they do.

They most certainly do not. To infer subjective experience from sensory experience is to commit a rational error.

[Consul]

They most certainly do not. To infer subjective experience from sensory experience is to commit a rational error.

No, since sensory experience = sensory subjective experience.

[GE Morton]

You are failing to make the crucial distinction between the behavior of using language and other sorts of behavior.

Not a failing. Speech is still behavior.

It is a failure to address the counterargument I have put forward, a counterargument which makes a distinction between different kinds of behavior.

There are many kinds of behaviors. "Behaviors" are empirically observable actions. No empirically observable action entails a subjective state on the part of the acting entity; the differences among types of behaviors are irrelevant. That logical gap is obvious from common experience. That Alfie claims, "I have a headache" doesn't entail that he has a headache. No claim other than tautologies contains its own truth conditions.

Language is an intentional manifestation and communication of the subject's abstract perception of the world. The intentional manifestation of a subject's abstract perception is a subjective manifestation.

No. Observable "manifestations" of anything are objective phenomena. They may be manifestations of subjective phenomena, if we assume the speaker is experiencing some subjective phenomena, or is at least capable of experiencing such phenomena. But that is an assumption.

The event of the pain that arises when you poke me is substantially different from the speech act where I intentionally express my subjective state in an objectively communicable and abstracted form, "I am experiencing pain."

True.

In short, the primary reason we know humans have subjective as opposed to mere sensory experiences is because they tell us.

We take their reports as evidence of subjective states only because we've already assumed, a priori, that other humans have minds and therefore experience subjective states. Even having made that a priori assumption, we take any particular report as tentative, pending confirmation via other evidence.

Epistemology requires that we make two grand a priori assumptions --- that there is an external world, and that it includes other minds. Without those assumptions epistemology, and all that depends on it, could not get off the ground.

Are you suggesting that we're not justified in imputing emotions (subjective states) to animals who lack speech? I'm pretty sure anyone who has lived with a dog or cat would disagree with you.

But now you are becoming mixed up by the strange verbiage of your own article. The article does not use "emotion" to indicate a subjective state. It uses "feeling" to indicate a subjective state. Your terms themselves are muddy, and these sorts of equivocations are at the heart of the problem.

That is why I followed "emotions" with the parenthetical qualifier. You're correct; the authors use "emotion" to denote only the observable behavior. But in common usage the term does entail subjective states --- because of our a priori assumption that other people experience such states.

That's correct. Having emotions (as defined in the article) doesn't deductively entail having feelings. But they justify inductively inferring that they do.

They most certainly do not. To infer subjective experience from sensory experience is to commit a rational error.

Actually, you're right there too. We can't logically infer subjective states from observable behavior. But we can infer it inductively, provided we've already assumed other minds exist and that there is a correlation between their subjective states and their behavior, based on the one case where we know there is such an association --- our own.

[Leontiskos]

They most certainly do not. To infer subjective experience from sensory experience is to commit a rational error.

No, since sensory experience = sensory subjective experience.

Animals have nerves (or their equivalent in the relevant non-mammal cases) and therefore receive sensory input. That is all I mean by 'sensory experience.'

We take their reports as evidence of subjective states only because we've already assumed, a priori, that other humans have minds and therefore experience subjective states.

Why think such a thing? You seem to be doing nothing more than begging the question in favor of your own conception of the inferential sequencing, but ironically your conception misses the mark of basic empiricism. If you think you've made an a priori assumption about the subjective nature of human beings before you witness the behavior that manifests the being's subjectivity, then you will have to explain why the heck you made that a priori assumption in the first place! It seems fairly clear that you've got it backwards. We begin with observed behavior of the substance before making assumptions about the nature of the substance. (My assumption here is that you are not some rarefied Platonist who thinks we know all sorts of synthetic truths a priori.)

That's correct. Having emotions (as defined in the article) doesn't deductively entail having feelings. But they justify inductively inferring that they do.

They most certainly do not. To infer subjective experience from sensory experience is to commit a rational error.

Actually, you're right there too. We can't logically infer subjective states from observable behavior. But we can infer it inductively, provided we've already assumed other minds exist and that there is a correlation between their subjective states and their behavior, based on the one case where we know there is such an association --- our own.

You are assuming the question at stake (begging the question). We are asking how, when one encounters a foreign entity or substance, one can discern whether that entity possesses subjective states. Your basic claim has been that if we cannot infer that certain animals have subjective states, then we also cannot infer that other humans have subjective states. I pointed out that this is incorrect, since the inference in the case of humans is based on evidence that is not present in animals, i.e. language and even self-description. In response you claim that we don't infer human subjectivity from any sort of observable behavior, but rather know it a priori. Now you would have to explain why such an a priori assumption is justified (and it is notable that you are claiming that it is justified prior to even basic observation of human beings, which is quite remarkable). But beyond that you have the burden of showing why that "a priori" assumption cannot exclude the non-human animals you wish to see as subjective beings. Do you claim that we also make this "a priori" assumption with regard to non-human animals?

Your basic argument, consistent even from the early parts of the thread, is as follows:

1. The behavior of human and non-human animals is more or less the same (with respect to " "emotion" ").
2. We infer subjectivity from the behavior of humans.
3. Therefore we must also infer subjectivity from the behavior of non-human animals.

That's a valid syllogism, but (1) is false. The behavior of humans is significantly different from the behavior of non-human animals, and thus we have two different bodies of evidence from which to draw inferences. This is obviously why we can and do draw different inferences about the subjectivity of the two different kinds of entities.

(Your points about entailment vs. inductive inference are somewhat tangential. We need only ask whether the inferences are rationally justified. I have no more interest than you in making the case that we can have demonstrative knowledge of the subjective states of other substances. To state my position in a weak form: we have more rational justification for assigning subjectivity to human beings than we do for assigning subjectivity to non-human animals.)