Animal Emotions

[GE Morton]

The sensory experience paradox indeed shows that 'good' must precede human nature, which (for the purpose of the discussion, i.e. on topic) has implications with regard the nature of morality as well as its potential for 'ought' intellectual progress and for securing the future of humanity.

What "paradox" is that? And, again, before you can "show" anything about "the good," you need to define it in terms that allow it to be recognized on presentation and describe it via propositions that are empirically or logical testable, which have determinable truth conditions.

As Levinas writes "sensation had to intentionalize to be experienced" and yet, much of its pre-intentional existences eludes consciousness.

Then how does he recognize it? What are his grounds for asserting its existence?

Yet, when it concerns philosophy and a potential intention to enhance morality, the fundamental questions, the why of morality, are important . . .

Yes, it is. The "why" of morality is to allow people with different goals, interests, personalities, strengths and weaknesses, experiences, etc., to live in a social setting without conflict, in order to benefit from the advantages such a setting affords.

[snt]

My contribution is merely as that of an outsider. The fact observed is that many profound philosophers have made a case for the idea that 'good' must precede human nature.

Such a claim is meaningless until you define what "the good" is, in terms that allow anyone to recognize it when they see it, just as with "the moon," or "the Taj Mahal." Until that is done there is no case to be made.

Can the future be seen? Can it be said that the future is purely random?

If no and no, plausibility of the concept 'good' is evident.

Those works are considered "profound" only by fellow wanderers in that phenomenological swamp. For most others they are incoherent and imcomprehensible gibberish.

Usefulness of a model of the world is merely utilitarian value and cannot logically be a basis for a guiding principle (morality) since a guiding principle would concern what is essential for value to be possible (a priori or “before value”).

One is therefore to venture beyond empirical reality and it is logical that it will require an effort to acquire comprehension.

[snt]

What "paradox" is that?

The paradox that sensing precedes conscious experience. Something must precede sensing and that something cannot be consciousness. Simple logic makes it evident that what underlays sensing is 'good'.

Then how does he recognize it? What are his grounds for asserting its existence?

Sensation is a phenomenon that underlays conscious experience. One's own conscious experience is evidence.

Yet, when it concerns philosophy and a potential intention to enhance morality, the fundamental questions, the why of morality, are important . . .

Yes, it is. The "why" of morality is to allow people with different goals, interests, personalities, strengths and weaknesses, experiences, etc., to live in a social setting without conflict, in order to benefit from the advantages such a setting affords.

Utilitarian value or usefulness of a model of the world (e.g. 'a purpose to benefit') cannot provide an answer to the 'why' question of morality.

Immanuel Kant argued that it is laziness to seek morality in the empirical in his work The Metaphysics of Morality:

"Thus every empirical element is not only quite incapable of being an aid to the principle of morality, but is even highly prejudicial to the purity of morals, for the proper and inestimable worth of an absolutely good will consists just in this, that the principle of action is free from all influence of contingent grounds, which alone experience can furnish.

We cannot too much or too often repeat our warning against this lax and even mean habit of thought which seeks for its principle amongst empirical motives and laws; for human reason in its weariness is glad to rest on this pillow, and in a dream of sweet illusions (in which, instead of Juno, it embraces a cloud) it [empirical] substitutes for morality a bastard patched up from limbs of various derivation, which looks like anything one chooses to see in it, only not like virtue to one who has once beheld her in her true form."

[Pattern-chaser]

Levinas says the following...

OK, but what does snt say?

My contribution is merely as that of an outsider. The fact observed is that many profound philosophers have made a case for the idea that 'good' must precede human nature. Some have created profound works for it that is seriously studied by scholars today. One of the hosts of the podcast Partially Examined Mind (Seth Paskin) studied Heidegger in Freiburg, Germany and later dedicated to Emmanuel Levinas.

I don't think you're seeing my point. I can go and examine the works of Levinas et al myself; I don't need you to do it for me. My interest here is in what you have to say, which could prove interesting, and which might contain insights that the source material does not. So far, I see little from you except a list of supposedly-eminent philosophers, and quotes from their work. I would love to know what your views are...?

[snt]

I mentioned it in my previous reply. What if good precedes human nature? I shared several perspectives for evidence that it is the case. I just noticed the following in a topic about randomness which also seems to provide evidence.

"Randomness cannot exist, with as an example result that computer encryption is always able to be broken with sufficient computing power. ... This is evidence that a factor is involved that prevents actual randomness to be possible, which is meaning. This is evidence that meaning is fundamental to the Universe."

Researchers identified a problem that holds the key to whether all encryption can be broken -- as well as a surprising connection to a mathematical concept that aims to define and measure randomness.
https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2 ... 194721.htm

When good precedes human nature morality would involve an eternal quest into good.

Killing an animal for food would always be immoral because the perspective of the animal and its environment are never lost. A human can merely decide to neglect the well-being/perspective of an animal.

My quote of philosopher Henry David Thoreau provides an indication that the idea is valid from a humanly social evolution perspective.

"Whatever my own practice may be, I have no doubt that it is a part of the destiny of the human race, in its gradual moral improvement, to leave off eating animals, as surely as the savage tribes have left off eating each other when they came in contact with the more civilized."

Morality can be seen as a form of long term intelligence, an inside-out light into the world, a light 'for good'. Morality would therefore be vital for 'ought' intellectual progress.

The cutting edge business science discovery of the critical significance of a moral culture to achieve success with companies that intend to do 'good', by the concept of (moral) intellectual resilience, provides further evidence for the importance of morality for intellectual progress.

"Deep purpose organizations are deeply committed to both positive commercial and positive social outcomes. Their leaders adopt a mindset of practical idealism. Deep purpose companies thoroughly embed their purpose in their strategy, processes, communications, human resources practices, operational decision-making, and culture."
https://hbr.org/2022/03/the-messy-but-e ... of-purpose

"Good strategy has traditionally been seen as the key to business success. More recently, purpose has become an essential element of doing business. But something else is missing: culture, or the essential elements of how an organization and its employees behave, as well as its governing beliefs and principles.

What teams need is a guiding frame to be effective and energized when the unexpected invariably happens. In a recent conversation I had with business leaders struggling with the challenging state of the environment, we concluded that being guided by our purpose and some key principles — a way to describe culture — and then doing our best was going to work better than hoping we had a clairvoyant strategy we could predictably execute."
https://hbr.org/2022/06/does-your-compa ... nd-purpose

What do you think of the idea that morality is an eternal quest into good? What do you think of the idea that morality is ever present and that moral choices concern whether or not to neglect morality, or alternatively, that morality is limited by the potential for moral consideration (an intellectual capacity)?

[snt]

OK, but what does snt say?

when it concerns philosophy and a potential intention to enhance morality, the fundamental questions, the why of morality, are important . . .

Yes, it is. The "why" of morality is to allow people with different goals, interests, personalities, strengths and weaknesses, experiences, etc., to live in a social setting without conflict, in order to benefit from the [empirical] advantages such a setting affords.

We cannot too much or too often repeat our warning against this lax and even mean habit of thought which seeks for its principle amongst empirical motives and laws; for human reason in its weariness is glad to rest on this pillow, and in a dream of sweet illusions (in which, instead of Juno, it embraces a cloud) it [empirical] substitutes for morality a bastard patched up from limbs of various derivation, which looks like anything one chooses to see in it, only not like virtue to one who has once beheld her in her true form.

What do you think Pattern-chaser?

[Pattern-chaser]

I shared several perspectives for evidence that it is the case. I just noticed the following in a topic about randomness which also seems to provide evidence.

"Randomness cannot exist, with as an example result that computer encryption is always able to be broken with sufficient computing power. ... This is evidence that a factor is involved that prevents actual randomness to be possible, which is meaning. This is evidence that meaning is fundamental to the Universe."

...

What do you think of the idea that morality is an eternal quest into good? What do you think of the idea that morality is ever present and that moral choices concern whether or not to neglect morality, or alternatively, that morality is limited by the potential for moral consideration (an intellectual capacity)?

We obviously have a different idea of what constitutes "evidence". Once again, you offer someone else's thoughts instead of your own. And those thoughts simply assert someone else's ideas, without explanation or justification. And you conclude by asking me what I think of X, Y, and Z? First, tell me what you think about them!

What do you think @Pattern-chaser?

I'll tell you when you have told me what you think, and not before. Am I being asked to write your homework assignment(s) for you? What are you up to?

[snt]

We obviously have a different idea of what constitutes "evidence". Once again, you offer someone else's thoughts instead of your own. And those thoughts simply assert someone else's ideas, without explanation or justification. And you conclude by asking me what I think of X, Y, and Z? First, tell me what you think about them!

The concept at hand that is deduced/retrieved from various sources, is the simple idea that good must precede human nature. I believe that the provided references have provided a pretty strong case that it is in fact reality that good precedes human nature.

Do you not agree that a case has been made that good precedes human nature? What about the sensing paradox (sensing to precede consciousness)? How could it be explained without a preceding concept of good?

What do you think Pattern-chaser?

I'll tell you when you have told me what you think, and not before. Am I being asked to write your homework assignment(s) for you? What are you up to?

I believe that the idea that good must precede human nature is correct and that the provided references have made a strong case. The fact that renowned philosophers conclude it based on their major work that today is studied scholars that are sometimes dedicated to their work, does provide a strong argument to consider that it may in fact be the case and perhaps it can be demanded to ask: why would it not be the case? (i.e. why would the cited intensively researched philosophers be wrong?)

The perception of morality as an eternal quest into good would be my own idea/vision as a logical consequence of 'good' to precede human nature, for the purpose of 'ought' intellectual progress to secure the future of humanity.

My personal vision is also that morality - when perceived as an eternal quest into good in the face of an unknown future - is like a light that can grow indefinitely from the inside-out into world, a form of long term intelligence that provides a foundation for intellectual resilience, a light 'for good'.

It would also imply that morality is ever present and can merely be neglected or alternatively, is limited by the potential for moral consideration (an intellectual capacity).

As a potential and a responsibility in the face of dignity, morality would be a quality that can be demanded through a moral culture.

[Pattern-chaser]

We obviously have a different idea of what constitutes "evidence". Once again, you offer someone else's thoughts instead of your own. And those thoughts simply assert someone else's ideas, without explanation or justification. And you conclude by asking me what I think of X, Y, and Z? First, tell me what you think about them!

The concept at hand ... is the simple idea that good must precede human nature.

"Good" is a human value judgement, a label pinned onto something we consider desirable or worthy of approval. "Good" is not a thing, like stone is.

"Human nature" is also a somewhat vague term, and it isn't wholly clear what you might mean by it. I imagine that you refer to 'the way that humans typically behave', or something like that?

Perhaps your intention is to wonder if human behaviour aims to achieve results that those humans would judge to be "good" (i.e. desirable, etc)?

I believe that the provided references have provided a pretty strong case that it is in fact reality that good precedes human nature.

Perhaps they have, but you have offered nothing except other people's opinions. Oh, and you vouchsafed that you agree with them.

Do you not agree that a case has been made that good precedes human nature?

I'm sorry, but my impression is that no coherent case has been offered for scrutiny.

[GE Morton]

Can the future be seen? Can it be said that the future is purely random?

"The future" can refer to two things, 1), any time following the present time, and 2) events and states of affairs which may prevail at such a time.

The first is well-defined. The second is as vague and indeterminate as "the good."

Usefulness of a model of the world is merely utilitarian value and cannot logically be a basis for a guiding principle (morality) since a guiding principle would concern what is essential for value to be possible (a priori or “before value”).

All that is necessary for value to be possible is a sentient creature with interests and some capacity for pursuing them. Those interests will be its values.

[snt]

"Good" is a human value judgement, a label pinned onto something we consider desirable or worthy of approval. "Good" is not a thing, like stone is.

"Human nature" is also a somewhat vague term, and it isn't wholly clear what you might mean by it. I imagine that you refer to 'the way that humans typically behave', or something like that?

When 'good' is to precede nature (physical reality) it cannot be a thing, however, what is argued is that philosophical plausibility is evident for its significance on the basis of which a case can be made with regard the nature of morality.

Human nature is a term meant to indicate a form that allows for the easy consideration of a state of pre-experience, thus to precede the potential for any sensibility, thought or consideration.

Perhaps your intention is to wonder if human behaviour aims to achieve results that those humans would judge to be "good" (i.e. desirable, etc)?

No, for desiring is empirical in nature and what is argued is that morality involves an a priori good. Morality would lay at the root of conscious experience and provide the basis for the senses. From a human nature perspective, morality would involve an eternal quest into good.

The citation of 🕮 Immanuel Kant is applicable to your comment:

"We cannot too much or too often repeat our warning against this lax and even mean habit of thought which seeks for its principle amongst empirical motives and laws; for human reason in its weariness is glad to rest on this pillow, and in a dream of sweet illusions (in which, instead of Juno, it embraces a cloud) it [empirical] substitutes for morality a bastard patched up from limbs of various derivation, which looks like anything one chooses to see in it, only not like virtue to one who has once beheld her in her true form."

Perhaps they have, but you have offered nothing except other people's opinions. Oh, and you vouchsafed that you agree with them.

Isn't it better to cite renowned philosophers who are heavily researched by scholars today of which some are literally dedicated to the work? How could I - a philosophy forum newbie - do better?

I'm sorry, but my impression is that no coherent case has been offered for scrutiny.

In the face of the ground presented in the form of reliable conclusory citations of major works on the subject by renowned philosophers, I believe that it can be said that a case has been made for consideration of plausibility.

Would it be possible to indicate why you would not agree with the idea that good would precede (human) nature?

[snt]

Can the future be seen? Can it be said that the future is purely random?

"The future" can refer to two things, 1), any time following the present time, and 2) events and states of affairs which may prevail at such a time.

The first is well-defined. The second is as vague and indeterminate as "the good."

You did not answer the questions. If your answers are no to both then - despite your explanation of "the future" - the conclusion would still hold.

All that is necessary for value to be possible is a sentient creature with interests and some capacity for pursuing them. Those interests will be its values.

That says nothing about the nature of a value judgement and therefore it cannot possibly describe the nature of value.

A whole 'sentient creature' (both sentience and creature are complex concepts) are to be assumed with as it appears the empirical nature of the concept interests (empirically deduce-able from behaviour observation) being selected as ground for morality merely for a theory-less (lax) belief that empirical reality is all there is that can be of significance, thus in the face of the question "what else could morality be?" the answer is none: just interests (desire in the variant by Pattern-chaser) are a potential candidate from an empirical perspective which would make the evidence clear.

For a value judgement to be possible, a priori good is required because a value judgement is not a choice between good and bad but a valuation on behalf of just good.

The citation of 🕮 Immanuel Kant is also applicable to your argument. It would be interesting to learn your response to his critique.

"We cannot too much or too often repeat our warning against this lax and even mean habit of thought which seeks for its principle amongst empirical motives and laws; for human reason in its weariness is glad to rest on this pillow, and in a dream of sweet illusions (in which, instead of Juno, it embraces a cloud) it [empirical] substitutes for morality a bastard patched up from limbs of various derivation, which looks like anything one chooses to see in it, only not like virtue to one who has once beheld her in her true form."

[GE Morton]

The paradox that sensing precedes conscious experience. Something must precede sensing and that something cannot be consciousness. Simple logic makes it evident that what underlays sensing is 'good'.

Well, first, that is not a paradox. A paradox is a proposition that entails its own contradiction. There is no contradiction in "sensing precedes experience." Second, sensing can mean two things: 1) a physical response to a stimulus, such as the response of a retinal nerve to a photon, or 2) becoming aware of such an event. Per the first meaning ("sensing1") the preceding event is the stimulus, the ensuing event is the nerve cell's response. Neither has anything to do with consciousness. Per the second meaning, becoming aware of the stimulus doesn't "precede conscious experience" --- it is a conscious experience.

And your "simple logic" is a glaring non-sequitur:

1. Sensing1 precedes conscious experience.
2. Something must precede sensing1.
3. That which precedes sensing1 is "good."

Ridiculously invalid argument --- you have a term in the conclusion which is undefined and appears in none of the premises.

Sensation is a phenomenon that underlays conscious experience. One's own conscious experience is evidence.

Conscious experience per se is evidence of no such thing. Many conscious experience have no sensory stimulus, e.g., dreams, fantasies, memories, etc. Some conscious experiences do, of course, have sensory precedents. But how those are related requires an intervening theory, the development of which is the chief focus of most contemporary neurophysiology and the philosophy of mind. It is Chalmers' "hard problem."

Yes, it is. The "why" of morality is to allow people with different goals, interests, personalities, strengths and weaknesses, experiences, etc., to live in a social setting without conflict, in order to benefit from the advantages such a setting affords.

Utilitarian value or usefulness of a model of the world (e.g. 'a purpose to benefit') cannot provide an answer to the 'why' question of morality.

Immanuel Kant argued that it is laziness to seek morality in the empirical in his work The Metaphysics of Morality:

"Thus every empirical element is not only quite incapable of being an aid to the principle of morality, but is even highly prejudicial to the purity of morals, for the proper and inestimable worth of an absolutely good will consists just in this, that the principle of action is free from all influence of contingent grounds, which alone experience can furnish.

Well, you chose to leave the word "will" out of the emphasized part of your Kant quote. A "good will" for Kant not your "absolute good." A "good will" for Kant is the willingness to adhere to duty in decision-making, the duty of observing the Categorical Imperative. You also ignore what Kant also said
in opening sentence of Ch 1:

"Nothing can possibly be conceived in the world, or even out of it, which can be called good without qualification, except a good will."

https://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets ... nt1785.pdf

Kant's "good will" obviously does not precede consciousness, as you claim for your "good." It is part of, a product of, consciousness.

[Pattern-chaser]

Isn't it better to cite renowned philosophers who are heavily researched by scholars today of which some are literally dedicated to the work? How could I - a philosophy forum newbie - do better?

To me, that's not the point at issue. You will learn more, and so will we, if you state your own opinions and beliefs, and listen to our responses, just as we listen to you. I don't mean that you, or anyone else, should/must post only new and unique ideas; few of us indeed could manage that! I only mean that quoting (say) Plato is not as beneficial to any/all of us as stating them in your own terms, according to your own understanding. That's my take on it, anyway.

Would it be possible to indicate why you would not agree with the idea that good would precede (human) nature?

I would hesitate to disagree with ideas that I have yet to properly understand. Although you believe you have offered a detailed account of what you believe, I find that I can make neither head nor tail of them. The question you ask simply makes no sense to me.

[snt]

The paradox that sensing precedes conscious experience. Something must precede sensing and that something cannot be consciousness. Simple logic makes it evident that what underlays sensing is 'good'.

Well, first, that is not a paradox. A paradox is a proposition that entails its own contradiction.

When it concerns sensing, it concerns an aspects that provides any potential sense-data that can be used to facilitate intentionality (attention) or consciousness. This is a paradox.

The idea that life started at some point in time in random chemical processes is nonsensical.

Life concerns subjective experience and experience is always based on sense-data. It is seen in biological cells, even the tiniest most primitive ones such as yeast, that the cell is actually sensing its environment with nanometre precision and with complex comprehension of its complex outer world.

Cells sense their environment to explore it (2017)
https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2 ... 125821.htm

Therefore, the sensory experience potential that is required at the root of life demands the same fundamental explanation in complex life forms and their habitual sense-organ machinery cannot be formed a posteriori.

The 'conscious I' cannot have preceded the sense-data and that means that sensing is primary and therefore causes a paradox because sensing requires intentionality (attention).

It is very easy to understand: how can you envision yourself (as a subjective experience) in complete nothingness to then explore an outer world? The subjective experience that is required at the root of life wouldn't have any ground to be subjective of.

And your "simple logic" is a glaring non-sequitur:

1. Sensing1 precedes conscious experience.
2. Something must precede sensing1.
3. That which precedes sensing1 is "good."

Ridiculously invalid argument --- you have a term in the conclusion which is undefined and appears in none of the premises.

As my previous comment showed, one is to consider the potential for sensing to be primary in the face of the root of life (subjective experience). Therefore, sensing cannot stand on its own as a chemical sense organ that merely 'reacts' to chemistry. The conscious I (subjective experience) cannot have preceded such a reaction and thus is sensing of a different nature than a reaction. Sensing involves intentionality (attention) and concerns value.

Sensation is a phenomenon that underlays conscious experience. One's own conscious experience is evidence.

Conscious experience per se is evidence of no such thing. Many conscious experience have no sensory stimulus, e.g., dreams, fantasies, memories, etc. Some conscious experiences do, of course, have sensory precedents. But how those are related requires an intervening theory, the development of which is the chief focus of most contemporary neurophysiology and the philosophy of mind. It is Chalmers' "hard problem."

That is incorrect. The concepts dreams, fantasies, memories etc. find their origin in sensuous being. Without ever having sensed anything, such concepts are not possible.

Also in the case of the processing of empirical sense-data, it is not possible to envision such a process to have developed a posteriori in the face of subjective experience. It is therefore not a neurophysiology question, and it is also not part of consciousness. It is an aspect that precedes the potential for conscious experience - the root of life - and that demands an explanation a such.

Well, you chose to leave the word "will" out of the emphasized part of your Kant quote. A "good will" for Kant not your "absolute good." A "good will" for Kant is the willingness to adhere to duty in decision-making, the duty of observing the Categorical Imperative. You also ignore what Kant also said
in opening sentence of Ch 1:

"Nothing can possibly be conceived in the world, or even out of it, which can be called absolutely good without qualification, except a good will."

https://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets ... nt1785.pdf

Kant's "good will" obviously does not precede consciousness, as you claim for your "good." It is part of, a product of, consciousness.

Yes, you are right that I left out the will part.

Kant argues that no 'thing' can be conceived of as being good without qualification, except a good will. This is a bit misleading.

Kant never went into depth about the nature of will or reason.

Kant argued that will is practical reason:

"Everything in nature works according to laws. Only a rational being has a will - which is the ability to act according to the thought of laws, i.e. to act on principle.

To derive actions from laws you need reason, so that's what will is - practical reason."

plato.stanford.edu on Kant's reason mentions the following:

"we might note that Kant rarely discusses reason as such. This leaves a difficult interpretative task: just what is Kant’s general and positive account of reason?

The first thing to note is Kant’s bold claim that reason is the arbiter of truth in all judgments—empirical as well as metaphysical. Unfortunately, he barely develops this thought, and the issue has attracted surprisingly little attention in the literature."

If this is the case from an academic Kant scholar perspective then what should be made of the idea that reason is 'given' by nature to serve a purpose?

Kant: "Nevertheless, reason is given to us as a practical faculty, that is, one that is meant to have an influence on the will."

If will (practical reason) is given, then an 'absolutely good' will simply requires the quality absolutely good a priori as an independent concept. Anything less than absolute would amount to an empirical and given quality.

Therefore, Kant's reasoning in my opinion does prove applicability of the concept 'good'.