Should people have a right to privacy?

[Pattern-chaser]

There is no "right" not to be distressed.

There is no "right" to anything at all, except for those rights that we award to ourselves, and enforce ourselves. There are no 'natural' rights, or any other kind of 'right'. They don't exist unless we create and maintain them.

So, if there is a right to (say) freedom of speech, then there could also be a right not to be distressed, if we decide that we want such a right. It's all down to us.

Exactly. The Classic Liberal Philosophers whom GE admires thought "natural rights" meant "God-given rights". To modern atheists (like most of us here) that means "human given rights", or "culturally constituted rights".

I'm no "modern atheist", but I still agree with what we're both saying here, wholeheartedly.

[GE Morton]

There is no "right" to anything at all, except for those rights that we award to ourselves, and enforce ourselves. There are no 'natural' rights, or any other kind of 'right'. They don't exist unless we create and maintain them.

Well, you've apparently decided to ignore the meaning of that term, the history of that concept and the truth conditions for propositions asserting a "right."

That is typical for ideologues determined to defend absurdities.

[GE Morton]

Exactly. The Classic Liberal Philosophers whom GE admires thought "natural rights" meant "God-given rights".

I gave you the meaning of "natural rights," in detail, more than once. How about quoting what I actually said there, rather than gratuitous inferences of your own?

[Ecurb]

I gave you the meaning of "natural rights," in detail, more than once. How about quoting what I actually said there, rather than gratuitous inferences of your own?

What you mean by "natural rights" and whence these supposed rights derive are two different things.

[GE Morton]

All agreements have an implicit element. As this post clearly shows, even the most rudimentary "arrangement between parties" must ALWAYS include and IMPLIED agreement as to the meaning of the terms;

Er, no. Agreement as to the meanings of terms is presumed by, but not the substance of, an agreement in the contractual sense, e.g., as to whether Bruno has incurred some debt to Alfie's grandma. Moreover, the agreement as to the meanings of terms is agreement in the passive sense, not the contractual sense. You and Vladimir Putin may agree that triangles have 3 sides, but that does not establish any contractual relationship between you.

That presumption of agreement regarding meanings is, BTW, that both sides will be interpreting the terms of the contractual agreement per their dictionary definitions (unless some different definitions are stipulated in the agreement itself).

Alfie's grandma is not "owed as a debt" any support from Bruno. Nor does she have any "natural or moral right" to his support.

That is merely incorrect. Bruno "owes" taxes, and Alfie's grandma is "owed" Medicare insurance, based on a contractual promise by the government. Perhaps you mean that you don't think Bruno SHOULD owe as a debt any support for Alfie's grandma. However, your statement as is is clearly wrong.

Well, you're again ignoring the express words of my statement and confounding legal rights and debts with moral ones. If Bruno is forced to pay Medicare taxes, then he is OWED that service by the government. If Grandma paid those taxes, then she is owed the service. But neither Bruno nor Grandma owed the government those taxes to begin with, morally.

verb (used with object), de·served, de·serv·ing.
to merit, be qualified for, or have a claim to (reward, assistance, punishment, etc.) because of actions, qualities, or situation:

Again, you are either incorrect, duplicitous, or illogical. You appear to think that humans (moral agents) "deserve" (are qualified for or have claim to) certain "natural rights", including life and liberty.

Er, no. First, being qualified for something is not the same as deserving something. One may be qualified for something for entirely accidental reasons, e.g., I may be qualified to serve as President of the US (being a citizen over 35 and having been a US resident for over 14 years), but that doesn't mean I deserve that job. Deserts ensue from actions, not arbitrary, accidental, contingent facts about the person.

Nor does anyone deserve natural rights, nor have I ever said so. One does not "deserve" his life, or liberty, or anything else he brought with him into the world. He does not deserve them because he had no role, indeed no say at all, about his possession of them. They were not gained by any action on his part. But he is still entitled to them, because his acquisition of them inflicted no loss or injury on anyone else. That fact is what establishes his right to them. Similarly with inherited property --- heirs do not deserve the fortune left them by their grandfather --- they did nothing to earn or otherwise merit it --- but they're still entitled to it, since that bequest inflicted no loss or injury on anyone else.

As I said before, entitlements don't imply deserts. Deserts usually imply entitlements, but there are exceptions even there. Attentive, helpful Alfie, who tended to and comforted his ailing grandfather for a decade, may deserve to inherit grandpa's fortune, but if grandpa leaves it instead to his neglectful, wastrel brother Bruno, the latter is entitled to it.

If these rights are their "just due" . . .

Natural rights are not anyone's "just due." You just have them. What is "due" you is others' respect for them, if they expect you to respect theirs.

. . . it is ludicrous to argue that no humans can "merit" or "deserve" other benefits because of the meanings of the words "merit", "deserve" and "just due". If you want to argue your position on other terms, lay on MacDuff. But lay off on the endless quibbling, which is ridiculous.

Er, no. It is hardly ludicrous to argue that people cannot merit or deserve things that are inconsistent with the meanings of those terms. Verbal communication cannot be fruitful, or even comprehensible, if some of the the parties to the discussion are inventing spurious definitions of common terms. So if you wish to avoid the "quibbling," stick with dictionary definitions.

As I've pointed out many times, all laws infringe on natural rights. Laws create limits on liberty (a "natural right").

Er, no. All laws do not infringe natural rights. They may limit liberty, but that is because natural rights themselves limit liberty. As you (or someone)
mentioned, your right to swing your fist ends whether the other fellow's nose begins.

That is all they do, and all they can do. Don't bother with ranting about how it's "just" for liberty to be limited when it harms other people. Of course I agree.

Well, that's a start. Now you just have to recognize that is the ONLY valid limit on your right to liberty.

[GE Morton]

I gave you the meaning of "natural rights," in detail, more than once. How about quoting what I actually said there, rather than gratuitous inferences of your own?

What you mean by "natural rights" and whence these supposed rights derive are two different things.

Why don't you go back through the thread, find those, and quote them. Then reconsider your claim above.

[Ecurb]

Why don't you go back through the thread, find those, and quote them. Then reconsider your claim above.

I don't feel like going to the trouble. It's an infinite regress. Natural rights (you claim) protect what you bring with you into the world (i.e. your person) what you acquire without harming others (or something like that). But why are these rights more basic or "natural" than other rights? To the religious (like Locke) these rights are God-given. To the rest of us they are merely traditional and culturally constituted. YOu're the one who is confusing legal rights with moral ones. I think both are culturally determined and constituted, you appear to thing that fiat rights are culturally constituted (and thus less significant) than "natural rights". It is true, of course, that some laws can be immoral -- just as it is true that some moral behaviors can be illegal. But how is that relevant?

Er, no. All laws do not infringe natural rights. They may limit liberty, but that is because natural rights themselves limit liberty. As you (or someone) mentioned, your right to swing your fist ends whether the other fellow's nose begins.

If liberty is a "natural right", then limiting liberty clearly limits natural rights. I agree that it's reasonable to limit such rights, but not that "liberty" ENTAILS such a limitation. This is standard nglish usage. By the way, I quoted the dictionary definitions of "merit" and "deserve" that I am using.

[GE Morton]

I don't feel like going to the trouble. It's an infinite regress. Natural rights (you claim) protect what you bring with you into the world (i.e. your person) what you acquire without harming others (or something like that). But why are these rights more basic or "natural" than other rights?

What "other rights" do you have in mind? Fiat "rights" conjured from thin air by politicians?

To the religious (like Locke) these rights are God-given.

"God-given" in the metaphorical sense meaning "natural," "products of nature."

YOu're the one who is confusing legal rights with moral ones.

??

I think both are culturally determined and constituted, you appear to thing that fiat rights are culturally constituted (and thus less significant) than "natural rights".

Language is a cultural construct, and all concepts expressible in language are "culturally constituted." But what the "culture" has assigned as the denotative meaning of "a right" is an entitlement to some good one has acquired "righteously," i.e., without inflicting losses or injuries on anyone else. The term does not denote "entitlements" arbitrarily declared by legislators. The concept of rights is culturally determined; but to what claims or possessions the term is assigned is factually determined. That is part of the concept.

If liberty is a "natural right", then limiting liberty clearly limits natural rights.

The right to liberty is constrained by the same criterion that defines rights --- that no losses or injuries are inflicted on others. That constraint is "built-into" the concept.

[Ecurb]

But what the "culture" has assigned as the denotative meaning of "a right" is an entitlement to some good one has acquired "righteously," i.e., without inflicting losses or injuries on anyone else.....

The right to liberty is constrained by the same criterion that defines rights --- that no losses or injuries are inflicted on others. That constraint is "built-into" the concept.

The right to vote was created through terror and guillotines in Revolutionary France. Is it not a "right" as a result?

Also, your Libertarian obsession with property leads you to add "acquired" to the normal definition of "rights":, which are (acc. the Stanford Dict. of Philosophy):

Rights are entitlements (not) to perform certain actions, or (not) to be in certain states; or entitlements that others (not) perform certain actions or (not) be in certain states.

Some entitlements are "acquired" (like property rights), others are not (like the right to liberty). How does one "righteously acquire" a right to liberty, or free speech, or freedom of religion? If property was unrighteously acquired centuries ago (by massacring Indians, for example), does that invalidate all "righteousness" in later acquisition?

Another definition of "rights" is: "a power or privilege to which one is justly entitled."

Now we're back to what constitutes "justice". It seems we can't agree on that. We're arguing in circles.

[GE Morton]

The right to vote was created through terror and guillotines in Revolutionary France. Is it not a "right" as a result?

The right to vote is a legal right. Any moral significance it appears to have derives from the hypothetical "social contract," making it a contractual right. E.g., if you are a member of a club with a charter with which you agreed to abide when joining, and that charter provides that all members have a right to vote for officers and on certain policy changes, then you have a contractual right to vote on those matters, which has moral significance. But there is no "social contract," and so the civil right to vote has no moral significance.

Also, your Libertarian obsession with property leads you to add "acquired" to the normal definition of "rights":, which are (acc. the Stanford Dict. of Philosophy):

Rights are entitlements (not) to perform certain actions, or (not) to be in certain states; or entitlements that others (not) perform certain actions or (not) be in certain states.

That definition is fine. But like most definitions it explains what rights are, but not how they arise, i.e., how one becomes entitled to something. And there is no "libertarian obsession with property." If libertarians have an obsession, it is with liberty, not property. Indeed, property rights flow from the right to liberty --- the freedom to take possession of unowned things, when the taking inflicts no losses or injuries on other moral agents.

Some entitlements are "acquired" (like property rights), others are not (like the right to liberty). How does one "righteously acquire" a right to liberty, or free speech, or freedom of religion?

You acquire rights to whatever you may claim --- whether the liberty to speak, worship, enter into relationships with other persons, etc., or to an apple or a mineral deposit, when you come into possession of those powers or goods without inflicting losses or injuries on other moral agents.

If property was unrighteously acquired centuries ago (by massacring Indians, for example), does that invalidate all "righteousness" in later acquisition?

Yes, if the legitimate title can be confidently traced to another living claimant. For most ancient wrongs, of course, it can't.

[Ecurb]

That definition is fine. But like most definitions it explains what rights are, but not how they arise, i.e., how one becomes entitled to something. And there is no "libertarian obsession with property." If libertarians have an obsession, it is with liberty, not property. Indeed, property rights flow from the right to liberty --- the freedom to take possession of unowned things, when the taking inflicts no losses or injuries on other moral agents.

Some entitlements are "acquired" (like property rights), others are not (like the right to liberty). How does one "righteously acquire" a right to liberty, or free speech, or freedom of religion?

You acquire rights to whatever you may claim --- whether the liberty to speak, worship, enter into relationships with other persons, etc., or to an apple or a mineral deposit, when you come into possession of those powers or goods without inflicting losses or injuries on other moral agents.

This is where I disagree. "Liberty" is not a "possession". It is not akin to property. We acquire rights by legal, moral and cultural agreement. Possession (in most cases) has nothing to do with it. By equating liberty with property, you are once again obsessing about property.

[GE Morton]

This is where I disagree. "Liberty" is not a "possession".

Of course it is. A possession is anything you have. The term is not confined to detached or tangible possessions.

Possess (verb):
1.
a. To have as property; own: possess great wealth.
b. Law To have under one's power or control: possess illegal drugs.
2.a. To have as a quality, characteristic, or other attribute: possesses great tact.

https://www.ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=possess

It is not akin to property.

It doesn't have to be.

We acquire rights by legal, moral and cultural agreement. Possession (in most cases) has nothing to do with it. By equating liberty with property, you are once again obsessing about property.

Well, you're just ignoring the difference between natural/common rights and legal rights, or, rather, just pretending the latter are the only rights there are. But the history of that term and concept decisively refute that pretension. It has been a popular one among lefties, however, who have long sought to eliminate ("cancel") the objective basis for rights and replace it with an arbitrary one they can define politically.

[Good_Egg]

Consider "useful" to a homophobe employer with a closeted staff member. Outing that staff member would be useful to the employer, but most secular people would consider it an injustice.

I'm not seeing any clear principle here, just a reflection of how much sympathy you feel for each of the two parties involved.

Talking about sympathy is a red herring.

The discussion is about ethics and the practical limitations of law. You can't expect such a discussion to solve the problems of the world but to examine the issues.

OK. I'd suggest that there is a minor virtue of minding one's own business. And that outing anyone to anyone else is thus an unvirtuous act, unless there is some particular circumstance which makes it one's own business to do so.

But that being a matter of virtue rather than a matter of rights, that's maybe not so simple to reflect in law.

[Ecurb]

Oh, come on, GE. One doesn't "have liberty as a quality, characteristic, or attribute." Liberty is granted one as an obligation on the part of other people. If the other people don't grant it, one doesn't have it. So I continue to disagree.

[GE Morton]

It has been a popular one among lefties, however, who have long sought to eliminate ("cancel") the objective basis for rights and replace it with an arbitrary one they can define politically.

Confining that criticism to lefties was too narrow. Righties have pursued that goal as well. Abolishing or re-defining the the concept of natural and common rights has been a priority for demagogues of all stripes, as it consistently thwarts their Utopian schemes.