The argument from marginal cases i.e name the trait doesn't work.
- analyticsupremacy
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The argument from marginal cases i.e name the trait doesn't work.
To be clear, I'm not arguing against veganism, just this specific argument. Here's why -
When we make moral axioms (which can be intuitions if you believe in moral intuitionism), we usually refer to the nature/norm of the community in question. In most cases, this community is humankind. For instance, when we say "Man is a rational being", we don't believe that all humans are rational. There is clearly knowledge of the fact that there are marginal case human beings who don't satisfy this criterion. Yet we don't take away the truth value of this proposition. That's because when statements of moral value are considered we refer to the norm of the community in question
Take the major schools of morality for example.
Teleology - Makes moral decisions based on purpose (induced by cultural norms)
Utilitarianism - Aggregate pleasure over pain (based on norm again)
Deontology - That's where such axioms come from (based on norm)
I would appreciate feedback on this argument. It would also help if somebody clarified whether this can be a potential research paper.
Thank you for reading. Have a nice day.
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Re: The argument from marginal cases i.e name the trait doesn't work.
Are you saying this because there are non-human animals with intelligence or other traits on a par with those humans who are marginal?
In any event, haven’t you got a non-sequitor here?
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Re: The argument from marginal cases i.e name the trait doesn't work.
In my opinion, morality is not bound to concepts relative to humanity. When it concerns morality, it concerns an aspect that precedes human nature (a priori to be expressed in the form of reason).
Emmanuel Kant argued that empirical concepts cannot provide a basis for morality. That would imply that traits cannot provide a basis for morality however in the same time Kant argued that the trait rational being is required for morality, which I find to be a contradiction.
Kant argued that the source of volition, which seems to equal will, is law as such. In the same time, reason is to be given by nature as a practical faculty to produce a will that is good in itself. This seems to be a contradiction. For example, when it concerns the trait rational being, can there be a will that is not good in itself before reason was 'given' by nature? How can that which is the source of will be in the same time a guiding principle of the will by which the will is to achieve the quality or state 'absolutely good without qualification'?Emmanuel Kant wrote:Everything in nature works according to laws. Only a rational being has a will - which is the ability to act according to the thought of laws, i.e. to act on principle.
To derive actions from laws you need reason, so that's what will is - practical reason.
If the origin of will is the origin of the will's added moral quality 'absolutely good without qualification' (namely law in itself, the thought of which produces a good will) then that would imply that the origin of will must be good in itself ad infinitum and at question would be why it would need reason as a 'given' faculty by nature (something external to the human as it appears, and also something a posteriori of nature itself for it to be possible to be 'given') to produce an absolutely good will.
Emmanuel Kant wrote:What can get respect and can thus serve as a command is something that isn't a consequence of my volition but only a source for it, and isn't in the service of my preferences but rather overpowers them or at least prevents them from being considered in the choice I make; this something is, in a word, law itself.
... so what is there left that can lead him to act as he does?
If the question means 'What is there objectively, i.e. distinct from himself, that determines his will in this case?' the only possible answer is law.
And if the question concerns what there is in the person that influences his will - i.e. what subjectively influences it - the answer has to be his respect for this practical law, and thus his acceptance of the maxim I am to follow this law even if it thwarts all my desires. (A maxim is a subjective principle of volition. The objective principle is the practical law itself; it would also be the subjective principle for all rational beings if reason fully controlled the formation of preferences.)
...
So we have a law the thought of which can settle the will without reference to any expected result, and must do so if the will is to be called absolutely good without qualification; what kind of law can this be? Since I have robbed the will of any impulses that could come to it from obeying any law, nothing remains to serve as a guiding principle of the will except conduct's universally conforming to law as such. That is, I ought never to act in such a way that I couldn't also will that the maxim on which I act should be a universal law.
In this context the guiding principle of the will is conformity to law as such, not bringing in any particular law governing some class of actions.
plato -dot- stanford -dot- edu on Kant's reason (that is to be 'given' by nature to produce a good will) mentions the following:
we might note that Kant rarely discusses reason as such. This leaves a difficult interpretative task: just what is Kant’s general and positive account of reason?
The first thing to note is Kant’s bold claim that reason is the arbiter of truth in all judgments—empirical as well as metaphysical. Unfortunately, he barely develops this thought, and the issue has attracted surprisingly little attention in the literature.
If this is the case from an academic Kant scholar perspective then what should be made of the idea that reason is 'given' by nature to serve a purpose?
Kant: Nevertheless, reason is given to us as a practical faculty, that is, one that is meant to have an influence on the will.
Kant also argued that the will to preserve one's self (the will to survive) isn't moral in nature.
The trait rational being is as ground for morality is therefore questionable in my opinion.Emmanuel Kant wrote:It is a duty to preserve one's life, and moreover everyone directly wants to do so. But because of the power of that want, the often anxious care that most men have for their survival has no intrinsic worth, and the maxim Preserve yourself has no moral content.
Men preserve their lives according to duty, but not from duty.
What is left is the concept morality itself, so I believe that your argument is right and that morality in principle might be applicable to everything (the infinite cosmos).
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