Oughts and Hypothetical Imperatives

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Consul
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Re: Oughts and Hypothetical Imperatives

Post by Consul »

Consul wrote: September 5th, 2022, 3:21 pm
Leontiskos wrote: September 4th, 2022, 4:10 pm "Deontological necessity" is one of your code words for "moral," so the result is the same. Substituting an analytically identical term for the definiendum creates the exact same problem.
Are "deontological" and "moral" synonyms? Not generally, I think; but—touché!—I concede that the phrase "deontological/deontic necessity" is synonymous with "moral necessity", since there is no non-deontological moral (ethical) necessity.
So far, so good—but…
Here's again what I wrote:

""Ought" is used morally (ethically) iff it expresses a (universalizable) duty or obligation (attributed to and possessed by a person), a "must" qua deontological necessity (as opposed to ontological, logical, or physical necessity), a requirement, a demand, a command—rather than something weaker, something non-obligatory: an advice, a recommendation, a suggestion, or an expectation."

If "deontological necessity" is replaced by "moral necessity", we get:

""Ought" is used morally (ethically) iff it expresses a (universalizable) duty or obligation (attributed to and possessed by a person), a "must" qua moral necessity (as opposed to ontological, logical, or physical necessity), a requirement, a demand, a command—rather than something weaker, something non-obligatory: an advice, a recommendation, a suggestion, or an expectation."

What is defined here is the moral meaning of "ought", and not the meaning of "moral"; so I doubt that this is really a case of a circular and thus formally inadequate definition.
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Consul
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Re: Oughts and Hypothetical Imperatives

Post by Consul »

Consul wrote: September 5th, 2022, 8:26 pmHere's again what I wrote:

""Ought" is used morally (ethically) iff it expresses a (universalizable) duty or obligation (attributed to and possessed by a person), a "must" qua deontological necessity (as opposed to ontological, logical, or physical necessity), a requirement, a demand, a command—rather than something weaker, something non-obligatory: an advice, a recommendation, a suggestion, or an expectation."
Deontology is duty ethics, so I could have written alternatively:

""Ought" is used morally (ethically) iff it expresses a (universalizable) duty or obligation (attributed to and possessed by a person), a "must" qua duty-ethical necessity (as opposed to ontological, logical, or physical necessity), a requirement, a demand, a command—rather than something weaker, something non-obligatory: an advice, a recommendation, a suggestion, or an expectation."

This definition doesn't look circular to me.
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Re: Oughts and Hypothetical Imperatives

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If traditional duties such as respecting elders, or not stealing, don't do any harm then it's stupid to throw them out. Moreover, when all traditional duties are thrown out this is a sign of great and unjustified risk -taking.
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Re: Oughts and Hypothetical Imperatives

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Consul wrote: September 5th, 2022, 3:21 pm Right. There might be different kinds of oughts all of which are moral ones.

Yesterday I came upon a book by Gregory Mellema titled The Expectations of Morality (Rodopi, 2004), in which he argues that "we can distinguish statements where “ought” designates moral duty or obligation from statements in which it designates something moral other than duty or obligation." (p. 35)
He calls that alleged weaker kind of moral ought expectation"x (morally) ought to do y" = "x is (morally) expected to do y" (≠ "x is (morally) obliged to do y")—, stating that moral obligation entails moral expectation, but not vice versa.

I haven't yet read the whole book, so I don't know how he spells out his idea of moral expectation in detail. I just mention it here so as to admit that not all moral philosophers equate the moral ought with duty or obligation, which is a problem for those—like me—who do so.
However, one could reply to Mellema that there are different degrees or strengths of duty or obligation, with expectation being a relatively weak form of duty or obligation rather than non-obligation. I know this is just hand-waving until I dig deeper into these matters; but rather than saying that expectation and obligation are different species of the same genus moral normativity, one could say that expectation is a species of the genus obligation = moral normativity. Then, moral expectation as a softer or weaker form of obligation rather than as non-obligation could be called "oaken duty", as opposed to "iron duty". (This terminology is borrowed from David Armstrong, who, talking about laws of nature, distinguishes between "iron laws" and "oaken laws".)
What Mellema writes is the opposite of what I write above: "…one could say that expectation is a species of the genus obligation = moral normativity." For him obligation is a species of the genus expectation:

QUOTE:
"If the positions I have stated about the relationship between moral obligation and moral expectation are true, then instances of moral obligation form a subset of the class of instances of moral expectation. All instances of moral obligation are instances of moral expectation, but not all instances of moral expectation are instances of moral obligation. The category of moral expectation is wider than that of moral obligation. It encompasses certain actions…which fall outside the scope of moral obligation. But no examples of moral obligation can be found which fall outside the scope of moral expectation."

(Mellema, Gregory F. The Expectations of Morality. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2004. p. 2)
:QUOTE
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Re: Oughts and Hypothetical Imperatives

Post by Consul »

Consul wrote: September 5th, 2022, 3:35 pm
Consul wrote: September 5th, 2022, 3:21 pm Right. There might be different kinds of oughts all of which are moral ones.
"The train ought to arrive at the station in 30 minutes." – There clearly isn't anything moral about "ought" as used here, which is due to trains not being moral subjects. As opposed to human train drivers, trains do not have any duties or obligations; so it is not the case that absolutely all ought-sentences are moral ones, but you can certainly argue that at least all ought-sentences concerning moral subjects or morally responsible persons are moral ones.
Doctor to patient: "You ought to get better soon."

Again, there clearly isn't anything moral about "ought" as used here, because it stands for likelihood or probability: "You will likely/probably get better soon."

"ought
=
1. Used to indicate obligation or duty: You ought to work harder than that.
2. Used to indicate advisability or prudence: You ought to wear a raincoat.
3. Used to indicate desirability: You ought to have been there; it was great fun.
4. Used to indicate probability or likelihood: She ought to finish by next week."


Source: https://www.ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=ought

Given sense 1, "x ought to do y" normally entails "x must do y", "x has to do y", with "must" representing duty qua moral necessity (moral requirement). The question is whether there are any moral meanings of "ought" where the ought-must entailment is not valid.
It is arguably not valid if "ought" is used in a weaker sense to express an advice, a recommendation, or a suggestion; but are these moral uses of "ought"?
To use one of the above examples, "You ought to wear a raincoat" in the sense of "You are well advised to wear a raincoat" doesn't entail "You are obliged/required to wear a raincoat" = "You must wear a raincoat".
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Re: Oughts and Hypothetical Imperatives

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If "ought" is used to express Mellema's moral expectation (rather than moral obligation), then there are true moral statements of the form "x is expected to do y, but x needn't do y", which is equivalent to "x is expected to do y, but it is not obligatory for x to do y"—which is equivalent to "x is expected to do y, but it is permissible for x not to do y"—which entails "x is expected to do y, but it is not morally wrong for x not to do y".

Given the absence of the normal ought-must entailment, with "ought" expressing duty or obligation, the normative sense and force of the weaker expectational ought as a kind of moral ought is unclear to me. For on the one hand expectation is said to be weaker than obligation; and on the other hand it is said to be stronger, i.e. morally more binding, than recommendation or suggestion.
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Re: Oughts and Hypothetical Imperatives

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QUOTE:
"Many philosophers have contended that there is no nonbinding sense of "ought (morally)," or that, at best, such a nonbinding sense is derivative from the binding sense (as in, perhaps: "God ought to prevent the suffering of little children"). I am inclined to think that this is mistaken, to think, that is, that there is a perfectly respectable nonbinding sense of "ought (morally)" that is not to be analyzed in terms of some binding sense of "ought (morally). Consider, for example, what Roderick Chisholm has to say about supererogation: "The status of supererogation might be summarized in this way. If I seek advice, concerning an act which would be supererogatory, and ask 'Shall I do this?', I may well be told, 'You ought to, but you don't have to' — it is advisable, but not obligatory." Of course, there are other readings to be given to "You ought to, but you don't have to." Someone might mean by this, "You are nonmorally (e.g., prudentially) required to do so, but you are not morally required to do so," or "You are morally required to do so, but no one has any moral claim on you that you do so." Fair enough. (…) What I don't see is that someone cannot also quite properly mean, "It would be morally desirable if you were to do so, but you are not morally required to do so (or even to try to do so, or to do something related to doing so, or...)."

Here, though, someone might object: "What can it mean to say that I ought morally to do something if I am not morally obligated to do it?" The idea underlying this objection is not that it is improper to use "ought" in an ideal, nonbinding sense, but that such an "ought" cannot be said to be a moral "ought." If "Little children ought not to have to suffer" implies no moral obligation, how is its "ought" a moral one? The objection concerns the proper extension of the term "moral." This is a huge issue, which, once again, I mention only to put aside. I have no ax to grind here and, indeed, have some sympathy with the objection, although on balance I am inclined to think it perfectly legitimate (whether or not it is true) to say that there are certain goals which, from a moral point of view, are ideal or desirable but which do not imply any obligation on anyone's part."

(Zimmerman, Michael J. The Concept of Moral Obligation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. pp. 3-4)
:QUOTE

It seems undeniable that "ought" is normatively used not only to express or represent deontological necessity qua duty or obligation, but also to stand for other normatively relevant factors such as advisability, recommendability, desirability, preferability, valuability, reasonability, (instrumental) rationality, prudentiality. The crucial question is whether or not these non-deontological, i.e. subobligational or subnecessitarian, normative uses of "ought" are properly called moral. As Zimmerman writes, this question "concerns the proper extension of the term 'moral'."
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Re: Oughts and Hypothetical Imperatives

Post by The Beast »

Ought = intention. In some philosophies it is absolute and in others relative. Why is there intention is the unanswered question. Is there a human reality that considers monism and dualism (both) as existing.
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Re: Oughts and Hypothetical Imperatives

Post by LuckyR »

The Beast wrote: September 6th, 2022, 6:07 pm Ought = intention. In some philosophies it is absolute and in others relative. Why is there intention is the unanswered question. Is there a human reality that considers monism and dualism (both) as existing.
Very accurate common definition of the term. Naturally some invoke a (philisophically based) "specialty" definition that imbues the word with additional meanings. Of course such practice leads to miscommunication.
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Re: Oughts and Hypothetical Imperatives

Post by Good_Egg »

Consul wrote: September 5th, 2022, 3:35 pm
"The train ought to arrive at the station in 30 minutes." – There clearly isn't anything moral about "ought" as used here, which is due to trains not being moral subjects.
I'm not sure about this example.

You could retort "it ought to have arrived an hour ago".
Referring to the arrival time promised in the published timetable. That's something like a transferred epithet. The train isn't a moral subject, but the railway company is.

You could say a similar sentence about a car journey where no arrival time was ever mentioned And I think what you'd mean by it is not a pure expectation of likely arrival time. But rather an outcome consistent with everything functioning "as it should" - no mechanical breakdown, no collision etc.

"It will arrive..." says that the future event is known. "It will probably arrive..." acknowledges uncertainty. "It ought to arrive..." carries a sense of a particular type of uncertainty - that it will if nothing goes wrong.

Mechanical parts are similarly not moral subjects. But they can be judged as fit for purpose. And if they're fit for purpose then the machine won't break down.

If you have a view of morality built on a notion of purpose, then it's tempting to see the supposedly moral and non-moral uses as having a broadly common meaning...
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Re: Oughts and Hypothetical Imperatives

Post by Consul »

The Beast wrote: September 6th, 2022, 6:07 pmOught = intention.
No!
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Re: Oughts and Hypothetical Imperatives

Post by The Beast »

Consul wrote: September 6th, 2022, 8:23 pm
The Beast wrote: September 6th, 2022, 6:07 pmOught = intention.
No!
“Ought to” is the intended.
Obviously, it is in human nature to tell “the other” what to do. But “no” seems to be absolute. I am taking the case in the theory of “No is No” to find holes in the prescription. So, there is the personal, the jointly (those involved) and the judgement by all. I read somewhere that lighting is something by looking and seen it and that lighting is not the same thing as electrical discharged.
To compare with: Lighting is an electrical discharge, and the former is within the previous.
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Re: Oughts and Hypothetical Imperatives

Post by Consul »

The Beast wrote: September 7th, 2022, 9:33 am“Ought to” is the intended.
If one ought to do x, then one ought to have the intention to do x; but "ought" as such doesn't express or represent intention.

"ought = the general verb to express duty or obligation of any kind; strictly used of moral obligation, but also with various weaker shades of meaning, expressing what is befitting, proper, correct, advisable, or naturally expected." – Oxford Dictionary of English
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Re: Oughts and Hypothetical Imperatives

Post by The Beast »

If one ought to do x, then one ought to have the intention to do x; but "ought" as such doesn't express or represent intention.
If one ought to do x, then one have the intention to do x; "ought" express or represent intention.
Your artifice failed to assert the target expression as normative. They are not compatible.
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Re: Oughts and Hypothetical Imperatives

Post by Good_Egg »

The Beast wrote: September 7th, 2022, 1:41 pm
If one ought to do x, then one ought to have the intention to do x; but "ought" as such doesn't express or represent intention.
If one ought to do x, then one have the intention to do x; "ought" express or represent intention.
A sentence like "I ought to finish my work, but I'll go down the pub with you instead" makes it clear that "ought" expresses a duty which may or may not coincide with one's intention.

One of the characteristics of morality is that one has more-or-less-free (let's not go into that) will to choose the moral course of action. Or some other course. Prescription is not description.

Seems to me that if you were to ask what morality is most like, the answer would be law or manners. These are similar in that each is a code of conduct. Law is societal and formal. Manners are societal and informal.

Those seeking radically-simplified models of the world often suggest that morality is the same thing as manners - no more than a societally-agreed code. But often they reject the implied conclusion that society cannot be wrong.

For the religious, seeing morality as God's law may be an adequate model.

Disagreement about what is legal can in principle be resolved by reference to the statute book. Although ambiguity of language gives rise to a need for lawyers....

Disgreements about what is polite can only be referred to common shared opinion.

Disagreements about what is moral are commonly referred to religious authorities. But religious authority binds only those who belong to the religion. It's tempting to conclude that those who do not belong to any religion therefore necessarily don't accept any morality. But experience gives the lie to that - we've all met moral atheists. And they might say that Reason is their authority.

The fact that, rejecting revelation, they don't all interpret reason-based morality the same way does not imply that there is nothing there to interpret. In the same way that differences of legal opinion do not imply that there is no law there to interpret. Rather the opposite - if the statute book were empty there would be nothing there to argue interpretations of.
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