But that is exactly what Becker is saying. As with Hare, we must separate your own view from that of Becker. Becker follows that sentence by saying, "Prudence, self-interest, altruism, social welfare, efficiency, economy, etiquette, and aesthetic considerations are all relevant, then, to moral argument understood in this way. They must be relevant, at least in principle, if moral argument is argument about what to do all things considered."Consul wrote: ↑September 3rd, 2022, 11:01 am"The general conception of morality, in a nutshell, is this: moral judgments are judgments about what rational agents ought to do or be, period." – Lawrence BeckerLeontiskos wrote: ↑September 3rd, 2022, 12:57 am On Becker's account, who you quoted <here>, "The general conception of morality, in a nutshell, is this: moral judgments are judgments about what rational agents ought to do or be, period." Thus according to Becker when the "amoralist" makes a judgment about what he--a rational agent--ought to do, he is making a moral judgment. The concrete, enacted act of a rational agent is naturally something enacted "all things considered."
If for Becker an "amoralist" is a chimera, but for you it is not, then it follows that you must deviate strongly from Becker's view.
Regarding these terms, "moral psychology," or, "moral considerations," we come back to the same nagging problem that has attended so many of your previous posts. There is no way for me to know what you mean by those terms until you properly lay out what you mean by "moral." You have consistently failed to provide an account of what you mean by "moral" and "non-moral".
Okay, this statement alone clearly implies that any use of "ought" is moral (ethical), such that one isn't an amoralist unless one doesn't use ought-statements at all.
An implication is that considerations of aesthetics and etiquette are moral considerations since they affect the ultimate judgment, which is itself moral. They could even be the predominant consideration in certain judgments. In your previous posts you have explicitly rejected the idea that aesthetic judgments are moral judgments, and this is a very concrete way that you differ substantially from Becker.
Here your dissonance with Becker rises to the level of contradiction, for you are redefining his "general" conception of morality into its opposite: a "special" conception of morality. This is what you are effectively saying:Consul wrote: ↑September 3rd, 2022, 11:01 amGiven the undeniable ambiguity of "ought", I find this implication unacceptable; so I would add the following qualification:
"Moral judgments are judgments about what rational agents ought to do or be" if and only if "ought" is used in judgments to express a...
- "The general conception of morality, in a nutshell, is this: moral judgments are judgments about what rational agents ought to do or be" if and only if "ought" is used in judgments to express a [special conception of morality].
- The general conception of morality is a special conception of morality.
Let's now look at your own view considered separately from Becker. You give three different approaches to answering the basic question:
The first approach says that the moral is the universalizable.Consul wrote: ↑September 3rd, 2022, 11:01 amGiven the undeniable ambiguity of "ought", I find this implication unacceptable; so I would add the following qualification:
"Moral judgments are judgments about what rational agents ought to do or be" if and only if "ought" is used in judgments to express a (universalizable) duty or obligation,. . .
The second approach says that the moral is the necessary (presumably categorical).
The third approach says that the immoral is the illegal.Consul wrote: ↑September 3rd, 2022, 11:01 amGiven the above conception, legal oughts (duties/obligations) are moral oughts violations of which are officially sanctionable (punishable) by statal institutions (courts, prisons). That is, violations of legal oughts are crimes, whereas violations of nonlegal moral oughts aren't crimes but vices or "sins".
Of course, much of your answer is rife with the same question-begging circularity that has been plaguing our discussion. For example:
Again, what is the difference between deontological necessity and, say, logical necessity? For Becker logical considerations are also moral considerations. Logical duties are surely universalizable. We are given no clear answer to what this notion of deontological even means.Consul wrote: ↑September 3rd, 2022, 11:01 am"Moral judgments are judgments about what rational agents ought to do or be" if and only if "ought" is used in judgments to express a (universalizable) duty or obligation, a "must" qua deontological necessity (as opposed to ontological, logical, or physical necessity) . . .
And like your previous post, this tells us nothing. It presupposes a difference between the obligatory and the prudent, which is the very question at hand. Repeating over and over the words, "obligatory," or, "duty," does not get us any closer to understanding what you think these words mean.Consul wrote: ↑September 3rd, 2022, 11:01 amTo use an example from a previous post of mine, in the statement "I ought to stay away from that guy, because I know he is prone to violence" "ought" is used non-morally, because it means "I am well advised to stay away from that guy…" rather than "It is obligatory for me to stay away from that guy…".
But perhaps the moral is the universalizable, or the categorical-necessary, or the observance of positive law, or some combination of these?