Oughts and Hypothetical Imperatives

[Leontiskos]

When an amoralist decides to do something, he doesn't thereby "claim that it is the right thing to do," because he is indifferent to and unmotivated by moral considerations (without intentionally acting immorally, i.e. preferring wrong actions to right ones).
When an immoralist decides to do something, he doesn't thereby "claim that it is the right thing to do," since he willfully flouts societal norms of rightness and wrongness.

They most certainly are (implicitly) claiming that it is the right thing to do, for that is just why they do it. Note again that every time you use the word "moral" to give an answer you are begging the question, for the point at issue is what your term "moral" even means. This is related to the problem of Socratic definitions that I posed to Lucky.

In my understanding, the right thing for somebody to do is what s/he ought to or should do; and when somebody does (decides to do) something, her/his reason for doing it (deciding to do it) isn't always that it is what s/he ought to or should do. Agents can act out their desires, wishes, preferences, or intentions without being interested in whether they ought to do/should do what they desire, want, prefer, or intend to do—whether what they desire, want, prefer, or intend to do is the right thing to do.

As for the evaluative/normative use of the adjective "right", here are some definitions from the Oxford Dictionary of English:

"right"
=def
1. "Of actions, conduct, etc.: In accordance with what is just or good; equitable; morally fitting."

2. "Agreeing with some standard or principle; correct, proper."

3. "Fitting, proper, appropriate; exactly answering to what is required or suitable."

4. "Of persons and things: regarded with approval; socially acceptable; potentially influential."

This is more begging of the question. I keep asking you what the difference between a moral and a non-moral 'ought' is, and you keep presupposing that distinction in your "answers."

Isn't it an empirical fact that many acts (including speech-acts) are carried out without involving any prior judgement that they should be or ought to be done?
Note that "I want to do x" isn't synonymous with "I should do/ought to do x"!

No, I don't think so. Whenever someone does something they have already decided that that thing ought to be done.

No, because (decisions to) actions needn't have a normative ethical motivation in terms of obligation or duty. The motivation can be purely psychological.

So you are effectively saying, "It's a psychological 'ought', not a moral 'ought'." Again, question-begging.

[Leontiskos]

Let me try a shorter reply so you won't feel overwhelmed with another post.

Okay great, this certainly resolves my objection. Nevertheless, I don't know if the solution is viable, as your previous admittance that all values are revisable seems more plausible. In our <previous conversation> I was referring to the position of "axiomatic values," such that a value is axiomatic if it cannot be changed, and a value is not axiomatic if it can be changed on the basis of axiomatic values. It seemed to me that in that conversation you first posited axiomatic values, then disavowed them, and now you are picking them up again.

Whether or not my interpretation was correct, the reason one would disavow axiomatic values is simply because it is hard to conceive of some value that cannot be revised in light of new arguments, data, or experiences. Further, it would be odd to think that values which are axiomatic for one person are non-axiomatic for another.

This gets at another difficulty I have with such a strong emphasis on values. "Moral rationalists" (those who believe morality is susceptible to reason) must of course hold that there are fundamental principles of moral reasoning (so-called 'first principles of practical reason'), but the idea that these principles could be grounded in subjective values does not seem at all workable. As an alternative, the virtue ethicist's first principle that all seek happiness seems much more workable, as it is something which really does remain constant through all the revisions of one's values, and it is something which does not vary from person to person.

1) I do not share a hesitancy to accept that some values might not be revisable in light of new arguments/data/experiences: the way I would put it is that some values aren't held for rational reasons, so rational reasons may not be able to move them. For every value that we have, that value is either held for some reason (I value being alive so I ought to value breathing) or not (why ought I value being alive? I just do).

Now someone could obviously say, "well, it's possible for you to change valuing being alive: maybe you go through something horrible and lose all will to want to live." Which, sure, that just means I'm calling the wrong thing "axiomatic." It means that valuing being alive was actually a secondary value the whole time, and something more axiomatic is like "I value having positive experiences in life."

But is there any conceivable value that you could point to as being axiomatic? It seems to me that you have a theory with no data points, for once a value is actually identified it becomes increasingly doubtful that it is axiomatic. I agree that since calamity can cause one to lose their valuing of life, that value is not axiomatic. But your response is basically, "Well, then some other value must be the axiomatic one!" But this feels like a rather unprincipled and unevidenced assertion of a theory.

3) I am not sure that "all seeking happiness" gets us anything like what moral realists want, because (sorry to beat Godwin to death here) some Nazi's idea of seeking happiness isn't going to seem very good to most others. I am not sure how you can take virtue ethicism and get moral realism out of it, which is the point: the noncognitivist doubts realism. They may or may not have some other system to replace it or explain what we call morality (I am trying, but my point is I don't have to, I just have to doubt realism and cast it into doubt successfully to "win" as a noncog).

I suppose we will end up disagreeing on whether the Nazi's actions were truly ordered to happiness. If there is no true, hierarchical happiness, and the Nazi's actions are as likely to lead to happiness as anyone else's, then you would be right.

I don't disagree with this. You may have misunderstood me. I was trying to argue that the practice of science involves some mean between doxastic voluntarism and purely passive belief formation. Further, as you yourself implicitly admit, it is possible to argue about which thresholds are reasonable, and to change one's mind on that question.

It seems to me that if doxastic voluntarism were true then every one of our beliefs would be nothing more than a matter of pure whim or choice. On the other hand, if beliefs were formed in a purely passive way, then determinism would be self-evidently true and we would not be agents/actors at all. We would merely be patients who are acted upon. Surely we agree that research, argument, and rational assent involves agency, even if it is not pure agency (doxastic voluntarism)?

I think I agree. The free will debate is actually one of my least favorite. I just call myself a compatibilist and steer clear, haha. But I think I tentatively agree that we do things that are between voluntarism and purely passive belief revision.

Okay.

I would say that we do choose what to value and believe, but indirectly rather than directly. Your choice to spend a great deal of time among feminists and feminist literature will, in all probability, lead to you valuing and believing feminism more and more. Some people do not recognize that their decisions will have this second-order effect, but many do. Along similar lines, there is a positive feedback loop between loving and knowing. We tend to know what we love and love what we know, and this is why those who are interested in science become the most adept scientists. When you immerse yourself in a feminist world you are inevitably activating that feedback loop, which will affect your inclinations, values, beliefs, emotions, etc.

At the same time, I have spent time among people and found I didn't like their values more and more (as in I grew to dislike their values more and more). I get what you're saying, but I still feel like the values are already there and just being discovered more so than being formed.

Okay. At bottom I think we're more alike than different. I don't think different humans hold incommensurably different values, 'cause we're all from the same stock. That might be the best I can do for the time being, especially given our mutual time constraints.

[Leontiskos]

3) I am not sure that "all seeking happiness" gets us anything like what moral realists want...

For those who are interested, here is how Aquinas grounds human action:

• As stated above (I-II:91:3), the precepts of the natural law are to the practical reason, what the first principles of demonstrations are to the speculative reason; because both are self-evident principles. [...]
  
  Now a certain order is to be found in those things that are apprehended universally. For that which, before aught else, falls under apprehension, is "being," the notion of which is included in all things whatsoever a man apprehends. Wherefore the first indemonstrable principle is that "the same thing cannot be affirmed and denied at the same time," which is based on the notion of "being" and "not-being": and on this principle all others are based, as is stated in Metaph. iv, text. 9. Now as "being" is the first thing that falls under the apprehension simply, so "good" is the first thing that falls under the apprehension of the practical reason, which is directed to action: since every agent acts for an end under the aspect of good. Consequently the first principle of practical reason is one founded on the notion of good, viz. that "good is that which all things seek after." Hence this is the first precept of law, that "good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided." All other precepts of the natural law are based upon this: so that whatever the practical reason naturally apprehends as man's good (or evil) belongs to the precepts of the natural law as something to be done or avoided.
  
  Since, however, good has the nature of an end, and evil, the nature of a contrary, hence it is that all those things to which man has a natural inclination, are naturally apprehended by reason as being good, and consequently as objects of pursuit, and their contraries as evil, and objects of avoidance. Wherefore according to the order of natural inclinations, is the order of the precepts of the natural law. Because in man there is first of all an inclination to good in accordance with the nature which he has in common with all substances: inasmuch as every substance seeks the preservation of its own being, according to its nature: and by reason of this inclination, whatever is a means of preserving human life, and of warding off its obstacles, belongs to the natural law. Secondly, there is in man an inclination to things that pertain to him more specially, according to that nature which he has in common with other animals: and in virtue of this inclination, those things are said to belong to the natural law, "which nature has taught to all animals" [Pandect. Just. I, tit. i], such as sexual intercourse, education of offspring and so forth. Thirdly, there is in man an inclination to good, according to the nature of his reason, which nature is proper to him: thus man has a natural inclination to know the truth about God, and to live in society: and in this respect, whatever pertains to this inclination belongs to the natural law; for instance, to shun ignorance, to avoid offending those among whom one has to live, and other such things regarding the above inclination.
• (Summa Theologica, Prima Secundae, Question 94, Article 2)

[Consul]

This is more begging of the question. I keep asking you what the difference between a moral and a non-moral 'ought' is, and you keep presupposing that distinction in your "answers."

You might find the following reply satisfying:

One straightforward way of arguing is that the moral (ethical) ought concerns what ought to be done unconditionally with all things considered. All other kinds of ought (duty/obligation) such as legal, prudential, instrumentally rational, or aesthetic ones are just normative aspects or partial considerations, which are subsumed under the general moral (ethical) all-things-considered ought that determines in the end what ought to be done simpliciter, i.e. not just in relation to a matter of law, prudence, instrumental rationality (efficacy), or aesthetics.

QUOTE:
"[The general conception of morality] holds that the moral point of view is the most inclusive one we can manage – the one we use when we say ‘All things considered, here is what we should do.’ Prudence, self-interest, altruism, social welfare, efficiency, economy, etiquette, and aesthetic considerations are all relevant, then, to moral argument understood in this way. They must be relevant, at least in principle, if moral argument is argument about what to do all things considered. That sort of argument is defined by a set of aims, limits, standards, and procedures. Constructing a moral theory ‘under’ the general conception is therefore a rule-governed activity. There are criteria of validity and soundness for its arguments.
Moral theory is then defined (…) as the attempt to work out a way of life that can be given a reasoned justification under the general conception of morality."
(p. 5)

"I adopt what I call the general conception of morality, in which the moral point of view is taken to be the most inclusive one possible – the all-things-considered point of view. Moral argument ‘under’ the general conception of morality is reasoning in the same plain sense that figuring out what move to make in a chessgame is reasoning; it is moral reasoning only in the sense that it is done without any special-purpose restrictions."
(p. 7)

"The General Conception of Morality

The general conception of morality, in a nutshell, is this: moral judgments are judgments about what rational agents ought to do or be, period. Moral acts and states of being are those that conform to moral judgments. Such judgments are not made in terms of the rules or an activity within our lives; they are not made in terms of an activity distinct from life itself. They are, rather, judgments made only in terms of living, period. They are judgments made, in principle, all things considered. That is what I meant at the outset when I said that moral judgments were made without special-purpose restrictions.

Special conceptions of morality, by contrast, hold that the moral point of view is just one among many that a rational agent might consider. According to this sort of conception, etiquette, egoism, altruism and so forth are all distinct points of view in terms of which one might choose to act. Morality is another. It is one which a rational agent could in principle reject, without self-contradiction.
(Defenders of the special conception are therefore concerned to give an account of why one ought to be moral – that is, an account of why one ought to adopt the moral point of view rather than some other. Under the general conception, by contrast, the question ‘Why be moral?’ is, in effect, the question ‘Why, all things considered, ought we to do what we ought to do all things considered?’ That ‘question’ answers itself.)

Both the general and the special conceptions are concerned exclusively with the conduct of rational agents – that is, with getting action-guidance for beings who are capable of deliberation and choice. My contention is that the general conception is a better instrument for that job than a special conception."
(p. 17)

(Becker, Lawrence C. Reciprocity. 1986. Reprint, New York: Routledge, 2014.)
:QUOTE

[Consul]

No, because (decisions to) actions needn't have a normative ethical motivation in terms of obligation or duty. The motivation can be purely psychological.

So you are effectively saying, "It's a psychological 'ought', not a moral 'ought'." Again, question-begging.

What I'm effectively saying is that my doings needn't be motivated and guided by the ethical thought that this is what I ought to be doing. That is, agential motivations, decisions, or intentions needn't be a matter of moral psychology. The amoralist is the paradigm of an agent whose motivations, decisions, and intentions are indifferent to and uninfluenced by moral considerations. Of course, even an amoralist can still be motivated by a non-moral ought-thought such as "I ought to stay away from that guy, because I know he is prone to violence", which is a matter of practical prudence rather than ethical obligation.

[Leontiskos]

This is more begging of the question. I keep asking you what the difference between a moral and a non-moral 'ought' is, and you keep presupposing that distinction in your "answers."

You might find the following reply satisfying:

One straightforward way of arguing is that the moral (ethical) ought concerns what ought to be done unconditionally with all things considered. All other kinds of ought (duty/obligation) such as legal, prudential, instrumentally rational, or aesthetic ones are just normative aspects or partial considerations, which are subsumed under the general moral (ethical) all-things-considered ought that determines in the end what ought to be done simpliciter, i.e. not just in relation to a matter of law, prudence, instrumental rationality (efficacy), or aesthetics.

QUOTE:
"[The general conception of morality] holds that the moral point of view is the most inclusive one we can manage – the one we use when we say ‘All things considered, here is what we should do.’ Prudence, self-interest, altruism, social welfare, efficiency, economy, etiquette, and aesthetic considerations are all relevant, then, to moral argument understood in this way. They must be relevant, at least in principle, if moral argument is argument about what to do all things considered. That sort of argument is defined by a set of aims, limits, standards, and procedures. Constructing a moral theory ‘under’ the general conception is therefore a rule-governed activity. There are criteria of validity and soundness for its arguments.
Moral theory is then defined (…) as the attempt to work out a way of life that can be given a reasoned justification under the general conception of morality."
(p. 5)

"I adopt what I call the general conception of morality, in which the moral point of view is taken to be the most inclusive one possible – the all-things-considered point of view. Moral argument ‘under’ the general conception of morality is reasoning in the same plain sense that figuring out what move to make in a chessgame is reasoning; it is moral reasoning only in the sense that it is done without any special-purpose restrictions."
(p. 7)

"The General Conception of Morality

The general conception of morality, in a nutshell, is this: moral judgments are judgments about what rational agents ought to do or be, period. Moral acts and states of being are those that conform to moral judgments. Such judgments are not made in terms of the rules or an activity within our lives; they are not made in terms of an activity distinct from life itself. They are, rather, judgments made only in terms of living, period. They are judgments made, in principle, all things considered. That is what I meant at the outset when I said that moral judgments were made without special-purpose restrictions.

Special conceptions of morality, by contrast, hold that the moral point of view is just one among many that a rational agent might consider. According to this sort of conception, etiquette, egoism, altruism and so forth are all distinct points of view in terms of which one might choose to act. Morality is another. It is one which a rational agent could in principle reject, without self-contradiction.
(Defenders of the special conception are therefore concerned to give an account of why one ought to be moral – that is, an account of why one ought to adopt the moral point of view rather than some other. Under the general conception, by contrast, the question ‘Why be moral?’ is, in effect, the question ‘Why, all things considered, ought we to do what we ought to do all things considered?’ That ‘question’ answers itself.)

Both the general and the special conceptions are concerned exclusively with the conduct of rational agents – that is, with getting action-guidance for beings who are capable of deliberation and choice. My contention is that the general conception is a better instrument for that job than a special conception."
(p. 17)

(Becker, Lawrence C. Reciprocity. 1986. Reprint, New York: Routledge, 2014.)
:QUOTE

Becker's view seems very close to my own, and if we follow him in his rejection of "special conceptions of morality" then the distinction between moral and non-moral 'oughts' becomes moot, as I have been arguing. So yes, I find that to be satisfying.

Earlier I suggested that another (common) approach would be to identify morality with justice, with the realm of interpersonal relations. Yet on this view it is not clear why my interactions with others are moral but my actions which do not affect others are not. Presumably this approach would make most sense for those committed to consent-based morality.

It may also be possible to support the distinction by claiming that only that which is categorically binding is moral. Kant's approach is something like this. The weakness here is the intuitive conviction that morality is often messy, with various norms coming into conflict with others and superseding one another.

Lucky attempts to formulate a common notion that what is moral is either stipulative (i.e. what I subjectively believe or stipulate to be moral) or else relative to the objective passions or conscience of the individual in question. This is surely not a promising way to ground morality, for the radical subjectivism will deprive morality of any interpersonal normativity. Nevertheless, this approach seems to represent the current cultural presupposition regarding morality. John Milbank comments perceptively on this schizophrenic situation:

• Habermas’s approach to our current global dilemmas is sensitive, even anguished, and highly acute. As he observes: “At the level of elementary interactions, a gap seems to be opening up between a prickly moral consciousness and impotence in the face of the structurally imposed switch to strategic conduct” (AWM, 74).
  
  Exactly so: one has here a kind of sterile oscillation between a ruling ruthlessness, on the one hand, and impotent moralistic whining, on the other. The ruthlessness is the result of the ever-greater submission of more and more spheres of human life to an instrumentalist and capitalist logic, which Habermas fears is increasingly driven by a revived social Darwinism. In the face of this ruthlessness, moral reserve retreats into the private domain and takes the form of a stuttering series of complaints that too often are merely about the supposed restriction of certain individuals and groups from full participation in the mass instrumentalizing process.
  
  It is a considerable tribute to his intellectual integrity that Habermas sees that perhaps the greatest exception here is that of religious groups, who continue to foster impulses toward moral action on a collective scale. . .
  
  (John Milbank, "Habermas and the Lack within Reason: The Debate with Ratzinger and the Munich Jesuits," in Habermas and Religion, pp. 563-4)

[Consul]

One straightforward way of arguing is that the moral (ethical) ought concerns what ought to be done unconditionally with all things considered. All other kinds of ought (duty/obligation) such as legal, prudential, instrumentally rational, or aesthetic ones are just normative aspects or partial considerations, which are subsumed under the general moral (ethical) all-things-considered ought that determines in the end what ought to be done simpliciter, i.e. not just in relation to a matter of law, prudence, instrumental rationality (efficacy), or aesthetics.

So it seems that "I morally ought (not) to do x" is synonymous with "It is my general duty (not) to do x", with "general" meaning "not confined by specialization or careful limitation" (Merriam-Webster).

[Leontiskos]

No, because (decisions to) actions needn't have a normative ethical motivation in terms of obligation or duty. The motivation can be purely psychological.

So you are effectively saying, "It's a psychological 'ought', not a moral 'ought'." Again, question-begging.

What I'm effectively saying is that my doings needn't be motivated and guided by the ethical thought that this is what I ought to be doing. That is, agential motivations, decisions, or intentions needn't be a matter of moral psychology. The amoralist is the paradigm of an agent whose motivations, decisions, and intentions are indifferent to and uninfluenced by moral considerations. Of course, even an amoralist can still be motivated by a non-moral ought-thought such as "I ought to stay away from that guy, because I know he is prone to violence", which is a matter of practical prudence rather than ethical obligation.

On Becker's account, who you quoted <here>, "The general conception of morality, in a nutshell, is this: moral judgments are judgments about what rational agents ought to do or be, period." Thus according to Becker when the "amoralist" makes a judgment about what he--a rational agent--ought to do, he is making a moral judgment. The concrete, enacted act of a rational agent is naturally something enacted "all things considered."

If for Becker an "amoralist" is a chimera, but for you it is not, then it follows that you must deviate strongly from Becker's view.

Regarding these terms, "moral psychology," or, "moral considerations," we come back to the same nagging problem that has attended so many of your previous posts. There is no way for me to know what you mean by those terms until you properly lay out what you mean by "moral." You have consistently failed to provide an account of what you mean by "moral" and "non-moral".

[Leontiskos]

One straightforward way of arguing is that the moral (ethical) ought concerns what ought to be done unconditionally with all things considered. All other kinds of ought (duty/obligation) such as legal, prudential, instrumentally rational, or aesthetic ones are just normative aspects or partial considerations, which are subsumed under the general moral (ethical) all-things-considered ought that determines in the end what ought to be done simpliciter, i.e. not just in relation to a matter of law, prudence, instrumental rationality (efficacy), or aesthetics.

So it seems that "I morally ought (not) to do x" is synonymous with "It is my general duty (not) to do x", with "general" meaning "not confined by specialization or careful limitation" (Merriam-Webster).

I am not really convinced that you are capturing Becker's idea with this interpretation. Your idea would seem to be better represented by the notion that "the moral (ethical) ought concerns what ought to be done unconditionally with zero things considered." That is, a moral (norm) is that which is asserted in the absence of any practical circumstances. This seems to be almost the opposite of what Becker promotes, for in Becker's terms this would be a "special conception of morality" (where the species is confined by recourse to the notion of 'general duty'). Yet this alternative answer will certainly not circumvent my interrogation in the way that Becker's answer circumvents it. The question of what makes such a norm moral rather than non-moral is left untouched.

(I will come back to this tomorrow)

[Consul]

So it seems that "I morally ought (not) to do x" is synonymous with "It is my general duty (not) to do x", with "general" meaning "not confined by specialization or careful limitation" (Merriam-Webster).

I just learned that there is a concept of special duties/obligations whose meaning is different from what I mean to say above:

"Special obligations are obligations owed to some subset of persons, in contrast to natural duties that are owed to all persons simply qua persons. Common sense morality seems to understand us as having special obligations to those to whom we stand in some sort of special relationship, e.g., our friends, our family members, our colleagues, our fellow citizens, and those to whom we have made promises or commitments of some sort."

Special Obligations: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/special-obligations/

[LuckyR]

...and the same thing is happening here. "Tell me what is the nature of this idea, 'morality'." For reference, see Plato's Euthyphro dialogue.* You are doing the same thing that Euthyphro was doing:

• Socrates: I dare say; and you shall tell me them at some other time when I have leisure. But just at present I would rather hear from you a more precise answer, which you have not as yet given, my friend, to the question, What is "piety"? When asked, you only replied, Doing as you do, charging your father with murder.
  
  Euthyphro: And what I said was true, Socrates.
  
  Soc: No doubt, Euthyphro; but you would admit that there are many other pious acts?
  
  Euth: There are.
  
  Soc: Remember that I did not ask you to give me two or three examples of piety, but to explain the general idea which makes all pious things to be pious. Do you not recollect that there was one idea which made the impious impious, and the pious pious?
  
  Euth: I remember.
  
  Soc: Tell me what is the nature of this idea, and then I shall have a standard to which I may look, and by which I may measure actions, whether yours or those of any one else, and then I shall be able to say that such and such an action is pious, such another impious.
  
  Euth: I will tell you, if you like.
  
  Soc: I should very much like.

(* http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/euthyfro.html)

Got it. Happy to oblige.

We all agree that making decisions (or critiquing past decisions) is universal. Everyone knows we use numerous possible criteria to make decisions. One of them goes by many labels, I'll call it relative "morality". First, it is a subjective criteria. Both in the sense of where particular choices lie on the moral scale and more importantly whether they even contain any moral aspect at all. Thus by the second statement the definition of what is moral is subjective, and thus fluid.

For me, the definition of what a situation that contains a moral element is: when viewed from the broader perspective (that is, beyond the personal), could be "society", could be the universe, could be "God", could be "karma", could be Mother Nature; the better vs worse or right vs wrong on that scale.

That's why a psychopath, who lacks the ability to view things from anyone else's perspective, might not have the ability to view things morally (by that definition).

Similarly, for a omnivore eating meat might not be a moral decision, for an animal welfare based vegetarian not eating meat makes the "universe" better because of less animal suffering so it is a moral decision, but for a cholesterol avoidance vegetarian while it might improve their personal health it might NOT be a moral decision.

So then to riff off Socrates, "What is it that makes the moral moral?"

Are you saying that acts required by one's deep values are moral acts? That because the animal welfare-based vegetarian holds a strong value about animals, their actions with respect to animals are therefore (subjectively) moral?

Perhaps my answer got lost in an overly wordy description. I'll repeat and try to clarify. I specifically avoided words such as "values" since in such a granular conversation I predicted having to define values alongside "moral". In your red sentence your use of values seems to mean "opinions" or "beliefs". If true, I can work with that.

In my description of moral I drew the distinction between evaluating the question at hand from a personal (say, selfish) perspective and a broader, specifically impersonal perspective.

In your example of avoiding eating meat by a vegetarian if the reason is personal (say it will cost me more money, or I don't like the taste, or it will make me fat) that is not in the group of acts that I label "moral". If the vegetarian is motivated by a broader perspective, beyond the personal (say, my religion is Hinduism and it is against my religious beliefs, or in the US it is not a cultural norm to eat pet dogs, or as you proposed I believe that planet Earth will be a better place if there is less animal suffering) those are acts that contain an element of the moral. Of course actual decisions are usually made by considering numerous criteria often both the nonmoral and the moral, we've simplified the description of the process for clarity.

Finally to answer your question (assuming I understand it correctly), no the strength (or weakness) of the values held is not important, rather whether those values are derived from viewing the question at hand from a personal or a broader (say global, societal, cultural, tribal or environmental) perspective.

Deciding not to murder someone with a knife because you're wearing your favorite white shirt (and you DEEPLY love that shirt) is NOT a moral decision. Deciding not to murder someone with a knife because you consider it a violation of societal norms (ie "it's wrong") or religious teachings is a moral decision (among numerous other possible morality based reasons).

[Good_Egg]

I agree that promises should be kept rather than broken, but are you saying that there is nothing more to morality than keeping promises?

No I'm not saying that promise-breaking is a necessary condition for an act to be wrong, only that it is a sufficient condition.

Subject to the over-riding understanding that the domain of morality is choices - there may be situations where breaking a promise is the least-wrong option and therefore the choice that a person morally should make. But maybe that's a complication we can do without at this stage.

Rather, if one held to the view that obligation attaches to promises but not to anything else then... ...the specific difference can be ascertained by asking the question, "Am I promise-bound to carry out this act, or not?" Further, it seems you might say, "The act pertains to no promise, and therefore is not a moral act. It is morally neutral."

The logic here is sound. But I would say that in such a case the same act today is morally neutral or right or wrong according to whether a promise was made yesterday. So the moral weight that it carries is not an inherent characteristic of the act itself, but depends on circumstance.

There is thus no typology of acts which divides them into morally-neutral and morally-significant. Sure, you can define the set of acts that I have promised to do today, but that may be different from the set of acts that I have promised to do tomorrow. Inclusion in the set for any particular day says nothing about the inherent characteristics of the act.

There is, I suggest, a type of act that is incapable of bearing moral weight - the set of things that it makes no sense to promise to do or not to do because they are not under your control.

But you've ruled those out by mentioning at some point that you're talking about intentional acts.

(Cross-posted)

[Leontiskos]

So then to riff off Socrates, "What is it that makes the moral moral?"

Are you saying that acts required by one's deep values are moral acts? That because the animal welfare-based vegetarian holds a strong value about animals, their actions with respect to animals are therefore (subjectively) moral?

Perhaps my answer got lost in an overly wordy description. I'll repeat and try to clarify. I specifically avoided words such as "values" since in such a granular conversation I predicted having to define values alongside "moral". In your red sentence your use of values seems to mean "opinions" or "beliefs". If true, I can work with that.

In my description of moral I drew the distinction between evaluating the question at hand from a personal (say, selfish) perspective and a broader, specifically impersonal perspective.

In your example of avoiding eating meat by a vegetarian if the reason is personal (say it will cost me more money, or I don't like the taste, or it will make me fat) that is not in the group of acts that I label "moral". If the vegetarian is motivated by a broader perspective, beyond the personal (say, my religion is Hinduism and it is against my religious beliefs, or in the US it is not a cultural norm to eat pet dogs, or as you proposed I believe that planet Earth will be a better place if there is less animal suffering) those are acts that contain an element of the moral. Of course actual decisions are usually made by considering numerous criteria often both the nonmoral and the moral, we've simplified the description of the process for clarity.

Finally to answer your question (assuming I understand it correctly), no the strength (or weakness) of the values held is not important, rather whether those values are derived from viewing the question at hand from a personal or a broader (say global, societal, cultural, tribal or environmental) perspective.

Deciding not to murder someone with a knife because you're wearing your favorite white shirt (and you DEEPLY love that shirt) is NOT a moral decision. Deciding not to murder someone with a knife because you consider it a violation of societal norms (ie "it's wrong") or religious teachings is a moral decision (among numerous other possible morality based reasons).

Okay, that makes more sense. So morality is that which flows from a broader perspective as opposed to a narrow perspective. This is similar to what Pierre Hadot describes as "The View from Above":

• The View from Above
  
  From the heights to which he rises in thought, the philosopher looks down at the earth and at mankind, and judges them at their true value. As we read in a Chinese philosophical text, he "sees things in the light of the heavens." The vision of the totality of being and time, mentioned in Plato's Republic, inspires us with contempt for death; while in the Theaetetus, all human affairs are petty nothingness for the philosopher who wanders over the whole extent of the real. He who is used "to embracing the whole world in his gaze" finds mankind's possessions small indeed. This theme recurs in the famous Dream of Scipio, in which Cicero tells how Scipio Aemilianus dreams he sees his ancestor Scipio Africanus. He is then transported to the Milky Way, where he sees the earth from above. It seems like a mere speck to him, so that he is ashamed of the tiny dimensions of the Roman Empire. His ancestor points out to him the vast spaces of the deserts, in order to make him see the insignificance of the space through which all-important fame can spread.
  
  Influenced by his Neopythagorean source, Ovid places the following words in the mouth of Pythagoras at the end of his Metamorphoses: "I yearn to travel amid the lofty stars. Leaving the earth, this inert way-station, I want to be borne by the clouds.... From above, I will see men wandering haphazardly, trembling with fear at the thought of death, because they lack reason." Epicureans and Stoics also recommended this attitude. From the heights of the serene regions, Lucretius lowers his gaze to mankind and sees them "wandering everywhere, seeking for the path of life at random." For Seneca, the philosopher's soul, transported amid the stars, casts its gaze down upon the earth, which seems like a speck to it. It then laughs at the luxuries of the wealthy; the wars over the borders which people erect between each other seem ridiculous to it; and armies invading territories are mere ants fighting over a narrow space.
  
  This is also the view of the Cynic Menippus in Lucian's brilliant story Icaromenippus. When the hero arrives on the moon, he sees people stupidly quarreling over national boundaries and the rich gloating over their lands, which, notes Menippus, are no larger than the atoms of Epicurus. When he sees mankind from above, Menippus also compares them to ants. In another work, entitled Charon, the ferryman of the dead looks at human life on earth from a vertiginous height, and considers how foolish men's actions are when one examines them while bearing in mind that their agents will soon die.
  
  It is significant that Lucian's observer should be the ferryman of the dead. To view things from above is to look at them from the perspective of death. In both cases, it means looking at things with detachment, distance, and objectivity, seeing them as they are in themselves, situating them within the immensity of the universe and the totality of nature, without the false prestige lent to them by our human passions and conventions. The view from above changes our value judgments on things: luxury, power, war, borders, and the worries of everyday life all become ridiculous.
  
  (Pierre Hadot, What Is Ancient Philosophy?, pp. 206-7)

[Consul]

On Becker's account, who you quoted <here>, "The general conception of morality, in a nutshell, is this: moral judgments are judgments about what rational agents ought to do or be, period." Thus according to Becker when the "amoralist" makes a judgment about what he--a rational agent--ought to do, he is making a moral judgment. The concrete, enacted act of a rational agent is naturally something enacted "all things considered."

If for Becker an "amoralist" is a chimera, but for you it is not, then it follows that you must deviate strongly from Becker's view.

Regarding these terms, "moral psychology," or, "moral considerations," we come back to the same nagging problem that has attended so many of your previous posts. There is no way for me to know what you mean by those terms until you properly lay out what you mean by "moral." You have consistently failed to provide an account of what you mean by "moral" and "non-moral".

"The general conception of morality, in a nutshell, is this: moral judgments are judgments about what rational agents ought to do or be, period." – Lawrence Becker

Okay, this statement alone clearly implies that any use of "ought" is moral (ethical), such that one isn't an amoralist unless one doesn't use ought-statements at all. Given the undeniable ambiguity of "ought", I find this implication unacceptable; so I would add the following qualification:

"Moral judgments are judgments about what rational agents ought to do or be" if and only if "ought" is used in judgments to express a (universalizable) duty or obligation, a "must" qua deontological necessity (as opposed to ontological, logical, or physical necessity), a requirement, a demand, a command—rather than to express something weaker, something non-obligatory: an advice, a recommendation, a suggestion, or an expectation. (E.g. the expectation that the train ought to arrive at the station in 30 minutes, with the train not being expected to arrive in the deontological sense of "to expect somebody to do something", since trains aren't moral subjects having the duty to arrive at stations as scheduled).

To use an example from a previous post of mine, in the statement "I ought to stay away from that guy, because I know he is prone to violence" "ought" is used non-morally, because it means "I am well advised to stay away from that guy…" rather than "It is obligatory for me to stay away from that guy…".

Given the above conception, legal oughts (duties/obligations) are moral oughts violations of which are officially sanctionable (punishable) by statal institutions (courts, prisons). That is, violations of legal oughts are crimes, whereas violations of nonlegal moral oughts aren't crimes but vices or "sins".

[Leontiskos]

I agree that promises should be kept rather than broken, but are you saying that there is nothing more to morality than keeping promises?

No I'm not saying that promise-breaking is a necessary condition for an act to be wrong, only that it is a sufficient condition.

Subject to the over-riding understanding that the domain of morality is choices - there may be situations where breaking a promise is the least-wrong option and therefore the choice that a person morally should make. But maybe that's a complication we can do without at this stage.

Okay, so you would say that some moral or immoral acts have nothing at all to do with promises. Right? (What you say below makes me wonder whether you truly eschew the idea that promise-breaking is a necessary condition for an act to be wrong, particularly this:)

There is, I suggest, a type of act that is incapable of bearing moral weight - the set of things that it makes no sense to promise to do or not to do because they are not under your control.

Rather, if one held to the view that obligation attaches to promises but not to anything else then... ...the specific difference can be ascertained by asking the question, "Am I promise-bound to carry out this act, or not?" Further, it seems you might say, "The act pertains to no promise, and therefore is not a moral act. It is morally neutral."

The logic here is sound. But I would say that in such a case the same act today is morally neutral or right or wrong according to whether a promise was made yesterday. So the moral weight that it carries is not an inherent characteristic of the act itself, but depends on circumstance.

There is thus no typology of acts which divides them into morally-neutral and morally-significant. Sure, you can define the set of acts that I have promised to do today, but that may be different from the set of acts that I have promised to do tomorrow. Inclusion in the set for any particular day says nothing about the inherent characteristics of the act.

Actually I already gave the way to divide acts in your system, "Rather, if one held to the view that obligation attaches to promises but not to anything else then the two kinds of acts do belong to a different species, where the specific difference can be ascertained by asking the question, 'Am I promise-bound to carry out this act, or not?'" On your system we are morally obligated to carry out those acts which we have promised to carry out. I am still unsure of whether we are not morally obligated to carry out the remainder of acts. In any case, it makes no difference when the promise was made, so long as we are promise-bound at the time of acting.

Regarding the specification of acts, what is circumstantial and what is inherent in the act itself is relative to the rational analysis being applied. When talking about the moral species of an act moral specification is obviously the relevant factor. So if someone's morality revolves around promises, then the moral weight of an act is derived from the moral characteristic of the act (i.e. whether we are promise-bound to carry it out), and this is the inherent characteristic of the moral act. So while I agree that promises are circumstantial with respect to material acts, they are not circumstantial with respect to moral acts in a moral system which revolves around promises. On such a view moral and immoral acts surely do belong to separate species.

But I concede your point that the promising-schema does not commit one to identifying material acts which are immoral, neutral, and moral in their materiality. ...Also that any material act could be the subject or non-subject of a promise, and that therefore there are no material acts which are definitively non-moral or neutral. But the import of all this depends in part on whether you believe non-promise-bound acts can also be moral and immoral.