Morals and values --- how are they related?

Discuss morality and ethics in this message board.
Featured Article: Philosophical Analysis of Abortion, The Right to Life, and Murder
GE Morton
Posts: 4696
Joined: February 1st, 2017, 1:06 am

Morals and values --- how are they related?

Post by GE Morton »

Re-located from the "Universe Isn't Locally Real - Nobel Prize in Physics 2022" thread. Comments follow.
Mercury wrote: November 13th, 2022, 2:26 pm
Mercury wrote: November 13th, 2022, 12:24 am
The origin of values is a moral sense - fostered in individuals in a tribal context by the advantage a moral sense offers the individual within the tribe, and the tribe composed of individuals that share food, share childcare, defend each other, engage in reciprocal grooming etc. Jane Goodall's work with chimpanzees suggests such behaviours long pre-date human intellectual awareness, and fulfil my definition of values - if not yours.
GE Morton wrote: November 13th, 2022, 12:33 pmMoralities are not the "origin of values," though individuals who adopt certain moral precepts will value them (they only adopt them because they do value them). People can assign a value to anything.

To value something means to desire it, be attracted to it, and be willing to give up something --- time, effort, money, some other good --- to obtain it, retain it, or protect it. What one is willing to give up in order to obtain some X is the quantitative measure of X's value to that person. Values per se are not social; Crusoe alone on his island will value various things; non-social animals value various things. We can estimate the value of a given thing to Alfie (or an animal) by observing Alfie's behavior with respect to it --- what he is willing to give up to secure it.

May I refer you back to my earlier remark that the simplest of organisms will move away from a hot needle.

You replied: "That is stretching the meaning of "value" quite a bit."

How so?

GE Morton wrote: November 13th, 2022, 12:33 pmMoralities are rules governing interactions between moral agents in a social setting. To the extent individuals find the advantages of a social setting desirable, they will also desire --- value --- rules that permit that setting to remain viable. Values, and the capacity to value, precede moralities.
What is valued by the individual may not be valued by the group!
I think you're talking about evolutionary drives playing out in an environment that has changed dramatically in just a few thousand years. Civilisation is only 12-15,000 years old, and was largely agricultural for most of that time. It's only in the past few hundred years industrial civilisation has developed; with people living in societies where they don't know most of the people around them.

May I suggest your conception of values is consistent with modern day social atomisation. If that's what you were going for, congrats, you nailed it. The subjective and idiosyncratic values of the socially excluded and alienated.
GE Morton wrote: November 13th, 2022, 12:33 pmYes indeed. The advent of civilization --- societies characterized by cities, which are communities so large than most of their members do not know most of the others --- forced a radical transformation in the nature of the relationships between individuals and in the moralities that are workable in that context. What works for kinship-based tribal societies does not work for "societies of strangers."

What people will value depends upon what is visible to or at least conceivable by them --- they rank the options available, of which they're aware, and direct their efforts accordingly. In insular tribal societies that range of options is narrow; in civilized societies it is vast. Different individuals in the latter fill their shopping baskets with different goods from that cornucopia.

There is, to be sure, an atavistic longing among some for the simplicity, familiarity, constancy, uniformity, and intimacy of tribal life --- the social form followed by all primates, including humans, for several million years. That longing leads to laments about "alienation."
If all you mean by value is 'what I want' then I'm at a loss to understand the philosophical significance. "Subjective and idiosyncratic" values are no values at all. Robinson Crusoe may want things; he may want A more than B - so "values" A; but this is value as an adverb, not as a noun. Crusoe cannot commit an immoral act because there is no-one to sin against.

noun:
principles or standards of behaviour; one's judgement of what is important in life.
"they internalize their parents' rules and values"
Similar: principles, moral principles, ethics, moral code, morals.

Values with philosophical significance; the noun form - are social values. Consequently, my argument traces values from the simplest organism moving away from a hot needle, via proto-moral behaviours in chimpanzee societies, to religious expression of moral values for the purposes of uniting hunter gather tribes to form societies and civilisations, unto political values.
GE Morton
Posts: 4696
Joined: February 1st, 2017, 1:06 am

Re: Morals and values --- how are they related?

Post by GE Morton »

GE Morton wrote: November 13th, 2022, 8:04 pm
GE Morton wrote: November 13th, 2022, 12:33 pmMoralities are not the "origin of values," though individuals who adopt certain moral precepts will value them (they only adopt them because they do value them). People can assign a value to anything.

To value something means to desire it, be attracted to it, and be willing to give up something --- time, effort, money, some other good --- to obtain it, retain it, or protect it. What one is willing to give up in order to obtain some X is the quantitative measure of X's value to that person. Values per se are not social; Crusoe alone on his island will value various things; non-social animals value various things. We can estimate the value of a given thing to Alfie (or an animal) by observing Alfie's behavior with respect to it --- what he is willing to give up to secure it.
May I refer you back to my earlier remark that the simplest of organisms will move away from a hot needle.

You replied: "That is stretching the meaning of "value" quite a bit."

How so?
""Value" implies some sort of weighing, evaluating, processing --- something more complex and analytical than a mere reflex response. Like your simple animal, I will immediately withdraw my hand if I touch a hot stove. But I don't disvalue the stove.
GE Morton wrote: November 13th, 2022, 12:33 pmMoralities are rules governing interactions between moral agents in a social setting. To the extent individuals find the advantages of a social setting desirable, they will also desire --- value --- rules that permit that setting to remain viable. Values, and the capacity to value, precede moralities.
What is valued by the individual may not be valued by the group!
Ah, that is a common mistake. Groups, not being sentient creatures or moral agents, don't value anything. Only their individual members do. And in large groups those values vary widely from person to person. "Group" (and all group terms) are just terms for some plurality of individuals.
GE Morton wrote: November 13th, 2022, 12:33 pmYes indeed. The advent of civilization --- societies characterized by cities, which are communities so large than most of their members do not know most of the others --- forced a radical transformation in the nature of the relationships between individuals and in the moralities that are workable in that context. What works for kinship-based tribal societies does not work for "societies of strangers."

What people will value depends upon what is visible to or at least conceivable by them --- they rank the options available, of which they're aware, and direct their efforts accordingly. In insular tribal societies that range of options is narrow; in civilized societies it is vast. Different individuals in the latter fill their shopping baskets with different goods from that cornucopia.

There is, to be sure, an atavistic longing among some for the simplicity, familiarity, constancy, uniformity, and intimacy of tribal life --- the social form followed by all primates, including humans, for several million years. That longing leads to laments about "alienation."
If all you mean by value is 'what I want' then I'm at a loss to understand the philosophical significance. "Subjective and idiosyncratic" values are no values at all. Robinson Crusoe may want things; he may want A more than B - so "values" A; but this is value as an adverb, not as a noun. Crusoe cannot commit an immoral act because there is no-one to sin against.

noun:
principles or standards of behaviour; one's judgement of what is important in life.
"they internalize their parents' rules and values"
Similar: principles, moral principles, ethics, moral code, morals.

Values with philosophical significance; the noun form - are social values. Consequently, my argument traces values from the simplest organism moving away from a hot needle, via proto-moral behaviours in chimpanzee societies, to religious expression of moral values for the purposes of uniting hunter gather tribes to form societies and civilisations, unto political values.
"Social values" is a misleading, if not vacuous, term. Societies are just groups of people so situated to be able to interact, and who do interact, at least occasionally. Any values to be found in them are values held by some of those people. Some values held by individuals do, of course, relate to maintaining a viable social environment, and may be fairly widely shared by members of that society. But they are still the values of individuals.

The significance of values for moral philosophy lies in the generally acknowledged purpose, aim, of moralities --- to establish principles and rules governing interactions between agents in a social setting which allow, as far as possible, each agent to maximize his welfare --- which will consist in securing the things HE values. A workable morality for a pluralistic, cosmopolitan, civilized society thus aims at value maximization, but is indifferent as between particular values, which are subjective and idiosyncratic. "To each his own." (There is one exception --- values which cannot be realized except by violating a moral rule are disallowed as malum in se).

The expression "moral values" should be abandoned. It presumably denotes a moral principle or rule which someone happens to value. But that a particular rule is valued by someone is not an argument for its soundness. Just referring instead to moral principles and rules avoids that subjective connotation.

Of course, I disagree with the evolutionary progression you outline --- in fact, different social species, different human tribes, not to mention modern societies, exhibit all manner of incompatible moral "values" and behaviors. In a given society they can also change rather catastrophically in a short period of time. There is no plausible Darwinian explanation for those phenomena.
Mercury
Posts: 377
Joined: December 17th, 2013, 6:36 pm

Re: Morals and values --- how are they related?

Post by Mercury »

GE Morton wrote: November 13th, 2022, 9:02 pm ""Value" implies some sort of weighing, evaluating, processing --- something more complex and analytical than a mere reflex response. Like your simple animal, I will immediately withdraw my hand if I touch a hot stove. But I don't disvalue the stove.
Right, but you're not a nematode worm moving away from a hot needle. For you values are far more complex affair than the pain pleasure reflex - because you're a far more complex organism.
GE Morton wrote: November 13th, 2022, 12:33 pmMoralities are rules governing interactions between moral agents in a social setting. To the extent individuals find the advantages of a social setting desirable, they will also desire --- value --- rules that permit that setting to remain viable. Values, and the capacity to value, precede moralities.
What is valued by the individual may not be valued by the group!
GE Morton wrote: November 13th, 2022, 12:33 pmAh, that is a common mistake. Groups, not being sentient creatures or moral agents, don't value anything. Only their individual members do. And in large groups those values vary widely from person to person. "Group" (and all group terms) are just terms for some plurality of individuals.
That's not so. While the individual imbued with a moral sense by evolution, is the origin of moral values; there is a collective consciousness that exists both inter-subjectively, and thus, peculiarly apart from each individual. And there's a social allocation of values; not arrived at by any process of reason or sentiment the individual is required to internalise - or be sanctioned by the group. Religion, law, politics, ethics etc, are all products of the mind, but come to exist inter-subjectively - and objectively from the individual standpoint.
GE Morton wrote: November 13th, 2022, 12:33 pmYes indeed. The advent of civilization --- societies characterized by cities, which are communities so large than most of their members do not know most of the others --- forced a radical transformation in the nature of the relationships between individuals and in the moralities that are workable in that context. What works for kinship-based tribal societies does not work for "societies of strangers."

What people will value depends upon what is visible to or at least conceivable by them --- they rank the options available, of which they're aware, and direct their efforts accordingly. In insular tribal societies that range of options is narrow; in civilized societies it is vast. Different individuals in the latter fill their shopping baskets with different goods from that cornucopia.

There is, to be sure, an atavistic longing among some for the simplicity, familiarity, constancy, uniformity, and intimacy of tribal life --- the social form followed by all primates, including humans, for several million years. That longing leads to laments about "alienation."
If all you mean by value is 'what I want' then I'm at a loss to understand the philosophical significance. "Subjective and idiosyncratic" values are no values at all. Robinson Crusoe may want things; he may want A more than B - so "values" A; but this is value as an adverb, not as a noun. Crusoe cannot commit an immoral act because there is no-one to sin against.

noun:
principles or standards of behaviour; one's judgement of what is important in life.
"they internalize their parents' rules and values"
Similar: principles, moral principles, ethics, moral code, morals.

Values with philosophical significance; the noun form - are social values. Consequently, my argument traces values from the simplest organism moving away from a hot needle, via proto-moral behaviours in chimpanzee societies, to religious expression of moral values for the purposes of uniting hunter gather tribes to form societies and civilisations, unto political values.
GE Morton wrote: November 13th, 2022, 12:33 pm"Social values" is a misleading, if not vacuous, term. Societies are just groups of people so situated to be able to interact, and who do interact, at least occasionally. Any values to be found in them are values held by some of those people. Some values held by individuals do, of course, relate to maintaining a viable social environment, and may be fairly widely shared by members of that society. But they are still the values of individuals.

The significance of values for moral philosophy lies in the generally acknowledged purpose, aim, of moralities --- to establish principles and rules governing interactions between agents in a social setting which allow, as far as possible, each agent to maximize his welfare --- which will consist in securing the things HE values. A workable morality for a pluralistic, cosmopolitan, civilized society thus aims at value maximization, but is indifferent as between particular values, which are subjective and idiosyncratic. "To each his own." (There is one exception --- values which cannot be realized except by violating a moral rule are disallowed as malum in se).

The expression "moral values" should be abandoned. It presumably denotes a moral principle or rule which someone happens to value. But that a particular rule is valued by someone is not an argument for its soundness. Just referring instead to moral principles and rules avoids that subjective connotation.

Of course, I disagree with the evolutionary progression you outline --- in fact, different social species, different human tribes, not to mention modern societies, exhibit all manner of incompatible moral "values" and behaviors. In a given society they can also change rather catastrophically in a short period of time. There is no plausible Darwinian explanation for those phenomena.
I wholly disagree with everything you've said, and as I have explained the evolutionary origins of values; conceived of as social moral values once or twice already, I'm guessing a third repetition would be similarly fruitless. There's no point in talking entirely at cross purposes. I still do not understand what you mean by values. If it is nothing more than 'what I want' then it is of no interest to anyone except you. Nonetheless, social moral values persist, and cannot simply be negated because they don't fit with your fumbling forward in the philosophical darkness. Retrace your steps, you've made an error.
So long, and thanks for all the fish!
GE Morton
Posts: 4696
Joined: February 1st, 2017, 1:06 am

Re: Morals and values --- how are they related?

Post by GE Morton »

Mercury wrote: November 13th, 2022, 10:34 pm
GE Morton wrote: November 13th, 2022, 12:33 pmAh, that is a common mistake. Groups, not being sentient creatures or moral agents, don't value anything. Only their individual members do. And in large groups those values vary widely from person to person. "Group" (and all group terms) are just terms for some plurality of individuals.
That's not so. While the individual imbued with a moral sense by evolution, is the origin of moral values . . .
Ah. And has evolution generated the "moral sense" of, say, Joseph Stalin, and Mahatma Gandhi, and Mother Theresa, and Pol Pot, Pope Francis, Benito Mussolini? Not to mention the vast range of "moral senses" propounded throughout the history of philosophy.

There is no "moral sense" (singular). There are only a plethora of moral senses, varying from individual to individual. Nor are there any "moral values," although people do tend to value whatever moral principles they've embraced. Claiming that "the moral sense" is the result of evolution is a vacuous non-explanation, similar to "Goddidit."
. . . there is a collective consciousness that exists both inter-subjectively, and thus, peculiarly apart from each individual.
Ah, the "collective consciousness." Perhaps you can explain how you would go about identifying the contents of this "collective consciousness" --- i.e., if someone were to assert, "X is a component of, a feature or aspect of, the collective consciousness," how would one go about demonstrating the truth of that claim? The only way I can imagine is by asking people, "Is X part of your consciousness?" But that approach would not only not be "apart from each individual," and it would surely yield a variety of answers.

The "collective consciousness," a sort of abstract superego, is a metaphysical fiction, a secular substitute for Divine Will --- i.e., a shibboleth contrived to justify some sort of authoritarianism.

Now, many animals, including most humans, do have certain instincts or dispositions to act in certain ways that are often described as "moral," e.g., the care of mothers for their offspring, of kin for kin, mates for mates, etc., but it is a mistake to confuse these innate dispositions --- which do indeed have survival value --- with morality (Patricia Churchland, whose views are similar to yours, makes this mistake).

For philosophers, ethics, or moralities, are systems of rules governing interactions between moral agents in a social setting that are rationally defensible and justifiable. "Moral" instincts or intuitions, whether innate or acquired (e.g., via social conditioning) are themselves subject to rational scrutiny, and in some cases are rationally indefensible, e.g., as when a mother acts to thwart the arrest of her criminal son.
And there's a social allocation of values; not arrived at by any process of reason or sentiment the individual is required to internalise - or be sanctioned by the group. Religion, law, politics, ethics etc, are all products of the mind, but come to exist inter-subjectively - and objectively from the individual standpoint.
What you're describing there are merely edicts imposed by force by some "authorities" having the power to exert it. The sanctions won't be imposed "by the group;" they'll be imposed by some particular minions of some particular lawgiver(s). Nor will anyone be required to "internalize" these "values." They'll only be required to act in accordance with them (no one can determine what someone else has "internalized").
If all you mean by value is 'what I want' then I'm at a loss to understand the philosophical significance. "Subjective and idiosyncratic" values are no values at all. Robinson Crusoe may want things; he may want A more than B - so "values" A; but this is value as an adverb, not as a noun. Crusoe cannot commit an immoral act because there is no-one to sin against.

noun:
principles or standards of behaviour; one's judgement of what is important in life.
"they internalize their parents' rules and values."
Similar: principles, moral principles, ethics, moral code, morals.
Yes --- the term "values" is often used as a synonym for moral principles and rules. As I said, that usage should be abandoned, because it injects a connotation of subjectivity into an inquiry which should be objective and rational. "One's judgement of what is important in life" --- is anything more subjective and idiosyncratic than that?
Values with philosophical significance; the noun form - are social values. Consequently, my argument traces values from the simplest organism moving away from a hot needle, via proto-moral behaviours in chimpanzee societies, to religious expression of moral values for the purposes of uniting hunter gather tribes to form societies and civilisations, unto political values.
I explained the role of values, their "philosophical significance," in my previous post. A person's welfare consists in securing the things he values. The aim of moral theories and systems is promoting, maximizing, human welfare (and perhaps the welfare of other sentient creatures). But since what persons value, and thus what contributes to their welfare, varies from person to person, rational, objective moral theories must be indifferent to values. And unless you mean by "social values" individual values that happen to be widely shared among a given group, there are no "social values. Societies are not moral agents and don't have any values --- that is a category mistake. Only their members do.
I wholly disagree with everything you've said, and as I have explained the evolutionary origins of values; conceived of as social moral values once or twice already, I'm guessing a third repetition would be similarly fruitless. There's no point in talking entirely at cross purposes. I still do not understand what you mean by values.
I thought my meaning was fairly clear about that. The term "value" denotes a pseudo-property we impute to things we desire or approve of, things we are willing to invest some time, effort, other goods, to acquire or protect.
If it is nothing more than 'what I want' then it is of no interest to anyone except you.
I assume that what YOU want is of interest to you. Is it not? A sound moral theory will be one which attempts to assure that you and I both get what we want, with no presumptions regarding what those things are or that they are the same.
Nonetheless, social moral values persist, and cannot simply be negated because they don't fit with your fumbling forward in the philosophical darkness. Retrace your steps, you've made an error.
What error would that be? Can you spell it out? Perhaps you could also give some examples of "social moral values" that are values of "society" and not of some of the individuals who constitute that society.
CIN
Posts: 284
Joined: November 6th, 2016, 10:33 am

Re: Morals and values --- how are they related?

Post by CIN »

GE Morton wrote: November 14th, 2022, 12:54 pm A person's welfare consists in securing the things he values.
A heroin addict values heroin. Does his welfare consist in securing it?
GE Morton wrote: November 14th, 2022, 12:54 pm A sound moral theory will be one which attempts to assure that you and I both get what we want...
The addict wants his next fix. Is a sound moral theory one that attempts to assure that he gets it?
Philosophy is a waste of time. But then, so is most of life.
GE Morton
Posts: 4696
Joined: February 1st, 2017, 1:06 am

Re: Morals and values --- how are they related?

Post by GE Morton »

CIN wrote: November 14th, 2022, 1:42 pm
GE Morton wrote: November 14th, 2022, 12:54 pm A person's welfare consists in securing the things he values.
A heroin addict values heroin. Does his welfare consist in securing it?
GE Morton wrote: November 14th, 2022, 12:54 pm A sound moral theory will be one which attempts to assure that you and I both get what we want...
The addict wants his next fix. Is a sound moral theory one that attempts to assure that he gets it?
Yes to both. His preferences may not square with welfare-for-you, but that is irrelevant.
Mercury
Posts: 377
Joined: December 17th, 2013, 6:36 pm

Re: Morals and values --- how are they related?

Post by Mercury »

GE Morton wrote: November 14th, 2022, 12:54 pm
Mercury wrote: November 13th, 2022, 10:34 pm
GE Morton wrote: November 13th, 2022, 12:33 pmAh, that is a common mistake. Groups, not being sentient creatures or moral agents, don't value anything. Only their individual members do. And in large groups those values vary widely from person to person. "Group" (and all group terms) are just terms for some plurality of individuals.
That's not so. While the individual imbued with a moral sense by evolution, is the origin of moral values . . .
Ah. And has evolution generated the "moral sense" of, say, Joseph Stalin, and Mahatma Gandhi, and Mother Theresa, and Pol Pot, Pope Francis, Benito Mussolini? Not to mention the vast range of "moral senses" propounded throughout the history of philosophy.

There is no "moral sense" (singular). There are only a plethora of moral senses, varying from individual to individual. Nor are there any "moral values," although people do tend to value whatever moral principles they've embraced. Claiming that "the moral sense" is the result of evolution is a vacuous non-explanation, similar to "Goddidit."
. . . there is a collective consciousness that exists both inter-subjectively, and thus, peculiarly apart from each individual.
Ah, the "collective consciousness." Perhaps you can explain how you would go about identifying the contents of this "collective consciousness" --- i.e., if someone were to assert, "X is a component of, a feature or aspect of, the collective consciousness," how would one go about demonstrating the truth of that claim? The only way I can imagine is by asking people, "Is X part of your consciousness?" But that approach would not only not be "apart from each individual," and it would surely yield a variety of answers.

The "collective consciousness," a sort of abstract superego, is a metaphysical fiction, a secular substitute for Divine Will --- i.e., a shibboleth contrived to justify some sort of authoritarianism.

Now, many animals, including most humans, do have certain instincts or dispositions to act in certain ways that are often described as "moral," e.g., the care of mothers for their offspring, of kin for kin, mates for mates, etc., but it is a mistake to confuse these innate dispositions --- which do indeed have survival value --- with morality (Patricia Churchland, whose views are similar to yours, makes this mistake).

For philosophers, ethics, or moralities, are systems of rules governing interactions between moral agents in a social setting that are rationally defensible and justifiable. "Moral" instincts or intuitions, whether innate or acquired (e.g., via social conditioning) are themselves subject to rational scrutiny, and in some cases are rationally indefensible, e.g., as when a mother acts to thwart the arrest of her criminal son.
And there's a social allocation of values; not arrived at by any process of reason or sentiment the individual is required to internalise - or be sanctioned by the group. Religion, law, politics, ethics etc, are all products of the mind, but come to exist inter-subjectively - and objectively from the individual standpoint.
What you're describing there are merely edicts imposed by force by some "authorities" having the power to exert it. The sanctions won't be imposed "by the group;" they'll be imposed by some particular minions of some particular lawgiver(s). Nor will anyone be required to "internalize" these "values." They'll only be required to act in accordance with them (no one can determine what someone else has "internalized").
If all you mean by value is 'what I want' then I'm at a loss to understand the philosophical significance. "Subjective and idiosyncratic" values are no values at all. Robinson Crusoe may want things; he may want A more than B - so "values" A; but this is value as an adverb, not as a noun. Crusoe cannot commit an immoral act because there is no-one to sin against.

noun:
principles or standards of behaviour; one's judgement of what is important in life.
"they internalize their parents' rules and values."
Similar: principles, moral principles, ethics, moral code, morals.
Yes --- the term "values" is often used as a synonym for moral principles and rules. As I said, that usage should be abandoned, because it injects a connotation of subjectivity into an inquiry which should be objective and rational. "One's judgement of what is important in life" --- is anything more subjective and idiosyncratic than that?
Values with philosophical significance; the noun form - are social values. Consequently, my argument traces values from the simplest organism moving away from a hot needle, via proto-moral behaviours in chimpanzee societies, to religious expression of moral values for the purposes of uniting hunter gather tribes to form societies and civilisations, unto political values.
I explained the role of values, their "philosophical significance," in my previous post. A person's welfare consists in securing the things he values. The aim of moral theories and systems is promoting, maximizing, human welfare (and perhaps the welfare of other sentient creatures). But since what persons value, and thus what contributes to their welfare, varies from person to person, rational, objective moral theories must be indifferent to values. And unless you mean by "social values" individual values that happen to be widely shared among a given group, there are no "social values. Societies are not moral agents and don't have any values --- that is a category mistake. Only their members do.
I wholly disagree with everything you've said, and as I have explained the evolutionary origins of values; conceived of as social moral values once or twice already, I'm guessing a third repetition would be similarly fruitless. There's no point in talking entirely at cross purposes. I still do not understand what you mean by values.
I thought my meaning was fairly clear about that. The term "value" denotes a pseudo-property we impute to things we desire or approve of, things we are willing to invest some time, effort, other goods, to acquire or protect.
If it is nothing more than 'what I want' then it is of no interest to anyone except you.
I assume that what YOU want is of interest to you. Is it not? A sound moral theory will be one which attempts to assure that you and I both get what we want, with no presumptions regarding what those things are or that they are the same.
Nonetheless, social moral values persist, and cannot simply be negated because they don't fit with your fumbling forward in the philosophical darkness. Retrace your steps, you've made an error.
What error would that be? Can you spell it out? Perhaps you could also give some examples of "social moral values" that are values of "society" and not of some of the individuals who constitute that society.
This post is too long, and too segmented to reply to in the manner you have. I tried - but it's too much. You ask too many questions, raise too many issues in one post - for me to respond that way before the universe ceases expanding, and begins to contract, and I'm forced to un-write it all, backwards, for eternity explaining, over and over how you've misunderstood even the basics of what I'm trying to say.

Please try and appreciate the difference between a moral sense - i.e. an individual sensitivity to moral implication, and the explicit expression set of a set of moral rules. You conflate the two throughout - making it an impossible task to correct you over and over in every paragraph of this centipede of a post.

An evolutionary, tribal moral sense - gives rise to explicit multi-tribal social moral rules; religion, politics, law etc.

Barring the odd psychopath, the vast majority of people are possessed of an innate moral sense - like a sense of humour, or aesthetics, we 'see' funny, we 'see' beauty, and we 'see' right and wrong. Some people are more sensitive than others, and then there's all sorts of confounding variables, like knowledge, identity and interests, such that we don't expect people to express identical moral values, nor to act upon them. But the sense of right and wrong - and the basic moral values expressed in a wide variety of cultures are remarkably similar.

Now I feel bad because of the effort you put into this, and I want to assure you that I read it. Thanks for the reference to Patricia Chruchland - Paul Churchland's wife apparently. It seems we do agree:

"She advocates the scientific endeavour, and has dismissed significant swathes of professional philosophy as obsessed with what she regards as unnecessary."
So long, and thanks for all the fish!
CIN
Posts: 284
Joined: November 6th, 2016, 10:33 am

Re: Morals and values --- how are they related?

Post by CIN »

GE Morton wrote: November 14th, 2022, 2:32 pm
CIN wrote: November 14th, 2022, 1:42 pm
GE Morton wrote: November 14th, 2022, 12:54 pm A person's welfare consists in securing the things he values.
A heroin addict values heroin. Does his welfare consist in securing it?
GE Morton wrote: November 14th, 2022, 12:54 pm A sound moral theory will be one which attempts to assure that you and I both get what we want...
The addict wants his next fix. Is a sound moral theory one that attempts to assure that he gets it?
Yes to both. His preferences may not square with welfare-for-you, but that is irrelevant.
I agree that welfare-for-me is irrelevant. I would merely point out that heroin can have the following side effects (https://www.parkroyalhospital.com/addic ... ithdrawal/):
Anxiety
Irritability
Depression
Circulatory problems
Nausea and vomiting
Liver damage
Respiratory depression
Intense sweating
Sleep apnea
Joint pain
Chills
Body weakness
Unsteady gait
Trouble with the law
Incarceration
Respiratory arrest
Suicidal ideation
Coma
Death due to overdose or suicide

If you think this is consistent with someone's welfare, and that a moral theory that aims to secure them for the addict is sound, then not only are you misusing the word 'welfare', you also have no grasp of morality.

Morality is not about what people want. It is about what is good for them.
Philosophy is a waste of time. But then, so is most of life.
Gertie
Posts: 2181
Joined: January 7th, 2015, 7:09 am

Re: Morals and values --- how are they related?

Post by Gertie »

GE
Now, many animals, including most humans, do have certain instincts or dispositions to act in certain ways that are often described as "moral," e.g., the care of mothers for their offspring, of kin for kin, mates for mates, etc., but it is a mistake to confuse these innate dispositions --- which do indeed have survival value --- with morality (Patricia Churchland, whose views are similar to yours, makes this mistake).
''Morality'' is an abstract concept created by humans. What Churchland does is explain what we currently understand as the evolutionary under-pinnings of what we've come to conceptualise as ''morality''. Specifically in terms of the widening of the 'circle of care', from self, to off-spring, to kith and strangers. And the neurobiological mechanisms which seem to play key roles in our species.

It's as good a way of understanding how our notions of right and wrong and duties came about as you'll find imo. Philosophical notions of morality have gone in all types of directions, with edifices of reasoning and jargon to match. But one thing Churchland shows us, is that without this social aspect of the widening circle of care, we'd just be lizzard brains as far as morality is concerned, only concerned about our welfare. Which we're not. We're social mammals who care about those close to us, care about fairness, value cooperation, have empathy and compassion, feel guilt and shame, abhor cheaters, etc.

We still have our self-focussed lizzard brain neurology too, it hasn't disappeared, it's been augmented to widen the circle of care. And it's often when the two conflict we're faced with questions of right and wrong.
User avatar
Consul
Posts: 6036
Joined: February 21st, 2014, 6:32 am
Location: Germany

Re: Morals and values --- how are they related?

Post by Consul »

GE Morton wrote: November 13th, 2022, 9:02 pm""Value" implies some sort of weighing, evaluating, processing --- something more complex and analytical than a mere reflex response. Like your simple animal, I will immediately withdraw my hand if I touch a hot stove. But I don't disvalue the stove.
"to value" = "to consider of worth or importance; to rate high; to esteem; to set store by" (Oxford Dictionary of English)
"We may philosophize well or ill, but we must philosophize." – Wilfrid Sellars
User avatar
Consul
Posts: 6036
Joined: February 21st, 2014, 6:32 am
Location: Germany

Re: Morals and values --- how are they related?

Post by Consul »

GE Morton wrote: November 14th, 2022, 12:54 pmThe term "value" denotes a pseudo-property we impute to things we desire or approve of, things we are willing to invest some time, effort, other goods, to acquire or protect.
According to David Lewis, to value something is not just to desire it, but to desire to desire it:

QUOTE>
"[V]aluing is just desiring to desire."
(p. 71)

"Roughly, values are what we are disposed to value. Less roughly, we have this schematic definition: Something of the appropriate category is a value if and only if we would be disposed, under ideal conditions, to value it.

…I shall advance a version of the dispositional theory of value. I begin by classifying the theory that is going to emerge. First, it is naturalistic: it advances an analytic definition of value. It is naturalistic in another sense too: it fits into a naturalistic metaphysics. It invokes only such entities and distinctions as we need to believe in anyway, and needs nothing extra before it can deliver the values. It reduces facs about value to facts about our psychology.

The theory is subjective: it analyses value in terms of our attitudes. But it is not subjective in the narrower sense of implying that value is a topic on which whatever we may think is automatically true, or on which there is no truth at all. Nor does it imply that if we had been differently disposed, different things would have been values. Not quite – but it comes too close for comfort.

The theory is internalist: it makes a conceptual connection between value and molivation. But it offers no guarantee that everyone must be motivated to pursue whatever is of value; still less, whatever he judges to be of value. The connection is defeasible, in more ways than one.

The theory is cognitive: it allows us to seek and to pin knowledge about what is valuable. This knowledge is a posteriori knowledge of contingent matters of fact. It could in principle be gained by psychological experimentation. But it is more likely to be gained by difficult exercises of imagination, carried out perhaps in a philosopher's or a novelist's armchair.

The theory is conditionally relativist: it does not exclude the possibility that there may be no such thing as value simpliciter, just value for this or that population. But it does not imply relativity, not even when taken together with what we know about the diversity of what people actually value. It leaves the question open."
(pp. 68-9)

"…So we turn to desires. But we'd better not say that valuing something is just the same as desiring it. That may do for some of us: those who manage, by strength of will or by good luck, to desire exactly as they desire to desire. But not all of us are so fortunate. The thoughtful addict may desire his euphoric daze, but not value it. Even apart from all the costs and risks, he may hate himself for desiring something he values not at all. It is a desire he wants very much to be rid of. He desires his high, but he does not desire to desire it, and in fact he desires not to desire it. He does not desire an unaltered, mundane state of consciousness, but he does desire to desire it. We conclude that he does not value what he desires, but rather he values what he desires to desire.

Can we do better by climbing the ladder to desires of ever-higher order? What someone desires to desire to desire might conceivably differ from what he does desire to desire. Or. . .Should we perhaps say that what a person really values is given by his highest order of desire, whatever order that is? – It is hard to tell whether this would really be better, because it is hard to imagine proper test cases. Further, if we go for the highest order, we automatically rule out the case of someone who desires to value differently than he does, yet this case is not obviously impossible. I hesitantly conclude we do better to stop on the second rung: valuing is just desiring to desire."
(pp. 70-1)

(Lewis, David. "Dispositional Theories of Value." 1989. Reprinted in Papers in Ethics and Social Philosophy, 68-94. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.)
<QUOTE
"We may philosophize well or ill, but we must philosophize." – Wilfrid Sellars
GE Morton
Posts: 4696
Joined: February 1st, 2017, 1:06 am

Re: Morals and values --- how are they related?

Post by GE Morton »

CIN wrote: November 14th, 2022, 3:49 pm
If you think this is consistent with someone's welfare, and that a moral theory that aims to secure them for the addict is sound, then not only are you misusing the word 'welfare', you also have no grasp of morality.

Morality is not about what people want. It is about what is good for them.
Well, that is the view of every presumptuous authoritarian who ever lived: "I know what is good for you."

Only Alfie can say what is good for him. He is likely well aware of the health risks his heroin use presents, and may have decided that the pleasure he gains from it is worth those risks, even if it means a shorter life, just as Evel Knievel decided the excitement of motorcycle jumping was worth the risks that presented. Those are their decisions to make.

And, no, I'm not misusing the word "welfare." Those who think it refers to some prescription dogmatically proffered by social scientists are misusing it; they committing what G.E. Moore called the "naturalistic fallacy."

https://ethics.org.au/ethics-explainer- ... ic-fallacy
GE Morton
Posts: 4696
Joined: February 1st, 2017, 1:06 am

Re: Morals and values --- how are they related?

Post by GE Morton »

Consul wrote: November 14th, 2022, 5:11 pm
"…So we turn to desires. But we'd better not say that valuing something is just the same as desiring it. That may do for some of us: those who manage, by strength of will or by good luck, to desire exactly as they desire to desire. But not all of us are so fortunate. The thoughtful addict may desire his euphoric daze, but not value it. Even apart from all the costs and risks, he may hate himself for desiring something he values not at all. It is a desire he wants very much to be rid of. He desires his high, but he does not desire to desire it, and in fact he desires not to desire it. He does not desire an unaltered, mundane state of consciousness, but he does desire to desire it. We conclude that he does not value what he desires, but rather he values what he desires to desire.

Can we do better by climbing the ladder to desires of ever-higher order? What someone desires to desire to desire might conceivably differ from what he does desire to desire. Or. . .Should we perhaps say that what a person really values is given by his highest order of desire, whatever order that is? – It is hard to tell whether this would really be better, because it is hard to imagine proper test cases. Further, if we go for the highest order, we automatically rule out the case of someone who desires to value differently than he does, yet this case is not obviously impossible. I hesitantly conclude we do better to stop on the second rung: valuing is just desiring to desire."
That is just convoluted, and unilluminating, way of saying people may hold values which conflict. Yes, the addict may well harbor other desires which his drug habit may render impossible of attainment. His behavior, and only his behavior, will inform us which of those desires takes priority. Note also that most values are volatile; their rank in the agent's value hierarchy may shift from day to day. For some people the desire for a "normal" life may come to outweigh the desire for the pleasures of the drug, and they quit the drug, sometimes "cold-turkey." Others continue with the drug, though with lingering regret that their other desires will never be satisfied.
GE Morton
Posts: 4696
Joined: February 1st, 2017, 1:06 am

Re: Morals and values --- how are they related?

Post by GE Morton »

Gertie wrote: November 14th, 2022, 3:56 pm
Now, many animals, including most humans, do have certain instincts or dispositions to act in certain ways that are often described as "moral," e.g., the care of mothers for their offspring, of kin for kin, mates for mates, etc., but it is a mistake to confuse these innate dispositions --- which do indeed have survival value --- with morality (Patricia Churchland, whose views are similar to yours, makes this mistake).
''Morality'' is an abstract concept created by humans. What Churchland does is explain what we currently understand as the evolutionary under-pinnings of what we've come to conceptualise as ''morality''. Specifically in terms of the widening of the 'circle of care', from self, to off-spring, to kith and strangers. And the neurobiological mechanisms which seem to play key roles in our species.
Well, what I've argued above is that morality has no "evolutionary underpinnings" --- that the natural and innate dispositions of mothers to care for their young, kin to care for kin, etc., have nothing to do with morality. Or, at least, with a rational morality of the sort with which philosophers have been concerned, which is a morality supported by evidence and arguments, not by "appeals to nature." That former sort of morality is a structured, coherent, intentionally created and adopted set of rules governing interactions between moral agents in a social setting. Indeed, those innate dispositions can sometimes lead to profoundly immoral actions.

Nor is there any "widening circle of care" of the sort you describe. People care for things they value, whether it be their kids, their spouse, their house, or their motorcycle. A carpenter takes care of his tools, a musician his instrument, a soldier his weapon. Mothers, human and many (but not all) animals, are pre-programmed to value, and thus care for, their young. People in kinship-based tribal societies come to value their kin, with whom they've been associated since birth and with whom they have personal relationships, and with whom they interact and cooperate every day. For most people there is no "widening" beyond that. You don't care for that you don't value, and you don't value things, including people, for which you have no use and with whom you have no relationships. Now, some people, per some religious or other indoctrination, may believe they "ought" to value, not only strangers, but such inanimate things as art, "nature," history and historic objects, etc., and may pay lip service to those "obligatory values." But as with all values, to see how highly they actually value them we observe their voluntary actions with respect to them:

"The average percent of income donated to charity by levels of income is sadly very low across the board. According to several of the largest charitable foundations, the average income donated to charity ranges from just 3% to 5% of annual gross income."

https://www.financialsamurai.com/the-av ... o-charity/
Gertie
Posts: 2181
Joined: January 7th, 2015, 7:09 am

Re: Morals and values --- how are they related?

Post by Gertie »

GE Morton wrote: November 14th, 2022, 9:26 pm
Gertie wrote: November 14th, 2022, 3:56 pm
Now, many animals, including most humans, do have certain instincts or dispositions to act in certain ways that are often described as "moral," e.g., the care of mothers for their offspring, of kin for kin, mates for mates, etc., but it is a mistake to confuse these innate dispositions --- which do indeed have survival value --- with morality (Patricia Churchland, whose views are similar to yours, makes this mistake).
''Morality'' is an abstract concept created by humans. What Churchland does is explain what we currently understand as the evolutionary under-pinnings of what we've come to conceptualise as ''morality''. Specifically in terms of the widening of the 'circle of care', from self, to off-spring, to kith and strangers. And the neurobiological mechanisms which seem to play key roles in our species.
Well, what I've argued above is that morality has no "evolutionary underpinnings" --- that the natural and innate dispositions of mothers to care for their young, kin to care for kin, etc., have nothing to do with morality. Or, at least, with a rational morality of the sort with which philosophers have been concerned, which is a morality supported by evidence and arguments, not by "appeals to nature." That former sort of morality is a structured, coherent, intentionally created and adopted set of rules governing interactions between moral agents in a social setting. Indeed, those innate dispositions can sometimes lead to profoundly immoral actions.

Nor is there any "widening circle of care" of the sort you describe. People care for things they value, whether it be their kids, their spouse, their house, or their motorcycle. A carpenter takes care of his tools, a musician his instrument, a soldier his weapon. Mothers, human and many (but not all) animals, are pre-programmed to value, and thus care for, their young. People in kinship-based tribal societies come to value their kin, with whom they've been associated since birth and with whom they have personal relationships, and with whom they interact and cooperate every day. For most people there is no "widening" beyond that. You don't care for that you don't value, and you don't value things, including people, for which you have no use and with whom you have no relationships. Now, some people, per some religious or other indoctrination, may believe they "ought" to value, not only strangers, but such inanimate things as art, "nature," history and historic objects, etc., and may pay lip service to those "obligatory values." But as with all values, to see how highly they actually value them we observe their voluntary actions with respect to them:

"The average percent of income donated to charity by levels of income is sadly very low across the board. According to several of the largest charitable foundations, the average income donated to charity ranges from just 3% to 5% of annual gross income."

https://www.financialsamurai.com/the-av ... o-charity/
If you want to understand how humans came to conceptualise their feelings of right and wrong, eventually coming up with rational theories, you can't ignore our evolutionary development as a social species.  If we were super-smart lizzards whose over-riding  concern was our own survival and welfare, our morality and values would reflect that.  But we're not, we're social mammals with a specific neurobiological evolutionary history, which 'required' us to care for our off-spring because they're born helpless.  (Unlike reptiles who can abandon their off-spring born in protective shells with an inbuilt food supply until they're ready to fend for themselves).  That's why the thought of mothers hurting or killing their children is horrific to us, feels so wrong.

Once that caring for others neurological mechanism is in place for mothers, it can adapt to care for other kin and kith, and empathy can be stimulated for strangers too. But the specific settings which gave rise to our specific neurobiological mechanisms aren't necessarily a good fit for how we live now. (Which is another good reason to try to understand our biases, who we naturally care about and why. How those buttons also get pushed in terms of conceiving the 'other' as competitor or threat too). On top of that we have rational reasons for engaging in behaviour to help and cooperate with others.  And the big picture ends up incredibly complex.  But human notions of right and wrong are rooted in, or under-pinned by, the sort of evolutionary neurobiological story Churchill outlines.  And right and wrong is what distinguishes morality.

Later came the process of going  about creating systemic rational formulations of what is right and wrong.  Where all sorts of other factors can come into play depending on the cultural setting. From defining the good as something which objectively exists in God, given to us and arbitrated by God's revelations to us, to the notion that  morality is completely subjective and so anything goes.

Associating what we value as individuals as The Good is close to the 'anything goes' latter, if it is unchained from the notion of the common good, or care for others.  It's lizzard brain morality, or the morality of psychopathy.  To escape such a solipsistic morality we need to acknowledge there is something meaningfully worthwhile about the welfare of others.  And to think beyond the neurobiological under-pinnings.

And that's where you and I agree - that the qualiative nature of conscious experience is what under-pins oughts in our interactions with others.  And that belongs to all experiencing subjects.  The onus to respect that foundation falls onto moral agents, because they have agency and choice, but it's the having of qualiative experience which ultimately justifies notions of right and wrong and oughts. That's the foundational framing, which should ground how we treat other subjects in a moral framework. (As opposed to our evolved biases, tho they're nigh on impossible to ignore, and so social groups have to incorporate them thoughtfully to be successful. Understanding them better is helpful in that of course)

It's a social framing, which draws others in simply by dint of their ability to flourish or suffer. I don't have to personally value every person or critter to understand my moral duty towards them.  My neurobiology naturally prioritises my circle of care, but I can rationally extend that circle when it comes to my behaviour. And  I don't have to feel a moral duty towards my tools if I'm a carpenter, even if I value them in helping me make a living. I do have a moral duty to my employees and customers tho, because unlike my hammer and saw,  they have an experiential stake in the state of affairs.
Post Reply

Return to “Ethics and Morality”

2023/2024 Philosophy Books of the Month

Entanglement - Quantum and Otherwise

Entanglement - Quantum and Otherwise
by John K Danenbarger
January 2023

Mark Victor Hansen, Relentless: Wisdom Behind the Incomparable Chicken Soup for the Soul

Mark Victor Hansen, Relentless: Wisdom Behind the Incomparable Chicken Soup for the Soul
by Mitzi Perdue
February 2023

Rediscovering the Wisdom of Human Nature: How Civilization Destroys Happiness

Rediscovering the Wisdom of Human Nature: How Civilization Destroys Happiness
by Chet Shupe
March 2023

The Unfakeable Code®

The Unfakeable Code®
by Tony Jeton Selimi
April 2023

The Book: On the Taboo Against Knowing Who You Are

The Book: On the Taboo Against Knowing Who You Are
by Alan Watts
May 2023

Killing Abel

Killing Abel
by Michael Tieman
June 2023

Reconfigurement: Reconfiguring Your Life at Any Stage and Planning Ahead

Reconfigurement: Reconfiguring Your Life at Any Stage and Planning Ahead
by E. Alan Fleischauer
July 2023

First Survivor: The Impossible Childhood Cancer Breakthrough

First Survivor: The Impossible Childhood Cancer Breakthrough
by Mark Unger
August 2023

Predictably Irrational

Predictably Irrational
by Dan Ariely
September 2023

Artwords

Artwords
by Beatriz M. Robles
November 2023

Fireproof Happiness: Extinguishing Anxiety & Igniting Hope

Fireproof Happiness: Extinguishing Anxiety & Igniting Hope
by Dr. Randy Ross
December 2023

Beyond the Golden Door: Seeing the American Dream Through an Immigrant's Eyes

Beyond the Golden Door: Seeing the American Dream Through an Immigrant's Eyes
by Ali Master
February 2024

2022 Philosophy Books of the Month

Emotional Intelligence At Work

Emotional Intelligence At Work
by Richard M Contino & Penelope J Holt
January 2022

Free Will, Do You Have It?

Free Will, Do You Have It?
by Albertus Kral
February 2022

My Enemy in Vietnam

My Enemy in Vietnam
by Billy Springer
March 2022

2X2 on the Ark

2X2 on the Ark
by Mary J Giuffra, PhD
April 2022

The Maestro Monologue

The Maestro Monologue
by Rob White
May 2022

What Makes America Great

What Makes America Great
by Bob Dowell
June 2022

The Truth Is Beyond Belief!

The Truth Is Beyond Belief!
by Jerry Durr
July 2022

Living in Color

Living in Color
by Mike Murphy
August 2022 (tentative)

The Not So Great American Novel

The Not So Great American Novel
by James E Doucette
September 2022

Mary Jane Whiteley Coggeshall, Hicksite Quaker, Iowa/National Suffragette And Her Speeches

Mary Jane Whiteley Coggeshall, Hicksite Quaker, Iowa/National Suffragette And Her Speeches
by John N. (Jake) Ferris
October 2022

In It Together: The Beautiful Struggle Uniting Us All

In It Together: The Beautiful Struggle Uniting Us All
by Eckhart Aurelius Hughes
November 2022

The Smartest Person in the Room: The Root Cause and New Solution for Cybersecurity

The Smartest Person in the Room
by Christian Espinosa
December 2022

2021 Philosophy Books of the Month

The Biblical Clock: The Untold Secrets Linking the Universe and Humanity with God's Plan

The Biblical Clock
by Daniel Friedmann
March 2021

Wilderness Cry: A Scientific and Philosophical Approach to Understanding God and the Universe

Wilderness Cry
by Dr. Hilary L Hunt M.D.
April 2021

Fear Not, Dream Big, & Execute: Tools To Spark Your Dream And Ignite Your Follow-Through

Fear Not, Dream Big, & Execute
by Jeff Meyer
May 2021

Surviving the Business of Healthcare: Knowledge is Power

Surviving the Business of Healthcare
by Barbara Galutia Regis M.S. PA-C
June 2021

Winning the War on Cancer: The Epic Journey Towards a Natural Cure

Winning the War on Cancer
by Sylvie Beljanski
July 2021

Defining Moments of a Free Man from a Black Stream

Defining Moments of a Free Man from a Black Stream
by Dr Frank L Douglas
August 2021

If Life Stinks, Get Your Head Outta Your Buts

If Life Stinks, Get Your Head Outta Your Buts
by Mark L. Wdowiak
September 2021

The Preppers Medical Handbook

The Preppers Medical Handbook
by Dr. William W Forgey M.D.
October 2021

Natural Relief for Anxiety and Stress: A Practical Guide

Natural Relief for Anxiety and Stress
by Dr. Gustavo Kinrys, MD
November 2021

Dream For Peace: An Ambassador Memoir

Dream For Peace
by Dr. Ghoulem Berrah
December 2021