An approach to objective Morality that is actually coherent?

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Alexander_Reiswich
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An approach to objective Morality that is actually coherent?

Post by Alexander_Reiswich »

Hello! I'm studying the subject of objective Morality and would like to share a few of my findings. In particular, I've come across an approach that actually seems (surprisingly) simple and coherent and doesn't lead to absurd conclusions when tested (as far as I'm able to ascertain). It'd be great to receive critical feedback, as I'm not sure if there's something I'm missing. Also, I'm wondering if this is perhaps an already known and existing approach that I coincidentally stumbled upon (possibly outside of classical philosophical approaches).

To make it more digestible, I'll divide this post into 4 parts:

1) What does "objective" Morality even mean?
2) Problems with existing approaches
3) Definitions
4) Explanation and examples

Feel free to jump to part 4 if you'd first like to get a sense of the approach I'm presenting here.

1) What does "objective" Morality even mean?
Conditional precepts -- a.k.a. "hypothetical imperatives" -- are not philosophically challenging. It's self-evident that if you want X, there are better and worse methods for attaining it. These methods are objective in the sense that they're based on external reality. As such, they have the potential for consistently leading to the same conclusions, everything else being equal. For example, if you want to lose weight, activities such as regular exercise and an optimized diet will consistently lead to the desired results (assuming no debilitating medical condition etc.).

However, the desire that motivates a hypothetical imperative is always subjective, meaning it's dependent upon a subject. It's perfectly possible for one person to want to lose weight, and for another to want to gain weight. Both people will have to follow different or opposite hypothetical imperatives in order to achieve their individual goals. But both desires are perfectly valid, relative to each subject.

This is all well and good, but the problem of subjectivity is that it can't be universalized; what's good for me doesn't have to be good for someone else. The ability to derive subjective goals or preferences without reference to a subject is a hard philosophical problem (I would argue it's entirely impossible).

This is a challenge for Morality -- if what we ought to do is inseparably connected to our subjective experience, then to require others to follow our values is logically illegitimate. Who's to say whose values are truly "right"?

As such, an objective approach to Morality would have to be not based on values at all, as values can't objectively inform us on what we should value.

This is of course a bit tricky, since a Morality separated from values is not trivial to conceive of. In the next section, I'll briefly cover the two predominant approaches at tackling this challenge and their shortcomings.


2) Problems with existing approaches to objective Morality
Deontological ethics attempt to identify right and wrong without reference to values and personal preferences. However, they are a bit of a disappointment. If you think about it, Kant's categorical imperative is actually just a concealed hypothetical imperative. Each of Kant's formulations is based on values: the first formulation asks us to value universalizability. The second asks us to value ends in themselves. The third asks us to value autonomy. As such, we're left with the question: why should we value any of these things?

Granted, it's possible to make fairly convincing arguments in favor of these particular values and Kant certainly did. But at the end of the day, all arguments regarding subjective values are still subjective, even if one of those values is universality (which is arguably an essential property of objectivity). If you were to remove values from the categorical imperative, it would simply no longer work. This means that Kant's approach is not actually objective -- it's every bit as subjective as any subjective moral system, just based on less emotionally laden, more detached and abstract values, thus giving it the "vibe" of objectivity. But being a subjective system, it can't be morally expected from others. Hence, it's not something that can be used in the context of justice or legislation, where true objectivity is required.

Furthermore, CI does not inform us about why something is moral or immoral, to what degree and in what sense exactly. For example, is lethal self-defense permissible? What would be the correct punishment for different kinds of offenses against perfect duties? What does it mean for something to be immoral when it can't be punished (suicide)?

Diametrically opposed to the deontological approach to Morality is the consequentialist approach, which is of course also centered around values, but offers a clever method to circumvent the problem of subjectivism in the form of utilitarianism: the basic idea is that the most probable future state providing the greatest increase in (subjective) pleasure is objectively the best course of action. This appears to be almost tautological on the surface, until you consider it a bit more deeply: should we prefer to increase pleasure or decrease / not increase suffering? Should we strive for an equal distribution of pleasure or maximize it where it has the greatest effect? Should the distribution further be dependent upon the already existing happiness value of each individual or should every subject be viewed as a blank slate? etc.

These and potentially many other questions -- which must be considered in every hedonic calculation -- are all based on subjective values. There simply is no right and wrong answer to them, meaning that even if we had perfect foresight, it would still not be possible to arrive at consistent conclusions, because as soon as there's a difference to any one of these questions, the end result will be different.

This means that utilitarianism, just as the categorical imperative, is only usable as a subjective ethical framework, which -- although perfectly useful from a personal point of view -- can't be reasonably scaled up and utilized objectively across the board.


3) Definitions
Morality can be a rather confusing subject due to varying and inconsistently used definitions. I would therefore like to take the time to define some of the relevant terms. I don't claim that these are the "correct" or only viable definitions; just that these are the ones I'll be using because they're coherent (I hope). They'll play into the approach of objective Morality I'll describe in part 4.

Let's begin by defining the term "concept": a concept is an abstract idea, which can either be explicitly described or represented by a single term, backed by an implicit definition. Concepts are mental constructs that do not exist in a physical sense, but they can reference physical objects. They can also reference immaterial properties such as quantities and relationships, as well as ideal abstract shapes or even impossible objects (i.e. penrose triangle, hypercube).

Concepts can be either internally consistent or contradictory. The former is considered valid, the latter invalid.

If a concept can be mapped to external reality in some way, it is considered objective. How well it maps to reality has no bearing on it being objective. A vague concept that references a real-world entity or effect is as objective as a highly precise concept, just that the former is less accurate than the latter.

A concept that is both valid and accurately maps to reality is considered true. If it's either invalid or sufficiently inaccurate it's considered false.

You may notice that I explicitly do not make objectivity dependent upon accuracy. For example, saying that the earth is flat would be an objective statement, because it refers to the property (shape) of an object. However, it doesn't map well to observable reality and as such is false -- but still objective. This distinction is relevant because if we make accuracy a hard requirement for objectivity, it will become virtually impossible and hence conceptually useless.

When concepts include the viewpoint of a subject, they are considered subjective. A subjective viewpoint can be a sense-based experience or an evaluation. For example, if I see a brown cat at night, it will appear grey to me. So subjectively it's grey (which is a valid observation, but not true), but objectively it's brown (which would be a true, but not exceedingly accurate statement). Both statements are perfectly correct in their own context, but the subjective and objective domains must never be confused.


4) Explanation and examples
Now let us review an approach to objective Morality that seems to satisfy the aforementioned requirements. It works in terms of duties and rights, but not necessarily as we colloquially know them.

A moral right is not something you have by virtue of being human, neither is it self-evident or "god-given". Rather, a moral right logically emerges when it is (consistently) respected, based on objectively measurable behavior. For example, if I am consistently truthful, I can claim the right to not be lied to. But don't let this confuse you: this is not an appeal to values. Claiming a right to honesty is not the same as saying "you should be honest with me". Rather, it's merely pointing out a causal relationship: "as long as you respect my right, I will respect your right. If you don't respect my right, I won't respect yours."

Having a right to honesty does not require an evaluation of honesty. We don't both have to agree that honesty is "good". Consensus is irrelevant. There is no need to establish a hierarchy of values.

Now, a moral duty can be defined as the required action (or inaction) to satisfy a claimed right. So for example, if I claim the right to not be lied to, I have duty to be truthful.

Moral rights and duties only exist relative to other subjects, since they encapsulate interactions between individuals (within a social context). When I claim a right, I claim it specifically from other individuals. I can't claim it from the universe, so to speak. So for example, there is no such thing as a "right to life", because we can die from causes that are completely unrelated to the actions of other people, i.e. sickness, accidents, natural disasters, etc.

However, I can claim a right to not be murdered by virtue of not murdering other people.

By the way, it's important to keep in mind that "claiming" a right is not to be understood literally. Just like one does not declare bankruptcy by literally declaring bankruptcy, one does not claim a right by claiming to have it. It happens implicitly via an action. So even an animal that can't speak can claim a right, in principle.

I'd also like to emphasize that having a moral right does not magically force others to respect it. This is a crucial aspect of this approach to objective Morality. Other people do of course have the ability to not respect your particular right. However, this permits you (or anyone else, really) to not respect their corresponding right. Nothing more, nothing less.

So for example, stealing -- just like any other action -- is not inherently "immoral". Rather, it is immoral to steal from someone who has a credible right to not be stolen from (i.e. someone who respects the property rights of others). However, stealing from someone who has no credible right to not be stolen from is not immoral, in a very similar sense as it's not immoral to claim an object that you find in the wild as your property.

Just now I touched upon another concept that is essential to this approach: credibility. Credibility or "trust" in the context of objective Morality should be understood in much the same sense as "certainty" in the context of a scientific theory. Moral credibility is developed, or "earned", on the basis of consistent demonstrations of respect in regard to a particular right ("fulfilling one's moral duty"). Naturally, it can be lost by failing to fulfill one's moral duty. But it can also be regained by paying amends and credibly demonstrating the intent to respect that particular right in the future. Even though "trust" has a subjective ring to it, this is actually an objective approach, as it can be measured by actual actions.

Now, I don't think anything of what I just wrote sounds terribly unusual or revolutionary. But when we apply it to moral questions, it actually works. Not only does it inform us about what is and isn't moral, but also why, to what extent and what would constitute an appropriate response.

Let's start with one of the classics: is lying immoral? The precise (and arguably correct) answer is: it is immoral to lie to people who claim a right to not be lied to (implicitly by virtue of not lying to others). What this means is that lying by itself is not a mortal offense. If you claim the right to not be lied to, but are lied to, you don't get the right to murder the offender. You do, however, have the right to not consider them credible. As such, the proper punishment for a liar is to not give them the benefit of the doubt. In more serious cases of trust-breaching, we might even want to take away their right to sign contracts. However, it is not morally permissible to incarcerate, coerce or hurt liars, assuming their lies did not cause physical harm to others.

How about theft? Again, theft is immoral relative to those who can credibly claim to have the right not to be stolen from. A thief therefore does not have a right to not be stolen from, or in other words, they don't have a right to property. The appropriate punishment for a thief is therefore not to do transactions with them. A thief has no right to purchase any kind of property until they have properly reimbursed those they have stolen from and made a credible effort to change their behavior in the future. Again, a thief can't be incarcerated, coerced or hurt / murdered solely on the basis of not respecting property rights. It becomes a different issue of course if there is a credible reason to believe that they might not respect other types of rights. But the point is that on the basis of this approach, we can objectively determine that i.e. hacking off the hand of a simple thief is the incorrect punishment and immoral.

Things like robbery, assault and rape constitute an aggressive, physical form of coercion and as such can legitimately be met with physical coercion. After all, it is immoral to physically coerce those who have a credible right to not be physically coerced. This forms the basis for self-defense.

The same logic can be applied to murder. However, there is a difference between murder and killing. A murder is a special type of killing, which requires certain conditions to be met: it must be intentionally caused by another subject and against the will of the victim. This becomes even clearer if we think of our bodies in terms of our "property". If I give someone permission to destroy my property, no right is being violated, as the act is sanctioned by the legitimate owner. Similarly, if I choose to destroy my body or permit someone else to do so, no right is violated.

This essentially means that euthanasia / suicide are not somehow inherently immoral. The reason why we should nonetheless be very careful with it is due to "credibility": how certain can we be that the person intending to commit suicide is in their right mind? How credible is their claim that their decision has been fully considered and is worthy of our respect? This is actually a perfectly objective question that can be examined on the basis of facts; for example, an old person with a painful, terminal illness should be taken much more seriously in their intent than a heartbroken teenager.

This approach to Morality works in every context. For instance, let's say you find yourself in the jungle where you have to kill other animals to survive. Do you have a right to do so? Sure, you just claim that right. All it means is that the tigers and crocodiles living there have the same right in regard to you. Now, if you come across a being intelligent enough that you can communicate with it (doesn't have to be a human, necessarily), you can claim more "civilized" rights, such as not being stolen from and not being murdered. You do this simply by virtue of respecting them in your counterpart.

Lastly, we can apply this approach to the trolley problem. Because why not? :) First, let's start with a simple variation: you enter a control room and find that a few people are stuck on a train track, soon to be killed by an oncoming train. You can press a button to switch the track, thus saving these people. Do you have a moral duty to save them? The answer is no. Sure, assuming these are innocent people, they have a right to not be murdered. But assuming they were not set up by you, they have no right to not be killed by an incoming train. If you have randomly found yourself in this room and you have no idea how any of the machinery there works or what is happening, nor the time to figure it all out, what your inaction would mean is that "you don't have a right to be randomly saved by an unrelated passerby from a deadly trap that you somehow found yourself in". That's it. Nobody has a legitimate right to punish you for this.

Now, this calculation changes if we alter the variables. For example, say the operator was injured and has instructed you on what to do exactly in order to save those people. You enter the control room and find the correct switch without issue. You know exactly what to do -- but you decide not to press it, for whatever reason. Maybe you just didn't like their faces or yearned to see a bloody spectacle. In this case, you would lose your right to not be murdered in a specific way (second-degree murder). This means that you could morally be incarcerated and left to starve to death (doesn't necessarily mean that we should enforce this punishment, unless we can be certain beyond reasonable doubt that you have no hope for redemption).

Everything changes again if we say that there is another person on the other track. This case is actually even simpler than the previous version, because there is no optimal option available. Evaluating human lifes is a subjective judgement, so no objective verdict can be made. For example, if the solitary person on the other track is your brother, it would be subjectively perfectly rational for you to not press the switch. All that would imply is that you as a stranger can't claim to be preferred over a family member in a life and death situation. But it would not hurt your claim to your right to not be murdered, considering you were not responsible for that entire situation in any way.

If we switch to the variation that requires us to throw a fat man on the rails to stop the train and thus save the others, we'll find that it would be a rather clear-cut case of first degree murder. The fat man is not responsible for the situation in any way and has a right to not be murdered. Assuming he isn't willing to go along with your idea, you throwing him on the tracks constitutes murder. As such, you would lose your credibility to your right to not be murdered. However, this does not mean that you should therefore receive the capital punishment. The credibility to a right is neither constant nor permanent. Given enough time and effort, a pathway to redemption is always possible. This would of course include an appropriate restitution in regards to the fat man's relatives and friends, but also the community as a whole to convince them that your intent was earnest and you really were just dealt a bad hand. Therefore, it is subjectively preferable to not do anything in this situation, as you can't be held responsible for something you haven't caused, unless you really, really want to save the five people.

I'm sure that I have forgotten to mention or properly explain a couple of important elements, so please let me know if anything's unclear. Otherwise any feedback is welcome.
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thrasymachus
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Re: An approach to objective Morality that is actually coherent?

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Are you saying that if a person has been raped, the person that has done the raping has given up the right not to be raped? And so a just response would be to rape the rapist?

Frankly your morality by negative reciprocity seems to justify a great deal that that is patently immoral. Not so far from lex talionis, is it?
Alexander_Reiswich
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Re: An approach to objective Morality that is actually coherent?

Post by Alexander_Reiswich »

thrasymachus wrote: January 27th, 2023, 12:44 pm Are you saying that if a person has been raped, the person that has done the raping has given up the right not to be raped? And so a just response would be to rape the rapist?

Frankly your morality by negative reciprocity seems to justify a great deal that that is patently immoral. Not so far from lex talionis, is it?
No, that's not what I'm proposing -- that's a terrible idea 😅

The effects of an offense are subjective, which is why the idea of an eye for an eye is utterly morally bankrupt. For example, it's possible that being raped would only constitute a mild inconvenience for the perpetrator (possibly not even that), while it might have caused life-long trauma to their victim.

The entire point of my proposition is to avoid subjective considerations -- which is not to say that they're irrelevant, just that they must never influence the process itself, in the same sense as subjective opinions must never influence mathematical calculations. This is because math, just as objective Morality, is a descriptive logical discipline, which is designed to inform, not to prescribe.

Since this is an attempt to derive Morality objectively, there is no concept of punishment from the get-go. Rather, it's exact meaning is derived on the basis that a right was lost, and therefore must be earned again. Normally, a right is earned by respecting it in other people. But once it's lost, additional measures are necessary.

So how can a rapist definitively demonstrate that they will respect other people's right not to be raped in the future?
Well, there's one obvious way: through castration.

But don't get me wrong: I'm not saying that this is the "one true correct punishment for rapists". Rather, it's an option that should be provided to the rapist. If they accept it, they can avoid imprisonment (assuming they aren't violent or otherwise dangerous, of course). But they don't have to accept it and instead face a prison sentence (or even propose another way to convincingly re-earn their lost right).

This only concerns the duty that the perpetrator owes to the society they live in, but it goes without saying that they also have a duty towards their victim, whom they must recompense for the damage inflicted, in order to fully reclaim their lost right.

In this way, I would argue that my proposed approach is the opposite of the law of retaliation -- it informs us exactly what would constitute appropriate responses to resolve a moral violation and restore lost moral rights, rather than just naively (and subjectively) presume that a punishment equivalent to the offense somehow magically solves anything.
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thrasymachus
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Re: An approach to objective Morality that is actually coherent?

Post by thrasymachus »

Alexander_Reiswich wrote
The effects of an offense are subjective, which is why the idea of an eye for an eye is utterly morally bankrupt. For example, it's possible that being raped would only constitute a mild inconvenience for the perpetrator (possibly not even that), while it might have caused life-long trauma to their victim.

The entire point of my proposition is to avoid subjective considerations -- which is not to say that they're irrelevant, just that they must never influence the process itself, in the same sense as subjective opinions must never influence mathematical calculations. This is because math, just as objective Morality, is a descriptive logical discipline, which is designed to inform, not to prescribe.

Since this is an attempt to derive Morality objectively, there is no concept of punishment from the get-go. Rather, it's exact meaning is derived on the basis that a right was lost, and therefore must be earned again. Normally, a right is earned by respecting it in other people. But once it's lost, additional measures are necessary.

So how can a rapist definitively demonstrate that they will respect other people's right not to be raped in the future?
Well, there's one obvious way: through castration.

But don't get me wrong: I'm not saying that this is the "one true correct punishment for rapists". Rather, it's an option that should be provided to the rapist. If they accept it, they can avoid imprisonment (assuming they aren't violent or otherwise dangerous, of course). But they don't have to accept it and instead face a prison sentence (or even propose another way to convincingly re-earn their lost right).

This only concerns the duty that the perpetrator owes to the society they live in, but it goes without saying that they also have a duty towards their victim, whom they must recompense for the damage inflicted, in order to fully reclaim their lost right.

In this way, I would argue that my proposed approach is the opposite of the law of retaliation -- it informs us exactly what would constitute appropriate responses to resolve a moral violation and restore lost moral rights, rather than just naively (and subjectively) presume that a punishment equivalent to the offense somehow magically solves anything.
You think it is a matter of quantifying that right that is lost, and systematizing quantifications such that a given crime can be measurably assigned a punishment?

It sounds like you are affirming the plea deal: The rapist can be castrated, or accept a prison sentence, or whatever is agreeable as to what s/he owes. So the rape itself is not conceived as a rape, but rather an offense of a certain quantitative nature; quantitative because the rape offense itself is reduced to "cash value" if you will that is interchangeable. take castration off the table altogether, because we don't do that. Whatever you might feel would be commensurate with the crime, there is a level of civility in place that simply says no, and to remove this would do violence to this civility, as with, say, public executions: it does more harm to us as a people and a culture than it might serve the interests of justice. At any rate, the objectivity you have here is already in place, but it is simply realized in terms of the length of sentencing, the amount of a fine paid, community service, the parole system, and so on.

True, it can be argued that there is a certain quantification in this, but it is nothing new.
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Re: An approach to objective Morality that is actually coherent?

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thrasymachus wrote: January 28th, 2023, 2:21 pm You think it is a matter of quantifying that right that is lost, and systematizing quantifications such that a given crime can be measurably assigned a punishment?

It sounds like you are affirming the plea deal: The rapist can be castrated, or accept a prison sentence, or whatever is agreeable as to what s/he owes. So the rape itself is not conceived as a rape, but rather an offense of a certain quantitative nature; quantitative because the rape offense itself is reduced to "cash value" if you will that is interchangeable. take castration off the table altogether, because we don't do that. Whatever you might feel would be commensurate with the crime, there is a level of civility in place that simply says no, and to remove this would do violence to this civility, as with, say, public executions: it does more harm to us as a people and a culture than it might serve the interests of justice. At any rate, the objectivity you have here is already in place, but it is simply realized in terms of the length of sentencing, the amount of a fine paid, community service, the parole system, and so on.

True, it can be argued that there is a certain quantification in this, but it is nothing new.
It's not so much quantification, but rather categorization. I would argue that it's fairly trivial, philosophically, to partition and abstract an action into it's constituent parts. To stay with the example from before: rape is a form of coercion of a sexual kind. The coercion aspect is integral -- if you remove it completely, you're left with something different than "rape".

This informs us that a rapist is violating the right to not be coerced (at the very least). This insight is what provides us with the justification for using coercion against the offender (i.e. incarceration).

This is not self-evident; there is much debate about zero-tolerance policies and all kinds of ideas about how to "punish" (or not punish) offenders. One side would prefer more "civilized" responses, the other aims to maximize the deterrence effect. However, all of them base their arguments on opinions. Even if some kind of data from studies and such is provided, it's still often a matter of opinion how to interpret it.

It's not rare for courts to rule either too harshly or too leniently, because our laws don't have an objective basis and thus are both too vague and too complex at the same time.

For example, let's take the degrees of murder. This is considered a fairly sophisticated legal model, but when viewed through the lens of a more objective approach, it seems almost primitive.

The definition of "murder" alone is extremely weak: "the unlawful killing of a human being"

By this definition, we can just remove a few laws and thus get rid of murder completely. Problem solved -- no more murder.

But in reality, it's of course not "laws" that determine whether a killing constitutes murder or not; it's consent. For the government, however, it's important to make it dependent upon law, because in this way it gets to control what kind of murder gets punished or not. So right from the start, it's plain to see that we're not trying to define murder accurately and objectively, but rather in a way that's most useful to the government. We don't mind this, because we don't have an objective basis to compare it against.

From a law perspective we generally think in terms of three degrees of murder:

First degree: premeditated and intentional killing
Second degree: either intentional or not intentional killing, but not premeditated
Third degree / Manslaughter: non-intentional killing

The actual laws are of course much more complex and vary from state to state (and country to country, naturally). But these are in general the three categories.

They seem reasonable at first, but there's a problem: they don't take into consideration who the victim is. As such, based on these classifications, there's no difference between murdering a violent maniac and murdering a peaceful jogger in the park. Therefore, an entirely new set of laws pertaining to self-defense is required, which overrides the laws for murder when applicable. It becomes even more complicated if we include things like euthanasia and abortions. For these reasons, actual law books are tremendously complex, because they define various (fictional) legal constructs to deal with different kinds of questions and observations, without an underlying theory to connect them.

Now let's compare this with an objective first-principles approach, where there are only two questions that must be answered (pertaining to a murder case):
1) who of the people involved had a valid claim to not be murdered (and who didn't)
2) how much ownership for the act of murder can be attributed to the murderer

Let me explain: A right is valid to the degree it's respected through outward behavior, in relation to other people. Or put another way: a right is valid to the degree one acts as if one has a duty to preserve that right. This means that a right is put into question when one denies someone else the same right. For example, let's say I've entered a building and before closing the door I notice another person running away from an obviously deranged lunatic with a bloody axe. If I want to keep a valid claim to my right to not be murdered, it's my duty to let the fleeing person inside and then close the door after them to prevent the crazy person from entering. If I close the door before the fleeing person has entered and thus leave them to their own devices, my respect for the right to not be murdered would be put into question.

Within my proposed framework, we don't need a special concept of self-defense. For example, if someone in a crowded street pulls out a gun and starts shooting at you, but you grab their weapon from their hand and kill them with it, this wasn't self-defense. Rather, what happened was this:

The shooter demonstrated through their actions that they don't respect the right to not be murdered. You, who respect the right to not be murdered, had therefore a duty to stop them from exercising their claimed right to murder others. Since they've forfeited their right to not be murdered, it was permissible for you to murder them, so your respect for the right to not be murdered can't credibly be put into question.

This approach can be applied to any circumstance and explain exactly who is "guilty" and "innocent" and to what extent. For example, if some drunk guy starts pushing you around and you shoot him five times in the face as a response, here's what happens:

The drunk guy demonstrates through their actions that they don't respect the right to not be harassed. You, through your actions, claim the right to murder and thus violate the right to not be murdered by killing the drunk guy, who retained their right to not be murdered. As such, he is guilty of harassment, while you are guilty of murder (technically: you have lost credibility regarding your respect for the right to not be murdered).

By thinking about it from first principles, we can also see that premeditation is not actually a relevant concept, at all -- this principle is based on a misunderstanding. Let me demonstrate this with two hypothetical scenarios:

A) Bob is constantly harassed by his boss at work, so he decides to murder him. He makes a plan and executes it. As a result, this is considered first-degree murder.

B) Bob is constantly harassed by his boss at work, but he has not made any plans to murder him. However, one day he can't take it any longer and murders his boss in a fit of rage. As a result, this is considered second-degree murder.

What's the difference between these two scenarios? Does the premeditation really make case A "worse" somehow? No -- the only reason why case B feels "less evil" is because Bob's consciousness is clouded by his anger. In other words, his intentions aren't pure. The same consideration can be applied if he was under the influence of a drug, suffered from a mental disorder or was affected by any other kind of cognitive impairment, but also if he did not intend to kill and it happened by accident or if he was externally pressured / coerced to do it.

What this means is that first and second degree murder are not actually different categories -- rather, it's merely a question of how much ownership can be attributed to the act of murder. With this in mind, here is an overview of an improved classification of murder, ranked from "worst" to "permissible":

1) Murder of a person claiming a valid right to not be murdered, with full ownership attribution (i.e. fully intentional murder)
2) Murder of a person claiming a valid right to not be murdered, with some or no ownership attribution (i.e. accidental murder / manslaughter)
3) Murder of a person claiming an invalid / no right to not be murdered, with full ownership attribution (i.e. aggressive self defense or suicide assistance)
4) Murder of a person claiming an invalid / no right to not be murdered, with some or no ownership attribution (i.e. accidental self defense / freak accident)

Any type of murder can be mapped on this spectrum, without any need for complicated exceptions for self-defense or other circumstances. And this approach isn't just applicable to murder, but to literally anything else. In this way, we can derive objectively "correct" laws from nothing but logical considerations.
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thrasymachus
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Re: An approach to objective Morality that is actually coherent?

Post by thrasymachus »

Alexander_Reiswich wrote
Within my proposed framework, we don't need a special concept of self-defense. For example, if someone in a crowded street pulls out a gun and starts shooting at you, but you grab their weapon from their hand and kill them with it, this wasn't self-defense. Rather, what happened was this:

The shooter demonstrated through their actions that they don't respect the right to not be murdered. You, who respect the right to not be murdered, had therefore a duty to stop them from exercising their claimed right to murder others. Since they've forfeited their right to not be murdered, it was permissible for you to murder them, so your respect for the right to not be murdered can't credibly be put into question.
You are saying the offense in question creates the conditions of the moral/legal response? And this does agree with our moral intuitions, for we do not think execution is an appropriate response to five and dime theft; rather, execution is reserved for capital cases. So there is certainly something in the existing attitudes that is commensurate with what you say, as it is with lex talionis, namely that the punishment should "fit" the crime. But you want the prevailing description of bad behavior reduced to an implicit agreement we all have with each other regarding rights, one's right to be free of bludgeoning, harassment, robbery, and so on, so we should think of a person, in this legal framework, as a body of existing rights. Why should I pay to park on the street? Because I have agreed to the right we all have to have a police force, fire department, and the like, that is paid for in part by parking fees, and if someone lets the meter expire, s/he should be ticketed because there has been a forfeiture of the right to park.

I think this kind of thinking is already in place, yet the real difference you seem to be defending is the removal of terms that are hard to quantify, like intent, motivation, and the ways these figure into guilt and innocence. You want something clear as a bell, measured in objective terms of utility, as these are easily quantifiable. Of course, this emphasis on rights will face the usual complaints: my rights to be free of something against your rights to do something. This is only resolvable in laying out an objective, public generalization of rights, like we have now, and the sorting out of these, the homeless peron's right to ask for hand outs vis a vis my right to be free of their pestering on the bus, say, is no less an issue by objectifying rights. And as to ignoring intent, this will be problematic when you are trying to decide the degree of culpability, for there are degrees of guilt, as in the difference between intending to murder someone against the murder in a passionate rage. You want to call this the degree of "ownership can be attributed to the act of murder". But calling it this doesn't change the way the matter is legally/morally worked out. Only, when we refer to actual degrees of guilt or innocence, rather than how much of a right is given up, we deal more directly with the individual, and so, the element of just punishment and even retributive justice are in play, and, I would argue, as they should be, for this reflects the true nature of the conditions of our moral thinking. We WANT people to feel guilty, pronounced and declared guilty. It is not just a feeling. It is a reflection of the public sentiment that stands in judgment, not just of the act, but the person.
Carter Blunt
Posts: 54
Joined: February 16th, 2023, 10:50 pm

Re: An approach to objective Morality that is actually coherent?

Post by Carter Blunt »

To me, evil is simply harm done to someone without their consent. Sorry, your formula may be coherent, but it's so long-winded and bogged down with directions, I could barely follow along, let alone apply it in real life situations. To me, consent is a huge part of what makes something moral or not. If the cartels want to cut each other's faces off, that's just the rules they agreed to.
Good_Egg
Posts: 782
Joined: January 27th, 2022, 5:12 am

Re: An approach to objective Morality that is actually coherent?

Post by Good_Egg »

Seems to me that your approach is to duck the question of what the content of morality is, and jump straight to the question of what the just punishment is for immoral acts. Using as examples what we all agree to be immoral acts.

At first sight this seems to imply that your view of the content of morality is the same as Kant's. Wrongdoing is acting in a way that one would not wish to see universalized.
Because if one so acts, then the loss of the right not to be treated in that way is no punishment.

So I'm not seeing how your criticism of universalizability - as a subjective value that is thereby unfit to form the basis of public morality - doesn't apply equally to your own view. You're just assuming it rather than stating it.

Then a second point is about claiming a right. I'm sure you don't believe that one can do as one pleases to a baby because it has not claimed any rights. So rights are best seen as being possessed until deliberately waived, rather than as not possessed until deliberately claimed.
"Opinions are fiercest.. ..when the evidence to support or refute them is weakest" - Druin Burch
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