Leontiskos wrote: ↑February 23rd, 2023, 12:45 pm
Hello Morton. Allow me to quote a few of your posts to give a context for my rejoinder. I will label these sources for reference:
GEs1: . . .
GEs9:
I want to argue against a number of propositions that you hold:
- GEp1: Public morality is restricted to law. (Cf. GEs3)
Er, no, I said no such thing. I said that a theory of
public morality is
analogous to a system of traffic laws, in that both set forth rules of interaction governing actors in a certain setting, which rules have a particular purpose. Moreover, both are pragmatic undertakings --- whether the rules being proposed actually serve their stated purpose is objectively determinable, and they are subject to revision in light of experience.
[*]GEp2: It is not the moral philosopher's job to judge and shape feelings and emotions. (Cf. GEs1, GEs2, GEs5)
Yes. His job is to develop a sound, rationally-defensible moral theory. How anyone feels about it, or about anything else, not his concern.
[*]GEp3: It is not the moral philosopher's job to judge and shape values and beliefs. (Cf. GEs1, GEs8)[/list]
True with respect to values. Not true with respect to beliefs. Anyone who publicly promulgates a theory, regarding morality, physics, economics, or anything else, obviously seeks to instill or change certain beliefs.
First let me just state that I accept GEs4, and it can be used as an anchor. GEs4 is as follows:
GE Morton wrote: ↑February 12th, 2023, 12:47 pmThe task for moral philosophers is to specify, on rational grounds, what acts (by moral agents in a social setting) are permissible and impermissible, praiseworthy and condemnable.
It is crucial to note at the outset that an act of an agent is something which the agent
does. It is something which involves their will. Acts could therefore be as various as chopping down a tree, cutting someone's hair, affirming an argument, drawing a conclusion, accepting one's plight, kindling or giving vent to an emotion, or even thinking a thought. Internal phenomena can often be actions in one case and passions in another case. For example, we might think a thought intentionally and thus be responsible for the thought, or we might be accosted by thoughts that we in no way willed to think. Similarly, emotions sometimes happen to us without any volition on our part, and at other times we drum up, promote, or excite emotions willfully. These are all important distinctions.
A theory of public morality is concerned only with a certain class of acts --- those involving an interaction between moral agents. "Internal acts" are beyond the purview of the theory.
When I oppose GEp1, by 'law' I mean any system which regulates external acts or behavior.
Well, if that is what you mean by "law," then what I said above may be moot. Yes, the aim of a system of public morality is to regulate "external acts" --- but only those involving another moral agent. Chopping down a tree, if it affects no one else, is also beyond the purview of the theory.
Of course law does fall within the domain of moral philosophy, but moral philosophy is in no way restricted to law. Historically moral philosophy has also been concerned to aid individuals, providing them with the inner resources necessary to both fulfill and surpass the law.
As I've acknowledged previously, "morality" and even moral philosophy covers a lot of ground. I've mentioned Aristole's "virtue ethics." The central concern of writers in that school/vein can be roughly described as offering prescriptions, advice, for "living a good (satisfying, noble, fulfilling, etc.) life." Stocism and hedonism fall into that category. The main problem with all of those, including Aristotle's, is that what is to be counted as "good" or "satisfying" or "fulfilling" depends upon a person's interests, tastes, and values, all of which are subjective and idiosyncratic. As a result there are no possible rational arguments which can be brought to bear in favor of any of them. One is no more likely to persuade someone, via argument, that he "ought" to be more empathetic than persuading someone who hates onions that he "ought" to love them, or someone who prefers Beethoven to Mozart that he "ought" to prefer Mozart.
The hallmark of philosophy is systematic analysis of "fundamental" problems by via reason and reliance on evidence. From a previous post in this thread:
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Philosophical ethics, however, is ethical theorizing pursued via reason, i.e., supported by objective evidence and logic --- philosophy being rational inquiry into fundamental questions and rational analysis of fundamental concepts:
"There is wide agreement that philosophy (from the ancient Greek φίλος, phílos: "love"; and σοφία, sophía: "wisdom") is characterized by various general features: it is a form of rational inquiry, it aims to be systematic, and it tends to critically reflect on its own methods and presuppositions."
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy
"Philosophy, (from Greek, by way of Latin, philosophia, “love of wisdom”) the rational, abstract, and methodical consideration of reality as a whole or of fundamental dimensions of human existence and experience."
https://www.britannica.com/topic/philosophy
"But in all cultures philosophy requires that we think critically: to be clear, precise, well-organized, truthful, complete, and able to handle objections. The study of critical thinking is called logic.
"To be philosophical is to be a logical thinker who seeks knowledge of the whole. In this way philosophers avoid unsupported beliefs but base their views on good reason and evidence. Philosophers demand of themselves and others that they have reasoned logical belief."
https://www.depauw.edu/academics/depart ... hilosophy/
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"Moralities" based on personal interests, tastes, feelings, and values --- I call these "private moralities" --- not being rationally defensible, are not philosophically respectable, however personally satisfying some might find them. What can be approached rationally and evaluated empirically are principles and rules governing interactions between agents in a social setting. Note than nothing prevents a person from following a private morality he finds satisfying, unless it induces him to act in some way prohibited by a sound
public morality (assuming he so acts in a social setting).
Thus, there is no reason why the internal action of anger (as opposed to the passion) would be unrelated to public morality. Of course this does not mean that the state should punish anger in the same way that it punishes assault or murder, but it does mean that the moral philosopher will be concerned with anger. Indeed, to be concerned with assault but not with anger is to treat the symptom.
No, a moral philosospher is not concerned with anger (or if he is, he's venturing into the psychologist's baliwick). He will, of course, realize that anger may lead some persons to immoral acts. But his job is
to say what those acts are, and give some reasons for so saying. Explaining and perhaps modifying those behaviors is not his job.
You claim that feelings, emotions, values, and beliefs only enter into moral philosophy as the data which a libertarian system must take into account when devising its "traffic rules". This may be true for libertarianism, but moral philosophy is much broader than libertarianism. Moral philosophy has long been concerned to judge these "subjective" realities as good or bad, and to make them well-ordered by shaping them.
Some moral philosophers have been concerned with such matters, as I've acknowledged. So far they've not shifted the range of values and emotional responses found among humans one iota. Nor will they ever (though Norman Vincent Peale, Deepak Chopra, and other "pop" philosophers have clearly won converts).
BTW, there is nothing especially "libertarian" about the public morality I've outlined. It proceeds logically from postulates which most would concede are self-evident.