How Significant is 'Moral Feeling' and Compassion in Ethics?

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Ecurb
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Re: How Significant is 'Moral Feeling' and Compassion in Ethics?

Post by Ecurb »

Good_Egg wrote: February 23rd, 2023, 4:28 am @Gertie , it seems to me that your argument runs as follows:

A) morality is a goal-directed activity
B) the appropriate goal is the flourishing of sentient beings
C) compassion is that virtue which when we see a sentient being makes us desire to see it flourish, therefore compassion is the driving force of morality
D) whilst flourishing involves material and psychological elements, it all gets very complicated, so it is reasonable to focus on basic material needs.
E) therefore philosophies which permit basic material needs to go unmet are lacking in compassion and thus immoral.

Is that a fair summary of your position ?

I disagree with A). To see morality as seeking to bring about a goal is to miss the point. A goal-directed ethic judges acts to be right or wrong according to whether they help or hinder the bringing-about of the goal-state.

Which maps onto utilitarian ethics, but seems incompatible with other approaches.

A morality of rights says that it is wrong for Alfie to murder Bruno regardless of what goal Alfie seeks to pursue thereby, which therefore includes the possibility that Alfie has the objectively-right goal.

B) is hard to disagree with. But I note that sentience isn't a well-defined binary yes/no attribute.

How sentient do dolphins have to be before you think that a human project (?tidal power station?) that kills dolphins is morally wrong ?

How sentient do dolphins have to be before you think you have a moral duty to sail the seven seas ensuring that every dolphin gets enough to eat ?
Aren't you proposing a goal of individual rights and freedoms? The goal in Gertie's proposal need not be utilitarian -- it can be abstract. It can even be as abstract as loving one's neighbors, which would encompass helping them meet their material needs (probably).

Why is it wrong for Alfie to murder Bruno? For an ethos to be reasonable there must be some reason (i.e. goal).
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Re: How Significant is 'Moral Feeling' and Compasion in Ethics?

Post by Leontiskos »

Hello Morton. Allow me to quote a few of your posts to give a context for my rejoinder. I will label these sources for reference:

GEs1:
GE Morton wrote: February 9th, 2023, 12:43 pmValues and emotions are also entirely subjective and idiosyncratic. While values have an essential role in ethics, that subjectivity must be kept in mind, and no particular values enshrined in the postulates of the theory. If the aim of a moral theory is to maximize the welfare of all agents in a moral field (a social setting), and if each agent's welfare consists in maximizing what HE values (which it must), then the theory must be value-neutral.
GEs2:
GE Morton wrote: February 10th, 2023, 1:44 pmA philosophical ethics is not concerned with anyone's feelings; but only with their actions. Its aim is to develop a set of principles and rules constraining the behavior of moral agents in a social setting, i.e., what acts are permissible, prohibited, or obligatory.
GEs3:
GE Morton wrote: February 11th, 2023, 1:12 pmDevising a rational theory of public morality is analogous to devising a set of traffic laws for a highway system.
GEs4:
GE Morton wrote: February 12th, 2023, 12:47 pmThe task for moral philosophers is to specify, on rational grounds, what acts (by moral agents in a social setting) are permissible and impermissible, praiseworthy and condemnable.
GEs5:
GE Morton wrote: February 12th, 2023, 12:47 pmThe only ground for pronouncing a feeling (or impulse or interest) immoral or "wrong" is that it leads predictably to immoral acts.
GEs6:
GE Morton wrote: February 13th, 2023, 12:14 pmEthics, or morality, in general, is concerned with the behaviors of moral agents in a social setting which have effects on other agents or "moral subjects" in that setting. It aims to set forth principles and rules constraining those behaviors.
GEs7:
GE Morton wrote: February 14th, 2023, 8:50 pm... a philosophical (i.e., rationally justifiable) public moral code is [...] a set of principles and rules governing interactions between moral agents in a social setting.
GEs8:
GE Morton wrote: February 15th, 2023, 2:20 pmMorality is not concerned with what someone believes, but only with how they act.
GEs9:
GE Morton wrote: February 16th, 2023, 12:31 am
Ecurb wrote: February 15th, 2023, 4:51 pmIs morality limited to social interaction?
Not necessarily. There is also "virtue ethics" (e.g., Aristotle), per which the term refers to codes of behavior generally, and thus can apply even to Crusoe alone on his island. There are many such "private moralities" which have the aim of enabling the agent to live "a good life." I have no interest in those "moralities;" they can be based on religion, feelings, or even whimsy. To each his own (provided one's private morality does not conflict with a sound public morality). But the central focus of moral theories historically has been on public moralities, with the aim given above. When I speak of moral theory, I mean theories of public morality.
I want to argue against a number of propositions that you hold:
  • GEp1: Public morality is restricted to law. (Cf. GEs3)
  • GEp2: It is not the moral philosopher's job to judge and shape feelings and emotions. (Cf. GEs1, GEs2, GEs5)
  • GEp3: It is not the moral philosopher's job to judge and shape values and beliefs. (Cf. GEs1, GEs8)
First let me just state that I accept GEs4, and it can be used as an anchor. GEs4 is as follows:
GE Morton wrote: February 12th, 2023, 12:47 pmThe task for moral philosophers is to specify, on rational grounds, what acts (by moral agents in a social setting) are permissible and impermissible, praiseworthy and condemnable.
It is crucial to note at the outset that an act of an agent is something which the agent does. It is something which involves their will. Acts could therefore be as various as chopping down a tree, cutting someone's hair, affirming an argument, drawing a conclusion, accepting one's plight, kindling or giving vent to an emotion, or even thinking a thought. Internal phenomena can often be actions in one case and passions in another case. For example, we might think a thought intentionally and thus be responsible for the thought, or we might be accosted by thoughts that we in no way willed to think. Similarly, emotions sometimes happen to us without any volition on our part, and at other times we drum up, promote, or excite emotions willfully. These are all important distinctions.

-----

GEp1
("Public morality is restricted to law")

When I oppose GEp1, by 'law' I mean any system which regulates external acts or behavior. Note that there are internal acts and external acts. There is internal behavior and external behavior. Law regulates only the external acts or behavior.

Of course law does fall within the domain of moral philosophy, but moral philosophy is in no way restricted to law. Historically moral philosophy has also been concerned to aid individuals, providing them with the inner resources necessary to both fulfill and surpass the law.

This is not a merely private matter, as many moral philosophers throughout the ages concentrated on providing these inner resources--justice, goodness, compassion, proper values, proper beliefs, properly ordered emotions, etc.--precisely in order to fulfill and exceed the demands of the law. Of course on the classical view moral philosophy and law both have the same end: the flourishing of individual and society. But even if your libertarianism deviates from the classical view, it remains incorrect to claim that public morality is reducible to law. Internal acts are putatively moral insofar as they bear on someone's conception of morality. You yourself concede a piece of this in GEs5. Thus, there is no reason why the internal action of anger (as opposed to the passion) would be unrelated to public morality. Of course this does not mean that the state should punish anger in the same way that it punishes assault or murder, but it does mean that the moral philosopher will be concerned with anger. Indeed, to be concerned with assault but not with anger is to treat the symptom.

-----

GEp2
("It is not the moral philosopher's job to judge and shape feelings and emotions")

Again, I agree with GEs4, and the above should show why GEp2 contradicts GEs4. Feelings and emotions can be volitional, and since moral philosophy is concerned with more than just law the moral philosopher is well within his rights to concern himself with that subset of feelings and emotions which are related to volition.

-----

GEp3
("It is not the moral philosopher's job to judge and shape values and beliefs")

Again, I agree with GEs4, and the above should show why GEp3 contradicts GEs4. Values and beliefs can be volitional, and since moral philosophy is concerned with more than just law the moral philosopher is well within his rights to concern himself with that subset of values and beliefs which are related to volition.

We can see this by noting that when we offer arguments and draw conclusions, even during private deliberation, we are forming beliefs and extending values. For example, an angry man might reason to himself, "I ought to follow the law and the law says that I should not murder; but this act which I am now contemplating is murder; therefore I should not perform this act." Now the belief which flows from this conclusion is a belief which many a man has failed to adopt. If he does adopt the belief on the basis of the argument then his reasoning is sound and his belief is true. The conclusion and belief will in time harden into a value, and that value will also be praiseworthy.

(For now, and in the interest of length, I will table the libertarian retort, <"That would presume an objective standard of value, and there is no such thing.">)

You claim that feelings, emotions, values, and beliefs only enter into moral philosophy as the data which a libertarian system must take into account when devising its "traffic rules". This may be true for libertarianism, but moral philosophy is much broader than libertarianism. Moral philosophy has long been concerned to judge these "subjective" realities as good or bad, and to make them well-ordered by shaping them.
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Re: How Significant is 'Moral Feeling' and Compassion in Ethics?

Post by GE Morton »

Ecurb wrote: February 23rd, 2023, 12:02 pm
GE Morton wrote: February 22nd, 2023, 9:56 pm

The latter is possible. Values are subjective, and I cannot know whether you value the Army unless you exhibit some behavior supporting it in some way. Benefits, however, are objective. Assuming you value your life, freedom, property, etc., which we can confirm by your behavior, and your risks of losing them to an invading force are reduced by the existence of the Army, then you benefit from it, no matter what you say.
Good grief! I may be a foreign agent who WANTS my country to be successfully invaded. A foreign conquest may harm some people, and benefit others. You're just making this stuff up!
*Sigh*
Collecting payments for a building a house is not robbery. For whom the house was built and from whom the payments are demanded is irrelevant.
Huh? I'm sure you don't mean it, but you're saying that if we collect money from the tax payers to build houses for the homeless, that is not robbery. Thank goodness you've finally come to your senses GE. I'm glad my cogent and persuasive arguments have changed your mind. Another soul saved! Hallelujah! GE is now a powerful ally in the woke, leftie army!
Only if a private contractor could do the same. I need some roof repairs. Since you seem to agree with the above, I'll have the contractor bill you.

Er, you're not assuming governments enjoy some special moral status and are afforded privileges not possessed by contractors, are you?
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Re: How Significant is 'Moral Feeling' and Compassion in Ethics?

Post by GE Morton »

Good_Egg wrote: February 23rd, 2023, 4:28 am @Gertie , it seems to me that your argument runs as follows:

A) morality is a goal-directed activity
B) the appropriate goal is the flourishing of sentient beings
C) compassion is that virtue which when we see a sentient being makes us desire to see it flourish, therefore compassion is the driving force of morality
D) whilst flourishing involves material and psychological elements, it all gets very complicated, so it is reasonable to focus on basic material needs.
E) therefore philosophies which permit basic material needs to go unmet are lacking in compassion and thus immoral.

Is that a fair summary of your position ?

I disagree with A). To see morality as seeking to bring about a goal is to miss the point. A goal-directed ethic judges acts to be right or wrong according to whether they help or hinder the bringing-about of the goal-state.

Which maps onto utilitarian ethics, but seems incompatible with other approaches.

A morality of rights says that it is wrong for Alfie to murder Bruno regardless of what goal Alfie seeks to pursue thereby, which therefore includes the possibility that Alfie has the objectively-right goal.
Gertie can certainly answer for herself, and probably will, but you may be confusing the goal of a moral theory with the goals of individual agents. Every intentional act has a goal, some reason for doing it. Constructing a moral theory is no exception --- it aims to bring about a certain result. Alfie may have any of many goals in doing X, but a moral theory will be indifferent to those, as long as Alfie's doing X does not conflict with the goal of the theory. As Ecurb mentioned, if we deem murder to be wrong, there must some reason it is so deemed --- some state of affairs, or goal, that murder thwarts.

The goal of a moral theory, as I see it (and which is implicit in most moral codes historically) is to devise a set of principles and rules governing interactions between moral agents and "moral subjects" which enable all agents and subjects in a moral field (a social setting) to maximize their welfare.

A moral theory need not, of course, have that goal. But it is a plausible one, it's rationally defensible, and consistent with the central thrust of moral theorizing historically.
B) is hard to disagree with. But I note that sentience isn't a well-defined binary yes/no attribute.

How sentient do dolphins have to be before you think that a human project (?tidal power station?) that kills dolphins is morally wrong ?

How sentient do dolphins have to be before you think you have a moral duty to sail the seven seas ensuring that every dolphin gets enough to eat ?
Yes, the whole question of the obligations of moral agents to moral subjects ("animal rights") is problematic and entirely unsettled. There is a strong consensus that they have some "rights," but just what those are is contentious and difficult to answer. There does seem to be an emerging consensus that it varies by species.
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Leontiskos
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Re: How Significant is 'Moral Feeling' and Compassion in Ethics?

Post by Leontiskos »

JackDaydream wrote: February 8th, 2023, 2:22 pm When I refer to 'moral feeling' the main idea which I am thinking of is conscience, in addition to compassion and empathy. John Henry Newman spoke of the concept of conscience in the following way,
'Conscience has a legitimate place among our mental acts; as really so, as the action of memory, of reasoning, of imagination, or as the sense of the beautiful; that, as there are objects which, when presented to the mind, cause it to feel grief, regret, joy, or desire, so that there are things which excite in us approbation or blame, and which we in consequence call right or wrong...'
For Newman conscience is not a feeling. It is a judge which dictates whether one ought or ought not undertake some action; or in retrospect, whether one did the right thing. Even in the quote you provide he is contrasting objects which cause emotions with objects that cause approbation or blame.
JackDaydream wrote: February 8th, 2023, 2:22 pmHow Significant is 'Moral Feeling' and Compassion in Ethics?
"Moral feeling" would need to be defined. Empathy can be helpful in carrying out the Golden Rule. Compassion or pity can be good insofar as it helps avoid callousness and spurs us to come to another's aid. <Here> is what Aquinas says about mercy, if you are interested.

In <Aquinas' treatise on the passions of the soul> he talks about things like love, hatred, concupiscence (desire), delight, pain, sorrow, hope, despair, fear, daring, and anger. But none of these passions are intrinsically good or evil. It always depends whether they are in accord with reason (Cf. ST II.II.24.4). For example:
  • "We may consider the passions of the soul in two ways: first, in themselves; secondly, as being subject to the command of the reason and will. If then the passions be considered in themselves, to wit, as movements of the irrational appetite, thus there is no moral good or evil in them, since this depends on the reason, as stated above (I-II:18:5). If, however, they be considered as subject to the command of the reason and will, then moral good and evil are in them. Because the sensitive appetite is nearer than the outward members to the reason and will; and yet the movements and actions of the outward members are morally good or evil, inasmuch as they are voluntary. Much more, therefore, may the passions, in so far as they are voluntary, be called morally good or evil. And they are said to be voluntary, either from being commanded by the will, or from not being checked by the will."
  • (ST II.II.24.1)
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Re: How Significant is 'Moral Feeling' and Compassion in Ethics?

Post by Sy Borg »

GE Morton wrote: February 22nd, 2023, 9:37 pm
Sy Borg wrote: February 22nd, 2023, 3:43 pm
In other words, you are too lazy to go back and actually read what I said, which you failed to do the first time.
Yes, I am. You are making the claim. Hence the burden of proof rests upon you. You presumably know where these examples are to be found; it should be no trouble for you to supply a link to your own post you claim provides them.
I said it, and more than once. You missed it so the issue is yours.

Until you do the work, I'm not wasting my time. Besides, you simply don't have the intellectual chops to meaningfully contribute in this topic. All you offer is ideological claptrap and game-playing.

Your belief that no amount of inequality is too extreme shows the blindness that obsessive ideology can induce. In other words, you believe that imbalances are impossible, and that imbalances do no influence sustainability.

There's no pragmatism in your ideas, no respect for logic or history or even science, just raw partisan beliefs. Meanwhile, the US is riven by conflict directly attributable to competition for resources and you refuse to see it.

You focus on distractions - the bread and circuses of abortion, religion, treatment of queer people etc - but the core disagreement is financial. It always is, in the end. Ever more Americans cannot afford to live "the American dream". When millions cannot have what they expected as citizens of "the greatest goddam country in the world", while seeing billionaire wealth growing rapidly, they get angry. The Democrats were supposed to stop such imbalances, but they did nothing. Meanwhile Republicans widened the imbalances further.
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Re: How Significant is 'Moral Feeling' and Compassion in Ethics?

Post by Leontiskos »

GE Morton wrote: February 23rd, 2023, 2:16 pmEvery intentional act has a goal, some reason for doing it. Constructing a moral theory is no exception --- it aims to bring about a certain result. Alfie may have any of many goals in doing X, but a moral theory will be indifferent to those, as long as Alfie's doing X does not conflict with the goal of the theory. As Ecurb mentioned, if we deem murder to be wrong, there must some reason it is so deemed --- some state of affairs, or goal, that murder thwarts.
Consequentialism isn't the only game in town. Not all reasons are grounded by goals and consequences. Means-based analyses of acts are not exhaustive. Indeed, the claim that means-based analyses of acts are exhaustive is actually incoherent. One way to try to manage that incoherency is by turning morality into an arbitrary contract between a set of individuals, as libertarians do. Since everyone knows that morality is not an arbitrary contract, this only partially masks the incoherence.
GE Morton wrote: February 23rd, 2023, 2:16 pmEvery intentional act has a goal, some reason for doing it. Constructing a moral theory is no exception --- it aims to bring about a certain result.
Again, you mistakenly believe that your own approach to morality is the only approach to morality, like the man who has drawn a triangle and believes that every triangle must be exactly like his own. When one constructs a moral theory they will do so for some reason, but achieving a determinate result-state is not the only possible reason. Further, "Constructing moral theories" is likely as odd and artificial as it sounds. As Pierre Hadot has shown with respect to ancient philosophy, (moral) philosophy is much more than mere philosophical discourse.

An additional problem is that your dichotomy between "goals of moral theories" and "goals of individual agents" is not exhaustive, and fails to understand both Good_Egg's (A) and what Gertie probably is doing. When someone says that morality is a goal-oriented activity what they mean is that moral agents should act in such-and-such a way to achieve such-and-such a goal. This classic and commonsensical approach to morality no doubt gives libertarians a conniption fit. Be that as it may, defining non-libertarian options out of existence isn't particularly helpful.
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Re: How Significant is 'Moral Feeling' and Compasion in Ethics?

Post by GE Morton »

Leontiskos wrote: February 23rd, 2023, 12:45 pm Hello Morton. Allow me to quote a few of your posts to give a context for my rejoinder. I will label these sources for reference:

GEs1: . . .
GEs9:

I want to argue against a number of propositions that you hold:
  • GEp1: Public morality is restricted to law. (Cf. GEs3)
Er, no, I said no such thing. I said that a theory of public morality is analogous to a system of traffic laws, in that both set forth rules of interaction governing actors in a certain setting, which rules have a particular purpose. Moreover, both are pragmatic undertakings --- whether the rules being proposed actually serve their stated purpose is objectively determinable, and they are subject to revision in light of experience.
[*]GEp2: It is not the moral philosopher's job to judge and shape feelings and emotions. (Cf. GEs1, GEs2, GEs5)
Yes. His job is to develop a sound, rationally-defensible moral theory. How anyone feels about it, or about anything else, not his concern.
[*]GEp3: It is not the moral philosopher's job to judge and shape values and beliefs. (Cf. GEs1, GEs8)[/list]
True with respect to values. Not true with respect to beliefs. Anyone who publicly promulgates a theory, regarding morality, physics, economics, or anything else, obviously seeks to instill or change certain beliefs.
First let me just state that I accept GEs4, and it can be used as an anchor. GEs4 is as follows:
GE Morton wrote: February 12th, 2023, 12:47 pmThe task for moral philosophers is to specify, on rational grounds, what acts (by moral agents in a social setting) are permissible and impermissible, praiseworthy and condemnable.
It is crucial to note at the outset that an act of an agent is something which the agent does. It is something which involves their will. Acts could therefore be as various as chopping down a tree, cutting someone's hair, affirming an argument, drawing a conclusion, accepting one's plight, kindling or giving vent to an emotion, or even thinking a thought. Internal phenomena can often be actions in one case and passions in another case. For example, we might think a thought intentionally and thus be responsible for the thought, or we might be accosted by thoughts that we in no way willed to think. Similarly, emotions sometimes happen to us without any volition on our part, and at other times we drum up, promote, or excite emotions willfully. These are all important distinctions.
A theory of public morality is concerned only with a certain class of acts --- those involving an interaction between moral agents. "Internal acts" are beyond the purview of the theory.
When I oppose GEp1, by 'law' I mean any system which regulates external acts or behavior.
Well, if that is what you mean by "law," then what I said above may be moot. Yes, the aim of a system of public morality is to regulate "external acts" --- but only those involving another moral agent. Chopping down a tree, if it affects no one else, is also beyond the purview of the theory.
Of course law does fall within the domain of moral philosophy, but moral philosophy is in no way restricted to law. Historically moral philosophy has also been concerned to aid individuals, providing them with the inner resources necessary to both fulfill and surpass the law.
As I've acknowledged previously, "morality" and even moral philosophy covers a lot of ground. I've mentioned Aristole's "virtue ethics." The central concern of writers in that school/vein can be roughly described as offering prescriptions, advice, for "living a good (satisfying, noble, fulfilling, etc.) life." Stocism and hedonism fall into that category. The main problem with all of those, including Aristotle's, is that what is to be counted as "good" or "satisfying" or "fulfilling" depends upon a person's interests, tastes, and values, all of which are subjective and idiosyncratic. As a result there are no possible rational arguments which can be brought to bear in favor of any of them. One is no more likely to persuade someone, via argument, that he "ought" to be more empathetic than persuading someone who hates onions that he "ought" to love them, or someone who prefers Beethoven to Mozart that he "ought" to prefer Mozart.

The hallmark of philosophy is systematic analysis of "fundamental" problems by via reason and reliance on evidence. From a previous post in this thread:

-------------
Philosophical ethics, however, is ethical theorizing pursued via reason, i.e., supported by objective evidence and logic --- philosophy being rational inquiry into fundamental questions and rational analysis of fundamental concepts:

"There is wide agreement that philosophy (from the ancient Greek φίλος, phílos: "love"; and σοφία, sophía: "wisdom") is characterized by various general features: it is a form of rational inquiry, it aims to be systematic, and it tends to critically reflect on its own methods and presuppositions."

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy

"Philosophy, (from Greek, by way of Latin, philosophia, “love of wisdom”) the rational, abstract, and methodical consideration of reality as a whole or of fundamental dimensions of human existence and experience."

https://www.britannica.com/topic/philosophy

"But in all cultures philosophy requires that we think critically: to be clear, precise, well-organized, truthful, complete, and able to handle objections. The study of critical thinking is called logic.

"To be philosophical is to be a logical thinker who seeks knowledge of the whole. In this way philosophers avoid unsupported beliefs but base their views on good reason and evidence. Philosophers demand of themselves and others that they have reasoned logical belief."

https://www.depauw.edu/academics/depart ... hilosophy/
-------------

"Moralities" based on personal interests, tastes, feelings, and values --- I call these "private moralities" --- not being rationally defensible, are not philosophically respectable, however personally satisfying some might find them. What can be approached rationally and evaluated empirically are principles and rules governing interactions between agents in a social setting. Note than nothing prevents a person from following a private morality he finds satisfying, unless it induces him to act in some way prohibited by a sound public morality (assuming he so acts in a social setting).
Thus, there is no reason why the internal action of anger (as opposed to the passion) would be unrelated to public morality. Of course this does not mean that the state should punish anger in the same way that it punishes assault or murder, but it does mean that the moral philosopher will be concerned with anger. Indeed, to be concerned with assault but not with anger is to treat the symptom.
No, a moral philosospher is not concerned with anger (or if he is, he's venturing into the psychologist's baliwick). He will, of course, realize that anger may lead some persons to immoral acts. But his job is to say what those acts are, and give some reasons for so saying. Explaining and perhaps modifying those behaviors is not his job.
You claim that feelings, emotions, values, and beliefs only enter into moral philosophy as the data which a libertarian system must take into account when devising its "traffic rules". This may be true for libertarianism, but moral philosophy is much broader than libertarianism. Moral philosophy has long been concerned to judge these "subjective" realities as good or bad, and to make them well-ordered by shaping them.
Some moral philosophers have been concerned with such matters, as I've acknowledged. So far they've not shifted the range of values and emotional responses found among humans one iota. Nor will they ever (though Norman Vincent Peale, Deepak Chopra, and other "pop" philosophers have clearly won converts).

BTW, there is nothing especially "libertarian" about the public morality I've outlined. It proceeds logically from postulates which most would concede are self-evident.
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Re: How Significant is 'Moral Feeling' and Compassion in Ethics?

Post by GE Morton »

Sy Borg wrote: February 23rd, 2023, 5:30 pm
Until you do the work, I'm not wasting my time.
Ah. Still no link. Just a repetition of your unsupported claim, "I already gave examples."

That is your work to do, not mine.
Besides, you simply don't have the intellectual chops to meaningfully contribute in this topic. All you offer is ideological claptrap and game-playing . . .

Your belief that no amount of inequality is too extreme shows the blindness that obsessive ideology can induce . . .

There's no pragmatism in your ideas, no respect for logic or history or even science, just raw partisan beliefs . . .
And then some ad hominems.
Ever more Americans cannot afford to live "the American dream". When millions cannot have what they expected as citizens of "the greatest goddam country in the world", while seeing billionaire wealth growing rapidly, they get angry.
Oh, it may be true that many --- even "millions," perhaps --- cannot have what they expected. That is largely because their expectations, formed by indoctrination with lefty ideology, are unrealistic. They've come to believe they're "entitled" to various material goods merely because they exist, or because "they're Americans!"

Well, no, they're not.
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Re: How Significant is 'Moral Feeling' and Compasion in Ethics?

Post by Leontiskos »

GE Morton wrote: February 23rd, 2023, 9:19 pm
Leontiskos wrote: February 23rd, 2023, 12:45 pm Hello Morton. Allow me to quote a few of your posts to give a context for my rejoinder. I will label these sources for reference:

GEs1: . . .
GEs9:

I want to argue against a number of propositions that you hold:
  • GEp1: Public morality is restricted to law. (Cf. GEs3)
Er, no, I said no such thing. I said that a theory of public morality is analogous to a system of traffic laws, in that both set forth rules of interaction governing actors in a certain setting, which rules have a particular purpose. Moreover, both are pragmatic undertakings --- whether the rules being proposed actually serve their stated purpose is objectively determinable, and they are subject to revision in light of experience.
I will ignore this since you concede below that it is moot. GEp1 correctly represents your view.
GE Morton wrote: February 23rd, 2023, 9:19 pm
Leontiskos wrote: February 23rd, 2023, 12:45 pm[*]GEp2: It is not the moral philosopher's job to judge and shape feelings and emotions. (Cf. GEs1, GEs2, GEs5)
Yes. His job is to develop a sound, rationally-defensible moral theory. How anyone feels about it, or about anything else, not his concern.
And thus GEp2 correctly represents your view.
GE Morton wrote: February 23rd, 2023, 9:19 pm
Leontiskos wrote: February 23rd, 2023, 12:45 pm[*]GEp3: It is not the moral philosopher's job to judge and shape values and beliefs. (Cf. GEs1, GEs8)[/list]
True with respect to values. Not true with respect to beliefs. Anyone who publicly promulgates a theory, regarding morality, physics, economics, or anything else, obviously seeks to instill or change certain beliefs.
Noted and useful. Presumably you are retracting GEs8.
GE Morton wrote: February 23rd, 2023, 9:19 pm
Leontiskos wrote: February 23rd, 2023, 12:45 pmFirst let me just state that I accept GEs4, and it can be used as an anchor. GEs4 is as follows:
GE Morton wrote: February 12th, 2023, 12:47 pmThe task for moral philosophers is to specify, on rational grounds, what acts (by moral agents in a social setting) are permissible and impermissible, praiseworthy and condemnable.
It is crucial to note at the outset that an act of an agent is something which the agent does. It is something which involves their will. Acts could therefore be as various as chopping down a tree, cutting someone's hair, affirming an argument, drawing a conclusion, accepting one's plight, kindling or giving vent to an emotion, or even thinking a thought. Internal phenomena can often be actions in one case and passions in another case. For example, we might think a thought intentionally and thus be responsible for the thought, or we might be accosted by thoughts that we in no way willed to think. Similarly, emotions sometimes happen to us without any volition on our part, and at other times we drum up, promote, or excite emotions willfully. These are all important distinctions.
A theory of public morality is concerned only with a certain class of acts --- those involving an interaction between moral agents. "Internal acts" are beyond the purview of the theory.
This is a restatement of GEp1, which I oppose.
GE Morton wrote: February 23rd, 2023, 9:19 pm
Leontiskos wrote: February 23rd, 2023, 12:45 pmWhen I oppose GEp1, by 'law' I mean any system which regulates external acts or behavior.
Well, if that is what you mean by "law," then what I said above may be moot. Yes, the aim of a system of public morality is to regulate "external acts" --- but only those involving another moral agent. Chopping down a tree, if it affects no one else, is also beyond the purview of the theory.
Yes, I understand that your conception of public morality involves an interaction between moral agents.
GE Morton wrote: February 23rd, 2023, 9:19 pm
Leontiskos wrote: February 23rd, 2023, 12:45 pmOf course law does fall within the domain of moral philosophy, but moral philosophy is in no way restricted to law. Historically moral philosophy has also been concerned to aid individuals, providing them with the inner resources necessary to both fulfill and surpass the law.
As I've acknowledged previously, "morality" and even moral philosophy covers a lot of ground. I've mentioned Aristole's "virtue ethics." The central concern of writers in that school/vein...
Let's stay on topic for the time being, lest the conversation become unmanageable. The question is whether public morality is reducible to law (GEp1).

Now apparently since you think public morality is reducible to law, you believe that the moral philosopher is a legislator. The moral philosopher thinks up laws. He thinks up rules for interpersonal interaction. Is this accurate?

Let me try to restate my argument more concisely. In short: Public morality is concerned with interactions between moral agents (i.e. justice). This means that public morality is primarily concerned with formal rules for interaction (law), and is secondarily concerned with anything which those interactions depend upon. This is because those things upon which the interpersonal interactions depend will have a determinate effect on the public sphere and the capacity of moral agents to abide by the law. For example, the moral philosopher who legislates against theft does so because he believes that theft is unjust and ought not occur. Since he believes that theft is unjust and ought not occur, he will in no way limit himself to legislation, but will go on to education and formation. He will therefore be interested in discoursing on things like greed, jealousy, property, the virtue of justice, etc. If you disagree, then you must tell us why the moral philosopher would legislate against theft but not address the causes of theft in moral agents.

Now above you conceded that a theorist--including the moral theorist--seeks to change beliefs. This is true, but since the moral philosopher is primarily concerned to shape action, his focus on beliefs is only mediate with respect to action. Other realities which shape action include values and emotions. If the object of moral philosophy is action, then why would the moral philosopher concern himself with beliefs but not values or emotions, given that all of these things mediate action?
GE Morton wrote: February 23rd, 2023, 9:19 pm
Leontiskos wrote: February 23rd, 2023, 12:45 pmThus, there is no reason why the internal action of anger (as opposed to the passion) would be unrelated to public morality. Of course this does not mean that the state should punish anger in the same way that it punishes assault or murder, but it does mean that the moral philosopher will be concerned with anger. Indeed, to be concerned with assault but not with anger is to treat the symptom.
No, a moral philosospher is not concerned with anger (or if he is, he's venturing into the psychologist's baliwick). He will, of course, realize that anger may lead some persons to immoral acts. But his job is to say what those acts are, and give some reasons for so saying. Explaining and perhaps modifying those behaviors is not his job.
But you are failing to provide argumentation for your position. If anger will lead to an infringement of public morality then why would the moral philosopher ignore it? All you've done here is begged the question and re-asserted your position. You haven't addressed my argument.

Indeed, in GEs5 you gave an argument very similar to my own, "The only ground for pronouncing a feeling (or impulse or interest) immoral or 'wrong' is that it leads predictably to immoral acts." Supposing that anger is a feeling or impulse which predictably leads to immoral acts, then by your own words anger can be accurately labeled 'immoral' or 'wrong'. The one who concerns himself with immoral acts will obviously concern himself with this sort of anger.
GE Morton wrote: February 23rd, 2023, 9:19 pmThe hallmark of philosophy is systematic analysis of "fundamental" problems by via reason and reliance on evidence.
This is simply false, and I would suggest reading scholars like Hadot rather than looking to Wikipedia.
GE Morton wrote: February 23rd, 2023, 9:19 pm
Leontiskos wrote: February 23rd, 2023, 12:45 pmYou claim that feelings, emotions, values, and beliefs only enter into moral philosophy as the data which a libertarian system must take into account when devising its "traffic rules". This may be true for libertarianism, but moral philosophy is much broader than libertarianism. Moral philosophy has long been concerned to judge these "subjective" realities as good or bad, and to make them well-ordered by shaping them.
Some moral philosophers have been concerned with such matters, as I've acknowledged. So far they've not shifted the range of values and emotional responses found among humans one iota.
This is gratuitous and absurd.
Wrestling with Philosophy since 456 BC

Socrates: He's like that, Hippias, not refined. He's garbage, he cares about nothing but the truth.
GE Morton
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Re: How Significant is 'Moral Feeling' and Compassion in Ethics?

Post by GE Morton »

Leontiskos wrote: February 23rd, 2023, 7:47 pm
Consequentialism isn't the only game in town.
Yes it is, if you wish to construct a theory of public morality which is rationally defensible. Teleology (consequentialism) is usually contrasted with deontology (adherence to "fundamental" moral norms). There have been, to be sure, many misguided understandings of "consequences" leading to theories vulnerable to criticism --- most of those due to failure to acknowledge the subjectivity of "the good" (the ends to be pursued). But deontology leaves a fundamental question unanswered --- what makes these "norms" norms? Why ought anyone heed them? The only rational answer can be: because if we don't, bad things will follow. So they are consequentialist after all. Other answers can be given, of course, e.g., "because God so commands," or, "because our intuitions so demand." But the God answer is not rationally defensible, and the intuition answer is subjective and idiosyncratic. It also commits the "is-ought" fallacy.
Not all reasons are grounded by goals and consequences.
Oh, quite right. But those other reasons are not rationally defensible.
Means-based analyses of acts are not exhaustive. Indeed, the claim that means-based analyses of acts are exhaustive is actually incoherent.
Not sure just what you're claiming there. Do you have an example?
One way to try to manage that incoherency is by turning morality into an arbitrary contract between a set of individuals, as libertarians do. Since everyone knows that morality is not an arbitrary contract, this only partially masks the incoherence.
"Everyone knows that"? Really? Many libertarians (and non-libertarians also) do accept the social contract theory as a heuristic device for exploring how a workable moral theory might come about. But no one (that I know of) imagines there is any such actual contract.
When one constructs a moral theory they will do so for some reason, but achieving a determinate result-state is not the only possible reason.
Well, I've not suggested that the goal of a moral theory is "achieving a determinate result state," any more than is a system of traffic laws. But, "result state" . . . of what? The goal of a sound moral theory is to enable moral agents to attain whatever "state" they may seek, as long as they don't impede others' efforts to do the same (just as a set of traffic laws aims to enable drivers to get wherever they wish to go, as long as they don't crash into other drivers).
When someone says that morality is a goal-oriented activity what they mean is that moral agents should act in such-and-such a way to achieve such-and-such a goal.
Yes, some do so claim. But those "such-and-such a goals" are always subjective, idiosyncratic, arbitrary, and theories which postulate them can't possibly be universalized.
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Re: How Significant is 'Moral Feeling' and Compassion in Ethics?

Post by Sy Borg »

GE Morton wrote: February 23rd, 2023, 9:36 pm
Sy Borg wrote: February 23rd, 2023, 5:30 pm
Until you do the work, I'm not wasting my time.
Ah. Still no link. Just a repetition of your unsupported claim, "I already gave examples."

That is your work to do, not mine.
So, you didn't bother to read in the first or second instances and now you expect me to chase them up and copy and paste the posts at your convenience. Childish.

GE Morton wrote: February 23rd, 2023, 9:36 pm
Besides, you simply don't have the intellectual chops to meaningfully contribute in this topic. All you offer is ideological claptrap and game-playing . . .

Your belief that no amount of inequality is too extreme shows the blindness that obsessive ideology can induce . . .

There's no pragmatism in your ideas, no respect for logic or history or even science, just raw partisan beliefs . . .
And then some ad hominems.
Only the comment about your lack of intellectual chops. The others are just observations, demonstrated many times on the forum where, in debates with you, I have seen one person after another give up in exasperation as their logic crashes on the rocks of your dogma.

I am far from your only victim, just one more in a long line.


GE Morton wrote: February 23rd, 2023, 9:36 pm
Ever more Americans cannot afford to live "the American dream". When millions cannot have what they expected as citizens of "the greatest goddam country in the world", while seeing billionaire wealth growing rapidly, they get angry.
Oh, it may be true that many --- even "millions," perhaps --- cannot have what they expected. That is largely because their expectations, formed by indoctrination with lefty ideology, are unrealistic. They've come to believe they're "entitled" to various material goods merely because they exist, or because "they're Americans!"

Well, no, they're not.
Americans' expectations do not come from "lefty ideology" - that's just more of your demented fanaticism.

The expectations come from being born and bred in the wealthiest and most powerful country in history. That level of power and wealth naturally raises people's expectations. They expect a fair share of the spoils for a fair day's work. They expect to live better than people from poorer nations. However, resources from the trickle down effect dried up and many Americans are poorer than their counterparts in other parts of the west.

Discord about lowering living standards has nothing whatsoever with "lefty ideology". It's a natural human response to expect fair distribution of resources. Actually, it's a natural primate response:



Better lock up that Commie monkey, eh? It's obviously been brainwashed by the dreaded lefties.
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Re: How Significant is 'Moral Feeling' and Compassion in Ethics?

Post by Gertie »

GE Morton wrote: February 23rd, 2023, 2:16 pm
Good_Egg wrote: February 23rd, 2023, 4:28 am @Gertie , it seems to me that your argument runs as follows:

A) morality is a goal-directed activity
B) the appropriate goal is the flourishing of sentient beings
C) compassion is that virtue which when we see a sentient being makes us desire to see it flourish, therefore compassion is the driving force of morality
D) whilst flourishing involves material and psychological elements, it all gets very complicated, so it is reasonable to focus on basic material needs.
E) therefore philosophies which permit basic material needs to go unmet are lacking in compassion and thus immoral.

Is that a fair summary of your position ?

I disagree with A). To see morality as seeking to bring about a goal is to miss the point. A goal-directed ethic judges acts to be right or wrong according to whether they help or hinder the bringing-about of the goal-state.

Which maps onto utilitarian ethics, but seems incompatible with other approaches.

A morality of rights says that it is wrong for Alfie to murder Bruno regardless of what goal Alfie seeks to pursue thereby, which therefore includes the possibility that Alfie has the objectively-right goal.
Gertie can certainly answer for herself, and probably will, but you may be confusing the goal of a moral theory with the goals of individual agents. Every intentional act has a goal, some reason for doing it. Constructing a moral theory is no exception --- it aims to bring about a certain result. Alfie may have any of many goals in doing X, but a moral theory will be indifferent to those, as long as Alfie's doing X does not conflict with the goal of the theory. As Ecurb mentioned, if we deem murder to be wrong, there must some reason it is so deemed --- some state of affairs, or goal, that murder thwarts.

The goal of a moral theory, as I see it (and which is implicit in most moral codes historically) is to devise a set of principles and rules governing interactions between moral agents and "moral subjects" which enable all agents and subjects in a moral field (a social setting) to maximize their welfare.

A moral theory need not, of course, have that goal. But it is a plausible one, it's rationally defensible, and consistent with the central thrust of moral theorizing historically.
B) is hard to disagree with. But I note that sentience isn't a well-defined binary yes/no attribute.

How sentient do dolphins have to be before you think that a human project (?tidal power station?) that kills dolphins is morally wrong ?

How sentient do dolphins have to be before you think you have a moral duty to sail the seven seas ensuring that every dolphin gets enough to eat ?
Yes, the whole question of the obligations of moral agents to moral subjects ("animal rights") is problematic and entirely unsettled. There is a strong consensus that they have some "rights," but just what those are is contentious and difficult to answer. There does seem to be an emerging consensus that it varies by species.
Right. Tho I talk about a moral foundation rather than a goal, I think if you don't have a foundation for morality, an understanding of what it's for and why it matters, you're left flapping around at each new situation, or devising systemic work arounds like deontology.

And if you want to understand what morality is for and why it matters, if you think it does, the answer lies in the nature of subjects' interests. That's the bridge from Is to Ought.

I've not seen anyone propose anything better, but the differences between subjects, and the difficulties with measuring interests which often conflict or compete, makes things tricky in practice. That's the appeal of work arounds, you can devise clear rules and treat them as universalised ends in themselves, like deontology or the golden rule. But without a foundation, you ultimately have nothing to check in with if they take you to places like the Nazis knocking on the door asking if there are Jews hiding in your attic. Or trying to treat a dolphin like you, a human, would like to be treated - Votes for Dolphins!
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Re: How Significant is 'Moral Feeling' and Compassion in Ethics?

Post by GE Morton »

Sy Borg wrote: February 24th, 2023, 7:04 am
Americans' expectations do not come from "lefty ideology" - that's just more of your demented fanaticism.

The expectations come from being born and bred in the wealthiest and most powerful country in history. That level of power and wealth naturally raises people's expectations. They expect a fair share of the spoils for a fair day's work.
Sure they do. The rub comes with what they consider a "fair" share of that wealth. And that is where lefty ideology comes in --- the Left views that wealth as community property, a common, to be distributed (more or less) equally. So a "fair" share is an equal share, rather than the share proportional to the value of each person's contribution to that wealth, the share commensurate with merit. Those views and expectations rest, of course, on the "organic fallacy," the archaic belief that modern, civilized societies are just larger versions of kinship-based tribes --- giant communes, or "big happy families." "All for one, one for all," etc. But they aren't.
They expect to live better than people from poorer nations.
Yes, they do, "Because I'm an American!" Or, in your words, because they were "born and bred in the wealthiest country in history." But where you were born and bred has nothing to do with what is your "fair share" of the wealth within a country --- it has only to do with how much you have contributed to that wealth. Expectations based on where you're born and bred derive from a false premise and are unrealistic.
Discord about lowering living standards has nothing whatsoever with "lefty ideology". It's a natural human response to expect fair distribution of resources. Actually, it's a natural primate response: . . .

Better lock up that Commie monkey, eh? It's obviously been brainwashed by the dreaded lefties.
No, the monkey's need not be brainwashed --- because they do live in kinship-based tribal communities. Those expectations are appropriate and workable for them. But not for modern humans.
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Re: How Significant is 'Moral Feeling' and Compassion in Ethics?

Post by Ecurb »

GE Morton wrote: February 24th, 2023, 8:41 pm

No, the monkey's need not be brainwashed --- because they do live in kinship-based tribal communities. Those expectations are appropriate and workable for them. But not for modern humans.
The notion that the monkeys expect equality because of their knship-based social system is, I think, incorrect. They are quite happy to receive a cucumber for their work instead of a grape until they see their cohort getting a grape for doing the same thing, The principle of "fairness" that they recognize is not one of absolute equality, but one of equal pay for equal work.

You, on the other hand, don't recognize this principle of fair play. If the employer can get away with paying some employees less than others, he should do so (you've claimed in the past). So which is it? Should reward be based on merit? Or should it be based on the whims of the employer, and what he can get away with? What constitutes just rewards?

That's the point of the experiment. Even monkeys understand the concept of just rewards.
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