Just about everyone you know is evil

[LuckyR]

I kinda love this topic! Looking at it from the poster's perspective, just about everyone will seem evil because almost everyone ignore the $5 donation for UNICEF most of the time.
However, we should also bear in mind that money is not the only solution to people's problems. Some people might need a hug to feel better. Others, just a smile or a listening ear. Remember, someone might offer you some money and treat you like a trash at the same time.
So I would say conclusively that what makes us human is not the daily charity donation, it is what is in us.

Well, UNICEF donations aren't the deciding criteria for being evil. Though I agree with you that whatever the criteria would be, it is based more on mindset than deeds.

I do agree with both of you to a point. Evil requires intent for the most part, but clearly inaction can be a form of evil, as in watching the child drown in the fountain. The same alleged logic of all or nothing thinking that people in this thread keep applying against Singer works as well against them. Having good thoughts without ever backing them up is not unlike claiming I could have been as good a football player as Tom Brady if I felt like trying. Am I still a good football player if I think good football thoughts but never take the field?

I think it's too easy to get caught up in our systems and entitlements and fail to see the forest for the trees. If I have lots of wealth, or at least much more than I need, and there are people with desperate needs for things I take for granted, I should feel some duty to help within reasonable limits. I think Singer hit a home run with this idea, and we all seem to be defensive about it, reinforcing in my mind the fact that he is on to something. His argument seems sound and nothing offered against it seems so.

However, even though Singer is much better at framing his argument, it's clear enough that a middle ground is reasonable. Further, he never asked anyone else to give all they could or even match his 25% (that's a straw man we keep throwing out to avoid the issue). How do we find our own proper level? Americans give about 2%, although some of that number is attributable to tax write-offs. Does that seem like a proper level?

I think that moderation is floor of acceptible behaviour for those with the wherewithal to give. More is "better" on this single axis of measurement, though it is an error to label this axis as necessarily the most important.

[Leontiskos]

He makes the point that there is a general principle beneath our nearly universal conclusion that we must act to save the child in the fountain:

-If we are able to stop something horrible from happening and the cost to ourselves is rather inconsequential, then we must do so.

He wants to apply this general principle to our awareness of hunger across the globe. "Would you like to add $5 to your bill to give to UNICEF?", the cashier asks. "Not today", you might reply. The implication of your reply is that you are still a good person who usually does the right thing, although today you really wanted to spend the $5 at Starbucks on the way home. If you say no, are you evil? If you let the child in the fountain die, were you evil? What, then, is the difference...

There are relevant differences of knowledge, proximity, and responsibility, just to name a few.

When we see a child drowning we have perfect knowledge that our acting will prevent a death, and will do so in a definitive way. When a random person solicits us for $5, we have no real knowledge that our acting will prevent a death, for the entire act is predicated on trusting a random person we have no reason to believe to be trustworthy, and on trusting a random organization that we also have no reason to believe to be trustworthy. This is why people are more likely to give money to a physically perceptible person in need than to a random, mediatory solicitor, and it is a very good reason. Further, there is no plausible reason to believe that the donation to UNICEF will prevent a death in a definitive way, even if 100% of the money is presumed to get to a child. This is because it is a patchwork, symptom-addressing measure that will merely delay death for a week or two. Not so with the drowning child.

I am not sure why Singer's argument could be thought to be sound. He is straightforwardly committing the logical fallacy of equivocation - in this case false equivalence. It seems like this elephant in the room has been pointed out multiple times in the thread. I think it is persuasive to some only because our culture is addicted to inculpation, especially at the universal level.

A good proof to show that Singer is committing an equivocation can be produced by asking yourself the question, "If I could only choose one, either saving the drowning child or giving $5, which would I choose?" Hands down, the answer is saving the child. It would be absurd to choose the second option, just as it is absurd to entertain the idea that our duty to perform the second is equivalent to our duty to perform the first. Given this absurdity, it is a non-starter to ask, "If you would save the child, then how could you possibly turn down the solicitation?"

[chewybrian]

None of that makes sense. You simply assume that your "evil" judgements are correct. I don't think any of it was evil. Sickness produces effects that one would say are "evil", but what you describe is simply a blend of sickness, naivete and natural selfishness. I'm not in the business of putting anyone on a hook, just to examine and try to understand what's going on

It's not up to us to judge the efforts of others, since we don't know their troubles and their (possibly) wrong ideas about the world or biases they might need to overcome in order to do better.

How much of a person's wealth must they give away to avoid being labelled "evil" by you?

We all seem to be missing the middle element in Singer's argument. IF we consider ourselves philosophers, then we should seek to act prudently, not to simply react to our environment by instinct or through fear or unbounded desire. In this light, when we save the child in the fountain, we should know that a principle in our mind is the foundation for the act. The principle remains in the next situation, even if the instinctual drive or the proximity of the problem might be different. I'm not judging 'them', but myself. I'm only pointing out the strength of Singer's argument, which I presume might hit hard for some other would-be philosophers. If I am acting out of sync with my principles, I should be grateful for the effort if someone shows me the error. I would expect other would-be philosophers to feel the same. Maybe I am mistaken; maybe they are in denial.

“ If someone can prove me wrong and show me my mistake in any thought or action, I shall gladly change. I seek the truth, which never harmed anyone: the harm is to persist in one’s own self-deception and ignorance. ” — Marcus Aurelius

Riiiight. If fixing inequality en masse was even remotely possible, it would have happened already in the last four thousand years. Are we analysing situations or joining hands to sing a rousing chorus of Imagine?

When covid hit, we managed to get the vaccine distributed broadly across the globe. When our will is strong enough or the emergency seems great enough, we can do great things. We can't just give up trying because there are a lot of bad or ignorant or greedy people in the world.

Can you find any examples of a jurisdictions changing their taxation laws to coax tax dollars from billionaires? Rupert Murdoch did not pay any income tax in Australia for over six years, despite making his usual fortune annually.

Yes, The U.S. had a serious change in the tax code following the great depression and the change stuck for about 40 years (roughly from FDR to Reagan).

Many who give to charity will have a home full of goods produced by slaves or by abused employees in sweatshops. Yet, if they only purchased humane goods they would not have extra money to donate to charities.

Then again, if you blackball slave labour in Africa, you ultimately stem the flow of western dollars into impoverished countries, exacerbating the problem. Theoretically, enough wealth flows in to "lift all boats" (when those who stole the money from the people spend that money in the local economy). In practice, the results are variable, depending on levels of corruption.

Rather than judge ordinary people, I see wicked problems.

I see the wicked problems, too, but I guess I'd just say don't let the perfect be the enemy of the good.

[chewybrian]

He makes the point that there is a general principle beneath our nearly universal conclusion that we must act to save the child in the fountain:

-If we are able to stop something horrible from happening and the cost to ourselves is rather inconsequential, then we must do so.

He wants to apply this general principle to our awareness of hunger across the globe. "Would you like to add $5 to your bill to give to UNICEF?", the cashier asks. "Not today", you might reply. The implication of your reply is that you are still a good person who usually does the right thing, although today you really wanted to spend the $5 at Starbucks on the way home. If you say no, are you evil? If you let the child in the fountain die, were you evil? What, then, is the difference...

There are relevant differences of knowledge, proximity, and responsibility, just to name a few.

When we see a child drowning we have perfect knowledge that our acting will prevent a death, and will do so in a definitive way. When a random person solicits us for $5, we have no real knowledge that our acting will prevent a death, for the entire act is predicated on trusting a random person we have no reason to believe to be trustworthy, and on trusting a random organization that we also have no reason to believe to be trustworthy. This is why people are more likely to give money to a physically perceptible person in need than to a random, mediatory solicitor, and it is a very good reason. Further, there is no plausible reason to believe that the donation to UNICEF will prevent a death in a definitive way, even if 100% of the money is presumed to get to a child. This is because it is a patchwork, symptom-addressing measure that will merely delay death for a week or two. Not so with the drowning child.

I am not sure why Singer's argument could be thought to be sound. He is straightforwardly committing the logical fallacy of equivocation - in this case false equivalence. It seems like this elephant in the room has been pointed out multiple times in the thread. I think it is persuasive to some only because our culture is addicted to inculpation, especially at the universal level.

A good proof to show that Singer is committing an equivocation can be produced by asking yourself the question, "If I could only choose one, either saving the drowning child or giving $5, which would I choose?" Hands down, the answer is saving the child. It would be absurd to choose the second option, just as it is absurd to entertain the idea that our duty to perform the second is equivalent to our duty to perform the first. Given this absurdity, it is a non-starter to ask, "If you would save the child, then how could you possibly turn down the solicitation?"

I give you credit for being the first one (in my own opinion) who offered up a rebuttal that could be considered philosophy. You make a good case and I don't fault anyone who joins you. In my mind, however, he is not claiming the situations to be identical. I agree with you that saving the child would be the only option to choose if you could only choose one option. However, I don't see that this would get us off the hook when we are presented with a new situation. He is telling us that either we have principles or we don't. If the principle is applicable to the new situation, then we should apply it and act.

I would say that there is a matter of urgency to act that does vary. We have to look at what resources we can spare and what good we think our donation might do and act reasonably. Can you offer us a basis for knowing when we should act or not? It seems the kneejerk reaction when we don't have enough certainty is to give up and do nothing, and this seems wrong.

[Pattern-chaser]

It seems like this elephant in the room has been pointed out multiple times in the thread. I think it is persuasive to some only because our culture is addicted to inculpation, especially at the universal level.

I agree with Sy Borg, that "inculpation" is a delightful new word — to me, and, I suspect, to most of us — but wouldn't "blame" be clearer?



Our culture is addicted to blame, at any and every level?

[Sy Borg]

None of that makes sense. You simply assume that your "evil" judgements are correct. I don't think any of it was evil. Sickness produces effects that one would say are "evil", but what you describe is simply a blend of sickness, naivete and natural selfishness. I'm not in the business of putting anyone on a hook, just to examine and try to understand what's going on

It's not up to us to judge the efforts of others, since we don't know their troubles and their (possibly) wrong ideas about the world or biases they might need to overcome in order to do better.

So we agree that "evil" refers to forces that are entropic enough to cause harm to us and those we care about - usually human-driven entropy. The ancients also sometimes saw natural events as evil too. Giving less charity than some deem appropriate is only "evil" is we mangle the meaning of the word to the point of meaninglessness.

How much of a person's wealth must they give away to avoid being labelled "evil" by you?

We all seem to be missing the middle element in Singer's argument. IF we consider ourselves philosophers, then we should seek to act prudently, not to simply react to our environment by instinct or through fear or unbounded desire. In this light, when we save the child in the fountain, we should know that a principle in our mind is the foundation for the act. The principle remains in the next situation, even if the instinctual drive or the proximity of the problem might be different. I'm not judging 'them', but myself. I'm only pointing out the strength of Singer's argument, which I presume might hit hard for some other would-be philosophers. If I am acting out of sync with my principles, I should be grateful for the effort if someone shows me the error. I would expect other would-be philosophers to feel the same. Maybe I am mistaken; maybe they are in denial.

I find Singer's argument disappointingly weak. I once thought more highly of him. When it comes to giving, as others have pointed out, charities are large organisations, and far from immune from the well-publicised issues with today's large organisations.

Further, helping humans in need is not necessarily the highest good, as is often assumed - by humans. You might be saving lives which draw from a river upstream, causing devastation downstream for both communities and critical ecosystems. Battles over water are increasing in Africa and other dry places.

Until governments in poor areas stop being so corrupt (usually the main cause of human suffering) and address their rapid population rises, it may be ethically better in the long run to let nature take its course, distasteful as that option seems on first glance.

Riiiight. If fixing inequality en masse was even remotely possible, it would have happened already in the last four thousand years. Are we analysing situations or joining hands to sing a rousing chorus of Imagine?

When covid hit, we managed to get the vaccine distributed broadly across the globe. When our will is strong enough or the emergency seems great enough, we can do great things. We can't just give up trying because there are a lot of bad or ignorant or greedy people in the world.

It's since been found that the vaccines were only effective against early Alpha strains, mainly for the elderly. It's also been found that the most likely source of the virus was a laboratory. There was considerable profiteering from the vaccines too. Yet those who doubted the standard lines were demonised in the media and social media. I did it myself, assiduously getting myself inoculated and judging the "tinfoils". It turns out that they were not entirely wrong. Further, it's clear that pandemics are made more problematic by overpopulation. We no longer must save every human life, but choose which lives to save. Generally, people will choose the young and, especially, those closer to them than strangers across the seas.

At some point, we are going to have to let old people go or today's problems will look like a picnic in the near-ish future. COVID was a great opportunity but it's been made clear that people are not yet ready for that. People will need to suffer more profoundly and for longer under the strains of overpopulation (noting that overpopulation increases inequality and reduces freedom) before they take the unpalatable hard options that, eventually, must be taken.

Can you find any examples of a jurisdictions changing their taxation laws to coax tax dollars from billionaires? Rupert Murdoch did not pay any income tax in Australia for over six years, despite making his usual fortune annually.

Yes, The U.S. had a serious change in the tax code following the great depression and the change stuck for about 40 years (roughly from FDR to Reagan).

That didn't work out too well, did it, Bri? Inequality in the US has been higher than in other western nations for a long time.

Many who give to charity will have a home full of goods produced by slaves or by abused employees in sweatshops. Yet, if they only purchased humane goods they would not have extra money to donate to charities.

Then again, if you blackball slave labour in Africa, you ultimately stem the flow of western dollars into impoverished countries, exacerbating the problem. Theoretically, enough wealth flows in to "lift all boats" (when those who stole the money from the people spend that money in the local economy). In practice, the results are variable, depending on levels of corruption.

Rather than judge ordinary people, I see wicked problems.

I see the wicked problems, too, but I guess I'd just say don't let the perfect be the enemy of the good.

"The good" is the issue in question. I'm not rejecting your presumed "good" because it's not enough, I am questioning your presumed "good" per se. My counter-cliché is "charity begins a home".

[Pattern-chaser]

It's since been found that the vaccines were only effective against early Alpha strains, mainly for the elderly.

We need to be careful, here, not to spread disinformation; there's plenty of that about already, particularly in this area.

Vaccination was associated with a smaller reduction in transmission of the delta variant than of the alpha variant, and the effects of vaccination decreased over time. PCR Ct values at diagnosis of the index patient only partially explained decreased transmission. (Funded by the U.K. Government Department of Health and Social Care and others.)

Source: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8757571/

It doesn't appear that vaccination was ineffective, but that its effectiveness reduced with later variants. But I am not medical, nor particularly well-informed on vaccine research, so...

[Leontiskos]

He makes the point that there is a general principle beneath our nearly universal conclusion that we must act to save the child in the fountain:

-If we are able to stop something horrible from happening and the cost to ourselves is rather inconsequential, then we must do so.

He wants to apply this general principle to our awareness of hunger across the globe. "Would you like to add $5 to your bill to give to UNICEF?", the cashier asks. "Not today", you might reply. The implication of your reply is that you are still a good person who usually does the right thing, although today you really wanted to spend the $5 at Starbucks on the way home. If you say no, are you evil? If you let the child in the fountain die, were you evil? What, then, is the difference...

There are relevant differences of knowledge, proximity, and responsibility, just to name a few.

When we see a child drowning we have perfect knowledge that our acting will prevent a death, and will do so in a definitive way. When a random person solicits us for $5, we have no real knowledge that our acting will prevent a death, for the entire act is predicated on trusting a random person we have no reason to believe to be trustworthy, and on trusting a random organization that we also have no reason to believe to be trustworthy. This is why people are more likely to give money to a physically perceptible person in need than to a random, mediatory solicitor, and it is a very good reason. Further, there is no plausible reason to believe that the donation to UNICEF will prevent a death in a definitive way, even if 100% of the money is presumed to get to a child. This is because it is a patchwork, symptom-addressing measure that will merely delay death for a week or two. Not so with the drowning child.

I am not sure why Singer's argument could be thought to be sound. He is straightforwardly committing the logical fallacy of equivocation - in this case false equivalence. It seems like this elephant in the room has been pointed out multiple times in the thread. I think it is persuasive to some only because our culture is addicted to inculpation, especially at the universal level.

A good proof to show that Singer is committing an equivocation can be produced by asking yourself the question, "If I could only choose one, either saving the drowning child or giving $5, which would I choose?" Hands down, the answer is saving the child. It would be absurd to choose the second option, just as it is absurd to entertain the idea that our duty to perform the second is equivalent to our duty to perform the first. Given this absurdity, it is a non-starter to ask, "If you would save the child, then how could you possibly turn down the solicitation?"

I give you credit for being the first one (in my own opinion) who offered up a rebuttal that could be considered philosophy. You make a good case and I don't fault anyone who joins you.

Okay, thank you.

In my mind, however, he is not claiming the situations to be identical. I agree with you that saving the child would be the only option to choose if you could only choose one option. However, I don't see that this would get us off the hook when we are presented with a new situation. He is telling us that either we have principles or we don't. If the principle is applicable to the new situation, then we should apply it and act.

As I read it the claim is, "If an individual does X, then they should also do Y, because Y is based on the same principle as X." At the root level this is a poor way to engage in moral reasoning, because moral reasoning is incredibly complex and is never based on a single isolated principle. As an analogy to moral reasoning you could consider the case where you witness someone pick up a $20 bill off the ground and then, a few steps later, ignore a dime laying on the ground. You could ask them, "Why did you pick up the bill and ignore the coin when the same principle is at play?" In fact there is never only a single principle at play, nor are most moral principles categorical and exceptionless.

He is telling us that either we have principles or we don't. If the principle is applicable to the new situation, then we should apply it and act.

The principle is supposed to be, "If you can help someone in a significant way and at little cost to yourself, then you should help them." My point in that last post is that the principle itself does not apply equally to each case, for it is much less clear that we are helping someone via UNICEF and it is much less clear that we are helping them in a definitive or significant way (as opposed to the drowning child). Another problem, which Lucky brought up, is that the principle itself is not categorical or exceptionless. This is because "little costs" amount to large costs when they are added together, and this fact undermines the principle in cases like the UNICEF one.

I would say that there is a matter of urgency to act that does vary. We have to look at what resources we can spare and what good we think our donation might do and act reasonably. Can you offer us a basis for knowing when we should act or not? It seems the kneejerk reaction when we don't have enough certainty is to give up and do nothing, and this seems wrong.

Religious claims aside, the rational basis of the principle is some form of solidarity, of evening-out burdens when it is optimal to do so. It is rooted in a notion of the common good, and can be approximated by viewing the moral agents as a team rather than as isolated individuals. "If the drowning child and I are a team, then it is in the best interest of this team that I sacrifice a small bit of energy in order to save the life of the child." Once we grant the antecedent, the consequent is obvious.

Singer's claim is, "If the starving African child and I are a team, then it is in the best interest of this team that I sacrifice a small bit of money in order to provide some food for the child." The first problem is that the antecedent is not so obvious in this case. It is more obvious that I form a team with the neighborhood kid who is drowning than with a random child thousands of miles away (this is the subsidiarity I referenced). The second problem is that the analysis is misleading. The more accurate claim would be, "If the millions of starving African children and I are a team, then it is in the best interest of this team that I sacrifice a small bit of money in order to provide some food for the millions of starving children." This inference isn't even valid, for the sacrifice in question will do approximately nothing to help the team. UNICEF's goal is to create enough benefactors to make that inference valid--to re-balance the optimal proportion between benefactors and beneficiaries. But whether it is valid in any given case is not as obvious as Singer seems to think.

But yeah... once it is recognized that Singer's principle is not free-standing but is in fact a consequence of solidarity and the common good, and that not all groups possess the same level of solidarity and not all common goods possess the same level of force, it becomes clear why we have such an enormously greater duty to help the child who is drowning a few feet away than to help the child who is starving 9,000 miles away. Finally, from a religious or universal perspective the principle of subsidiarity means not only that African children aren't our primary responsibility, but also that African children are someone's primary responsibility, namely Africans'. Everyone knows that it is the duty of a parent to feed their own children before they feed other children.

[chewybrian]

Can you find any examples of a jurisdictions changing their taxation laws to coax tax dollars from billionaires? Rupert Murdoch did not pay any income tax in Australia for over six years, despite making his usual fortune annually.

My reply:

Yes, The U.S. had a serious change in the tax code following the great depression and the change stuck for about 40 years (roughly from FDR to Reagan).

That didn't work out too well, did it, Bri? Inequality in the US has been higher than in other western nations for a long time.

It worked out better than anyone could have hoped! (Recall that I *only* referenced the time between FDR and Reagan, when we did what you seem to think could never be done). The little guy never had it so good before or since. A single income earner at a job most people could easily get could have earned enough to: support a family, buy a house and a car and send his kids to college. In addition, workers' rights were better protected than ever, and many of them enjoyed defined pensions and other benefits that most of us wish we had today. Meanwhile, we paid off an enormous war debt as the economy grew like never before at the same time.

Of course, we forgot the lessons of the past, led by the nose by people who want to control us and rob us blind. We let our fears, prejudices and greed blind us to all the good things that were accomplished, We outsourced the jobs and created 'right to work' laws that gave all the power back to the employer. We let the billionaires re-write the tax code until they scarcely pay taxes at all and we are going bankrupt as a result, all in exchange for the magic bean promise of wealth 'trickling down'.

The fact that we foolishly gave back our gains does not negate the fact that we gained them, for a time, though. It was (and is) possible to re-write the tax code or to do any other thing within reason when we set our minds to it. However, our minds are pretty weak and more distracted than ever. Perhaps only another crisis at the scale and severity of the great depression could prompt us to do the right thing.

[chewybrian]

He makes the point that there is a general principle beneath our nearly universal conclusion that we must act to save the child in the fountain:

-If we are able to stop something horrible from happening and the cost to ourselves is rather inconsequential, then we must do so.

He wants to apply this general principle to our awareness of hunger across the globe. "Would you like to add $5 to your bill to give to UNICEF?", the cashier asks. "Not today", you might reply. The implication of your reply is that you are still a good person who usually does the right thing, although today you really wanted to spend the $5 at Starbucks on the way home. If you say no, are you evil? If you let the child in the fountain die, were you evil? What, then, is the difference...

There are relevant differences of knowledge, proximity, and responsibility, just to name a few.

When we see a child drowning we have perfect knowledge that our acting will prevent a death, and will do so in a definitive way. When a random person solicits us for $5, we have no real knowledge that our acting will prevent a death, for the entire act is predicated on trusting a random person we have no reason to believe to be trustworthy, and on trusting a random organization that we also have no reason to believe to be trustworthy. This is why people are more likely to give money to a physically perceptible person in need than to a random, mediatory solicitor, and it is a very good reason. Further, there is no plausible reason to believe that the donation to UNICEF will prevent a death in a definitive way, even if 100% of the money is presumed to get to a child. This is because it is a patchwork, symptom-addressing measure that will merely delay death for a week or two. Not so with the drowning child.

I am not sure why Singer's argument could be thought to be sound. He is straightforwardly committing the logical fallacy of equivocation - in this case false equivalence. It seems like this elephant in the room has been pointed out multiple times in the thread. I think it is persuasive to some only because our culture is addicted to inculpation, especially at the universal level.

A good proof to show that Singer is committing an equivocation can be produced by asking yourself the question, "If I could only choose one, either saving the drowning child or giving $5, which would I choose?" Hands down, the answer is saving the child. It would be absurd to choose the second option, just as it is absurd to entertain the idea that our duty to perform the second is equivalent to our duty to perform the first. Given this absurdity, it is a non-starter to ask, "If you would save the child, then how could you possibly turn down the solicitation?"

I give you credit for being the first one (in my own opinion) who offered up a rebuttal that could be considered philosophy. You make a good case and I don't fault anyone who joins you.

Okay, thank you.

In my mind, however, he is not claiming the situations to be identical. I agree with you that saving the child would be the only option to choose if you could only choose one option. However, I don't see that this would get us off the hook when we are presented with a new situation. He is telling us that either we have principles or we don't. If the principle is applicable to the new situation, then we should apply it and act.

As I read it the claim is, "If an individual does X, then they should also do Y, because Y is based on the same principle as X." At the root level this is a poor way to engage in moral reasoning, because moral reasoning is incredibly complex and is never based on a single isolated principle. As an analogy to moral reasoning you could consider the case where you witness someone pick up a $20 bill off the ground and then, a few steps later, ignore a dime laying on the ground. You could ask them, "Why did you pick up the bill and ignore the coin when the same principle is at play?" In fact there is never only a single principle at play, nor are most moral principles categorical and exceptionless.

He is telling us that either we have principles or we don't. If the principle is applicable to the new situation, then we should apply it and act.

The principle is supposed to be, "If you can help someone in a significant way and at little cost to yourself, then you should help them." My point in that last post is that the principle itself does not apply equally to each case, for it is much less clear that we are helping someone via UNICEF and it is much less clear that we are helping them in a definitive or significant way (as opposed to the drowning child). Another problem, which Lucky brought up, is that the principle itself is not categorical or exceptionless. This is because "little costs" amount to large costs when they are added together, and this fact undermines the principle in cases like the UNICEF one.

I would say that there is a matter of urgency to act that does vary. We have to look at what resources we can spare and what good we think our donation might do and act reasonably. Can you offer us a basis for knowing when we should act or not? It seems the kneejerk reaction when we don't have enough certainty is to give up and do nothing, and this seems wrong.

Religious claims aside, the rational basis of the principle is some form of solidarity, of evening-out burdens when it is optimal to do so. It is rooted in a notion of the common good, and can be approximated by viewing the moral agents as a team rather than as isolated individuals. "If the drowning child and I are a team, then it is in the best interest of this team that I sacrifice a small bit of energy in order to save the life of the child." Once we grant the antecedent, the consequent is obvious.

Singer's claim is, "If the starving African child and I are a team, then it is in the best interest of this team that I sacrifice a small bit of money in order to provide some food for the child." The first problem is that the antecedent is not so obvious in this case. It is more obvious that I form a team with the neighborhood kid who is drowning than with a random child thousands of miles away (this is the subsidiarity I referenced). The second problem is that the analysis is misleading. The more accurate claim would be, "If the millions of starving African children and I are a team, then it is in the best interest of this team that I sacrifice a small bit of money in order to provide some food for the millions of starving children." This inference isn't even valid, for the sacrifice in question will do approximately nothing to help the team. UNICEF's goal is to create enough benefactors to make that inference valid--to re-balance the optimal proportion between benefactors and beneficiaries. But whether it is valid in any given case is not as obvious as Singer seems to think.

But yeah... once it is recognized that Singer's principle is not free-standing but is in fact a consequence of solidarity and the common good, and that not all groups possess the same level of solidarity and not all common goods possess the same level of force, it becomes clear why we have such an enormously greater duty to help the child who is drowning a few feet away than to help the child who is starving 9,000 miles away. Finally, from a religious or universal perspective the principle of subsidiarity means not only that African children aren't our primary responsibility, but also that African children are someone's primary responsibility, namely Africans'. Everyone knows that it is the duty of a parent to feed their own children before they feed other children.

I thought Singer's argument was a compelling exception to the is/ought rule, but you've knocked it down pretty well. Are you convinced, then, that are are no moral rules we can lay out for ourselves and others which would not be able to be torn down in this way? I think if we agree on some assertions there might be some. For example, I think we do have solidarity with the folks in Africa on the basis that we are human, and therefore we have some duty to try to help, since we have wealth and they are poor. If instead we view them as 'the other', or even as an enemy or a threat, then we might think differently.

I feel a lot of our inaction is a result of a kind of denial. We are not honest with ourselves about the situation because we don't want to feel guilt or have to give some of our wealth. I thought Singer's argument was a good way to prompt people to examine their own motives and actions, but it seems ineffective and perhaps flawed. Still, we could and should do better and do more if we examined our own minds and our own assessment of the truth.

[LuckyR]

I thought Singer's argument was a compelling exception to the is/ought rule, but you've knocked it down pretty well. Are you convinced, then, that are are no moral rules we can lay out for ourselves and others which would not be able to be torn down in this way? I think if we agree on some assertions there might be some. For example, I think we do have solidarity with the folks in Africa on the basis that we are human, and therefore we have some duty to try to help, since we have wealth and they are poor. If instead we view them as 'the other', or even as an enemy or a threat, then we might think differently.

I feel a lot of our inaction is a result of a kind of denial. We are not honest with ourselves about the situation because we don't want to feel guilt or have to give some of our wealth. I thought Singer's argument was a good way to prompt people to examine their own motives and actions, but it seems ineffective and perhaps flawed. Still, we could and should do better and do more if we examined our own minds and our own assessment of the truth.

Yet another way the child in the fountain vs the UNICEF plea are different in a germain way is that children in fountains that you come across are rare such that you can 100% address them "at little cost", whereas the number of charities seeking money are vast and cannot all be addressed by people of even modest wealth, let alone average means. Thus in the latter case, some (most) charities will be not supported by an individual. The question is: of the myriad charities, which few are you going to support? Thus bypassing this or that one at a single point in time is routine, not proof of evilness.

[Gertie]

There are relevant differences of knowledge, proximity, and responsibility, just to name a few.

When we see a child drowning we have perfect knowledge that our acting will prevent a death, and will do so in a definitive way. When a random person solicits us for $5, we have no real knowledge that our acting will prevent a death, for the entire act is predicated on trusting a random person we have no reason to believe to be trustworthy, and on trusting a random organization that we also have no reason to believe to be trustworthy. This is why people are more likely to give money to a physically perceptible person in need than to a random, mediatory solicitor, and it is a very good reason. Further, there is no plausible reason to believe that the donation to UNICEF will prevent a death in a definitive way, even if 100% of the money is presumed to get to a child. This is because it is a patchwork, symptom-addressing measure that will merely delay death for a week or two. Not so with the drowning child.

I am not sure why Singer's argument could be thought to be sound. He is straightforwardly committing the logical fallacy of equivocation - in this case false equivalence. It seems like this elephant in the room has been pointed out multiple times in the thread. I think it is persuasive to some only because our culture is addicted to inculpation, especially at the universal level.

A good proof to show that Singer is committing an equivocation can be produced by asking yourself the question, "If I could only choose one, either saving the drowning child or giving $5, which would I choose?" Hands down, the answer is saving the child. It would be absurd to choose the second option, just as it is absurd to entertain the idea that our duty to perform the second is equivalent to our duty to perform the first. Given this absurdity, it is a non-starter to ask, "If you would save the child, then how could you possibly turn down the solicitation?"

I give you credit for being the first one (in my own opinion) who offered up a rebuttal that could be considered philosophy. You make a good case and I don't fault anyone who joins you.

Okay, thank you.

In my mind, however, he is not claiming the situations to be identical. I agree with you that saving the child would be the only option to choose if you could only choose one option. However, I don't see that this would get us off the hook when we are presented with a new situation. He is telling us that either we have principles or we don't. If the principle is applicable to the new situation, then we should apply it and act.

As I read it the claim is, "If an individual does X, then they should also do Y, because Y is based on the same principle as X." At the root level this is a poor way to engage in moral reasoning, because moral reasoning is incredibly complex and is never based on a single isolated principle. As an analogy to moral reasoning you could consider the case where you witness someone pick up a $20 bill off the ground and then, a few steps later, ignore a dime laying on the ground. You could ask them, "Why did you pick up the bill and ignore the coin when the same principle is at play?" In fact there is never only a single principle at play, nor are most moral principles categorical and exceptionless.

He is telling us that either we have principles or we don't. If the principle is applicable to the new situation, then we should apply it and act.

The principle is supposed to be, "If you can help someone in a significant way and at little cost to yourself, then you should help them." My point in that last post is that the principle itself does not apply equally to each case, for it is much less clear that we are helping someone via UNICEF and it is much less clear that we are helping them in a definitive or significant way (as opposed to the drowning child). Another problem, which Lucky brought up, is that the principle itself is not categorical or exceptionless. This is because "little costs" amount to large costs when they are added together, and this fact undermines the principle in cases like the UNICEF one.

I would say that there is a matter of urgency to act that does vary. We have to look at what resources we can spare and what good we think our donation might do and act reasonably. Can you offer us a basis for knowing when we should act or not? It seems the kneejerk reaction when we don't have enough certainty is to give up and do nothing, and this seems wrong.

Religious claims aside, the rational basis of the principle is some form of solidarity, of evening-out burdens when it is optimal to do so. It is rooted in a notion of the common good, and can be approximated by viewing the moral agents as a team rather than as isolated individuals. "If the drowning child and I are a team, then it is in the best interest of this team that I sacrifice a small bit of energy in order to save the life of the child." Once we grant the antecedent, the consequent is obvious.

Singer's claim is, "If the starving African child and I are a team, then it is in the best interest of this team that I sacrifice a small bit of money in order to provide some food for the child." The first problem is that the antecedent is not so obvious in this case. It is more obvious that I form a team with the neighborhood kid who is drowning than with a random child thousands of miles away (this is the subsidiarity I referenced). The second problem is that the analysis is misleading. The more accurate claim would be, "If the millions of starving African children and I are a team, then it is in the best interest of this team that I sacrifice a small bit of money in order to provide some food for the millions of starving children." This inference isn't even valid, for the sacrifice in question will do approximately nothing to help the team. UNICEF's goal is to create enough benefactors to make that inference valid--to re-balance the optimal proportion between benefactors and beneficiaries. But whether it is valid in any given case is not as obvious as Singer seems to think.

But yeah... once it is recognized that Singer's principle is not free-standing but is in fact a consequence of solidarity and the common good, and that not all groups possess the same level of solidarity and not all common goods possess the same level of force, it becomes clear why we have such an enormously greater duty to help the child who is drowning a few feet away than to help the child who is starving 9,000 miles away. Finally, from a religious or universal perspective the principle of subsidiarity means not only that African children aren't our primary responsibility, but also that African children are someone's primary responsibility, namely Africans'. Everyone knows that it is the duty of a parent to feed their own children before they feed other children.

I thought Singer's argument was a compelling exception to the is/ought rule, but you've knocked it down pretty well. Are you convinced, then, that are are no moral rules we can lay out for ourselves and others which would not be able to be torn down in this way? I think if we agree on some assertions there might be some. For example, I think we do have solidarity with the folks in Africa on the basis that we are human, and therefore we have some duty to try to help, since we have wealth and they are poor. If instead we view them as 'the other', or even as an enemy or a threat, then we might think differently.

You understood it correctly imo.  It was a challenge, and something of a game changer.  But there's no such thing as a factually provable basis for Oughts, there will always be counter-arguments to any attempt at such, and the counter-arguments will rest on equally unfalsifiable foundations.

But we can say Singer's argument is consequentialist.  If we accept it's morally good to to achieve the consequence of saving a child's life at little cost to ourselves, then the proximity of the child isn't in itself relevant.

I believe it is morally good to do so.  Because my understanding of Oughts is consequentialist, that they are appropriately grounded in the welfare of conscious creatures, who have a quality of life, can thrive and suffer.  Who have stake in what happens to them - to us.  The shared humanity you spoke of.  Not out of team solidarity of transactional loyalty, but because it matters to people whether they live or die, suffer or thrive, and whether I harm or help them. However imperfectly I go about it.  That's a rational moral position.  And the mattering to the child, her family, the basis of how we interact with each other, is about the having a stake in what happens.  It's what makes the difference between the Is of me walking away from from a dying child, and the Ought of helping.

The foundation is simple, the practical execution is complex, fuzzy and perfection is unrealistic, but Effective Altruism is a helpful tool to do better.

I feel a lot of our inaction is a result of a kind of denial. We are not honest with ourselves about the situation because we don't want to feel guilt or have to give some of our wealth. I thought Singer's argument was a good way to prompt people to examine their own motives and actions, but it seems ineffective and perhaps flawed. Still, we could and should do better and do more if we examined our own minds and our own assessment of the truth.

I agree.

[Gertie]

I thought Singer's argument was a compelling exception to the is/ought rule, but you've knocked it down pretty well. Are you convinced, then, that are are no moral rules we can lay out for ourselves and others which would not be able to be torn down in this way? I think if we agree on some assertions there might be some. For example, I think we do have solidarity with the folks in Africa on the basis that we are human, and therefore we have some duty to try to help, since we have wealth and they are poor. If instead we view them as 'the other', or even as an enemy or a threat, then we might think differently.

I feel a lot of our inaction is a result of a kind of denial. We are not honest with ourselves about the situation because we don't want to feel guilt or have to give some of our wealth. I thought Singer's argument was a good way to prompt people to examine their own motives and actions, but it seems ineffective and perhaps flawed. Still, we could and should do better and do more if we examined our own minds and our own assessment of the truth.

Yet another way the child in the fountain vs the UNICEF plea are different in a germain way is that children in fountains that you come across are rare such that you can 100% address them "at little cost", whereas the number of charities seeking money are vast and cannot all be addressed by people of even modest wealth, let alone average means. Thus in the latter case, some (most) charities will be not supported by an individual. The question is: of the myriad charities, which few are you going to support? Thus bypassing this or that one at a single point in time is routine, not proof of evilness.

Agreed. We can make better or worse choices tho, and there are resources dedicated to helping us do that like the Giving Well website. (I'm not allowed to link it, sorry).

[Leontiskos]

Religious claims aside, the rational basis of the principle is some form of solidarity, of evening-out burdens when it is optimal to do so. It is rooted in a notion of the common good, and can be approximated by viewing the moral agents as a team rather than as isolated individuals. "If the drowning child and I are a team, then it is in the best interest of this team that I sacrifice a small bit of energy in order to save the life of the child." Once we grant the antecedent, the consequent is obvious.

Singer's claim is, "If the starving African child and I are a team, then it is in the best interest of this team that I sacrifice a small bit of money in order to provide some food for the child." The first problem is that the antecedent is not so obvious in this case. It is more obvious that I form a team with the neighborhood kid who is drowning than with a random child thousands of miles away (this is the subsidiarity I referenced). The second problem is that the analysis is misleading. The more accurate claim would be, "If the millions of starving African children and I are a team, then it is in the best interest of this team that I sacrifice a small bit of money in order to provide some food for the millions of starving children." This inference isn't even valid, for the sacrifice in question will do approximately nothing to help the team. UNICEF's goal is to create enough benefactors to make that inference valid--to re-balance the optimal proportion between benefactors and beneficiaries. But whether it is valid in any given case is not as obvious as Singer seems to think.

But yeah... once it is recognized that Singer's principle is not free-standing but is in fact a consequence of solidarity and the common good, and that not all groups possess the same level of solidarity and not all common goods possess the same level of force, it becomes clear why we have such an enormously greater duty to help the child who is drowning a few feet away than to help the child who is starving 9,000 miles away. Finally, from a religious or universal perspective the principle of subsidiarity means not only that African children aren't our primary responsibility, but also that African children are someone's primary responsibility, namely Africans'. Everyone knows that it is the duty of a parent to feed their own children before they feed other children.

I thought Singer's argument was a compelling exception to the is/ought rule, but you've knocked it down pretty well.

I am not sure Singer would see his argument as an exception to the is-ought rule. My guess is that he accepts that rule as exceptionless. Note that the principle which your OP takes as its starting point itself involves an 'ought', namely, "We ought to help when such-and-such a case obtains."

Are you convinced, then, that are are no moral rules we can lay out for ourselves and others which would not be able to be torn down in this way? I think if we agree on some assertions there might be some.

I think the principles of solidarity and subsidiarity are strong candidates. The most powerful solidarity is found among families, and states enforce this moral principle at the familial level by establishing civil duties, such as the duty of a parent to provide for their child.

Even for someone like Morton who is allergic to common goods, there are other strong candidates, such as the principle that it is unjust and impermissible to harm the innocent.

For example, I think we do have solidarity with the folks in Africa on the basis that we are human, and therefore we have some duty to try to help, since we have wealth and they are poor.

I am not opposed to global solidarity or human solidarity, but I would maintain that the strength of this solidarity compared to familial or neighborhood solidarity is like that of the dime compared to the $20 bill. Trying to equate them by saying that we are equally duty-bound to both, as Singer attempts to do, is not plausible.

Using wealth to remedy problems in faraway lands often has problematic and unintended consequences. An interesting article in this regard is Sam Kriss' "The Truth about Bill Gates" in First Things.

The other consideration which is often brought up is restitution. If a country has acted unjustly towards Africa via exploitation of workers or resources or some such thing, then there is a debt which must be repaid. This is true, but it is a wholly different consideration than Singer's.

I feel a lot of our inaction is a result of a kind of denial. We are not honest with ourselves about the situation because we don't want to feel guilt or have to give some of our wealth. I thought Singer's argument was a good way to prompt people to examine their own motives and actions, but it seems ineffective and perhaps flawed. Still, we could and should do better and do more if we examined our own minds and our own assessment of the truth.

I don't really disagree with Singer's conclusion, but I don't think his argument is valid. But this whole thread could be revisited from a different angle by arguing over what it means for someone to be "evil." I think a really serious difficulty in our culture is that we fly back and forth between the position that evil does not exist, and the position that evil is everywhere. What I've found is that most people really have little idea what they are talking about when they use that word.

...The other thing to note is that if one wants to inculpate the person who turns down a UNICEF solicitation, it will have to be done on a case-by-case basis. The claim that, "Everyone who turns down a UNICEF solicitation is evil," is grandiose, likely false, and therefore difficult to justify. But some people who turn down the solicitation might be acting badly. For instance, we might note that the proper response to unmerited suffering is pity, and therefore the person who perceives unmerited suffering while failing to feel pity is acting badly, and may even be a bad person.* And some people might suppress their pity, and this also would be a bad action. But just because one perceives unmerited suffering, or just because one feels pity, does not mean that one has a duty to alleviate that suffering. Indeed, on the other side of the coin there would be circumstances where one acts badly by feeling too much pity, or by giving alms when they ought not do so. That is, some who give to UNICEF are acting badly.
These questions don't have easy, black-and-white answers.


* Note, though, that some cultures, such as Hindu cultures would not necessarily see such suffering as unmerited.

[Sy Borg]

Can you find any examples of a jurisdictions changing their taxation laws to coax tax dollars from billionaires? Rupert Murdoch did not pay any income tax in Australia for over six years, despite making his usual fortune annually.

My reply:

Yes, The U.S. had a serious change in the tax code following the great depression and the change stuck for about 40 years (roughly from FDR to Reagan).

That didn't work out too well, did it, Bri? Inequality in the US has been higher than in other western nations for a long time.

... The fact that we foolishly gave back our gains does not negate the fact that we gained them, for a time, though. It was (and is) possible to re-write the tax code or to do any other thing within reason when we set our minds to it. However, our minds are pretty weak and more distracted than ever. Perhaps only another crisis at the scale and severity of the great depression could prompt us to do the right thing.

Not only were the gains given back, they have rebounded enormously. The level of inequality in the US is unprecedented since Mansa Musa in Africa in the fourteenth century.

"Profound failure" would be a fairest description of the US's equality project. The nation formed idealistic goals that sadly crashed on the rocks of our animal natures. The champion o egalitarian is not only more inequitable than any other western nation, it has exported its inequality to more moderate nations, not always accidentally.

Does that make the US per se evil, or just human?