How do you feel about vengeance?

[Mounce574]

Vengeance is a circular in the way it works. You hurt me, I hurt you, you hurt me again, I hurt you again.
Add the justice system into the equation: I hurt you, you use the justice system- I go to prison (for use of this example), someone from my family seeks vengeance on my behalf and you get hurt again. Does this line of thinking make sense or is it just the way I have been raised that is wrong?
And the justice system- it does not serve justice. I've been robbed at gunpoint. What did that person get- plea deal for 5 years. Didn't get my possessions back. I've been shot at by an ex- what did he get? 20 years probation for attempted murder. PROBATION. Is that justice? What should I do in these situations?

You only seem to have two options — move to a different country, or campaign for changes to the justice system in the country where you live.

Moving to another country isn't worthwhile. I would be giving up rights that I have in the United States that are not allowed in other countries. I do participate in campaigns that I feel make a difference.
However, I feel no guilt for anything that may befall those individuals.

[LuckyR]

...So my main point is against doing nothing, as opposed to promoting particular varieties of response. Having said that, I do believe in proportionality, though specifically for lowering the risk of future transgressions, not in response to the past event. In other words, if I believe that I will never run into the perpetrator again, I would do nothing.

Let's have a look at your consequentialist approach to vengeance. There are three concepts bound up with redressing commutative injustice: retribution, deterrence, and rehabilitation. Retribution is more or less the same thing as vengeance. You are proposing an approach which discards retribution in favor of deterrence. This view is fairly common in our day and age. C. S. Lewis addresses it eloquently in his essay, <"The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment."> I will address it less eloquently here.

The problem with such a view is that it can't make sense of the well-accepted moral fact that one should not harm the innocent. In particular, it cannot repel the judge who would "make an example" of someone, even if that person committed no injustice. For instance, suppose someone is commonly believed to have committed some crime, but in fact did not commit it. Should a judge who has been convinced of their innocence punish them? If punishment is merely for the sake of deterrence and has no dependence on retribution--if it is only a proactive measure against future events and 'not a response to the past event'--then it really makes no difference that the person is innocent. The past event is irrelevant. If they are commonly believed to have committed the crime then punishing them will serve the end of deterrence, and since punishment is about nothing more than deterrence there is no reason why they should not be punished, and every reason to punish them.*

But this is absurd. It is not just to punish the innocent, even when it would deter crime. We must therefore throw out this overreliance on the end of deterrence and re-introduce the criterion of retribution. It is never permissible to harm the innocent. It is sometimes permissible to harm the guilty. But guilt always attaches to that "past event" you wish to ignore. If that past event merits the punishment then the punishment is just. If it does not merit the punishment then the punishment is unjust. It is not possible or just to prescind from the past event and turn all of our attention to deterrence and consequences. Deterrence can only follow upon retribution. It can never replace it.


* This emphasis on consequences is how things like the Dreyfus Affair arise.

Several things:

First professional judges have jurisdiction over communities, thus "deterrence" means to them, deterring say young, impressionable delinquents from a life of crime. This is very impersonal, whereas the realm of vengeance ie personal vengeance (the topic of this thread) is the opposite. Specifically you know who punched you in the nose or stole your idea at the board meeting, so there are no falsely accused. In addition you're not so worried about uninvolved folks' future behavior, you want to send a message to the guy who wronged you so he doesn't wrong YOU in the future. Whether he continues his shenanigans against someone else is of secondary (or likely tertiary) importance. Thus the goal is to change your public persona from "easy pickings" to "don't mess with that guy". So ultimately it's not really about the perpetrator, it's about you.

[LuckyR]

Vengeance is a circular in the way it works. You hurt me, I hurt you, you hurt me again, I hurt you again.
Add the justice system into the equation: I hurt you, you use the justice system- I go to prison (for use of this example), someone from my family seeks vengeance on my behalf and you get hurt again. Does this line of thinking make sense or is it just the way I have been raised that is wrong?
And the justice system- it does not serve justice. I've been robbed at gunpoint. What did that person get- plea deal for 5 years. Didn't get my possessions back. I've been shot at by an ex- what did he get? 20 years probation for attempted murder. PROBATION. Is that justice? What should I do in these situations?

You only seem to have two options — move to a different country, or campaign for changes to the justice system in the country where you live.

Moving to another country isn't worthwhile. I would be giving up rights that I have in the United States that are not allowed in other countries. I do participate in campaigns that I feel make a difference.
However, I feel no guilt for anything that may befall those individuals.

I hear you sister. First, sorry those things happened to you. The justice system did it's thing (which is good, often they can't or won't get involved). True, I'm not happy with their final outcome, as you obviously aren't either. For me, I would be done, I'd be an unsatisfied "customer" of the justice system. If one were to do something about it, of a revenge type nature, that would fall under the topic of the thread.

[Pattern-chaser]

If someone accidentally harms us, there is no cause for anger or revenge.

No, of course not, although many humans would pursue vengeance anyway, in such circumstances.

Humans will not pursue revenge if they perceive the harm to be purely accidental (and unrelated to neglect). Revenge is only sought when there is a perceived fault or culpability.

Our misunderstanding stems from the fact that I am writing about real humans who live in the real world, and you are describing idealised humans, living in an ideal world, behaving as (you think) they *should* do. I regret we cannot meet your standards. [This not quite a "mea culpa," but rather a "we are culpable," but I don't know the Latin for that.]

[Leontiskos]

Our misunderstanding stems from the fact that I am writing about real humans who live in the real world, and you are describing idealised humans, living in an ideal world, behaving as (you think) they *should* do. I regret we cannot meet your standards.

No, that is not true. And it is a remarkably condescending comment.

If you wish to make an argument, you should. That's what these forums are for.

[Leontiskos]

...So my main point is against doing nothing, as opposed to promoting particular varieties of response. Having said that, I do believe in proportionality, though specifically for lowering the risk of future transgressions, not in response to the past event. In other words, if I believe that I will never run into the perpetrator again, I would do nothing.

Let's have a look at your consequentialist approach to vengeance. There are three concepts bound up with redressing commutative injustice: retribution, deterrence, and rehabilitation. Retribution is more or less the same thing as vengeance. You are proposing an approach which discards retribution in favor of deterrence. This view is fairly common in our day and age. C. S. Lewis addresses it eloquently in his essay, <"The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment."> I will address it less eloquently here.

The problem with such a view is that it can't make sense of the well-accepted moral fact that one should not harm the innocent. In particular, it cannot repel the judge who would "make an example" of someone, even if that person committed no injustice. For instance, suppose someone is commonly believed to have committed some crime, but in fact did not commit it. Should a judge who has been convinced of their innocence punish them? If punishment is merely for the sake of deterrence and has no dependence on retribution--if it is only a proactive measure against future events and 'not a response to the past event'--then it really makes no difference that the person is innocent. The past event is irrelevant. If they are commonly believed to have committed the crime then punishing them will serve the end of deterrence, and since punishment is about nothing more than deterrence there is no reason why they should not be punished, and every reason to punish them.*

But this is absurd. It is not just to punish the innocent, even when it would deter crime. We must therefore throw out this overreliance on the end of deterrence and re-introduce the criterion of retribution. It is never permissible to harm the innocent. It is sometimes permissible to harm the guilty. But guilt always attaches to that "past event" you wish to ignore. If that past event merits the punishment then the punishment is just. If it does not merit the punishment then the punishment is unjust. It is not possible or just to prescind from the past event and turn all of our attention to deterrence and consequences. Deterrence can only follow upon retribution. It can never replace it.


* This emphasis on consequences is how things like the Dreyfus Affair arise.

Several things:

First professional judges have jurisdiction over communities, thus "deterrence" means to them, deterring say young, impressionable delinquents from a life of crime. This is very impersonal, whereas the realm of vengeance ie personal vengeance (the topic of this thread) is the opposite.

But we've already covered that mistake in some detail, namely the mistake which tries to make the word "vengeance" purely pejorative and personal, and fails to offer any real definition.

Specifically you know who punched you in the nose or stole your idea at the board meeting, so there are no falsely accused.

You don't know that without adverting to the past event you wish to ignore. Either the punishment is for the past event or it is not. You claimed that the punishment is "not in response to the past event." In that case it can in no way be a punishment for the past event.

The idea that there will never be any falsely accused simply doesn't accord with what you've said. Again, if the goal is deterrence and we don't care about the past event, then you have no reason to assert that there will be no falsely accused. You would have to bring in other principles, such as the principle that the innocent should not be harmed, but that principle itself presupposes the principle of retribution, although most people do not understand this.

Thus the goal is to change your public persona from "easy pickings" to "don't mess with that guy". So ultimately it's not really about the perpetrator, it's about you.

And now we've moved from deterring another from unjust acts to instilling fear in others, so that they won't "mess with you." If vengeance is only about instilling fear, then the problems I have identified will persist, along with others.

[LuckyR]

...So my main point is against doing nothing, as opposed to promoting particular varieties of response. Having said that, I do believe in proportionality, though specifically for lowering the risk of future transgressions, not in response to the past event. In other words, if I believe that I will never run into the perpetrator again, I would do nothing.

Let's have a look at your consequentialist approach to vengeance. There are three concepts bound up with redressing commutative injustice: retribution, deterrence, and rehabilitation. Retribution is more or less the same thing as vengeance. You are proposing an approach which discards retribution in favor of deterrence. This view is fairly common in our day and age. C. S. Lewis addresses it eloquently in his essay, <"The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment."> I will address it less eloquently here.

The problem with such a view is that it can't make sense of the well-accepted moral fact that one should not harm the innocent. In particular, it cannot repel the judge who would "make an example" of someone, even if that person committed no injustice. For instance, suppose someone is commonly believed to have committed some crime, but in fact did not commit it. Should a judge who has been convinced of their innocence punish them? If punishment is merely for the sake of deterrence and has no dependence on retribution--if it is only a proactive measure against future events and 'not a response to the past event'--then it really makes no difference that the person is innocent. The past event is irrelevant. If they are commonly believed to have committed the crime then punishing them will serve the end of deterrence, and since punishment is about nothing more than deterrence there is no reason why they should not be punished, and every reason to punish them.*

But this is absurd. It is not just to punish the innocent, even when it would deter crime. We must therefore throw out this overreliance on the end of deterrence and re-introduce the criterion of retribution. It is never permissible to harm the innocent. It is sometimes permissible to harm the guilty. But guilt always attaches to that "past event" you wish to ignore. If that past event merits the punishment then the punishment is just. If it does not merit the punishment then the punishment is unjust. It is not possible or just to prescind from the past event and turn all of our attention to deterrence and consequences. Deterrence can only follow upon retribution. It can never replace it.


* This emphasis on consequences is how things like the Dreyfus Affair arise.

Several things:

First professional judges have jurisdiction over communities, thus "deterrence" means to them, deterring say young, impressionable delinquents from a life of crime. This is very impersonal, whereas the realm of vengeance ie personal vengeance (the topic of this thread) is the opposite.

But we've already covered that mistake in some detail, namely the mistake which tries to make the word "vengeance" purely pejorative and personal, and fails to offer any real definition.

Specifically you know who punched you in the nose or stole your idea at the board meeting, so there are no falsely accused.

You don't know that without adverting to the past event you wish to ignore. Either the punishment is for the past event or it is not. You claimed that the punishment is "not in response to the past event." In that case it can in no way be a punishment for the past event.

The idea that there will never be any falsely accused simply doesn't accord with what you've said. Again, if the goal is deterrence and we don't care about the past event, then you have no reason to assert that there will be no falsely accused. You would have to bring in other principles, such as the principle that the innocent should not be harmed, but that principle itself presupposes the principle of retribution, although most people do not understand this.

Thus the goal is to change your public persona from "easy pickings" to "don't mess with that guy". So ultimately it's not really about the perpetrator, it's about you.

And now we've moved from deterring another from unjust acts to instilling fear in others, so that they won't "mess with you." If vengeance is only about instilling fear, then the problems I have identified will persist, along with others.

Several things.

Firstly, the idea that a professional judge would KNOWINGLY convict an innocent defendant purely for the reason of deterring future criminals supposes that A) convictions of actual guilty defendants are so rare that manufacturing an additional one would justify breaking a central tenet of his profession and that B) the correlation between a conviction of a single defendant and deterring even a single "at risk" potential criminal was well established. Neither apply to actual human experience.

As to your paraphrasing of my comments, I apologize for being difficult to understand. My reason for performing personal vengeance is not to "get even" for the primary episode, nor to make myself feel better about it. Rather since the primary episode has already occurred, say at time Zero, if I do nothing in response, then at a time after time Zero I believe that the perpetrator (specifically) is more likely to try to victimize me again, compared to him suffering a negative consequence for his original action. Therefore giving a negative consequence to a bystander (the innocent defendant, say) doesn't promote my goal, giving a negative consequence to a perpetrator I will never see again is equally unhelpful. Thus my goal is behavior modification (towards me specifically) of the perpetrator THROUGH changing his view of me from "easy mark" to "don't mess with him". I do not have as a primary goal to change my reputation to anyone else, though of course depending on circumstances, I acknowledge that could be a byproduct of my actions.

If there is a bully in one's community, in my experience it is a much more achievable task to make oneself a little bit more unpleasant or difficult to victimize than other potential victims in the community, than it is to change the bully into a non-bully or to make oneself almost impossible to victimize. In my experience bullies are not courageous, they tend to go after low hanging fruit. Though I agree that if someone could somehow change the bully, that would be a superior outcome compared to my proposal.

[Pattern-chaser]

Our misunderstanding stems from the fact that I am writing about real humans who live in the real world, and you are describing idealised humans, living in an ideal world, behaving as (you think) they *should* do. I regret we cannot meet your standards.

No, that is not true. And it is a remarkably condescending comment.

You describe how humans *do* and *will* behave. The humans you describe do not conform to empirical observations of human behaviour. I submit that my comments were accurate, and not condescending in the least. Let's look again:

If someone accidentally harms us, there is no cause for anger or revenge.

No, of course not, although many humans would pursue vengeance anyway, in such circumstances.

Humans will not pursue revenge if they perceive the harm to be purely accidental (and unrelated to neglect). Revenge is only sought when there is a perceived fault or culpability.

Our misunderstanding stems from the fact that I am writing about real humans who live in the real world, and you are describing idealised humans, living in an ideal world, behaving as (you think) they *should* do. I regret we cannot meet your standards. [This not quite a "mea culpa," but rather a "we are culpable," but I don't know the Latin for that.]

You assert your idea of human behaviour, but it does not match the actual, real-world, behaviour of humans. Revenge is a highly emotional thing, not dominated by reason or any similar quality. Many humans can be observed to avenge wrongs that were committed accidentally.

[Leontiskos]

Firstly, the idea that a professional judge would KNOWINGLY convict an innocent defendant purely for the reason of deterring future criminals supposes that A) convictions of actual guilty defendants are so rare that manufacturing an additional one would justify breaking a central tenet of his profession and that B) the correlation between a conviction of a single defendant and deterring even a single "at risk" potential criminal was well established. Neither apply to actual human experience.

I said nothing about "a professional judge." Our subject here is judging acts and meting out vengeance, hence the role of 'judge'. This includes but is in no way limited to "professional judges."

A) Here you beg the question that he would be "breaking a central tenet of his profession," for what is at stake is the nature of vengeance along with its motive. If you think that your own view of vengeance is contrary to justice (by affirming that a judge would have to judge unjustly in order to uphold it), then you already agree with my conclusion. Judges--professional or otherwise--must attend to the "past event."

B) We are talking about the logic of your position, Lucky. Saying, "Well, I don't think that conflict of interest would ever arise," is hardly a response to the question of where your thought leads.

Thus my goal is behavior modification (towards me specifically) of the perpetrator THROUGH changing his view of me from "easy mark" to "don't mess with him".

Okay, then let's focus on this explicit goal you have set out. You wish to dissuade a perpetrator who has 'messed with you' from 'messing with you again' in the future.

First, I don't see how this could be, "not in response to the past event." Do you still maintain that it is not in response to the past event?

Second, a sine qua non of your deterrence strategy is the fact that the person in question is a perpetrator who has 'messed with you' and therefore has committed an unjust act. The goal is not merely behavior modification, at least not if you would reject the view which says that we can attempt to modify others' behavior in any way we see fit, even when that behavior is not unjust. It seems to me that your actual goal is the modification of unjust behavior.

...Though I agree that if someone could somehow change the bully, that would be a superior outcome compared to my proposal.

I am not saying that the bully should be changed. I have been arguing for retribution/vengeance, not rehabilitation. My point is that your account does not escape from being intertwined with morality or justice. A necessary condition of your strategy is the fact that the act was unjust. I think it would be mistaken to say, "I don't really care whether the guy's act was moral or just, I am only trying to get him to quit doing it." To truly say that would be to accept the view which I above assumed you would reject.

[Leontiskos]

Our misunderstanding stems from the fact that I am writing about real humans who live in the real world, and you are describing idealised humans, living in an ideal world, behaving as (you think) they *should* do. I regret we cannot meet your standards.

No, that is not true. And it is a remarkably condescending comment.

You describe how humans *do* and *will* behave. The humans you describe do not conform to empirical observations of human behaviour. I submit that my comments were accurate, and not condescending in the least. Let's look again:

If someone accidentally harms us, there is no cause for anger or revenge.

No, of course not, although many humans would pursue vengeance anyway, in such circumstances.

Humans will not pursue revenge if they perceive the harm to be purely accidental (and unrelated to neglect). Revenge is only sought when there is a perceived fault or culpability.

Our misunderstanding stems from the fact that I am writing about real humans who live in the real world, and you are describing idealised humans, living in an ideal world, behaving as (you think) they *should* do. I regret we cannot meet your standards. [This not quite a "mea culpa," but rather a "we are culpable," but I don't know the Latin for that.]

You assert your idea of human behaviour, but it does not match the actual, real-world, behaviour of humans. Revenge is a highly emotional thing, not dominated by reason or any similar quality. Many humans can be observed to avenge wrongs that were committed accidentally.

You are the one doing the asserting, here. Do you have any arguments to support your assertions? If so, present them.

My claim is that one will only seek vengeance with respect to acts which one perceives to be volitional. Because you probably don't understand the difference between a willed act and a volitional act, I phrased it negatively, "Humans will not pursue revenge if they perceive the harm to be purely accidental (and unrelated to neglect)."

At least try to offer an example of an exception to the rule I have set out.

[LuckyR]

Firstly, the idea that a professional judge would KNOWINGLY convict an innocent defendant purely for the reason of deterring future criminals supposes that A) convictions of actual guilty defendants are so rare that manufacturing an additional one would justify breaking a central tenet of his profession and that B) the correlation between a conviction of a single defendant and deterring even a single "at risk" potential criminal was well established. Neither apply to actual human experience.

I said nothing about "a professional judge." Our subject here is judging acts and meting out vengeance, hence the role of 'judge'. This includes but is in no way limited to "professional judges."

A) Here you beg the question that he would be "breaking a central tenet of his profession," for what is at stake is the nature of vengeance along with its motive. If you think that your own view of vengeance is contrary to justice (by affirming that a judge would have to judge unjustly in order to uphold it), then you already agree with my conclusion. Judges--professional or otherwise--must attend to the "past event."

B) We are talking about the logic of your position, Lucky. Saying, "Well, I don't think that conflict of interest would ever arise," is hardly a response to the question of where your thought leads.

Thus my goal is behavior modification (towards me specifically) of the perpetrator THROUGH changing his view of me from "easy mark" to "don't mess with him".

Okay, then let's focus on this explicit goal you have set out. You wish to dissuade a perpetrator who has 'messed with you' from 'messing with you again' in the future.

First, I don't see how this could be, "not in response to the past event." Do you still maintain that it is not in response to the past event?

Second, a sine qua non of your deterrence strategy is the fact that the person in question is a perpetrator who has 'messed with you' and therefore has committed an unjust act. The goal is not merely behavior modification, at least not if you would reject the view which says that we can attempt to modify others' behavior in any way we see fit, even when that behavior is not unjust. It seems to me that your actual goal is the modification of unjust behavior.

...Though I agree that if someone could somehow change the bully, that would be a superior outcome compared to my proposal.

I am not saying that the bully should be changed. I have been arguing for retribution/vengeance, not rehabilitation. My point is that your account does not escape from being intertwined with morality or justice. A necessary condition of your strategy is the fact that the act was unjust. I think it would be mistaken to say, "I don't really care whether the guy's act was moral or just, I am only trying to get him to quit doing it." To truly say that would be to accept the view which I above assumed you would reject.

We are just not communicating effectively.

You have labeled my proposal/strategy as "deterrence" centered, which is generally accurate, then criticized deterrence in the broad sense through your "convict the innocent man to achieve community deterrence" analogy, yet I am specifically describing my personal strategy to address personal wrongdoing by a specific wrongdoer. Apples and oranges. Your analogy doesn't apply to my proposal, though it has it's merits within the confines of community deterrence.

More importantly (to me) you keep quoting my comment that I don't perform vengeance "in response to the past event". I want to be crystal clear on what I mean by that. I was drawing a distinction (in conversation with other posters) between their opinion of why those who perform vengeance do it and my motivation. Their opinion was it was done solely for retribution FOR THE PAST ACT. My comment was that I don't agree with vengeance to improve my emotional state when thinking about the past act (which feeling that "justice was done" could provide), rather I seek to lower my otherwise increased risk of being victimized IN THE FUTURE.

Perhaps a numerical description would help here. At time 1 (before I am victimized) my risk of being victimized is average, say 5 on a 10 point scale. I am victimized at time 2 by a perpetrator Alfie. The crux of my decision making is that it is my experience that my chance of being victimized at a later time, say time 3, by Alfie if he suffers no negative consequences is higher than average, say 8. My goal is to provide the negative consequences such that Alfie's chance of victimizing me is 5 or less, just like everyone else (at time 1).

Therefore if I don't know who the perpetrator is, there is no one for me to address. If the community believes I was victimized by Bruno, but I know it was Alfie, there is no reason to mete out vengeance to Bruno (the innocent man), since he already has a 5 or lower chance of victimizing me at time 3. Only Alfie has an 8 chance. If Alfie is going to move to Columbia before time 3, my risk at time 3 from him is zero, no need for vengeance.

As to your point on whether the original act was just or unjust, I also said earlier that I believe in proportionality. Thus my strategy for optimizing my future risk exposure is universal in scope, just proportionally more severe if the interaction is unjust. For example, if an office competitor technically plays by the rules (not unjust) but twists them to his advantage against me, by invoking proportionality I am morally justified in similarly twisting the rules to regain the advantage against him. Naturally when Alfie performs his unjust action, all bets are off and again invoking proportionality, I am justified (though not required) to use methods outside of the rules to meet my goals.

[Pattern-chaser]

At least try to offer an example of an exception to the rule I have set out.

OK. A boy named Stanley was on his last day in school. We encountered one another, and he suddenly thumped me in the face, knocking me down and leaving me bleeding. When I asked "Why?", he told me he was taking revenge on me for being such a prat. And because he would never see me again, he didn't want to miss out on his final opportunity to hurt me.

There are so many examples of such behaviour, in the real world. Some will even avenge themselves on a complete innocent, because the genuinely-guilty party was not available or accessible.

[Leontiskos]

Firstly, the idea that a professional judge would KNOWINGLY convict an innocent defendant purely for the reason of deterring future criminals supposes that A) convictions of actual guilty defendants are so rare that manufacturing an additional one would justify breaking a central tenet of his profession and that B) the correlation between a conviction of a single defendant and deterring even a single "at risk" potential criminal was well established. Neither apply to actual human experience.

I said nothing about "a professional judge." Our subject here is judging acts and meting out vengeance, hence the role of 'judge'. This includes but is in no way limited to "professional judges."

A) Here you beg the question that he would be "breaking a central tenet of his profession," for what is at stake is the nature of vengeance along with its motive. If you think that your own view of vengeance is contrary to justice (by affirming that a judge would have to judge unjustly in order to uphold it), then you already agree with my conclusion. Judges--professional or otherwise--must attend to the "past event."

B) We are talking about the logic of your position, Lucky. Saying, "Well, I don't think that conflict of interest would ever arise," is hardly a response to the question of where your thought leads.

Thus my goal is behavior modification (towards me specifically) of the perpetrator THROUGH changing his view of me from "easy mark" to "don't mess with him".

Okay, then let's focus on this explicit goal you have set out. You wish to dissuade a perpetrator who has 'messed with you' from 'messing with you again' in the future.

First, I don't see how this could be, "not in response to the past event." Do you still maintain that it is not in response to the past event?

Second, a sine qua non of your deterrence strategy is the fact that the person in question is a perpetrator who has 'messed with you' and therefore has committed an unjust act. The goal is not merely behavior modification, at least not if you would reject the view which says that we can attempt to modify others' behavior in any way we see fit, even when that behavior is not unjust. It seems to me that your actual goal is the modification of unjust behavior.

...Though I agree that if someone could somehow change the bully, that would be a superior outcome compared to my proposal.

I am not saying that the bully should be changed. I have been arguing for retribution/vengeance, not rehabilitation. My point is that your account does not escape from being intertwined with morality or justice. A necessary condition of your strategy is the fact that the act was unjust. I think it would be mistaken to say, "I don't really care whether the guy's act was moral or just, I am only trying to get him to quit doing it." To truly say that would be to accept the view which I above assumed you would reject.

We are just not communicating effectively.

You have labeled my proposal/strategy as "deterrence" centered, which is generally accurate, then criticized deterrence in the broad sense through your "convict the innocent man to achieve community deterrence" analogy, yet I am specifically describing my personal strategy to address personal wrongdoing by a specific wrongdoer. Apples and oranges. Your analogy doesn't apply to my proposal, though it has it's merits within the confines of community deterrence.

More importantly (to me) you keep quoting my comment that I don't perform vengeance "in response to the past event". I want to be crystal clear on what I mean by that. I was drawing a distinction (in conversation with other posters) between their opinion of why those who perform vengeance do it and my motivation. Their opinion was it was done solely for retribution FOR THE PAST ACT. My comment was that I don't agree with vengeance to improve my emotional state when thinking about the past act (which feeling that "justice was done" could provide), rather I seek to lower my otherwise increased risk of being victimized IN THE FUTURE.

Perhaps a numerical description would help here. At time 1 (before I am victimized) my risk of being victimized is average, say 5 on a 10 point scale. I am victimized at time 2 by a perpetrator Alfie. The crux of my decision making is that it is my experience that my chance of being victimized at a later time, say time 3, by Alfie if he suffers no negative consequences is higher than average, say 8. My goal is to provide the negative consequences such that Alfie's chance of victimizing me is 5 or less, just like everyone else (at time 1).

Therefore if I don't know who the perpetrator is, there is no one for me to address. If the community believes I was victimized by Bruno, but I know it was Alfie, there is no reason to mete out vengeance to Bruno (the innocent man), since he already has a 5 or lower chance of victimizing me at time 3. Only Alfie has an 8 chance. If Alfie is going to move to Columbia before time 3, my risk at time 3 from him is zero, no need for vengeance.

As to your point on whether the original act was just or unjust, I also said earlier that I believe in proportionality. Thus my strategy for optimizing my future risk exposure is universal in scope, just proportionally more severe if the interaction is unjust. For example, if an office competitor technically plays by the rules (not unjust) but twists them to his advantage against me, by invoking proportionality I am morally justified in similarly twisting the rules to regain the advantage against him. Naturally when Alfie performs his unjust action, all bets are off and again invoking proportionality, I am justified (though not required) to use methods outside of the rules to meet my goals.

Yes, I understand what you are saying. I think we are now in agreement that all of your purported strategies presuppose acting in response to a past event? Even the "twisting of the rules"? That even if your primary aim is not focused on the past event, the past event is still logically necessary for any of the strategies?

My point about general deterrence was meant to provide an example of a general problem with the view which leans too heavily on deterrence. I think I'll leave that argument behind since it is not making any headway.

I think this is probably a good place to stop. On the other hand, if you want to continue, I would say that "bending the rules" is unjust, and that it is never justified to harm the innocent (it is never justified to harm someone who has not acted unjustly). ...So your example of "bending the rules" is not an exception to the rule I have been pointing out.

[Leontiskos]

At least try to offer an example of an exception to the rule I have set out.

OK. A boy named Stanley was on his last day in school. We encountered one another, and he suddenly thumped me in the face, knocking me down and leaving me bleeding. When I asked "Why?", he told me he was taking revenge on me for being such a prat. And because he would never see me again, he didn't want to miss out on his final opportunity to hurt me.

Are you claiming that "being a prat" is non-volitional, such that it is purely accidental and unrelated even to neglect? Because it seems obvious to me that this is false, and that your example therefore fails. Stanley obviously perceives you to be at fault for being a prat.

The reason we might punish someone for "being a prat" is because they are at fault for being a prat, and they should have acted differently.

[LuckyR]

We are just not communicating effectively.

You have labeled my proposal/strategy as "deterrence" centered, which is generally accurate, then criticized deterrence in the broad sense through your "convict the innocent man to achieve community deterrence" analogy, yet I am specifically describing my personal strategy to address personal wrongdoing by a specific wrongdoer. Apples and oranges. Your analogy doesn't apply to my proposal, though it has it's merits within the confines of community deterrence.

More importantly (to me) you keep quoting my comment that I don't perform vengeance "in response to the past event". I want to be crystal clear on what I mean by that. I was drawing a distinction (in conversation with other posters) between their opinion of why those who perform vengeance do it and my motivation. Their opinion was it was done solely for retribution FOR THE PAST ACT. My comment was that I don't agree with vengeance to improve my emotional state when thinking about the past act (which feeling that "justice was done" could provide), rather I seek to lower my otherwise increased risk of being victimized IN THE FUTURE.

Perhaps a numerical description would help here. At time 1 (before I am victimized) my risk of being victimized is average, say 5 on a 10 point scale. I am victimized at time 2 by a perpetrator Alfie. The crux of my decision making is that it is my experience that my chance of being victimized at a later time, say time 3, by Alfie if he suffers no negative consequences is higher than average, say 8. My goal is to provide the negative consequences such that Alfie's chance of victimizing me is 5 or less, just like everyone else (at time 1).

Therefore if I don't know who the perpetrator is, there is no one for me to address. If the community believes I was victimized by Bruno, but I know it was Alfie, there is no reason to mete out vengeance to Bruno (the innocent man), since he already has a 5 or lower chance of victimizing me at time 3. Only Alfie has an 8 chance. If Alfie is going to move to Columbia before time 3, my risk at time 3 from him is zero, no need for vengeance.

As to your point on whether the original act was just or unjust, I also said earlier that I believe in proportionality. Thus my strategy for optimizing my future risk exposure is universal in scope, just proportionally more severe if the interaction is unjust. For example, if an office competitor technically plays by the rules (not unjust) but twists them to his advantage against me, by invoking proportionality I am morally justified in similarly twisting the rules to regain the advantage against him. Naturally when Alfie performs his unjust action, all bets are off and again invoking proportionality, I am justified (though not required) to use methods outside of the rules to meet my goals.

Yes, I understand what you are saying. I think we are now in agreement that all of your purported strategies presuppose acting in response to a past event? Even the "twisting of the rules"? That even if your primary aim is not focused on the past event, the past event is still logically necessary for any of the strategies?

My point about general deterrence was meant to provide an example of a general problem with the view which leans too heavily on deterrence. I think I'll leave that argument behind since it is not making any headway.

I think this is probably a good place to stop. On the other hand, if you want to continue, I would say that "bending the rules" is unjust, and that it is never justified to harm the innocent (it is never justified to harm someone who has not acted unjustly). ...So your example of "bending the rules" is not an exception to the rule I have been pointing out.

Perhaps my post was unclear. I believe that when responding to harm from someone who acted technically within the rules, one should also act "technically" within the rules. That is both the original act and the response are "not unjust".