Consul,
Consul wrote:But you're wrong insofar as apisticism (B-agnosticism) is not the same as negative atheism, because not all negative atheists are apistics. However useful it may be, the distinction between negative atheism and positive atheism has the unfortunate logical consequence that positive atheists are negative atheists too, since you cannot consistently believe in the nonexistence of gods without lacking the belief in the existence of gods: positive atheism entails negative atheism.
I see what you are saying but I disagree. However, my disagreement may be based on appeal to context.
If we interpret negative atheism to not mean non-positive atheism, than we render the quantifier negative meaningless. In that case, negative atheism would just mean atheism (since atheism would include both non-positive and positive atheism). Thus, even if just by context, I think negative atheism would mean non-positive atheism.
However, for the sake of clarity, I think it would most clear to call it (by it I mean what you call B-agnosticism and what I was calling negative atheism) either
non-positive atheism or
apistic atheism or
apisticism about the existence of a god or gods. What do you think?
Consul wrote:you can use "theist", "antitheist" ("positive atheist"), and "apistic" ("B-agnostic") instead.
Yes, I agree, and that is exactly how I meant the categories earlier, but the use of the term apistic is much clearer.
Consul wrote:And if we add the aspect of K-agnosticism, we get the following classification:
1. theists 1.1 K-gnostic theists 1.2 K-agnostic theists 2. atheists 2.1 apistics/B-agnostics (neutralists) 2.2 antitheists 2.2.1 K-gnostic antitheists 2.2.2 K-agnostic antitheists
People belonging to 1.1 or 2.2.1 believe and claim to know, or are (100%) certain that gods (don't) exist.
Yes, exactly. And hence the 5 different mutually exclusive categories:
- 1.1 K-gnostic theists
- 1.2 K-agnostic theists
- 2.1 apistics/B-agnostics (neutralists)
- 2.2.1 K-gnostic antitheists
- 2.2.2. K-agnostic antitheists
***
Fooloso4 wrote:Clearly this is not how you want to use the term, but to insist that other uses are misuses is simply wrong.
In fact, by your own standards, you are misusing the term ‘agnostic’ for Huxley was referring to a skeptical method of inquiry
[...]
So, first, your use of the term ‘agnostic’ in the religious sense is contrary to Huxley’s
I'm not sure of the basis for this accusation because in the OP I wrote:
"The term agnosticism means 'the doctrine that humans cannot know of the existence of anything beyond the phenomena of their experience'. The term actually refers to a broad epistemological position, not simply a position on whether or not a god or gods exist (source 1, source 2 - page 66)."
In the “Positivity Distinction” you list three categories , but in the “Exhaustive, Mutually Exclusive Categories of Belief in The Existence of a God or Gods” there are five categories.
Scott wrote:In
this post on the topic "Belief: the difference between I DO & I DON'T", I showed that logically a rational person's belief regarding any given proposition must fall into one and only one of the following three categories:
- A) "I believe X AND I do not believe -X."
- C) "I believe -X AND I do not believe X."
- D) "I do not believe X AND I do not believe -X."
Fooloso4 wrote:In the “Positivity Distinction” you list three categories , but in the “Exhaustive, Mutually Exclusive Categories of Belief in The Existence of a God or Gods” there are five categories. In the later all but the middle term should be labelled positive if any are. The problem is that you then have both a positive and negative atheism, which runs contrary to Huxley’s negative atheism. You switch from the term ‘atheism’ itself as being negative – neither affirming nor denying belief, to a claim about knowledge rather than belief, and label that positive.
Actually, the three positions are changed to 5 by breaking beliefs into knowledge and non-knowledge beliefs.
So we start with:
- A) "I believe X AND I do not believe -X."
- C) "I believe -X AND I do not believe X."
- D) "I do not believe X AND I do not believe -X."
And go to:
- A) "I believe X but don't know X AND I do not believe -X."
- A2) "I know X AND I do not believe -X."
- C1) "I believe -X but don't know -X AND I do not believe X."
- C2) "I know -X AND I do not believe X."
- D) "I do not believe X AND I do not believe -X."
The problem is that what appear to be contradictory statements may not be contradictory. I believe in God and I do not believe in God are not necessarily contradictory statements. You are attempting to categorize beliefs in God. There are many people who believe in God except they do not believe in God as you define God.
Fallacy of equivocation.
I have acknowledged that one could be an atheist using one definition of the word god and not an atheist using a different one. That's why when using words that could have multiple definitions it is important to specify the definition being used. Otherwise, it's very easy to commit a fallacy of equivocation
Perhaps Consul said it better earlier when he wrote,
"Of course, if more than one thing is named God, then I can consistently believe in God1 and disbelieve in God2, because God1 ≠ God2; but if "God" refers to one thing only, I can't."
If you wish to use the word 'god' to refer to something other than 'a being who meets at least one of the two criteria listed in the American Heritage definition', then please specify what that is, i.e. provide your definition. Then let the definition I provided be referred to by God1 and the definition you provide be referred to as God2. Then, we can easily see someone might be an atheist
while using the God1 definition but a theist
while using the God2 definition. Or instead of saying God1 and God2 we can just use parenthical specifications, like saying one "is an atheist
(using the American Heritage definition) but a theist
(using John Doe's definition)". However, to leave out those
qualifiers leads almost surely to a fallacy of equivocation.
Fooloso4 wrote:You provide definitions that are less vague and not idiosyncratic but are nevertheless significantly different than what some mainstream theist mean by the term.
The definition I have provided is from the dictionary.
However, I am more than happy if a respondent wishes to specify a different definition and state into which of the 5 categories their belief or nonbelief in the existence of that thing they call god falls and why.
Fooloso4 wrote:But for some it is not a matter of epistemology at all, as when, for example, God makes Himself known, as it is said He did with His prophets. We might propose epistemological theories, raise questions, and debate this, but none of this arises for one who has an immediate, direct encounter with the divine. I am told that there are individuals and groups today who believe that God speaks directly to them.
And so, whether gnosis is a category of belief may not depend on one’s epistemology but rather on one’s theology. If one believes that God reveals Himself, makes Himself known, then to those to whom He has revealed Himself and who thus know Him, what your categories of belief exclude is knowledge of God. It turns gnosis into a claim of gnosis or a belief that one knows, which may turn out to be false and thus not knowledge but illusion.
I fear we may be talking past each other on this point. My point is simply (to steal the quote from Consul):
"What I know, I believe." ~ Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty, §177
Or in other words: 'To know' entails 'to believe'. But 'to believe' does not necessarily entail 'to know'.
***
-0+,
-0+ wrote:Can a line be clearly drawn between believe and not believe or is there a grey area in-between? Does vaguely thinking that gods exist qualify as belief?
What if someone says, "I think it is more likely that a god exists than not - I feel I relate more to theism than atheism - but I wouldn't go as far as to say I believe that a god exists"?
I understand your concern, but to say "I believe but don't know X" is already pretty vague way of thinking it is true.
-0+ wrote:What if someone says, "I have no idea if a god exists or not, but if I had to bet some money on it, I would bet that no god exists"?
I suppose that depends on one's own
standard of belief as addressed in my topic
How much evidence does it take to believe or to know?
However, I am thrown off by the qualifier, "if I had to bet some money on it".
If I had to bet on a coin toss, I would, and I'd just randomly guess whether I thought it would be heads or tails.
However, if I was confident there was a 51% chance X is true and a 49% chance it is not. I would gladly bet on it at 50-50 payout. That's how casinos make money. That to me might be a decent standard of belief, and then belief is corroborated by action such as my action to voluntarily go out and try to bet on it.
Alternatively, some might not be willing to say they believe something until they estimate it's likelihood to be much closer to 100% or even not until it is 100%. However, 100% might be qualified in some context such that even a 100% belief is not true knowledge. In other words, they might expect proof beyond a reasonable doubt just to get to belief and then consider true knowledge impossible, since for instance we could all be living in The Matrix.
-0+ wrote:The stronger one's belief, the more one may be willing to gamble ... Is there any reason for anyone who "knows" not to gamble everything they own (including own life) on this?
That's a great litmus test for knowledge, I think.
***
Fooloso4,
Fooloso4 wrote:If we look at Genesis it is clear that God is not perfect. It may be, however, as some scholars claim, that the fathers of monotheistic religions, Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, were not monotheists but henotheists.
I didn't realize you were including the surahs of Islam since you used the word Genesis. There are very significant differences between the way the surahs describe Adam and creation and the way they are described in the Genesis section of the Old Testament of the Christian Bible. Regardless, I don't see the relevance to the topic at hand.
Fooloso4 wrote:This excludes those who do not believe that God is a being, but is, rather, the source of all beings.
If lots of people use the term god to not refer to a being, then I recommend those people contact the dictionary.
Those who use an idiosyncratic definition of the word god are free to specify the definition they use and then answer the question in the OP using that definition. However, it is important for them then to specify the used definition as to not cause a fallacy of equivocation, just as one who would describe a feather as light would need to make it clear whether they meant not dark in color or not heavy in weight.
Fooloso4 wrote:That is my point. You use the term God as if we have a clear definition of the term.
No, I don't. I
gave a definition from the dictionary. Others are free to use a different definition. But the usage of the same term with two different definitions needs to be
specified such as by saying something like: "I am an atheist
using the American Heritage Definition but
using [name definition here] definition I am a theist."
Similarly, if I say, "This feather is not light. And by light I mean not dark in color." One could respond, "The feather is not light
using that brightness definition of light, but
using the weight definition of light that feather is light." That is reasonable. However, it would have been equivocal to say, "The feather is light and not light," or otherwise to switch definitions without specification.
I don't use the term god like it has a single clear definition. Instead, I have provided a dictionary definition of a thus verified common meaning and I am using the word in that context. Others are free to specify a different definition and thus a different context to use the same word to express themselves. That can easily be done without gibberish equivocations that imply X is not X.