Re: Christian Atheism, Muslim Atheism, Religious Atheism Generally - Possible?
Posted: January 22nd, 2018, 1:18 pm
If the people responders CAN'T be distinguished
Philosophy for Philosophers
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So an S-Zombie would be a person without existential crisis? Or would an S-Zombie be a person without passion? Both? Neither? Anyway, the Zombie problem is very useful philosophically now that we know so much about the material body, evolution, physics. When people like Kierkegaard were writing, the concept of the human really came from the concept of the soul. I think that's clear. That's because the body to them was just meat. They had no idea about Evolution, no idea about physics or physical chemistry, no idea about DNA.Hereandnow wrote: ↑January 22nd, 2018, 1:14 pmFirst, I don't know what you mean by 'physical'. It is a fiction, materialism, that is. A useful term and I may use it in many contexts, but not philosophically. If it is brought up philosophically, it needs a lot of explaining.Dlaw:
What would the physical difference be between something that has "latent subjectivity" and something that doesn't?
If we constructed an S-Zombie - which we defined as exactly like a human in every respect but WITHOUT subjectivity, how would we tell the S-Zombie from a real human?
What also needs explaining is subjectivity. I am tempted to say that defining a human without subjectivity is like defining, say, defining a room with out extension. A room IS extension. All the things you would mention always already are subjectivity; even those scientific pronouncements have their origin in the meanings laid forth by a structured subjectivity.
But I think you have in mind phenomena. Never mind that we may live "in mind" and all we see are ideational content, what if among these, there were no subjective core, like a soul or a transcendental ego? The question is, what if there were no transcendental ego would there be a
discernible difference?
Depends on how you define the such an ego. If positing it is justified, then there is something there in the world that does the justifying and would be missing, and the difference you seek would be found in the absence of this. So, is the positing of a transcendental ego justified? The subjective end of things we do in conscious awareness, in judging, in feeling, in thinking, in questioning, and so forth, needs to be determined in such a way that the judging what it is without such a positing.
Kierkegaard would say the evidence you seek reveals itself by taking your inquiring self off the matter at hand, the theoretical searching for a transcendental ego, and attending to the dynamic of what presents itself when foundational issues, for him , the passionate pursuit eternal happiness through faith that delivers the soul into its true actuality, rise to awareness. Were you to put the question to K. he would probably your say thoughts are about words, like the word 'soul' while the real issue before you is passionate engagement. This engagement IS the soul (see his Sickness Unto Death). No proof is needed beyond putting one in the midst of this powerful dread of realizing the life you live in the everyday world is not really who you are. You discern this by being a real Christian, which is being in an existential crisis.
K. is called a father of existentialism because he brilliantly tried to bring matters of philosophy to a level beneath, if you will, science to what is at the Real core of our being here. Kant tried to do this with transcendental arguments and for him the structural features of consciousness were rational. For K. they are the whole person's world, filled with need and fear and passion. That is the real human being. What is missing in the above question, once the soul is taken out of the picture is this.
To me it's a bit like the Touring test in which people are on one side and computers and other people are on the other and the former listen to the latter respond to questions. If the people responders can be distinguished from the computers then is there a difference? K. would laugh at this silliness. If the computer is capable of an existential crisis per above, then let's talk.
Well, this is familiar territory to me. Science has little to nothing to say on matters like this. I know that sounds shocking, but there is simply this: Science assumes there is nothing in the perceptual act itself that stands int he way of what it posits about the world. But this is wrong. And there is nothing I can say to convince you, except: Kant, Husserl, Levinas, Peirce, Dewey, James, Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Buber, et al. There is another world of thought out there. But it takes time and interest.Dlaw:
So an S-Zombie would be a person without existential crisis? Or would an S-Zombie be a person without passion? Both? Neither? Anyway, the Zombie problem is very useful philosophically now that we know so much about the material body, evolution, physics. When people like Kierkegaard were writing, the concept of the human really came from the concept of the soul. I think that's clear. That's because the body to them was just meat. They had no idea about Evolution, no idea about physics or physical chemistry, no idea about DNA.
Our model of the human body is so informed now, so rich and deep that the Zombie problem serves to reconnect soul-based philosophical ideas with the reality of, if you will, flesh, blood and particles.
You and I are of a mind on the fact that the "perceptual act" does not get its due as a phenomenon in the Universe. Possibly it's just too strange for people to handle.Hereandnow wrote: ↑January 22nd, 2018, 9:51 pmWell, this is familiar territory to me. Science has little to nothing to say on matters like this. I know that sounds shocking, but there is simply this: Science assumes there is nothing in the perceptual act itself that stands int he way of what it posits about the world. But this is wrong. And there is nothing I can say to convince you, except: Kant, Husserl, Levinas, Peirce, Dewey, James, Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Buber, et al. There is another world of thought out there. But it takes time and interest.Dlaw:
So an S-Zombie would be a person without existential crisis? Or would an S-Zombie be a person without passion? Both? Neither? Anyway, the Zombie problem is very useful philosophically now that we know so much about the material body, evolution, physics. When people like Kierkegaard were writing, the concept of the human really came from the concept of the soul. I think that's clear. That's because the body to them was just meat. They had no idea about Evolution, no idea about physics or physical chemistry, no idea about DNA.
Our model of the human body is so informed now, so rich and deep that the Zombie problem serves to reconnect soul-based philosophical ideas with the reality of, if you will, flesh, blood and particles.
As for me, I am going on a reading hiatus. I am in Rorty's Mirror of Nature. He has a lot say about your objections above, but it takes a lot of orientation, that is, reading philosophy.