On rational grounds of lack of evidence I deny the existence of that which is not or is other than first person subjective experience. Denying non-subjective experience does not rationally necessitate I deny the existence of other subjective experience, for I do not deny the possibility of the existence of every object exterior to the mind, just any object not consisting of subjective experience.If you deny the possibility, on rational grounds and evidence, of the existence of any object exterior to the mind, you're obliged to deny the existence of person-objects, which are still a subset of the set of all exterior objects.phenomenal_graffiti wrote:
There are no non-person objects exterior to the mind (or there are probably no non-person objects exterior to the mind, and if there were, if they are not themselves composed of first-person subjective experience, they cannot rationally have anything to do with the existence, appearance, behavior, etc. of non-person objects composed of first-person subjective experience).
There's no rational ground to accept all exterior objects.There's no rational ground to accept some exterior objects and deny others.
If you believe the person flying an airplane is real and has an existence outside of your mind, you're forced to believe that the airplane he's flying has the same ontological status.
True, but at the end of the day, one is forced to believe in the existence of something with the same questionable status as God. If one believes the brain creates consciousness, the person flying the airplane and the airplane demonstrably exists only as aspects of a simulated reality, materially consisting of first-person subjective experience, that is generated by a brain in a skull. We have no evidence of the existence of the person and airplane not created by one's brain that exists outside the skull, further, there is no evidence of the existence of non-experiential brains.
But there's no reason to believe in the existence of something that is not first-person subjective experience or that does not consist of first-person subjective experience as this is not based on the evidence of something that actually demonstrates it exists.When you attribute to that person the property of having a first-person subjective experience, it is still an attribute you assign to an exterior object from your own first-person experience. You may believe there's an exterior person-object that has a first-hand experience, but you're not in better position than anyone believing there's another exterior object having some other property.
The sentence in alignment with my doctrine, absent the concept of sub-dimensional consciousness, would say or should have said "given that God is a first-person subjective experience and the only thing that is ever experienced is God's first person subjective experience." If sub-dimensional consciousness and the subconscious mind exists, "we" exist in the sense that one is not the conscious mind of God pretending to be persons other than himself, but the substance of the subconscious mind of God forming doppelgangers of the content of the wakeful and dreaming imagination of God.Again, let's be careful with language. Your own doctrine does not allow you to use the pronoun "WE" tied to the first-person experience, that by definition is singular and cannot be confused with the plural first-person, composed of I and THEY. Actually you mean "given that I am first-person subjective experience".phenomenal_graffiti wrote:
Given that we are first-person subjective experiences and the only thing that is ever experienced is one's first-person subjective experience
True. The perceptual process is nevertheless useful as an idea illustrating the conceptual distinction between the idea of brain-generated simulated reality that is one's experience of the world and the idea of an exterior-to-the-mind copy of the simulation (that imaginatively matches the simulation with greater or lesser accuracy) not created by the brain.OK, but if there's no evidence and they are entirely fictional, then they don't exist and that confirms that they cannot be taken into account to explain anything. So if we took your own doctrine for good, there's not even perceptual process.phenomenal_graffiti wrote:
...there is no evidence of the existence of exterior-to-the-mind eyes, brains, and the mechanic-visual process. Indeed, the mechanical visual process itself is entirely fictional, as it is merely an imagined process,
Sure, there would be no observers if there is no such thing as sub-dimensional or subconscious doppelganger-ism in God's mind. Indeed "I" would be the Christian God experiencing oneself as a human being typing at a keyboard on a laptop, that are essentially aspects of a constructed (as opposed to simulated) reality consisting of the God's consciousness assuming a non-indigenous shape.But you must realize, according to what is expressed above, that there can't be, according to your own doctrine: parts, observations, neuroscientific/medical contexts, nor observers. You only have your thoughts, which is consistent with solipsism.phenomenal_graffiti wrote:
...the parts that may be observed in neuroscientific/medical context merely percepts made up of the first-person subjective experience of the observers. Indeed, the entire process of vision, despite being purely imaginary (as there is no evidence of the existence of exterior-to-the-mind doppelgangers of eyes, brains, and biology) is merely a God-implanted reductio ad absurdum to instigate reason in the direction of panpsychism.
According to my doctrine, God "cannot have facts" about anything that is not his own mind. He cannot pretend (well, He can, as one is can pretend) to know properties of anything but His mind, and the properties of the illusory objects His mind creates are as illusory as the mental objects themselves.No, according to your own doctrine, you cannot have facts, and especially none about anything that is not your own mind. You cannot pretend to know properties of anything but your mind, and the properties of the illusory objects your mind creates are as illusory as the mental objects themselves.phenomenal_graffiti wrote:
The premise may be circular, but in it's content it is the most obvious fact about the nature of existence. Regardless of whether or not it is circular to say 'this rock is composed materially of rock' the fact remains that existence only appears and manifests in the form of 'rock' (first-person subjective experience)
Regardless, the fact remains that existence appears and manifests only in the form of first-person subjective experience: the fact (if solipsism is true) that it is the first-person subjective experience of the only person in existence is beside the point.
"Again, when using "WE" it is implied as if it is something that other independent beings agreed on, but you can only mean "I have evidence of subjective experience...phenomenal_graffiti wrote:
As existence only manifests as subjective experience, we have evidence only of the existence of subjective experience.
Or "God has evidence only of the existence of subjective experience". But "WE" can exist if the substance of God's consciousness can form consciousness that is not God's conscious mind.
Nothing about your subjective experience leads automatically to the conclusion that there are other subjective experiences. The justification is only that, given that I exist, if others existed, given that I am first-person subjective experience and existence just happened to exist in a way that it assumed the form of a person and that which the person experiences, it is reasonable to believe these others should, if they exist, also be persons that experience. For if they are not persons that experience, how can they experience, or how can existence exist in a form in which it knows it exists?This is completely a non sequitur fallacy. Nothing about your subjective experience leads automatically to the conclusion that there are other subjective experiences.phenomenal_graffiti wrote:
The objective existence of other subjective experiences is justified by the existence of my own subjective experience.
Using your meaning of the term "justified", there are more reasons to assert the proposition that if others exist, they would consist of first-person subjective experience than to deny it, as given the evidence of the form existence actually takes, it may be that if other persons exist, in order for them to know they exist, they must take the form of a person that experiences.We usually mean "justified" to express the notion that there are more reasons to assert the proposition, than to deny it, not that there is merely a chance of having what the proposition asserts. You're "reasonable" speculations mean only a rationalization of your faith-based belief. One could "reasonably" believe as well anything that the mind will be willing to entertain arbitrarily, and you certainly could not deny anyone else their beliefs on the basis that "they are not justified".phenomenal_graffiti wrote:
Given that I won the lottery of existence as opposed to non-existence, the existence of other subjective experiences is justified in that despite the fact that I cannot experience them, it is reasonable to think that existence did not do a "one off" and halt production of others after the existence of myself.
Their existence is not justified, as given your definition of "justified" above, there is no reason to assert the proposition of material bodies that materially consist of something that is not/is other than subjective experience, as existence only appears and manifests as subjective experience. As existence only appears in the form of subjective experience (solipsism or no), there is no evidence of the existence of something that is not subjective experience, thus there is no logic to the proposition of the existence of non-subjective experience.There's no logical necessity for the non-existence of material bodies, so you would have to admit that believing that they exist is well justified.phenomenal_graffiti wrote:
absence of the logical necessity of the non-existence of others is justification for belief in the objective existence of others.
If solipsism is false, my consciousness would exist alongside theirs. There is nothing about their experience that would invalidate my existence. They would "see" in the sense of having a visual experience of an object they assign as my body, etc.They can't "see", remember? At best, they could imagine seeing you, and that would imply that for they being real, you have to be fictitious, including your first-person experience. Why you don't doubt then, your first-person experience? Their experience invalidates automatically yours.phenomenal_graffiti wrote:
Well, they will only see my body in their first-person subjective experience, hear sounds coming from that body, see the body move in a meaningful way that indicates communication, etc.
I was referring to something that is not/that is other than subjective experience--like material bodies existing exterior to the mind composed of something that is not/that is other than subjective experience---not being able to experience.But that's exactly what you believe and you think it is rational. Those things that your mind imagines as experiencing objects cannot experience, precisely because they're illusions of your mind. They can only be illusions of experiences in your mind, yet you believe they somehow exist as first-person experience and can really experience.phenomenal_graffiti wrote:
I don't think anyone can rationally think that something that is not experience can experience,
And that would be the way, if the analogy is objectively true in the form of Pantheopsychism and Pantheopsychic Christianity, the "cookie crumbles" so to speak, the manner in which existence arbitrarily happens to exist. It comes down to existence, existing only in the form of a person (even if the "author" or "indigenous consciousness" is an illusion), the person consisting only of first-person subjective experience, that (like physical energy in the 1st Law of Thermodynamics, "merely changes form") assuming arbitrary forms comprising the gamut of what happens to be/become actual.Assuming the analogy depicted accurately the universe you're describing, you would have to admit that there's absolutely nothing that could be absurd and illogical in that fictional world theater. Everything, arbitrarily chosen, would be possible, and there could be no objection to one thing being more likely or justified than other. At the same time, given that nothing would be a necessary and sufficient cause of anything else, since anything goes, nothing could be asserted with conviction, even the existence of the overarching mind imagining all this, because it well may be possible that the idea of authorship is also a mere illusion. Even the whole idea of stating a problem to be solved logically becomes a capricious game without any real purpose, because there's no end to it, no conclusion can be reached. There can be no talk of natural states, order, etc. Anything goes, literally.phenomenal_graffiti wrote:
A fiction writer imagines fictional characters doing this or that, thinking this or that, feeling this or that, but the characters are mental "figurines" made up of the mental "clay" of the writer. It is the writer contorting his or her thought-experience into the form of other people. These "individuals" are not objectively existing subjective experiences existing exterior to the writer's mind, but are simulacrum of the writer's thoughts. At the end of the day, the characters have no objective existence but are essentially the writer toying with his or her own consciousness to contort it into the form of "another's" consciousness, when in actuality it is just his or her consciousness appearing in the form of someone other than the indigenous consciousness.
In Solipsism, this is merely the only person in existence, if the person chooses to create fictional characters that are just mental illusions made up of the person's mind, contorting its consciousness into these myriad, happenstance forms. If, however, as Greta stated:
"It is an odd thing that each of us is just an objects of consciousness in other people's (and animals') minds, except to ourselves. It appears that there is no clear overarching perception of reality, only many fragmented ones."
:that is solipsism is false, the existential condition of there being just first-person experience in the form of persons in a fragmented perception of reality would attain in normal panpsychism.
Indeed in Pantheopsychism I propose that the indigenous consciousness of the Judeo-Christian God is itself just a fortuitous construction of the substance of which He is composed: first-person subjective experience. In this way, first-person subjective experience is as a substance is the true God, the person of the Judeo-Christian God itself a "figurine" made up of the "clay" of this basic substance.
Solipsism and the "solipsistic non-existence" of others as only the mental illusions of a single mind aside, I was referring to brute "non-existence" or of not existing at all: of first-person subjective experience (even that of the single person in solipsism) first being non-existent,i.e. not existing at all, then somehow existing a moment later without the use of pre-existing or eternally existing substance to fashion or mold the thing that just "popped" into existence, or vice versa, in which first-person subjective experience (even that of the single person in solipsism) first exists, then altogether does not exist.I remember that you tried to make the point at the beginning of this thread that one could not claim that a person ceased to exist. But all your explanations now lead to consider any person a fictional character, that actually does not exist, and that certainly can be made to be deceased in your fictional world of solipsism.
True, but can a non-solipsist infer the existence of first-person subjective experience outside one's mind independent of mere belief in it's existence?No, you can't, if you follow your own doctrine.I can use induction to infer the existence of first-person subjective experience outside my mind.
Existence appears as something other than a person and that which the person experiences?That's an unwarranted belief, you cannot prove it, not even to yourself.phenomenal_graffiti wrote:
Given that existence only appears in the form of first-person subjective experience,
As existence only appears in the form of first-person subjective experience, there is no justification for the existence of non-subjective experience.There's no reason for induction to give you only person-objects and not giving you non-person objects.phenomenal_graffiti wrote:
I don't think one can rationally justify belief in bridges, skyscrapers, brains, and other bodies made up of something other than first-person subjective experience.
It's just the happenstance nature of experience. Existence happens to exist in such a way that the forms of "others" (re: the illusion of others in solipsism) are embodied or the "consciousness" of "others" appear to be invisible and intangible things inside a "physical" representative. It's just the arbitrary form consciousness happens to take. As before, within my doctrine, if sub-dimensionalism is true, the brain is an object composed of a sub-dimensional person's consciousness that is a deliberately implanted or formed reductio ad absurdum that logically leads to panpsychism.Interestingly, you have not explained why in your doctrine (if there was anything rationally justified in your assumptions) the exterior minds imagined by your mind appear to be embodied, I mean, they don't appear disembodied, in other words, not linked to a person's body, and particularly his brain. Why they don't appear as ghostly minds hanging around?
If Pantheopsychic Christianity were true in the sense of the fiction writer analogy above, there is no point to anything, as it is merely God pretending to be the individuals he saves or damns (or not, if Universalism is true). If first-person subjective experience is primarily, even in Pantheopsychism, a universal substance comprising everything, including the infinite mind of God and non-God beings are composed of this same substance within the overarching mental container of the Judeo-Christian God, then it is not one person contorting one's own consciousness into the forms of others but a substance forming a single overarching person and other tiny persons within the larger person ("boxes within a box"). Greta's fragmentation manages to exist, but the fragments are made up of the substance of the overarching mind while residing not exterior to the overarching mind, but within it.That's the problem with solipsism, all solipsism. Since everything is real as an illusion, there's no distinction between real and not real. What would be the point of your doctrine in calling something real or not real?phenomenal_graffiti wrote:
The book is made up of my consciousness, which I believe derives only from more consciousness in the exterior world in the form of an exterior Person imagining the book, and transmitting the idea of the book to His sub-conscious and the sub-dimensional persons within the Person, the book and its content mimicked in the subconscious doppelganger of the conscious idea.
One can be justified in believing there are real, mind-independent bridges, skyscrapers, and brains...but these exterior existences only logically exist if by "mind-independent" they are "exterior to a subject's mind", they are composed of first-person subjective experience, and exist only in the form of an idea in the mind of an exterior person.
In the belief that the universe ("everything that exists" irrespective of the concept of a multiverse) is an infinite space containing every brain that creates every consciousness that shall ever exist, the infinite space is the container containing the entire population of Greta's "fragmented perceptions". Physical energy, the "whatever" that is and materially consists of something other/that is not first-person subjective experience (as in common belief first-person subjective experience exists and can only exist when produced by the brain) is the substance forming the overarching container within which resides all brains (and summarily, all consciousness).
Pantheopsychism merely swaps physical energy for subjective experience and does away with non-experiential brains and other distal objects conceptually composed of something that is not/other than subjective experience.
If you believe the brain creates consciousness, and that your consciousness does not exist outside your brain producing it, you experience only "Princess Leia holograms" of cars, bridges, brains, people, etc. and as such have no evidence of the objective existence of non-experiential cars, bridges, brains, people, etc. as the "Princess Leia hologram" is the only thing you have ever, and can only, experience.So, my first-person subjective experience gives me evidence of the existence of things independent of my mind. I experience cars, bridges, brains, people, so I have evidence of their objective existence.phenomenal_graffiti wrote:
The only evidence you have for the existence of anything exterior to your mind is your first-person subjective experience
Using the belief that the brain creates consciousness for illustrative basis, your first-person subjective experience gives you evidence of things existing only in an artificial reality made up of your subjective experience generated by your brain. You can only experience things produced by your brain (however the brain stored subjective experience that have not yet happened); you cannot experience things not created by your brain.
"Objectively existing" cars, bridges, brains, people, etc. are not created by your brain, thus even if they existed they cannot and are not experienced, as these do not exist within the brain (as exterior-to-the-mind cars, for example, would be too large to fit within before intangibly phasing through a brain). Brains, in the way R2D2 in Star Wars is only able to produce a hologram of Princess Leia rather than R2D2 containing and spitting out the body of Leia herself, can only produce the artificial reality of one's visual, tactile, etc. experience of cars, bridges, brains, people etc.).
The "Princess Leia hologram" of cars, bridges, brain,s, people, etc. produced by your brain is not one and the same as cars, bridges, brains, people, etc. that exist outside your skull (using the idea that there are non-experiential objects and events exterior to the mind and the idea that brains create consciousness for the sake of illustrative argument).
PG
