I shall address your generous comments on the God Question in a separate post.Thomyum2 wrote: ↑September 25th, 2020, 11:21 amWhat constitutes silence? Without hearing, could it be said that there even are such things as sounds or silence? From an evolutionary viewpoint, organisms developed the ability to hear because of the value – because it is pragmatic to be able to distinguish sound from silence.Angel Trismegistus wrote: ↑September 23rd, 2020, 4:15 am Yes, you get it. Yes, the tree falls in the forest out of earshot. Does it fall in silence?
In this regard we could talk about color as well as beauty, I think.
I don’t think it contradicts science, as science is only concerned with what is observed, not with what is not or cannot be observed.Angel Trismegistus wrote: ↑September 23rd, 2020, 4:15 am
To think that the tree falls in silence contradicts common sense. It also contradicts a basic scientific assumption about the world.
I mean, the absurdity is easily illustrated by giving our tree conundrum another turn: if a tree falls in a forest out of eyeshot, does it fall?
But yes, it does contradict a basic assumption. I think the ‘tree falls’ question is one of the most revealing, and gets at one of the core ideas of philosophy, precisely because how we answer it does reveal our underlying assumptions. The assumption here being that certain things exist, and events happen, independent of whether or not we observe them. But we only assume this because we value it; we call it true because we find it useful to us to understand what changes or what remains the same when we are not observing. Value drives what we assume, not the other way around.
I’m glad you find it interesting and yes I think you’ve understood, although I wouldn’t say ‘logically’ or ‘temporally’ prior (which is why I put ‘precede’ in quotes, since that word normally has a temporal sense). Rather I might say ‘existentially’ prior. To continue on with our tree falling example, valuing a distinction between sound and silence – growing or learning or becoming able to make this distinction – brings these concepts into existence, and this occurs apart from time. When we come to be able to distinguish something, and our awareness of it may extend into past, present and future....Angel Trismegistus wrote: ↑September 23rd, 2020, 4:15 am However, your idea of the priority of value is too interesting not to explore further. As I understand your view, value is prior -- logically and temporally prior -- to both the subjective and the objective elements of a particular experience. Have I read you aright? Do I get your point?
On the question of value, let me say straightaway that your thoughts are cogent and profound. That the riddle of the tree applies to silence as well as sound is a brilliant insight. My compliments. And you certainly get to the heart of the matter in the following passage:
If our view is that the tree falling unobserved in the forest raises a question about silence as well as sound, then the meaning of the riddle broadens and it is no longer simply about this or that particular perception but more generally about experience -- namely, about whether anything that is not directly experienced can be known to exist. The riddle becomes a parable of empiricism. And perhaps this is what it was all along. Of course, the tree may be said to make an inferential sound, and this inferential sound is based on many direct experiences of trees falling, or even just of things falling. But an inferential sound is not a sound. An inferential sound is the thought of a sound. And the thought of a sound relies on an assumption, not unlike the assumption made by science in its empirical pursuits. Value, you say, drives both what we experience and what we assume, and "not the other way around."The assumption here being that certain things exist, and events happen, independent of whether or not we observe them. But we only assume this because we value it; we call it true because we find it useful to us to understand what changes or what remains the same when we are not observing. Value drives what we assume, not the other way around.
But surely we must acknowledge a difference between an experiential sound and an inferential sound, and with that acknowledgment draw a distinction between value perceived and value conceived that corresponds to the difference between perception and conception -- and based on that distinction, differentiate respectively between the real and the pragmatic in the matter of value. Whereas value appears to be "existentially" prior in the case of value conceived, it seems intuitive that in the case of value perceived the matter must be "the other way around."