When I say human I mean human interpretation. Revelation doesn't exist without human interpretation.
Toy Worlds and the Problem of Suffering
- Angelo Cannata
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Re: Toy Worlds and the Problem of Suffering
- LuckyR
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Re: Toy Worlds and the Problem of Suffering
- Astro Cat
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Re: Toy Worlds and the Problem of Suffering
Ok, yes, that's a good point. I considered objecting, but the more I thought about it, the more I was forced to agree. For instance, my thoughts began with "what is an example of a physical suffering if an omnibeing was in charge of physics that it wouldn't be able to resolve for all people, with their subjective tastes?"LuckyR wrote: ↑June 23rd, 2022, 1:54 am The simple answer is: no. The reason is that suffering is a relative term. It is like asking can there be a universe without cold? To me 40 degrees F is cold. But it doesn't matter if somehow a universe was made with all temperatures above 40 degrees, because whatever the low end of the observed scale is, that will be the de facto definition of cold. Even if it is 10,000 degrees. Similarly, no matter how pleasant life is in a universe, the least positive portion of the life experience can be labeled suffering.
Then it struck me: I hate the feeling of walking on grass in my bare feet. Tons of people love it. I love walking on sand in my bare feet, some people probably don't. So by the sheer fact of the premise of free agency being a thing and the fact that people have preferences, you're right; these slight "unpleasantries" would be interpreted as suffering. In fact, if anything is physically pleasant at all, the absence of that thing (temporary or no) could be interpreted as suffering.
I'm afraid I have to admit that my OP is no longer good as written. But I think it can be salvaged.
The point is to demarcate some entire realm of suffering that doesn't have to exist, but does: something that can't be broken down into a sliding scale but must come whole-sale and either be present or absent.
So I propose this: imagine the OP's argument, but instead of just saying "suffering," I simply narrow the category to "lethal suffering." Then we don't have to define suffering on any kind of sliding scale: something about physics either kills you (or allows your death) or it does not. How do you feel about that?
--Richard Feynman
- Angelo Cannata
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Re: Toy Worlds and the Problem of Suffering
Of course our mind is capable, it goes without saying, there's no reason to doubt it. First rule: don't think, believe!
- 3017Metaphysician
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Re: Toy Worlds and the Problem of Suffering
AC!Astro Cat wrote: ↑June 22nd, 2022, 10:15 pmHi Metaphysician,3017Metaphysician wrote: ↑June 22nd, 2022, 1:51 pm AC!
My argument with a-theists has been relative to their 'seemingly' unsophisticated thinking (the inability to think for themselves)in their approach to apologetics, etc.. As you so very well pointed out/qualified your thesis (which shows your own level of sophistication), what logic allows one to conclude that the mind of a God, is Omni-3?
To help, other alternatives to the concern relate to Process Theology and the like. Existentially, are you suggesting that you know the mind of a God? How is that possible, you think?
I'm not claiming to know the mind of God. This is a reductio ad absurdum argument whereby the arguer takes some premises, reaches an absurd or incongruent conclusion, and then argues "therefore these premises can't possibly be true." If anything, I am simply saying "God can not have these properties in aggregate."
It's saying "I don't know what a God might be, but it at least can't be this."
Thanks
I certainly agree with the absurdum. However, to be very succinct, your argument buys into the Omni-3 qualities or properties of a conscious Being called God, as a basis for [your] disbelief.
See the inconsistency? For clarification purposes (later for the sake of argument, I'm going to advocate the assumption of the Omni-3 in a bit, and parse what that really means existentially) I am still not clear whether you yourself are buying into it (Omni-3) when you say "I'm not claiming to Know the Mind of God".
You're saying on the one hand you don't know a God, but on the other you're using the Omni-3 as a bases somehow for disbelief. Did I get that right?
― Albert Einstein
- Pattern-chaser
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Re: Toy Worlds and the Problem of Suffering
Can you offer any reasoning behind your deduction that "whatever we think God follows, the consequence is that that thing precedes God"? This "consequence" is not obvious to me, at least.Angelo Cannata wrote: ↑June 22nd, 2022, 2:22 pm Whatever we think God follows, the consequence is that that thing precedes God; as consequence, God is not God.
"Who cares, wins"
- Pattern-chaser
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Re: Toy Worlds and the Problem of Suffering
I can see where your first sentence comes from. An omni-everything Creator-God would surely precede the universe She created.Angelo Cannata wrote: ↑June 22nd, 2022, 2:22 pm If God is God, he (or she or whatever) must precede anything, must be the one who determines what everything is.
For example, God must be the one who determines what good is, what omnipotent means, what God means, what infinite means and so on.
But why should your second sentence be as you describe? Good is a value judgement, usually made by a human, not a deity. Omnipotence seems to go with the territory of an omni-everything God. But the meaning of "God" and "infinite"? Why should such definitions be the province of God?
Do you think God rules and controls every event that ever occurs in Her universe? Absolute control, down to the finest detail? If that was so, we would not be us, human beings, we would just be puppets animated by God; we would be God, and nothing more. I cannot believe this is Her preference/decision.
"Who cares, wins"
- Angelo Cannata
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Re: Toy Worlds and the Problem of Suffering
An example is what Astro Cat said:Pattern-chaser wrote: ↑June 23rd, 2022, 10:09 am Can you offer any reasoning behind your deduction that "whatever we think God follows, the consequence is that that thing precedes God"? This "consequence" is not obvious to me, at least.
If God has to obey logic, to follow logic, then logic is something that precedes God. If God has to follow a rule, then that rule precedes God and God needs to conform to that rule.
I understand that there seems to be a conflict between “to follow”, that means you are behind what you follow, and “to precede”, that means that you are after what comes first. Think of law to make your idea: if you have to follow a law, this means that the law was made before you. If you follow my instructions, what happens in time is 1) I give you instructions, 2) you follow the instructions: you can see that the instructions that you follow precede your action of following them.
- Angelo Cannata
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Re: Toy Worlds and the Problem of Suffering
If deciding what is good and what is not is up to you, then God, if he wants to be good, needs to follow your idea of what is good: you establish what God must follow. In this case you are the real God, and God becomes your follower. What I am saying comes actually from considering things from God’s perspective. How can God think that he should adapt to your idea of what is good? The same applies to all other ideas.Pattern-chaser wrote: ↑June 23rd, 2022, 10:16 am Good is a value judgement, usually made by a human, not a deity. Omnipotence seems to go with the territory of an omni-everything God. But the meaning of "God" and "infinite"? Why should such definitions be the province of God?
Do you think God rules and controls every event that ever occurs in Her universe? Absolute control, down to the finest detail? If that was so, we would not be us, human beings, we would just be puppets animated by God; we would be God, and nothing more. I cannot believe this is Her preference/decision.
This does not mean some sort of pantheism, where everything is just a particle of God’s giant body. As you said, this would mean no freedom, no free will. Rather, we can understand that God, even if he is at the origin of everything, is able to decide to make humans who are able to be, at least to some degree, the origin of their own choices.
- Pattern-chaser
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Re: Toy Worlds and the Problem of Suffering
Logic isn't "something". It isn't a thing at all. It's a way of thinking that minimises the chance of incorrect (i.e. illogical) reasoning. It's like you're saying, "God must be preceded by thinking."Angelo Cannata wrote: ↑June 23rd, 2022, 11:48 am If God has to obey logic, to follow logic, then logic is something that precedes God.
"Who cares, wins"
- Pattern-chaser
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Re: Toy Worlds and the Problem of Suffering
God surely has Her own ideas as to what is desirable, for that is what "good" refers to. I imagine that what is "good" (desirable) to Her is not the same as what is desirable to me, although I can't know what God thinks. So why would you think I was trying to get God to "adapt" to my ideas?Angelo Cannata wrote: ↑June 23rd, 2022, 12:03 pm How can God think that he should adapt to your idea of what is good?
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Re: Toy Worlds and the Problem of Suffering
I don't see a difference as for our discussion.Pattern-chaser wrote: ↑June 23rd, 2022, 2:10 pm Logic isn't "something". It isn't a thing at all. It's a way of thinking that minimises the chance of incorrect (i.e. illogical) reasoning. It's like you're saying, "God must be preceded by thinking."
- Angelo Cannata
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Re: Toy Worlds and the Problem of Suffering
Because God is supposed to be the maximum good.Pattern-chaser wrote: ↑June 23rd, 2022, 2:39 pm God surely has Her own ideas as to what is desirable, for that is what "good" refers to. I imagine that what is "good" (desirable) to Her is not the same as what is desirable to me, although I can't know what God thinks. So why would you think I was trying to get God to "adapt" to my ideas?
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Re: Toy Worlds and the Problem of Suffering
They are not ill-founded, for you have stripped the universe of all the most meaningful human interactions, good and bad. In your toy universe there is no murder, no martyrdom, no sacrificial love, no heroic virtue. The universe is effectively emptied of all meaningful interactions and all we are left with is banality. This does not strike me as an improvement on God's creation.Astro Cat wrote: ↑June 20th, 2022, 10:45 pm"But Cat," you might ask, "what about physical suffering people inflict on each other, like a stabbing?" Ostensibly God could stop this sort of suffering without removing free will: people physically incapable of stabbing each other are still relevantly free because they can still wake up and choose what they're wearing today, where they're going, who they're hanging out with, what they're going to do when they get there, etc.
"But Cat, someone that can't stab someone else is less free than someone who can." Technically true, but we have to ask if that's a good sort of freedom to have for the sake of it? We already have multiple actions we aren't free to do, yet still consider ourselves free: I can't teleport to Mars or walk unaided on my ceiling. Am I not free because of these few actions I'm physically prohibited from performing? I don't think that would be a reasonable take to have. Additionally, if we really did want to make the argument that "more freedoms, no matter what kind, are better," then we must reach the absurd conclusion that a universe where we're free to enact Hellish tortures with telekinesis or pyrokinesis or whatever on other people only seen in horror movies in our universe is somehow "more free" and therefore "better." I don't think that's a good line of argument, and I hope you agree. So, let us agree that God can cease physical suffering without removing our status as free beings with agency, and that objections this is "less" free are ill-founded.
So sure, we could have a 'thin' and inconsequential instantiation of agency in the toy universe, but it seems obvious that a thicker instantiation of agency would be better qua agency, for in that case we would have control over not only unimportant things, but important things as well.
I don't think it is difficult to articulate. If the malady is introduced for the sake of the cure then presumably nothing has been accomplished, for the cure is nothing more than the negation of the malady.Astro Cat wrote: ↑June 20th, 2022, 10:45 pmNow, I mentioned that the definition of omnibenevolence (since it is rather inexhaustive) allows for some theodicies: we can still get our typical theodicies such as the good-making theodicy (maybe physical suffering is a necessary means to a good end, e.g. firefighters are heroes, heroes are good, and firefighters/heroes can't exist unless the bad things they fight exist). My response to this sort of theodicy is that it's kind of like arguing it's "worth it" to invent smallpox because it would be "good" to cure smallpox. It's hard to articulate why this is absurd, but there it is, I hope you agree that this is absurd.
But it would seem that you do not understand the good-making ("soul-making") theodicy. On such a theodicy smallpox is not good as a means to a cure; it is good as a means to good human beings. For example, it provides occasion for courage in the face of adversity, the courageous person is better than the non-courageous person, and the virtue of courage is not attainable in the absence of fear and adversity.
First I would note that it is fairly obvious that no fallacy is being committed. If you think a fallacy is being committed, then you should either name or explain the fallacy.Astro Cat wrote: ↑June 20th, 2022, 10:45 pmWe might also encounter the theodicy by which the theist says, "God actualized physical suffering for a mysterious reason that only God knows, but we can be sure that it's a good reason." This is special pleading, and I always like to illustrate how this sort of thinking is a trap that can never be escaped from. Let me tell you a quick story and I think you'll agree that once this special pleading is adopted, nothing can ever shake the theist out of it, and I think we should agree that these kinds of traps are fallacious for a reason and should be avoided...
Second, the theist's argument is not only not fallacious, it is sound. If God has our best interests in mind and God's understanding and power far surpasses our own, then when God allows us to suffer something that we cannot make sense of, it is eminently reasonable to conclude that he has allowed it for a good reason that we do not currently understand. There is nothing here that should lead us to the non sequitur that God can never be questioned (cf. Book of Job).
For instance, consider the child who trusts their parents even during a confusing and painful time. It would be quite wrongheaded to tell them, "Once you adopt this trusting disposition, nothing will ever shake you out of it, and therefore you are committing a fallacy which must be disowned." Would this not be a silly and presumptuous thing to say to the child?
---------------
Lucky is mistaken. Suffering is not relative, it is just somewhat subjective, and "lethal suffering" is just as subjective as is general suffering, for some desire death.Astro Cat wrote: ↑June 23rd, 2022, 2:17 amOk, yes, that's a good point. I considered objecting, but the more I thought about it, the more I was forced to agree. For instance, my thoughts began with "what is an example of a physical suffering if an omnibeing was in charge of physics that it wouldn't be able to resolve for all people, with their subjective tastes?"LuckyR wrote: ↑June 23rd, 2022, 1:54 am The simple answer is: no. The reason is that suffering is a relative term. It is like asking can there be a universe without cold? To me 40 degrees F is cold. But it doesn't matter if somehow a universe was made with all temperatures above 40 degrees, because whatever the low end of the observed scale is, that will be the de facto definition of cold. Even if it is 10,000 degrees. Similarly, no matter how pleasant life is in a universe, the least positive portion of the life experience can be labeled suffering.
Then it struck me: I hate the feeling of walking on grass in my bare feet. Tons of people love it. I love walking on sand in my bare feet, some people probably don't. So by the sheer fact of the premise of free agency being a thing and the fact that people have preferences, you're right; these slight "unpleasantries" would be interpreted as suffering. In fact, if anything is physically pleasant at all, the absence of that thing (temporary or no) could be interpreted as suffering.
I'm afraid I have to admit that my OP is no longer good as written. But I think it can be salvaged.
The point is to demarcate some entire realm of suffering that doesn't have to exist, but does: something that can't be broken down into a sliding scale but must come whole-sale and either be present or absent.
So I propose this: imagine the OP's argument, but instead of just saying "suffering," I simply narrow the category to "lethal suffering." Then we don't have to define suffering on any kind of sliding scale: something about physics either kills you (or allows your death) or it does not. How do you feel about that?
Your OP is about improving the universe by removing physical pain. Physical pain is a bit hard to define, and it may be impossible to distinguish from psychological pain. Also, the physical order contributes to both pain and pleasure (as well as the alleviation of pain, which is arguably a form of pleasure). For example, if your 'simulation' allows knives to cut tomatoes but not humans, then the surgeon will not be able to perform his operations.
Nevertheless, none of this destroys the OP due to the fact that the OP is highly speculative. You could always just add another condition, "Knives are not allowed to cut humans for the sake of harming them," or again, "Knives are not allowed to cut humans for the sake of unjustified harm," etc. Even if the concept of suffering is a bit nebulous, all that is required for your OP is to identify some subset of pointless or gratuitous suffering, such as Ivan does in his conversation with Alyosha in The Brothers Karamazov.
Socrates: He's like that, Hippias, not refined. He's garbage, he cares about nothing but the truth.
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Re: Toy Worlds and the Problem of Suffering
This may spiral into its own fully developed side discussion (as I guess happens in these things, right?), but I have several gut reactions that I need to decide between focusing on:Leontiskos wrote: ↑June 24th, 2022, 12:48 am They are not ill-founded, for you have stripped the universe of all the most meaningful human interactions, good and bad. In your toy universe there is no murder, no martyrdom, no sacrificial love, no heroic virtue. The universe is effectively emptied of all meaningful interactions and all we are left with is banality. This does not strike me as an improvement on God's creation.
So sure, we could have a 'thin' and inconsequential instantiation of agency in the toy universe, but it seems obvious that a thicker instantiation of agency would be better qua agency, for in that case we would have control over not only unimportant things, but important things as well.
1) I could dispute that "all we are left with is banality." I cried yesterday, for instance; had what might be considered a vulnerable moment. But I wasn't sad, I was just listening to music after a night of work and research, and I was just deeply moved by the music: that's it. Granted I cry often when I listen to music, so this is a little tailored to my idiosyncrasies, but I didn't have to suffer to have a non-banal time (I don't know what an antonym would be: profound?)
I also happen to cry a lot when I read books, when I watch films, on the rare occasion that I look at art, when I just have a really good time with my friends and appreciate my connection with them... who says the absence of one type of suffering has to be banal?
2) I could make an argument that if it is good to have firemen that stop fires, which are bad; then wouldn't it be really good to have some kind of exotic evil-fighter, someone that alleviates some kind of really bad suffering, worse than any of the ones we know now? If a sacrifice hurts that much more, for longer, with a deeper sensation of pain, in order to alleviate some exotic source of suffering (that itself hurts worse, for longer, with a deeper sensation of pain), isn't that a better martyrdom and sacrifice? Must we ask, is God good enough, having not made this exotic torture and then overcoming good, if this line of thinking works?
3) I could continue making an argument against the good-making (or, apparently soul-making; can you tell I'm not formally trained?) theodicy by either insisting it is absurd to hold that crime is worth it so that we can have police; or make a weaker argument that perhaps some audience of my argument would agree it's absurd and that this is a success?
I don't know which tack to take, but I think you can see where each one goes in a sense.
I believe that courage would still be required in a world without physical suffering: how else might we approach that person we admire that might reject us, or stand before a crowd to speak our mind while dealing with the notion that they might judge us, or stand up in the face of people with hurtful ideas (which would still exist in a Toy World, though I suppose we wouldn't have to worry about physical violence)?Leontiskos wrote:I don't think it is difficult to articulate. If the malady is introduced for the sake of the cure then presumably nothing has been accomplished, for the cure is nothing more than the negation of the malady.
But it would seem that you do not understand the good-making ("soul-making") theodicy. On such a theodicy smallpox is not good as a means to a cure; it is good as a means to good human beings. For example, it provides occasion for courage in the face of adversity, the courageous person is better than the non-courageous person, and the virtue of courage is not attainable in the absence of fear and adversity.
We might object "ah, but there wouldn't be the sort of courage it takes to keep a cool head when saving someone from falling onto the subway tracks" (or something, I don't know).
But I am reminded by an objection I used to get to this argument a lot: "But if there is no physical suffering, then how would you know if you put your hand on a hot burner?"
The objection has always struck me as odd because obviously, if there is no physical suffering, why would we need to worry about our hand being on a hot burner?
What good does courage of the "I'm not afraid of physical consequences if I take this risky action to do a good thing" sort do if there are no physical consequences? Why is it good to take the risky action to, say, save someone if the someone could have never been in danger in the first place? You say that the point isn't to have a disease just to have a cure, but I have a hard time seeing how that isn't exactly what this is! The disease is suffering, the cure is things like courage and strength through adversity, and the outcome is simply the alleviation or prevention of suffering that needn't have occurred in the first place: what a travesty if the suffering was instantiated just to attain those cures; particularly if things like suffering and strength through adversity can exist without physical suffering.
I don't have as much time to respond right now as I thought (I will continue this response tonight), but I'll cede that fallacy isn't the right word to have used. This aspect of the conversation deserves its own post in my estimation (which I'll still do in this thread). I am deeply troubled by the ability to use our epistemic limitations to believe something is true even in the appearance of the opposite. It feels like special pleading. I know that parents do this with children, but something doesn't sit right with me about it, and I need time to elucidate my thoughts on it. Later tonight, then. (I will also get to the rest of the post. Am needing to step away shortly for a dinner date)Leontiskos wrote: First I would note that it is fairly obvious that no fallacy is being committed. If you think a fallacy is being committed, then you should either name or explain the fallacy.
Second, the theist's argument is not only not fallacious, it is sound. If God has our best interests in mind and God's understanding and power far surpasses our own, then when God allows us to suffer something that we cannot make sense of, it is eminently reasonable to conclude that he has allowed it for a good reason that we do not currently understand. There is nothing here that should lead us to the non sequitur that God can never be questioned (cf. Book of Job).
For instance, consider the child who trusts their parents even during a confusing and painful time. It would be quite wrongheaded to tell them, "Once you adopt this trusting disposition, nothing will ever shake you out of it, and therefore you are committing a fallacy which must be disowned." Would this not be a silly and presumptuous thing to say to the child?
--Richard Feynman
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