Count Lucanor wrote: ↑August 24th, 2022, 12:13 am
Grant R Henderson wrote: ↑August 21st, 2022, 7:01 pm
I do own the criteria by which I measure how accurately the explanation meets the criteria, because I am my conscious experience, and I understand what is my conscious experience according to my own inner reflections thereof. We can never find a satisfactory explanation of how matter and motion, etc produces sensation, feeling and experience, because we can never make ourselves the “subject” of that interaction as a means to prove it.
The problem is that in that case you can only own your subjective, personal criteria, but you can never own the other subjects' own criteria, which means your explanation does not apply to them. You're still left with the inability to provide a "full explanation", since whatever you can provide stays within the boundaries of your self. In your own explanation, the causes of anything are internal to your subjective experience, they are not objective causes outside the domain of your self that can be grasped by external observers.
Grant R Henderson wrote: ↑August 21st, 2022, 7:01 pm
We can only prove our own conscious experience by thinking -- “I think therefore I am”. Furthermore, we can only define our conscious experience through thinking about our conscious experience. The definition is satisfactory if our thinking about our conscious experience describes what our conscious experience does, according to our conscious experience. What consciousness does could not be deciphered according to anything else. It is satisfactory because it is consistent with empirical observations (my own thinking, other peoples descriptions of their own thinking).
Notice that there is no correspondency between the amount of subjects implied in the problem and what you claim is the criteria of proof: "I think, therefore I am". You have kept saying "WE" because that's what is required for a satisfactory explanation: the other subject's acknowledgement of the objective causes of something, but then you resort to what you think proves your own conscious experience. At best it only proves yours to you, but not anyone else's. You cannot jump from the "I think, therefore I am" to the "we think, therefore we are". You're still left with the inability to provide a "full explanation".
Grant R Henderson wrote: ↑August 21st, 2022, 7:01 pm
If you need the physical to infer the non-physical, it doesn't follow that the non-physical is bound by the physical. The manner in which I comprehend the relevant concepts plays no role in their causal structure. Rather, it would be logical that a non-physical ontological ground could not be reduced to anything -- physical or otherwise -- simply because such implies no possible prior explanatory basis.
We are talking ontology here. It's not about inferring the concept of the non-physical from the concept of the physical, but about inferring the existence of the non-physical from the existence of the physical. You said that "we can infer nonphysical properties based on physical evidence", which implies some ontological relation of dependency: whatever you call the non-physical, its existence cannot be explained without the existence of the physical.
Grant R Henderson wrote: ↑August 21st, 2022, 7:01 pm
Regardless, my post does not indicate that there are objects of perception, and things in themselves (non-physical or otherwise). It merely presupposes that the world is composed of concept and percept, which are bridged together by knowledge. This demonstrates two sides of a single reality. We could say that the world presents itself to us as a duality, but knowledge fuses these together as a unified whole. This is not dualism. Dualism assumes two worlds totally distinct from one another, and attempts to show how one of these two worlds offers an explanation for the other. Dualism does not indicate there to be two sides of a single reality.
That is not consistent, however, with how you have replied to my points. You indeed behave as if things in themselves existed outside of you and were, therefore, objects of perception, which in this case also happen to be subjects to which you want to show a logical proof. The world that you presuppose as composed ONLY of concept, percept and knowledge, can only be your own subjective world. Who are you trying to prove something if not yourself? If I and this forum are nothing but products of your consciousness, there would be nothing to prove, as there would be nothing objectively true.
Grant R Henderson wrote: ↑August 21st, 2022, 7:01 pm
Yes, I cannot point to anything non-physical. But I also cannot point to my consciousness, or your consciousness.
From the approach you adopt, you cannot point to anything. That's what Idealism always leads to: to nothing.
The problem is that in that case you can only own your subjective, personal criteria, but you can never own the other subjects' own criteria, which means your explanation does not apply to them. You're still left with the inability to provide a "full explanation", since whatever you can provide stays within the boundaries of your self. In your own explanation, the causes of anything are internal to your subjective experience, they are not objective causes outside the domain of your self that can be grasped by external observers.
By granting that you are conscious, I am granting an instance of a category that I know to be true within myself. Thus, I can reasonably infer that other subjects are also conscious. I can then ask other subjects if this explanation about their own consciousness applies equally to them. If we can all agree that we, fundamentally, experience content with qualitative meaning, then the axiom holds. It doesn’t matter that external observers can’t grasp my own conscious experience, because we can compare notes about the content of our individual experiences, and create a shared model thereof. This is no different than how, say, multiple subjects can agree that there is a tree in front of them. They compare observations to achieve a consensus.
And remember, we are now talking about “satisfactory explanations” not “full explanations”. This explanation is satisfactory because it is consistent with empirical observations (my own thinking, other subjects' descriptions about their own thinking).
Notice that there is no correspondency between the amount of subjects implied in the problem and what you claim is the criteria of proof: "I think, therefore I am". You have kept saying "WE" because that's what is required for a satisfactory explanation: the other subject's acknowledgement of the objective causes of something, but then you resort to what you think proves your own conscious experience. At best it only proves yours to you, but not anyone else's. You cannot jump from the "I think, therefore I am" to the "we think, therefore we are". You're still left with the inability to provide a "full explanation".
This is addressed by my previous paragraph.
And again, I am not concerned about providing a “full explanation” of anything. Even you said such is impossible.
We are talking ontology here. It's not about inferring the concept of the non-physical from the concept of the physical, but about inferring the existence of the non-physical from the existence of the physical. You said that "we can infer nonphysical properties based on physical evidence", which implies some ontological relation of dependency: whatever you call the non-physical, its existence cannot be explained without the existence of the physical.
How we infer the existence of something from something else does indicate that there is some sort of dependency — codependent, causal or otherwise — but it does not indicate what that dependency is. I infer that the leaves on a tree are dying based on the change in their color, but this doesn’t mean that the change in leaf color causes the leaves to die. We know that the opposite is in fact true; the dying leaves cause the leaves to change color. Likewise, how we infer a “physical property” or a “nonphysical property” indicates nothing about their causal relationship, or ontological dependence.
And besides, I don’t consider “non-physical phenomena” and “physical phenomena” to have separate existences with a definitive causal structure, but rather as being codependent phenomena in a shared reality.
That is not consistent, however, with how you have replied to my points. You indeed behave as if things in themselves existed outside of you and were, therefore, objects of perception, which in this case also happen to be subjects to which you want to show a logical proof.
According to my experience/observation, I cannot confirm if objects do or do not exist independent of experience. But according to my logical proof, I demonstrate how objects cannot exist independent of experience. I speak on both accounts. This might be why you think that you detect inconsistencies in my descriptions.
The world that you presuppose as composed ONLY of concept, percept and knowledge, can only be your own subjective world. Who are you trying to prove something if not yourself? If I and this forum are nothing but products of your consciousness, there would be nothing to prove, as there would be nothing objectively true.
I take the stance that content is a factor in our shared consciousness, not a product of my own consciousness. Why should that mean there is nothing objectively true?
From the approach you adopt, you cannot point to anything. That's what Idealism always leads to: to nothing.
I am not denying the existence of physical properties. I adopt the view that the world is composed of concept and percept (physical), which are bridged together by knowledge. This, as a unity, cannot be pointed to. We can point into the physical aspect of this, but not the qualitative aspect.