A New Logical Proof that Consciousness is Fundamental to Reality

[Grant R Henderson]

While there is no established definition of consciousness by which to prove that consciousness is fundamental to reality, there is general consensus among most professionals that any definition of consciousness must account for the hard problem of consciousness. The hard problem of consciousness suggests that consciousness cannot be fully explained in terms of physical systems, because this would not account for how and why we have subjective experience. Even if consciousness/subjective experience could be measured or replicated through physical interactions, how subjective experience occurs would still remain a mystery, as what it is like to subjectively experience would not be demonstrated by the physical interactions themselves. Therefore, It is only through personal reflections of our own thinking, about our own thinking, that we can define the subjective experience of consciousness.

The basic empirical fact about our subjective experience realized by those who undertake personal reflections of their own thinking is that our subjective experience is that which gives meaningful qualities to properties. Our subjective experience isn’t merely the computational processing of facts or procedures from sensory stimuli. Nor is it, inversely, the processing of “qualities” without any reference to sensory stimuli. Our thinking, rather, is the organization of sensory information into qualitatively meaningful content/properties. This is the basic inner observation of our subjective experience which we can claim as fact, as it is evident in all thinking. For example, when we observe water flowing through a river, we attach the qualitative idea of a flowing river to the sensory stimuli which interacts with our field of perception. This fact alone most certainly does not explain all of our subjective experience. However, it is from this basic fact that we infer all additional phenomena of our subjective experience, of which ultimately relates back to this basic fact. Thus, the fact that we give qualitative meaning to properties is by all accounts the defining characteristic of our subjective experience/consciousness.

Axiom 1: Consciousness/experience = That which gives qualitative meaning to properties.

To demonstrate that consciousness is fundamental to reality, the definition of consciousness must equate to the definition of reality, or be implied by the definition of reality. Consciousness = reality if and only if it is true by definition.

Axiom 2: Reality has a definition: The definition of reality is “all that is not nothing”.

This definition of reality is a tautology. Reality cannot solely be defined as “all that is real” because such fails to define what is real, or thereby what is reality. Rather, reality is all that is real because all that is real is all that is not nothing.
How this definition of reality directly implies the proposed definition of consciousness will be explained throughout the remainder of this proof.

Axiom 3: Reality has essential properties & non-properties

For the sake of argument, realities properties could either be mind dependent (idealism, conceptualism) or mind independent (realism). The prospect that reality has properties — irrespective of whether they are general or abstract qualities — is almost a universally held claim. What may further consist of realities essential properties is not of concern for the purposes of this proof procedure.

The only property posed by the definition of reality -- “all that is not nothing” -- is “realness”. However, this definition of reality also references “nothingness”. While nothingness is actually the absence of property, it is still required to define reality with. The non-property “nothingness” is essential for defining the property “realness”, and is thereby equally essential as the property “realness” for defining reality. Thus, “nothingness” can be regarded as an essential non-property of reality. Furthermore, the definition of reality imposes the essential property “realness”, and the essential non-property “nothingness”. This is certainly not to say that nothingness can properly exist, or that it is possible for their to be absolutely nothing. But rather, that the term absolute nothingness has conceptual meaning, and that conceptual meaning is required to define reality.

Axiom 4: The definition of reality informs the essential properties & non-properties of reality.

The definition of reality informs the essential properties/non-properties of reality because they are posed by the definition of reality. If, rather, the essential properties/non-properties of reality were contrary to that which is posed by the definition of reality, they could not be used to define reality, and the definition of reality would have no bearing on its properties.

With these 4 axioms in place, consider the following:

The definition of reality poses the property "realness" and the non-property "nothingness". Additionally, without considering what this definition means, what is implied is that reality is both "real" and "unreal", as these are the properties/non-properties posed by the definition of reality.
Of course, this contradicts the definition — reality cannot both exist and not exist. By depriving the meaning from the definition of reality, while maintaining the properties/non-properties posed by the definition (“realness” and “nothingness”), it is implied that reality has the property “realness” and the non-property “nothingness”. Evidently, this would contradict the meaning/definition of reality — all that is not nothing. Realness and nothingness are indeed essential properties/non-properties for defining reality as “all that is not nothing”, but only in terms of that definition upon which they are posed. In other words, as per the definition of reality, reality is the meaningful configuration of the property “realness” and the non-property “nothingness” in a qualitative manner that only means “realness”. Thus, the essential properties/non-properties of reality are subject to the qualitative meaning reality gives them.

Thus, reality cannot just be its properties/non-properties. Reality must be that which gives qualitative meaning to its properties/non-properties. This is equivalent to the proposed definition of consciousness (Axiom 1). Therefore, consciousness is fundamental to reality.

In summary:

Axiom 1) Consciousness has a conventional definition -- “That which gives qualitative meaning to properties”

Axiom 2) Reality has a conventional definition — “All that is not nothing”.

Axiom 3) Reality has essential properties & non-properties.

Axiom 4) The definition of reality informs the essential properties & non-properties of reality.

With only the first three axioms amounting to a definition of reality, reality runs a contradiction by implicating to be both real and unreal. However, these three axioms happen to implicate one more axiom, amounting to a definition of consciousness. With all four axioms amounting to a definition of consciousness, reality is properly real, as per its definition.

Therefore, consciousness is fundamental to reality.

Side note: One may object to this deduction with the claim that, for the essential non-property of “nothingness” to coincide with the definition of reality, an object distinction must be conceptualized, thereby conceptualizing “something” instead. While we as experiencing agents are unable to conceptualize nothingness without in fact conceptualizing something instead, there’s reason to claim that mind-at-large can, because it isn’t obscured by the conceptual contents of perception that we are. Mind-at-large, or reality-at-large, can conceptualize nothingness because all that’s required is the absence of concept (non-concept).

[Grant R Henderson]

moderator: If you approve of this post, could you delete my last topic post?

[JackDaydream]

While there is no established definition of consciousness by which to prove that consciousness is fundamental to reality, there is general consensus among most professionals that any definition of consciousness must account for the hard problem of consciousness. The hard problem of consciousness suggests that consciousness cannot be fully explained in terms of physical systems, because this would not account for how and why we have subjective experience. Even if consciousness/subjective experience could be measured or replicated through physical interactions, how subjective experience occurs would still remain a mystery, as what it is like to subjectively experience would not be demonstrated by the physical interactions themselves. Therefore, It is only through personal reflections of our own thinking, about our own thinking, that we can define the subjective experience of consciousness.

The basic empirical fact about our subjective experience realized by those who undertake personal reflections of their own thinking is that our subjective experience is that which gives meaningful qualities to properties. Our subjective experience isn’t merely the computational processing of facts or procedures from sensory stimuli. Nor is it, inversely, the processing of “qualities” without any reference to sensory stimuli. Our thinking, rather, is the organization of sensory information into qualitatively meaningful content/properties. This is the basic inner observation of our subjective experience which we can claim as fact, as it is evident in all thinking. For example, when we observe water flowing through a river, we attach the qualitative idea of a flowing river to the sensory stimuli which interacts with our field of perception. This fact alone most certainly does not explain all of our subjective experience. However, it is from this basic fact that we infer all additional phenomena of our subjective experience, of which ultimately relates back to this basic fact. Thus, the fact that we give qualitative meaning to properties is by all accounts the defining characteristic of our subjective experience/consciousness.

Axiom 1: Consciousness/experience = That which gives qualitative meaning to properties.

To demonstrate that consciousness is fundamental to reality, the definition of consciousness must equate to the definition of reality, or be implied by the definition of reality. Consciousness = reality if and only if it is true by definition.

Axiom 2: Reality has a definition: The definition of reality is “all that is not nothing”.

This definition of reality is a tautology. Reality cannot solely be defined as “all that is real” because such fails to define what is real, or thereby what is reality. Rather, reality is all that is real because all that is real is all that is not nothing.
How this definition of reality directly implies the proposed definition of consciousness will be explained throughout the remainder of this proof.

Axiom 3: Reality has essential properties & non-properties

For the sake of argument, realities properties could either be mind dependent (idealism, conceptualism) or mind independent (realism). The prospect that reality has properties — irrespective of whether they are general or abstract qualities — is almost a universally held claim. What may further consist of realities essential properties is not of concern for the purposes of this proof procedure.

The only property posed by the definition of reality -- “all that is not nothing” -- is “realness”. However, this definition of reality also references “nothingness”. While nothingness is actually the absence of property, it is still required to define reality with. The non-property “nothingness” is essential for defining the property “realness”, and is thereby equally essential as the property “realness” for defining reality. Thus, “nothingness” can be regarded as an essential non-property of reality. Furthermore, the definition of reality imposes the essential property “realness”, and the essential non-property “nothingness”. This is certainly not to say that nothingness can properly exist, or that it is possible for their to be absolutely nothing. But rather, that the term absolute nothingness has conceptual meaning, and that conceptual meaning is required to define reality.

Axiom 4: The definition of reality informs the essential properties & non-properties of reality.

The definition of reality informs the essential properties/non-properties of reality because they are posed by the definition of reality. If, rather, the essential properties/non-properties of reality were contrary to that which is posed by the definition of reality, they could not be used to define reality, and the definition of reality would have no bearing on its properties.

With these 4 axioms in place, consider the following:

The definition of reality poses the property "realness" and the non-property "nothingness". Additionally, without considering what this definition means, what is implied is that reality is both "real" and "unreal", as these are the properties/non-properties posed by the definition of reality.
Of course, this contradicts the definition — reality cannot both exist and not exist. By depriving the meaning from the definition of reality, while maintaining the properties/non-properties posed by the definition (“realness” and “nothingness”), it is implied that reality has the property “realness” and the non-property “nothingness”. Evidently, this would contradict the meaning/definition of reality — all that is not nothing. Realness and nothingness are indeed essential properties/non-properties for defining reality as “all that is not nothing”, but only in terms of that definition upon which they are posed. In other words, as per the definition of reality, reality is the meaningful configuration of the property “realness” and the non-property “nothingness” in a qualitative manner that only means “realness”. Thus, the essential properties/non-properties of reality are subject to the qualitative meaning reality gives them.

Thus, reality cannot just be its properties/non-properties. Reality must be that which gives qualitative meaning to its properties/non-properties. This is equivalent to the proposed definition of consciousness (Axiom 1). Therefore, consciousness is fundamental to reality.

In summary:

Axiom 1) Consciousness has a conventional definition -- “That which gives qualitative meaning to properties”

Axiom 2) Reality has a conventional definition — “All that is not nothing”.

Axiom 3) Reality has essential properties & non-properties.

Axiom 4) The definition of reality informs the essential properties & non-properties of reality.

With only the first three axioms amounting to a definition of reality, reality runs a contradiction by implicating to be both real and unreal. However, these three axioms happen to implicate one more axiom, amounting to a definition of consciousness. With all four axioms amounting to a definition of consciousness, reality is properly real, as per its definition.

Therefore, consciousness is fundamental to reality.

Side note: One may object to this deduction with the claim that, for the essential non-property of “nothingness” to coincide with the definition of reality, an object distinction must be conceptualized, thereby conceptualizing “something” instead. While we as experiencing agents are unable to conceptualize nothingness without in fact conceptualizing something instead, there’s reason to claim that mind-at-large can, because it isn’t obscured by the conceptual contents of perception that we are. Mind-at-large, or reality-at-large, can conceptualize nothingness because all that’s required is the absence of concept (non-concept).

It is difficult to establish an argument for consciousness according to the principles of logic but your one seems fairly convincing to me. You bring the argument back to the reality of experience and subjectivity which is essential for understanding consciousness as a phenomenological starting point. This is necessary because it is an experiential form of knowledge rather than based on looking from the outside in upon it. Even the understanding of others' minds, which involves observation of behaviour, is based upon inference of similar subjective realities arising from reflection upon one's own. It also goes back to the witness state of the 'I' of consciousness introduced by Descartes.

[Grant R Henderson]

It is difficult to establish an argument for consciousness according to the principles of logic but your one seems fairly convincing to me. You bring the argument back to the reality of experience and subjectivity which is essential for understanding consciousness as a phenomenological starting point. This is necessary because it is an experiential form of knowledge rather than based on looking from the outside in upon it. Even the understanding of others' minds, which involves observation of behaviour, is based upon inference of similar subjective realities arising from reflection upon one's own. It also goes back to the witness state of the 'I' of consciousness introduced by Descartes.

Hello Jack, thank you for your comment. I agree that we need a firm phenomenological starting point in order to answer this question. I believe that the meaningful (i.e, logical) configuration of the property "something" and the non-property "nothingness" in a manner that just means "something" is similar to how our minds organize sensory information into meaningful content. Our sensory perception accumulates data from our environment in a random stream of sorts. It is our thinking function which organizes these random streams of data into concepts with meaningful content. In a similar way, I believe that without consciousness, "something" has no way of distinguishing itself from "nothing".

Also, do you know if there is any way to edit topic posts and/or comments?

[Gertie]

While there is no established definition of consciousness by which to prove that consciousness is fundamental to reality, there is general consensus among most professionals that any definition of consciousness must account for the hard problem of consciousness. The hard problem of consciousness suggests that consciousness cannot be fully explained in terms of physical systems, because this would not account for how and why we have subjective experience. Even if consciousness/subjective experience could be measured or replicated through physical interactions, how subjective experience occurs would still remain a mystery, as what it is like to subjectively experience would not be demonstrated by the physical interactions themselves. Therefore, It is only through personal reflections of our own thinking, about our own thinking, that we can define the subjective experience of consciousness.

The basic empirical fact about our subjective experience realized by those who undertake personal reflections of their own thinking is that our subjective experience is that which gives meaningful qualities to properties. Our subjective experience isn’t merely the computational processing of facts or procedures from sensory stimuli. Nor is it, inversely, the processing of “qualities” without any reference to sensory stimuli. Our thinking, rather, is the organization of sensory information into qualitatively meaningful content/properties. This is the basic inner observation of our subjective experience which we can claim as fact, as it is evident in all thinking. For example, when we observe water flowing through a river, we attach the qualitative idea of a flowing river to the sensory stimuli which interacts with our field of perception. This fact alone most certainly does not explain all of our subjective experience. However, it is from this basic fact that we infer all additional phenomena of our subjective experience, of which ultimately relates back to this basic fact. Thus, the fact that we give qualitative meaning to properties is by all accounts the defining characteristic of our subjective experience/consciousness.

I'd put it that conscious experience by its nature has this   ' something it is like'' character, for instance there is something it is like for a subject to see a river, or be Gertie from moment to moment.  To say experience gives qualiative meaning to properties  isn't  the same thing.  I don't give the  river anything by looking at it, I have a qualiative experience when I look at it. 

Axiom 1: Consciousness/experience = That which gives qualitative meaning to properties.

To demonstrate that consciousness is fundamental to reality, the definition of consciousness must equate to the definition of reality, or be implied by the definition of reality. Consciousness = reality if and only if it is true by definition.

Axiom 2: Reality has a definition: The definition of reality is “all that is not nothing”.

This definition of reality is a tautology. Reality cannot solely be defined as “all that is real” because such fails to define what is real, or thereby what is reality. Rather, reality is all that is real because all that is real is all that is not nothing.
How this definition of reality directly implies the proposed definition of consciousness will be explained throughout the remainder of this proof.

The issue of whether conscious experience is real goes deeper than definitions.  It's known to be real because to experience involves knowing you are experiencing.  It is 'directly known'.   and you can't be mistaken about whether you are experiencing, or what you are experiencing.  As Descartes didn't put it - 'I think therefore my thinking is real'.

Axiom 3: Reality has essential properties & non-properties

For the sake of argument, realities properties could either be mind dependent (idealism, conceptualism) or mind independent (realism). The prospect that reality has properties — irrespective of whether they are general or abstract qualities — is almost a universally held claim. What may further consist of realities essential properties is not of concern for the purposes of this proof procedure.

OK

The only property posed by the definition of reality -- “all that is not nothing” -- is “realness”. However, this definition of reality also references “nothingness”. While nothingness is actually the absence of property, it is still required to define reality with. The non-property “nothingness” is essential for defining the property “realness”, and is thereby equally essential as the property “realness” for defining reality. Thus, “nothingness” can be regarded as an essential non-property of reality. Furthermore, the definition of reality imposes the essential property “realness”, and the essential non-property “nothingness”. This is certainly not to say that nothingness can properly exist, or that it is possible for their to be absolutely nothing. But rather, that the term absolute nothingness has conceptual meaning, and that conceptual meaning is required to define reality.

I guess, but stuff can be real without any concept of nothingness existing.  It's just a conceptual relationship.

Axiom 4: The definition of reality informs the essential properties & non-properties of reality.

The definition of reality informs the essential properties/non-properties of reality because they are posed by the definition of reality. If, rather, the essential properties/non-properties of reality were contrary to that which is posed by the definition of reality, they could not be used to define reality, and the definition of reality would have no bearing on its properties.

You mean something has to fit the conceptual scope of what we define as real in order for us to define it as as real?   Sure.

The definition of reality poses the property "realness" and the non-property "nothingness". Additionally, without considering what this definition means, what is implied is that reality is both "real" and "unreal", as these are the properties/non-properties posed by the definition of reality.
Of course, this contradicts the definition — reality cannot both exist and not exist. By depriving the meaning from the definition of reality, while maintaining the properties/non-properties posed by the definition (“realness” and “nothingness”), it is implied that reality has the property “realness” and the non-property “nothingness”. Evidently, this would contradict the meaning/definition of reality — all that is not nothing. Realness and nothingness are indeed essential properties/non-properties for defining reality as “all that is not nothing”, but only in terms of that definition upon which they are posed. In other words, as per the definition of reality, reality is the meaningful configuration of the property “realness” and the non-property “nothingness” in a qualitative manner that only means “realness”. Thus, the essential properties/non-properties of reality are subject to the qualitative meaning reality gives them.

Well, you can theoretically define nothing as belonging to the category of things that do or don't exist. But nothing wouldn't fit in the category of things that do exist.

To make that distinction you need to capacity to understand how categories work.  A human, for example, who creates concepts and categorises them, when considering the ontological reality of what actually exists. 

In summary:

Axiom 1) Consciousness has a conventional definition -- “That which gives qualitative meaning to properties”

Axiom 2) Reality has a conventional definition — “All that is not nothing”.

Axiom 3) Reality has essential properties & non-properties.

Axiom 4) The definition of reality informs the essential properties & non-properties of reality.

With only the first three axioms amounting to a definition of reality, reality runs a contradiction by implicating to be both real and unreal. However, these three axioms happen to implicate one more axiom, amounting to a definition of consciousness. With all four axioms amounting to a definition of consciousness, reality is properly real, as per its definition.

Therefore, consciousness is fundamental to reality.

Disagree.  The underlying issue here imo is can the world exist without subjects experiencing/knowing it.  It's an epistemological/ontological distinction. 



Your argument relies on subjects experiencing something like a river to 'give' the river qualiative, meaningful  reality.  But as above, I'd say the qualiative/meaningfulness lies in the act of experiencing by the subject, rather than the subject bestowing reality onto what we experience. I mean it's possible you're right, but that's not how its generally understood, and I've never come across this definition of consciousness - ''Consciousness has a conventional definition -- “That which gives qualitative meaning to properties”


This is broadly how I think we generally come to think about what is real. Each of us directly knows with certainty our own conscious experience exists.  Not conscious experience generally, just our own.  Solipsism. 

But the content of our experience represents an 'external' world of trees, rivers, my body, other people who experience too, etc.   We compare notes with other people about the content of our experience, and create a shared model of the world we share.   And decide what to treat as 'real' via third party falsification, reasoning, theorising or whatever.   The contents of our shared model include prehistoric geology, cosmology, evolution and so on which suggest there was a physical world which existed before experiencing subjects came along. That suggests reality doesn't rely on us experiencing a river for the river to exist.  I don't think your proof disrupts this as our best shot at understanding what's real, or proves conscious experience is fundamental.

[Count Lucanor]

The hard problem of consciousness suggests that consciousness cannot be fully explained in terms of physical systems, because this would not account for how and why we have subjective experience. Even if consciousness/subjective experience could be measured or replicated through physical interactions, how subjective experience occurs would still remain a mystery, as what it is like to subjectively experience would not be demonstrated by the physical interactions themselves.

There are two problems with these statements. One, there is NOTHING in the world that can be "fully explained". The best of explanations only reflects a state of our limited knowledge within a practical level of human inquiry that allows us to deal with the problems we encounter in our everyday world. We can always know enough of the sun as to be pretty confident we can make accurate predictions and produce reliable affirmations about how it is, how it affects the planets, etc. There's always the possibility of learning more, things we might not know yet, things yet to be explained, but even as we can't get everything "fully explained", it doesn't mean that we can dismiss all our current explanations and seek for an entirely new set of explanations based on mere philosophical speculations.

Secondly, if something cannot be explained in terms of physical systems, then what is the alternative? Can anybody point to a non-physical substance without implying the physical? What is it? Where? What are its properties? We can be sure consciousness doesn't do it, because it requires brains. So far, no one has ever shown a disembodied consciousness.

[Grant R Henderson]

I'd put it that conscious experience by its nature has this   ' something it is like'' character, for instance there is something it is like for a subject to see a river, or be Gertie from moment to moment.  To say experience gives qualiative meaning to properties  isn't  the same thing.  I don't give the  river anything by looking at it, I have a qualiative experience when I look at it. 

I don’t mean to imply that the physical state of the property in reference changes by observing it. Furthermore, Weather or not the qualitative meaning of the physical property in reference actually changes or not by experiencing it cannot be answered by defining experience because such is an inference that resides outside of the experiencing agent (the world). I only intend to communicate that the content is given qualitative meaning as we experience it. Or, the experience or observation of the content/properties in reference is given qualitative meaning. Whether or not consciousness plays a role in actually constructing reality may only be deciphered with additional reasoning, as is the goal of this post in totality.
If you can think of a way to communicate this more clearly, please let me know, but I will continue to think on it.

The issue of whether conscious experience is real goes deeper than definitions.  It's known to be real because to experience involves knowing you are experiencing.  It is 'directly known'.   and you can't be mistaken about whether you are experiencing, or what you are experiencing.  As Descartes didn't put it - 'I think therefore my thinking is real'.

Weather conscious experience is real or not is not the goal of this post. I am writing on the assumption that it is real — a fact which I don’t believe will be contested. Furthermore, I have based my definition of consciousness purely on our phenomenal experience of reality. So there really should be no concern here.

I guess, but stuff can be real without any concept of nothingness existing.  It's just a conceptual relationship.

My logical analysis claims otherwise. You can try to refute that.

Well, you can theoretically define nothing as belonging to the category of things that do or don't exist. But nothing wouldn't fit in the category of things that do exist.

To make that distinction you need to capacity to understand how categories work.  A human, for example, who creates concepts and categorises them, when considering the ontological reality of what actually exists. 

Yes, Nothing doesn’t belong in a category of things that exist. It is, however, a concept required to logically define reality.

Disagree.  The underlying issue here imo is can the world exist without subjects experiencing/knowing it.  It's an epistemological/ontological distinction.

What are you disagreeing with? Indeed, the underlying issue is whether the world can exist without experience, or not. That is the entire point of my post.

Your argument relies on subjects experiencing something like a river to 'give' the river qualiative, meaningful  reality.  But as above, I'd say the qualiative/meaningfulness lies in the act of experiencing by the subject, rather than the subject bestowing reality onto what we experience. I mean it's possible you're right, but that's not how its generally understood, and I've never come across this definition of consciousness - ''Consciousness has a conventional definition -- “That which gives qualitative meaning to properties”

Like I stated before, one cannot logically claim that conscious subjects construct reality, as per our experience of reality, and as a definition of reality. However, this logical argument in its totality aims to demonstrate how this is the case.

This is broadly how I think we generally come to think about what is real. Each of us directly knows with certainty our own conscious experience exists.  Not conscious experience generally, just our own.  Solipsism. 

But the content of our experience represents an 'external' world of trees, rivers, my body, other people who experience too, etc.   We compare notes with other people about the content of our experience, and create a shared model of the world we share.   And decide what to treat as 'real' via third party falsification, reasoning, theorising or whatever.   The contents of our shared model include prehistoric geology, cosmology, evolution and so on which suggest there was a physical world which existed before experiencing subjects came along. That suggests reality doesn't rely on us experiencing a river for the river to exist.  I don't think your proof disrupts this as our best shot at understanding what's real, or proves conscious experience is fundamental.

We can all agree that we experience content with qualitative meaning, no different than how we can all agree that we know a tree is real. That is not solipsism. By granting that you are conscious, I am granting an instance of a category that I know to be true within myself.
Not to mention, as per your argument, we have to confirm that something, aka a tree is real based on the evidence provided from other individuals. But also, you claim that we have no reason to claim that another person's experiences are real or therefore reliable sources of truthful information. Why would we rely on other peoples accounts to confirm if something is real or not when we cannot confirm that other peoples accounts are real? This is a contradiction.

[Grant R Henderson]

The hard problem of consciousness suggests that consciousness cannot be fully explained in terms of physical systems, because this would not account for how and why we have subjective experience. Even if consciousness/subjective experience could be measured or replicated through physical interactions, how subjective experience occurs would still remain a mystery, as what it is like to subjectively experience would not be demonstrated by the physical interactions themselves.

There are two problems with these statements. One, there is NOTHING in the world that can be "fully explained". The best of explanations only reflects a state of our limited knowledge within a practical level of human inquiry that allows us to deal with the problems we encounter in our everyday world. We can always know enough of the sun as to be pretty confident we can make accurate predictions and produce reliable affirmations about how it is, how it affects the planets, etc. There's always the possibility of learning more, things we might not know yet, things yet to be explained, but even as we can't get everything "fully explained", it doesn't mean that we can dismiss all our current explanations and seek for an entirely new set of explanations based on mere philosophical speculations.

Secondly, if something cannot be explained in terms of physical systems, then what is the alternative? Can anybody point to a non-physical substance without implying the physical? What is it? Where? What are its properties? We can be sure consciousness doesn't do it, because it requires brains. So far, no one has ever shown a disembodied consciousness.

Good point. I will change it to “satisfactorily explained '' or something along those lines. As for your second contention; Indeed, we cannot empirically prove non-physical phenomena. However, we can infer nonphysical properties based on physical evidence. For example, a quantum state is a nonphysical property of a system.
But regardless, this post is merely a logical argument. I am under no illusions with regards to the extent to which logic refers to reality.

[Count Lucanor]

The hard problem of consciousness suggests that consciousness cannot be fully explained in terms of physical systems, because this would not account for how and why we have subjective experience. Even if consciousness/subjective experience could be measured or replicated through physical interactions, how subjective experience occurs would still remain a mystery, as what it is like to subjectively experience would not be demonstrated by the physical interactions themselves.

There are two problems with these statements. One, there is NOTHING in the world that can be "fully explained". The best of explanations only reflects a state of our limited knowledge within a practical level of human inquiry that allows us to deal with the problems we encounter in our everyday world. We can always know enough of the sun as to be pretty confident we can make accurate predictions and produce reliable affirmations about how it is, how it affects the planets, etc. There's always the possibility of learning more, things we might not know yet, things yet to be explained, but even as we can't get everything "fully explained", it doesn't mean that we can dismiss all our current explanations and seek for an entirely new set of explanations based on mere philosophical speculations.

Secondly, if something cannot be explained in terms of physical systems, then what is the alternative? Can anybody point to a non-physical substance without implying the physical? What is it? Where? What are its properties? We can be sure consciousness doesn't do it, because it requires brains. So far, no one has ever shown a disembodied consciousness.

Good point. I will change it to “satisfactorily explained '' or something along those lines.

I'm afraid that the change of wording doesn't solve the problem, perhaps makes it even harder to solve. To be in position to qualify something as being not satisfactorily explained implies you own the criteria by which you measure how accurately the explanation meets the criteria, but then again that criteria becomes the "full explanation". No one has the full explanation of anything.

As for your second contention; Indeed, we cannot empirically prove non-physical phenomena. However, we can infer nonphysical properties based on physical evidence. For example, a quantum state is a nonphysical property of a system.

So the answer to my question of whether can anybody point to a non-physical substance without implying the physical, or not, is that no, they can't. We need the physical to infer it. So, consciousness, however you want to consider it, implies the physical: if you considered consciousness a non-physical thing, and if consciousness were fundamental to reality, so would the physical to which it is bound to. That would rule out Absolute Idealism and leave us, at best, with classic mind/body dualism. Now, if mind/body dualism were true, the question of whether the physical is subordinate to a non-physical consciousness, or vice versa, requires an answer, which take us to the fact that no consciousness has been identified as being disembodied, while we are at the same time very much aware of the existence of non-conscious bodies. So, even if we came to agree that consciousness is fundamental to reality, we would have to agree even more strongly on physical substance being fundamental to consciousness.

But that, of couse, would be if we considered consciousness or anything else purportedly non-physical, as a real non-physical substance, existing in the world. Still, nobody can point to that non-physical system, to its non-physical attributes, in fact no one can point out what a non-physical attribute is. There's no good reason to believe that a quantum state is "a non-physical property of a system". It is still a state of a physical system. You can call handedness not being a physical thing in itself, but that says very little about its "non-physicality", since it still refers to properties of a physical thing being to the left or to the right. It wouldn't make much sense to call digestion a non-physical thing because processes are "not material".

[Gertie]

Grant

Welcome btw

Thus, reality cannot just be its properties/non-properties. Reality must be that which gives qualitative meaning to its properties/non-properties. This is equivalent to the proposed definition of consciousness (Axiom 1). Therefore, consciousness is fundamental to reality.

This is your claim in a nutshell.  That a river can't have properties (and therefore ontologically exist) unless there's an experiencing observer (eg you or me) giving  qualiative/experiential meaning to its properties, right?



My counter argument is that an experiencing observer is the one having the qualiative experience when observing the river, nothing necessarily changes about the river's ontological existence by being observed (QM or some similar evidence aside).  What changes is that the experiencing observer has the meaningful, qualiative experience of seeing the river, and comes to know the river exists.

Or at least that's how the world seems to be, and to claim otherwise requires evidence that's not really how the world is. But as things stand, I know that I, the observer, have qualiative experience. But there's nothing that suggests I can 'give' or 'take' existence from the river simply by experiencing seeing it.



So the main problem lies with Axiom 1 imo.

Axiom 1) Consciousness has a conventional definition -- “That which gives qualitative meaning to properties”

First that's not the conventional definition of consciousness.  But your argument rests on the implication in the definition that observing an object gives that object some qualiative status in itself. When it's the observing subject which has the qualiative experience. A subject having the qualiative experience of seeing an object simply doesn't address whether the river can have physical properties when it isn't being observed.



Rather the conscious observer comes to epistemologically know the river exists through the meaningful, qualiative experience of observing it.  But that is different to claiming the observer brings the river into ontological existence by experiencing observing it.



It might be that reality is like that, that observation does in some way bring a river into existence, but your proof attempts to claim that as an axiom via a slippery definition, when that's not axiomatic. Because the alternative view is that the river's physical properties can exist without being observed/known by an experiencing subject.  And there is evidence for example, that the universe existed before conscious experiencing subjects existed, and that  the river changes when it's not being observed.

[Gertie]

Grant

If I might reply to your reply to Jack here which fleshes your view out more -

I believe that the meaningful (i.e, logical) configuration of the property "something" and the non-property "nothingness" in a manner that just means "something" is similar to how our minds organize sensory information into meaningful content. Our sensory perception accumulates data from our environment in a random stream of sorts. It is our thinking function which organizes these random streams of data into concepts with meaningful content.

I agree with that last sentence, the observer creates an experiential model of the reality she experiences. So what we experience as the river isn't going to be a perfect, complete experiential representation of the real river. But I don't think that logically leads to the following -

In a similar way, I believe that without consciousness, "something" has no way of distinguishing itself from "nothing".

Because existence doesn't necessarily have to rely on distinguishing itself from nothing. We experiencing subjects categorise and distinguish stuff, create models - but the logic is rather that something has to exist in order to be categorised and distinguished by a subject, rather than the subject doing the distinguishing is necessary for anything to exist. It might be that only the subject's experience exists, and that's what is being distinguished as rivers and mountains and so on - but it also might that the stuff we experientially model as rivers and mountains exist independently

So I don't think distinguishing infers that consciousness is fundamental.

[Waysofbeing]

Grant

If I might reply to your reply to Jack here which fleshes your view out more -

I believe that the meaningful (i.e, logical) configuration of the property "something" and the non-property "nothingness" in a manner that just means "something" is similar to how our minds organize sensory information into meaningful content. Our sensory perception accumulates data from our environment in a random stream of sorts. It is our thinking function which organizes these random streams of data into concepts with meaningful content.

I agree with that last sentence, the observer creates an experiential model of the reality she experiences. So what we experience as the river isn't going to be a perfect, complete experiential representation of the real river. But I don't think that logically leads to the following -

In a similar way, I believe that without consciousness, "something" has no way of distinguishing itself from "nothing".

Because existence doesn't necessarily have to rely on distinguishing itself from nothing. We experiencing subjects categorise and distinguish stuff, create models - but the logic is rather that something has to exist in order to be categorised and distinguished by a subject, rather than the subject doing the distinguishing is necessary for anything to exist. It might be that only the subject's experience exists, and that's what is being distinguished as rivers and mountains and so on - but it also might that the stuff we experientially model as rivers and mountains exist independently

So I don't think distinguishing infers that consciousness is fundamental.

I agree with Gertie, clearly put. As the experiential brain, the most amazing learning mechanism, develops categories (kind of), we map our experience. This development of pattern-representation leads to an experience of gestalt wholes (eg chairs, rivers). This doesn’t tell us whether our experience is of any kind of reality/separate existence. Personally it seems a bigger jump to say that it isn’t so with respect to Occam’s Razor I’m for the independent material existences that we appear to experience.

[Grant R Henderson]

Grant

Welcome btw

Thus, reality cannot just be its properties/non-properties. Reality must be that which gives qualitative meaning to its properties/non-properties. This is equivalent to the proposed definition of consciousness (Axiom 1). Therefore, consciousness is fundamental to reality.

This is your claim in a nutshell.  That a river can't have properties (and therefore ontologically exist) unless there's an experiencing observer (eg you or me) giving  qualiative/experiential meaning to its properties, right?



My counter argument is that an experiencing observer is the one having the qualiative experience when observing the river, nothing necessarily changes about the river's ontological existence by being observed (QM or some similar evidence aside).  What changes is that the experiencing observer has the meaningful, qualiative experience of seeing the river, and comes to know the river exists.

Or at least that's how the world seems to be, and to claim otherwise requires evidence that's not really how the world is. But as things stand, I know that I, the observer, have qualiative experience. But there's nothing that suggests I can 'give' or 'take' existence from the river simply by experiencing seeing it.



So the main problem lies with Axiom 1 imo.

Axiom 1) Consciousness has a conventional definition -- “That which gives qualitative meaning to properties”

First that's not the conventional definition of consciousness.  But your argument rests on the implication in the definition that observing an object gives that object some qualiative status in itself. When it's the observing subject which has the qualiative experience. A subject having the qualiative experience of seeing an object simply doesn't address whether the river can have physical properties when it isn't being observed.



Rather the conscious observer comes to epistemologically know the river exists through the meaningful, qualiative experience of observing it.  But that is different to claiming the observer brings the river into ontological existence by experiencing observing it.



It might be that reality is like that, that observation does in some way bring a river into existence, but your proof attempts to claim that as an axiom via a slippery definition, when that's not axiomatic. Because the alternative view is that the river's physical properties can exist without being observed/known by an experiencing subject.  And there is evidence for example, that the universe existed before conscious experiencing subjects existed, and that  the river changes when it's not being observed.

This is your claim in a nutshell. That a river can't have properties (and therefore ontologically exist) unless there's an experiencing observer (eg you or me) giving qualiative/experiential meaning to its properties, right?

No, your second paragraph is more or less what I am suggesting when I attempt to define conscious experience:

My counter argument is that an experiencing observer is the one having the qualiative experience when observing the river, nothing necessarily changes about the river's ontological existence by being observed (QM or some similar evidence aside). What changes is that the experiencing observer has the meaningful, qualiative experience of seeing the river, and comes to know the river exists.

However, The logic I have presented here does attempt to demonstrate how properties cannot just be things in themselves, but must also be imbued with qualitative meaning in order to exist. While this does suggest that your first claim is actually correct, I do not derive such a conclusion by means of my inner observation of my own conscious experiences, through which I define my conscious experience. I derive this conclusion from the logic argument I have presented.

First that's not the conventional definition of consciousness.

You are correct that this definition of consciousness is not conventional. I will edit this.

But your argument rests on the implication in the definition that observing an object gives that object some qualiative status in itself. When it's the observing subject which has the qualiative experience. A subject having the qualiative experience of seeing an object simply doesn't address whether the river can have physical properties when it isn't being observed.

Of course, I cannot dismiss that there are no “things in themselves” outside of my observation of them, because I cannot apprehend anything outside of my own conscious experience. But this also means that any claim on the matter is merely hypothetical and without any basis in empirical facts. This is also a dualistic interpretation, which has its own share of issues.

My argument rests only on the implication that the observer bridges qualitative meaning and properties, regardless of what may lie “outside” of my experience of such properties. But this proposition applied to reality at large, if successful (valid, true), would suggest that there are no properties outside of the qualitative meaning which they are imbued with.

It might be that reality is like that, that observation does in some way bring a river into existence, but your proof attempts to claim that as an axiom via a slippery definition, when that's not axiomatic.

No, it doesn’t, for the reasons previously outlined.

Because the alternative view is that the river's physical properties can exist without being observed/known by an experiencing subject. And there is evidence for example, that the universe existed before conscious experiencing subjects existed, and that the river changes when it's not being observed.

If the world is conscious, then it is not just “us” that plays a role in its existence, but the world. But indeed, this criticism cannot be addressed by my argument, as it is merely logical, and not empirical or scientific in nature. I recommend reading about anthroposophy if you are interested in oppositions to this criticism.

[Grant R Henderson]

The hard problem of consciousness suggests that consciousness cannot be fully explained in terms of physical systems, because this would not account for how and why we have subjective experience. Even if consciousness/subjective experience could be measured or replicated through physical interactions, how subjective experience occurs would still remain a mystery, as what it is like to subjectively experience would not be demonstrated by the physical interactions themselves.

There are two problems with these statements. One, there is NOTHING in the world that can be "fully explained". The best of explanations only reflects a state of our limited knowledge within a practical level of human inquiry that allows us to deal with the problems we encounter in our everyday world. We can always know enough of the sun as to be pretty confident we can make accurate predictions and produce reliable affirmations about how it is, how it affects the planets, etc. There's always the possibility of learning more, things we might not know yet, things yet to be explained, but even as we can't get everything "fully explained", it doesn't mean that we can dismiss all our current explanations and seek for an entirely new set of explanations based on mere philosophical speculations.

Secondly, if something cannot be explained in terms of physical systems, then what is the alternative? Can anybody point to a non-physical substance without implying the physical? What is it? Where? What are its properties? We can be sure consciousness doesn't do it, because it requires brains. So far, no one has ever shown a disembodied consciousness.

Good point. I will change it to “satisfactorily explained '' or something along those lines.

I'm afraid that the change of wording doesn't solve the problem, perhaps makes it even harder to solve. To be in position to qualify something as being not satisfactorily explained implies you own the criteria by which you measure how accurately the explanation meets the criteria, but then again that criteria becomes the "full explanation". No one has the full explanation of anything.

As for your second contention; Indeed, we cannot empirically prove non-physical phenomena. However, we can infer nonphysical properties based on physical evidence. For example, a quantum state is a nonphysical property of a system.

So the answer to my question of whether can anybody point to a non-physical substance without implying the physical, or not, is that no, they can't. We need the physical to infer it. So, consciousness, however you want to consider it, implies the physical: if you considered consciousness a non-physical thing, and if consciousness were fundamental to reality, so would the physical to which it is bound to. That would rule out Absolute Idealism and leave us, at best, with classic mind/body dualism. Now, if mind/body dualism were true, the question of whether the physical is subordinate to a non-physical consciousness, or vice versa, requires an answer, which take us to the fact that no consciousness has been identified as being disembodied, while we are at the same time very much aware of the existence of non-conscious bodies. So, even if we came to agree that consciousness is fundamental to reality, we would have to agree even more strongly on physical substance being fundamental to consciousness.

But that, of couse, would be if we considered consciousness or anything else purportedly non-physical, as a real non-physical substance, existing in the world. Still, nobody can point to that non-physical system, to its non-physical attributes, in fact no one can point out what a non-physical attribute is. There's no good reason to believe that a quantum state is "a non-physical property of a system". It is still a state of a physical system. You can call handedness not being a physical thing in itself, but that says very little about its "non-physicality", since it still refers to properties of a physical thing being to the left or to the right. It wouldn't make much sense to call digestion a non-physical thing because processes are "not material".

I'm afraid that the change of wording doesn't solve the problem, perhaps makes it even harder to solve. To be in position to qualify something as being not satisfactorily explained implies you own the criteria by which you measure how accurately the explanation meets the criteria, but then again that criteria becomes the "full explanation". No one has the full explanation of anything.

I do own the criteria by which I measure how accurately the explanation meets the criteria, because I am my conscious experience, and I understand what is my conscious experience according to my own inner reflections thereof. We can never find a satisfactory explanation of how matter and motion, etc produces sensation, feeling and experience, because we can never make ourselves the “subject” of that interaction as a means to prove it. We can only prove our own conscious experience by thinking -- “I think therefore I am”. Furthermore, we can only define our conscious experience through thinking about our conscious experience. The definition is satisfactory if our thinking about our conscious experience describes what our conscious experience does, according to our conscious experience. What consciousness does could not be deciphered according to anything else. It is satisfactory because it is consistent with empirical observations (my own thinking, other peoples descriptions of their own thinking).

We need the physical to infer it. So, consciousness, however you want to consider it, implies the physical: if you considered consciousness a non-physical thing, and if consciousness were fundamental to reality, so would the physical to which it is bound to. That would rule out Absolute Idealism and leave us, at best, with classic mind/body dualism.That would rule out Absolute Idealism and leave us, at best, with classic mind/body dualism.

If you need the physical to infer the non-physical, it doesn't follow that the non-physical is bound by the physical. The manner in which I comprehend the relevant concepts plays no role in their causal structure. Rather, it would be logical that a non-physical ontological ground could not be reduced to anything -- physical or otherwise -- simply because such implies no possible prior explanatory basis.

Regardless, my post does not indicate that there are objects of perception, and things in themselves (non-physical or otherwise). It merely presupposes that the world is composed of concept and percept, which are bridged together by knowledge. This demonstrates two sides of a single reality. We could say that the world presents itself to us as a duality, but knowledge fuses these together as a unified whole. This is not dualism. Dualism assumes two worlds totally distinct from one another, and attempts to show how one of these two worlds offers an explanation for the other. Dualism does not indicate there to be two sides of a single reality.

But that, of course, would be if we considered consciousness or anything else purportedly non-physical, as a real non-physical substance, existing in the world. Still, nobody can point to that non-physical system, to its non-physical attributes, in fact no one can point out what a non-physical attribute is.

Yes, I cannot point to anything non-physical. But I also cannot point to my consciousness, or your consciousness.

[3017Metaphysician]

While there is no established definition of consciousness by which to prove that consciousness is fundamental to reality, there is general consensus among most professionals that any definition of consciousness must account for the hard problem of consciousness. The hard problem of consciousness suggests that consciousness cannot be fully explained in terms of physical systems, because this would not account for how and why we have subjective experience. Even if consciousness/subjective experience could be measured or replicated through physical interactions, how subjective experience occurs would still remain a mystery, as what it is like to subjectively experience would not be demonstrated by the physical interactions themselves. Therefore, It is only through personal reflections of our own thinking, about our own thinking, that we can define the subjective experience of consciousness.

The basic empirical fact about our subjective experience realized by those who undertake personal reflections of their own thinking is that our subjective experience is that which gives meaningful qualities to properties. Our subjective experience isn’t merely the computational processing of facts or procedures from sensory stimuli. Nor is it, inversely, the processing of “qualities” without any reference to sensory stimuli. Our thinking, rather, is the organization of sensory information into qualitatively meaningful content/properties. This is the basic inner observation of our subjective experience which we can claim as fact, as it is evident in all thinking. For example, when we observe water flowing through a river, we attach the qualitative idea of a flowing river to the sensory stimuli which interacts with our field of perception. This fact alone most certainly does not explain all of our subjective experience. However, it is from this basic fact that we infer all additional phenomena of our subjective experience, of which ultimately relates back to this basic fact. Thus, the fact that we give qualitative meaning to properties is by all accounts the defining characteristic of our subjective experience/consciousness.

Axiom 1: Consciousness/experience = That which gives qualitative meaning to properties.

To demonstrate that consciousness is fundamental to reality, the definition of consciousness must equate to the definition of reality, or be implied by the definition of reality. Consciousness = reality if and only if it is true by definition.

Axiom 2: Reality has a definition: The definition of reality is “all that is not nothing”.

This definition of reality is a tautology. Reality cannot solely be defined as “all that is real” because such fails to define what is real, or thereby what is reality. Rather, reality is all that is real because all that is real is all that is not nothing.
How this definition of reality directly implies the proposed definition of consciousness will be explained throughout the remainder of this proof.

Axiom 3: Reality has essential properties & non-properties

For the sake of argument, realities properties could either be mind dependent (idealism, conceptualism) or mind independent (realism). The prospect that reality has properties — irrespective of whether they are general or abstract qualities — is almost a universally held claim. What may further consist of realities essential properties is not of concern for the purposes of this proof procedure.

The only property posed by the definition of reality -- “all that is not nothing” -- is “realness”. However, this definition of reality also references “nothingness”. While nothingness is actually the absence of property, it is still required to define reality with. The non-property “nothingness” is essential for defining the property “realness”, and is thereby equally essential as the property “realness” for defining reality. Thus, “nothingness” can be regarded as an essential non-property of reality. Furthermore, the definition of reality imposes the essential property “realness”, and the essential non-property “nothingness”. This is certainly not to say that nothingness can properly exist, or that it is possible for their to be absolutely nothing. But rather, that the term absolute nothingness has conceptual meaning, and that conceptual meaning is required to define reality.

Axiom 4: The definition of reality informs the essential properties & non-properties of reality.

The definition of reality informs the essential properties/non-properties of reality because they are posed by the definition of reality. If, rather, the essential properties/non-properties of reality were contrary to that which is posed by the definition of reality, they could not be used to define reality, and the definition of reality would have no bearing on its properties.

With these 4 axioms in place, consider the following:

The definition of reality poses the property "realness" and the non-property "nothingness". Additionally, without considering what this definition means, what is implied is that reality is both "real" and "unreal", as these are the properties/non-properties posed by the definition of reality.
Of course, this contradicts the definition — reality cannot both exist and not exist. By depriving the meaning from the definition of reality, while maintaining the properties/non-properties posed by the definition (“realness” and “nothingness”), it is implied that reality has the property “realness” and the non-property “nothingness”. Evidently, this would contradict the meaning/definition of reality — all that is not nothing. Realness and nothingness are indeed essential properties/non-properties for defining reality as “all that is not nothing”, but only in terms of that definition upon which they are posed. In other words, as per the definition of reality, reality is the meaningful configuration of the property “realness” and the non-property “nothingness” in a qualitative manner that only means “realness”. Thus, the essential properties/non-properties of reality are subject to the qualitative meaning reality gives them.

Thus, reality cannot just be its properties/non-properties. Reality must be that which gives qualitative meaning to its properties/non-properties. This is equivalent to the proposed definition of consciousness (Axiom 1). Therefore, consciousness is fundamental to reality.

In summary:

Axiom 1) Consciousness has a conventional definition -- “That which gives qualitative meaning to properties”

Axiom 2) Reality has a conventional definition — “All that is not nothing”.

Axiom 3) Reality has essential properties & non-properties.

Axiom 4) The definition of reality informs the essential properties & non-properties of reality.

With only the first three axioms amounting to a definition of reality, reality runs a contradiction by implicating to be both real and unreal. However, these three axioms happen to implicate one more axiom, amounting to a definition of consciousness. With all four axioms amounting to a definition of consciousness, reality is properly real, as per its definition.

Therefore, consciousness is fundamental to reality.

Side note: One may object to this deduction with the claim that, for the essential non-property of “nothingness” to coincide with the definition of reality, an object distinction must be conceptualized, thereby conceptualizing “something” instead. While we as experiencing agents are unable to conceptualize nothingness without in fact conceptualizing something instead, there’s reason to claim that mind-at-large can, because it isn’t obscured by the conceptual contents of perception that we are. Mind-at-large, or reality-at-large, can conceptualize nothingness because all that’s required is the absence of concept (non-concept).

Grant!

I would agree consciousness is fundamental to reality from at least two perspectives.

1. Subjective Idealism. Much like the existence of a photograph, the camera is logically necessary for the photo's existence. Our Will corresponds to the camera which apperceives subjective experiences from our own way of Being (own metaphysical Will). That camera processes information of experiences (thoughts and feelings) and observations (subject-object) along with the innate properties of the camera itself (i.e., the Will which in-itself cannot be fully understood physically) which is all part of the design. That qualitative design that has sentient experiences from observations of objects is relative to a some-thing.

Thoughts and feelings one has about experiencing objects may be as simple as a rich child and a poor child walking together observing the same ten dollar bill on the sidewalk. The rich child says it's not very much money and the poor child says it's a lot of money. The difference lies in how they apperceive the same event – the lens of past experience through which they see and value (or devalue) the money is relative to the subject. And that camera-lens design quality each has its own relative effects.

2. In physics, quantum observation and relativity works in an analogical way in that our apperception of things like gravity and spacetime, which in-themselves are also not exclusively physical phenomena, are fundamental to the subject-object dynamic. Just like gravity itself needs physical particles to manifest its informational energy, consciousness needs both the physical (neurons, etc.) and metaphysical (the Will) to manifest its own. Or, time needing change to manifest its phenomenon. The quantum observer effect (John Wheeler's participatory Anthropic Principle/double-slit experiment's) requires a subject and object. All of those kinds of things are mind-dependent.

With respect to the OP, 'logical proof', and cosmology, one could further deduce that causational entities or abstract structures are those things that seemingly breath fire into the Hawking equation's. Meaning, for something like consciousness or the universe to exist there must be a cause to its existence. Whether a complete logical understanding of a first cause is logically necessary (through deduction) or something that transcends logic itself (i.e., like the notion of eternity and/or things that are logically impossible yet exist), the question might not be about what got things started or how long they have been going, but rather what keeps them going (like dark energy).

In any event, I don't think there is anyway around consciousness being logically necessary or fundamentally relative for any or all levels of understanding (epistemology). Since the thread is talking about logic, it might be intriguing to parse those things which seem; logically possible, logically impossible, and logically necessary.