Is being homeless a crime / should it be?

[GE Morton]

We have a decent, moral foundation in place we agree on then, which we agree is the appropriate justification for oughts. Imo this is crucial, and one of the biggest probs we face philosophically re morality. It doesn't matter if we call it subjective or objective, it's universal and solves the problem of moral relativism. And it gives us a foundation to build Oughts from. Which can be in various forms, such as rights, laws, social norms, institutional good practice, education, etc.

Well, whether those "oughts" (laws, norms, etc.), to the extent they are followed, do or do not further the goal stated in the Axiom is usually empirically verifiable, and thus objective.

So lets get get to thinking how we do that. I've suggested the logical place to start is to establish basic Rights/Entitlements which are so necessary to promoting the welfare of sentient creatures and the ability to persue their interests that no government or authority should over-rule them. I don't claim to have a complete list, but some are obvious. The in principle, where conditions allow, right to life, the right to safe shelter, sustenance, healthcare and education. Justified by our specific moral foundation.

You can't ignore the other postulates of the theory, such as the Equal Agency postulate, the Relativity postulate, and the postulate of Individuality. The Relativity postulate asserts that the components of welfare --- what counts as a "good" or an "evil," and the values (positive or negative) thereof, are subjective and relative to agents. The Individuality postulate asserts that what are counted as goods and evils, and the values attached to them, differ from agent to agent.

The Equal Agency postulate rules out any "ought" that would improve the welfare of one agent by reducing the welfare of another agent. The Relativity postulate rules out assigning a value to any good a priori, and the Individuality postulate rules out assuming that the values assigned to any goods or evils are universal among agents. Hence any "oughts" which depend upon such assignments and assumptions are also ruled out. As with all other goods, the value, and rank in his hierarchy, of shelter, sustenance, etc., to Alfie can only be decided by him, and likely differs from the values assigned to those things by other agents. That holds, BTW, for the value of his own life. We can't place a value on it that overrides the value Alfie himself places on it (which will determine what risks he is willing to take with it). We can sometimes make those decisions for moral subjects --- young children and animals --- but not for other moral agents.

Nor can we assume that Alfie places a high value, or any value, on Bruno's life. He may or may not.

Those postulates also rule out the utilitarian principle ("greatest good for greatest number") which you may be tempted to invoke. Since goods are subjective, what is the "greatest good" can only be determined for each individual, and determining that would be an impossible task in any large society. As Rawls observed in his Theory of Justice, "Utilitarianism does not take seriously the distinction between persons." (Rawls himself does not take it seriously enough).

I'm suggesting we use Rights based on our moral foundation, we don't need to be bound by others in the past who made up rights based on a different foundation or conception of morality. But OK, we don't have to call them Rights, we can call them Foundational Entitlements - or .... something better lol. The point is to establish a means of ensuring that basic welfare needs are met and sentient creatures have the opportunity to flourish. Regardless of the whims and compromises of governments/authorities. It's about establishing a baseline all sentient creatures should in principle be accorded, before the societal trade-offs involved with competing interests is addressed.

There are no universal "basic welfare needs." Needs are generated by and dependent upon wants --- they are means to ends --- and wants are subjective and idiosyncratic. True, humans (and other animals) need food, water, and oxygen --- but only if they want to continue living. The "needs" you identify are those of persons who want lifestyles characteristic of "middle-class" citizens of modern Western societies. But the moral question does not concern what people want, and may consequently need. The moral question concerns who is obligated to meet these diverse wants and needs. Again, you must either take the postulates seriously, or abandon one or more of them. Per what principle would Alfie become obligated to satisfy Brunos' wants, at the cost of satisfying his own?

The usual route followed by utilitarians seeking to avoid this choice is by ranking the various wants people may have, and declaring that some outrank others. But given the lack, as I've mentioned, of any objective means of measuring cardinal utility, any such ranking will be arbitrary. The only ranking of interests which can be objectively verified is the ranking each agent assigns the various interests in his own hierarchy.

Well, there is the rub --- to SHOW how it logically follows, given the Equal Agency postulate (which I assume you accept).

(As I understand it, your Equal Agency Postulate simply states all agents are equally obligated to follow the oughts resulting from our foundation, yes? That makes sense to me in principle ).

See above. It logically follows because it strives to ensure each sentient creature has the necessary and sufficient conditions for well-being/persuing their interests - our moral foundation. What comprises basic necessary and sufficient conditions might be blurry, but it shouldn't be hard to agree on things like food, shelter, education, healthcare.

The Equal Agency postulate entails more than that. It also implies the interests of all agents have the same rank; that all are equally entitled to pursue their interests, whatever they may be. The theory is not concerned with interests; it is only concerned with the actions people take to pursue them, when those actions impinge on others' efforts to pursue their interests. Here is the full statement of that Postulate:

"5. Postulate of Equal Agency: All agents in the moral field are of equal moral status, i.e., all duties and constraints generated by the theory are equally binding on all.
Corollary: Postulate of Neutrality: The theory is neutral as between goods and evils, and the values thereof, as defined by agents."

"Cardinal utility is an attempt to quantify an abstract concept because it assigns a numerical value to utility...
If your approach depends on those trade-offs you mentioned you have set yourself a formidable problem."

I agree! It's the one serious problem I think we have with this moral foundation. But it's a problem inherent to a wellbeing/interests based moral foundation. We're stuck with it. So we either ditch the foundation for something tidier, or do our best.

The problem is not with the foundation, but with deriving obligations from it without paying cognizance to the Postulates.

I think you'd say there is a right not to pay taxes at all unless voluntarily. Because there is a right to freedom or property (eg tax money) which over-rides the right/entitlement to have basic welfare needs met. So what is our touchstone for settling such disputes? Our moral foundation of promoting the well-being/interests of sentient creatures. You need to justify your position in the terms of the foundation.

Not so with respect to taxes. The test of whether a tax is justifiable, and may morally be enforced, is whether the tax pays for services that benefit the taxpayer. They are not justifiable if paying for services which benefit someone else, i.e., if they reduce Alfie's welfare to improve Bruno's. That is a violation of the Equal Agency postulate and the Axiom itself, which commands rules that promote the welfare of all agents, not of some agents at the expense of others.

I should point out that the Duty to Aid commands generosity; it is not limited to commanding aid only in dire emergency situations. One ought to offer aid whenever one can do so without (in Peter Singer's words) "thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance." But only the acting agent himself can do that weighing and thus make that judgment; for others to force their judgment upon him denies his status as an equal moral agent.

Sorry for the delayed response. Reponding to your posts requires more thought, and thus more time, than most.

[LuckyR]

The criteria of taxes being thievery if the taxed receive no benefit from what the tax provides is a very low bar. True it may be easy to show that this or that taxpayer receives no direct benefit, but it is exceedingly difficult to show that there is no indirect, potential or theoretical benefit.

[GE Morton]

Even if Crusoe is the only person in existence, any right he is thought to have would be contingent on potential or counterfactual obligations (e.g. "If or when there is another rational agent out there, then they are obligated in such-and-such a way"). Granted, if he is the only existing rational being then my definition would need to be tweaked, but the general point is that rights still presuppose obligations.

Well, now you're being inconsistent. His right is contingent upon there being obligations? Didn't we agree that first possession is a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a right?

I don’t think I am being inconsistent. I think I have consistently claimed that obligations are a necessary part of the meaning of rights, and that one cannot understand what a right is without understanding the obligations that a right establishes. Everything I have written to you revolves around this claim.

Well, if x is contingent on y, then y is a necessary condition for x. Correct?

I have argued that if someone does not see that a right entails obligations then they do not know what a right is.

I agree.

Whether first possession is a sufficient condition for the existence of a right then depends on whether first possession logically entails rights-obligations. In our conversation I have tended to agree with you that first possession is sufficient, but this is because I see first possession as logically entailing the necessary obligations.

That is the point of disagreement. I disagree that an empirical fact, e.g. first possession, can logically entail an obligation (or any other moral proposition). That is the "is-ought gap." What it does logically imply is that the thing first possessed was acquired without inflicting loss or injury on anyone else. That is also an empirical fact, but one that has moral import. But it only has moral import because of a prior assumption, or belief, that inflicting losses or injuries on others is morally wrong, and hence that everyone is obliged to refrain from doing that. The moral implications of a right derive from that assumption, not from the bare and morally neutral fact of first possession.

I also agree with you that the entailed obligation is part of the "meaning" of "having a right." The meanings of words (as commonly understood) often include associations and connotations in addition to the necessary and sufficient conditions for an x being a y. To return to the pseudo-property "doctor": part of the meaning of that term is that a person who wears that tag is competent to practice medicine. But that is a connotation of the term, not a necessary or sufficient condition for applying it (which is that he was awarded an M.D. degree by an accredited medical school).

But this disagreement is over a pretty tangential logical point. I think we agree on the substance, namely, that a right denotes an empirical fact and also has moral import, i.e., it imposes obligations.

Perhaps this will help. Earlier I made reference to marriage as an analogy. We could teach someone to verify the existence of a marriage, even if that person has no idea what marriage actually means. All they would have to do is verify some factual conditions about whether certain vows were made. The idea revolves around the possibility of verifying the existence of some thing when one only understands that thing in a superficial way. Similarly, a parent might teach a small child to recognize and fear poisonous snakes even before the child has a real understanding of what a snake is.

My contention is that if someone leverages your definition to recognize rights while failing to perceive obligations, then they are like the child with the snake, for they have only a superficial understanding of that which they recognize. Apparently we disagree on whether that pre-obligation notion is sufficient to be called a right.

I agree in substance, but there is no "pre-obligation" notion of a right. Indeed, the notion that a right imposes obligations pre-exists its assignment to someone; invoking those obligations being the reason for assigning it (which is not the same as the grounds for assigning it).

I think the common opinion is that we do not have a right to an object if no one is obligated to respect the unique relation we claim to have with the object. Apparently you think this is a coherent claim, “Crusoe has a right to this coconut despite the fact that no one has any obligations to Crusoe with respect to the coconut.” That strikes me as a misuse of the word “right”.

There actually are such cases, beyond the far-fetched one of Crusoe being the only moral agent in the universe. Alfie, a famous artist, has a right to a certain painting, being its creator and therefore its first possessor. But Alfie, while driving drunk, crashed into Bruno, injuring him and thus indebting him to Bruno. The painting is the only asset Alfie has of sufficient value to compensate Bruno. Hence Bruno has no obligation to respect Alfie's right to the painting; nor does anyone acting on his behalf to secure that compensation. Indeed, it is Alfie's very right to the painting that justifies seizing it from him --- we couldn't seize it if Alfie was merely borrowing it from someone else who had the right to it. (Yes, this implies that rights can sometimes be morally violated).

(Some comments passed over, as they cover the same ground).

I grant that adopting the goal is a value decision, and is thus subjective, but I don’t see why it isn’t moral. Is the claim that value decisions are not moral decisions, or that subjective decisions are not moral decisions? Most people would just say that we are morally obliged to adopt the goal, and that adopting the goal is a moral act.

Yes, value decisions are not moral decisions. That is controversial, and inconsistent with the scope some moral philosophers have assumed for that field, e.g., Aristotle and other "virtue ethicists." But the distinction between deontology (the inquiry into moral rules) and axiology (the study of values) is generally recognized.

"The word deontology derives from the Greek words for duty (deon) and science (or study) of (logos). In contemporary moral philosophy, deontology is one of those kinds of normative theories regarding which choices are morally required, forbidden, or permitted. In other words, deontology falls within the domain of moral theories that guide and assess our choices of what we ought to do (deontic theories), in contrast to those that guide and assess what kind of person we are and should be (aretaic [virtue] theories)."

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethi ... tological/

"In its narrowest sense, “value theory” is used for a relatively narrow area of normative ethical theory particularly, but not exclusively, of concern to consequentialists. In this narrow sense, “value theory” is roughly synonymous with “axiology”. Axiology can be thought of as primarily concerned with classifying what things are good, and how good they are. For instance, a traditional question of axiology concerns whether the objects of value are subjective psychological states, or objective states of the world."

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/value-theory/

I take morality to consist of principles and rules governing the interactions between moral agents in a social setting. Every agent has interests --- things he values or disvalues --- but those are subjective and idiosyncratic, differing from agent to agent. Morality (understood as deontology) is not concerned with what people value; it is only concerned with their actions in pursuit of those values, whatever they may be.

No one can be "morally obliged" do adopt the axiom of a moral theory, for that would imply the existence of some meta-theory from which that obligation derives. Ad infinitum.

For moral philosophers like Kant morality is the exact opposite of instrumental, so I’m trying to understand why you are using the word in such a different way.

Oh, for Kant morality is very much instrumental. But he thinks there are some innate constraints, i.e., the CI, on how we go about choosing those principles and rules.

[GE Morton]

The criteria of taxes being thievery if the taxed receive no benefit from what the tax provides is a very low bar. True it may be easy to show that this or that taxpayer receives no direct benefit, but it is exceedingly difficult to show that there is no indirect, potential or theoretical benefit.

Indirect benefits are chargeable, if you can show them; potential or theoretical benefits, being hypothetical, are not.

[Ecurb]

For those who may be interested - @Ecurb, @chewybrian, @Belindi -

Today Public Discourse published an article by Martin Rhonheimer entitled, "The Universal Destination of Goods and Private Property: Is the Right to Private Property a “Second-Tier” Natural Right?" It is the abridged version of a longer article (link).

Rhonheimer is responding to part of Pope Francis' latest encyclical where he implied that the right to private property is a "secondary right" which ought not displace the "primary right" of the universal destination of goods. Rhonheimer looks at the history of Christianity (and Catholicism) in order to argue that the right to private property is an integral part of Christian tradition and is not overridden by the universal destination of goods, which is a principle rather than a right.

In all likelihood this article will give birth to some internecine Christian debates over the legitimacy of a right to private property.

Interesting, Leontiskos. I knew nothing about universal destination of goods until I read the article. I've just read it quickly -- maybe I'll comment if I read more carefully. An interesting aside: in "Confessions" St. Augustine thinks St. Ambrose (who is quoted in the article) may be bewitched because he reads silently without moving his lips. Apparently that just wasn't done in 400 ACE.

Another aside: whether we agree or not, these Roman Catholics are pretty darned smart (this is relevant to the prejudices expressed by some Philosophy Forum members in another thread).

[GE Morton]

Today Public Discourse published an article by Martin Rhonheimer entitled, "The Universal Destination of Goods and Private Property: Is the Right to Private Property a “Second-Tier” Natural Right?" It is the abridged version of a longer article (link).

An informative retrospective on the origins and evolution of the communalist thread in Catholic social theory. The "universal destination of goods" doctrine rests, of course, upon the Biblical dogma that "God created the Earth and gave it to mankind in common." That dogma, resting as it does on supernatural assumptions which have proven impossible to rationally defend, is not taken seriously by most contemporary moral philosophers, there being no rational reason to believe that Earth was "created" by anyone, or "given" by anyone to anyone.

It is interesting, though, that the dogma assumes the first possession principle for determining ownership of property.

[Leontiskos]

Today Public Discourse published an article by Martin Rhonheimer entitled, "The Universal Destination of Goods and Private Property: Is the Right to Private Property a “Second-Tier” Natural Right?" It is the abridged version of a longer article (link).

Interesting, Leontiskos. I knew nothing about universal destination of goods until I read the article. I've just read it quickly -- maybe I'll comment if I read more carefully. An interesting aside: in "Confessions" St. Augustine thinks St. Ambrose (who is quoted in the article) may be bewitched because he reads silently without moving his lips. Apparently that just wasn't done in 400 ACE.

True. Rhetoric and public oration was such a revered skill in ancient times that reading silently to oneself was less common.

I had been thinking of the principle of the universal destination of goods while reading some of the discussions here, so the timing of the article was fortuitous.

----------

Today Public Discourse published an article by Martin Rhonheimer entitled, "The Universal Destination of Goods and Private Property: Is the Right to Private Property a “Second-Tier” Natural Right?" It is the abridged version of a longer article (link).

An informative retrospective on the origins and evolution of the communalist thread in Catholic social theory. The "universal destination of goods" doctrine rests, of course, upon the Biblical dogma that "God created the Earth and gave it to mankind in common." That dogma, resting as it does on supernatural assumptions which have proven impossible to rationally defend, is not taken seriously by most contemporary moral philosophers, there being no rational reason to believe that Earth was "created" by anyone, or "given" by anyone to anyone.

It is interesting, though, that the dogma assumes the first possession principle for determining ownership of property.

Yes, in some ways it does take God to be transferring his own property to mankind.

The principle is surely supported by Christian revelation, but I don't know that someone like Locke would see it as inaccessible to unaided reason. For example, if Ebenezer has a silo full of grain that cannot be sold and is rotting away while poor people are simultaneously starving, apparently some of that grain should go to those who are starving. Why? Because grain is meant to be eaten. So we could add another moral principle to "do not harm," namely: food is meant to be eaten.

[Leontiskos]

Even if Crusoe is the only person in existence, any right he is thought to have would be contingent on potential or counterfactual obligations (e.g. "If or when there is another rational agent out there, then they are obligated in such-and-such a way"). Granted, if he is the only existing rational being then my definition would need to be tweaked, but the general point is that rights still presuppose obligations.

Well, now you're being inconsistent. His right is contingent upon there being obligations? Didn't we agree that first possession is a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a right?

I don’t think I am being inconsistent. I think I have consistently claimed that obligations are a necessary part of the meaning of rights, and that one cannot understand what a right is without understanding the obligations that a right establishes. Everything I have written to you revolves around this claim.

Well, if x is contingent on y, then y is a necessary condition for x. Correct?

Yes, but it is a necessary condition for the meaning or use of the term ‘right’, not for assignment of rights (more on this below). The conditions for assignment logically precede both the right and the obligations, which are inseparable.

I have argued that if someone does not see that a right entails obligations then they do not know what a right is.

I agree.

But if you agree that a right (logically) entails obligations, then how could you say that the notion of obligation is not a necessary condition for applying it?

Whether first possession is a sufficient condition for the existence of a right then depends on whether first possession logically entails rights-obligations. In our conversation I have tended to agree with you that first possession is sufficient, but this is because I see first possession as logically entailing the necessary obligations.

That is the point of disagreement.

I actually don’t think this is the primary point of disagreement. I think it is true that if you dropped your no-ought-from-is premise you would agree that obligations are a necessary part of the meaning of rights, but the primary disagreement is over whether obligations are a necessary part of the meaning of rights. That is the crucial point at which your theory runs up against common opinion, and I would consider it the primary problem regardless of how I view the is-ought bridge.

I disagree that an empirical fact, e.g. first possession, can logically entail an obligation (or any other moral proposition). That is the "is-ought gap." What it does logically imply is that the thing first possessed was acquired without inflicting loss or injury on anyone else. That is also an empirical fact, but one that has moral import. But it only has moral import because of a prior assumption, or belief, that inflicting losses or injuries on others is morally wrong, and hence that everyone is obliged to refrain from doing that. The moral implications of a right derive from that assumption, not from the bare and morally neutral fact of first possession.

Okay, well said.

I also agree with you that the entailed obligation is part of the "meaning" of "having a right." The meanings of words (as commonly understood) often include associations and connotations in addition to the necessary and sufficient conditions for an x being a y.

I address this below.

To return to the pseudo-property "doctor": part of the meaning of that term is that a person who wears that tag is competent to practice medicine. But that is a connotation of the term, not a necessary or sufficient condition for applying it (which is that he was awarded an M.D. degree by an accredited medical school).

I would say that competence to practice medicine is a necessary condition, but not a sufficient condition. The sufficient condition is the M.D., and the M.D. necessarily entails competence to practice medicine.

But this disagreement is over a pretty tangential logical point. I think we agree on the substance, namely, that a right denotes an empirical fact and also has moral import, i.e., it imposes obligations.

True, and I think we’re approaching the end of the conversation.

Perhaps this will help. Earlier I made reference to marriage as an analogy. We could teach someone to verify the existence of a marriage, even if that person has no idea what marriage actually means. All they would have to do is verify some factual conditions about whether certain vows were made. The idea revolves around the possibility of verifying the existence of some thing when one only understands that thing in a superficial way. Similarly, a parent might teach a small child to recognize and fear poisonous snakes even before the child has a real understanding of what a snake is.
My contention is that if someone leverages your definition to recognize rights while failing to perceive obligations, then they are like the child with the snake, for they have only a superficial understanding of that which they recognize. Apparently we disagree on whether that pre-obligation notion is sufficient to be called a right.

I agree in substance, but there is no "pre-obligation" notion of a right. Indeed, the notion that a right imposes obligations pre-exists its assignment to someone; invoking those obligations being the reason for assigning it (which is not the same as the grounds for assigning it).

Good, I agree. But spelling out the necessary and sufficient conditions for assigning a right is not the same thing as defining the meaning of the word, “right.” To quote your source on intensional definitions, “An intensional definition gives the meaning of a term by specifying necessary and sufficient conditions for when the term should be used” (Wikipedia). The conditions you are giving fall short of an intensional definition because they are the conditions for assigning a right rather than the conditions for using the term. A necessary condition for use is the idea that the right-holder can invoke obligations, and this condition is absent from your “assignment conditions,” which means that those assignment conditions are not sufficient for a definition of the term “rights”.

I would further argue that your conditions are not necessary for use, at least not if we think there are rights to speech, or assembly, or association. It seems to me that my definition tracks the usage of the word in all of those contexts, whereas yours is restricted to property.

I think the common opinion is that we do not have a right to an object if no one is obligated to respect the unique relation we claim to have with the object. Apparently you think this is a coherent claim, “Crusoe has a right to this coconut despite the fact that no one has any obligations to Crusoe with respect to the coconut.” That strikes me as a misuse of the word “right”.

There actually are such cases, beyond the far-fetched one of Crusoe being the only moral agent in the universe. Alfie, a famous artist, has a right to a certain painting, being its creator and therefore its first possessor. But Alfie, while driving drunk, crashed into Bruno, injuring him and thus indebting him to Bruno. The painting is the only asset Alfie has of sufficient value to compensate Bruno. Hence Bruno has no obligation to respect Alfie's right to the painting; nor does anyone acting on his behalf to secure that compensation. Indeed, it is Alfie's very right to the painting that justifies seizing it from him --- we couldn't seize it if Alfie was merely borrowing it from someone else who had the right to it. (Yes, this implies that rights can sometimes be morally violated).

I would say that this is not a counterexample because at no point are you using the word “right” in a way that does not include obligations. Even in your explanation, “Rights can sometimes be morally violated,” is the implicit sense of a violated obligation. This just means that the obligations are not absolute, not that there are no obligations. The obligations that derive from rights can be overridden in rare circumstances.

I grant that adopting the goal is a value decision, and is thus subjective, but I don’t see why it isn’t moral. Is the claim that value decisions are not moral decisions, or that subjective decisions are not moral decisions? Most people would just say that we are morally obliged to adopt the goal, and that adopting the goal is a moral act.

Yes, value decisions are not moral decisions. That is controversial, and inconsistent with the scope some moral philosophers have assumed for that field, e.g., Aristotle and other "virtue ethicists." But the distinction between deontology (the inquiry into moral rules) and axiology (the study of values) is generally recognized.

"The word deontology derives from the Greek words for duty (deon) and science (or study) of (logos). In contemporary moral philosophy, deontology is one of those kinds of normative theories regarding which choices are morally required, forbidden, or permitted. In other words, deontology falls within the domain of moral theories that guide and assess our choices of what we ought to do (deontic theories), in contrast to those that guide and assess what kind of person we are and should be (aretaic [virtue] theories)."

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethi ... tological/

"In its narrowest sense, “value theory” is used for a relatively narrow area of normative ethical theory particularly, but not exclusively, of concern to consequentialists. In this narrow sense, “value theory” is roughly synonymous with “axiology”. Axiology can be thought of as primarily concerned with classifying what things are good, and how good they are. For instance, a traditional question of axiology concerns whether the objects of value are subjective psychological states, or objective states of the world."

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/value-theory/

I take morality to consist of principles and rules governing the interactions between moral agents in a social setting. Every agent has interests --- things he values or disvalues --- but those are subjective and idiosyncratic, differing from agent to agent. Morality (understood as deontology) is not concerned with what people value; it is only concerned with their actions in pursuit of those values, whatever they may be.

No one can be "morally obliged" do adopt the axiom of a moral theory, for that would imply the existence of some meta-theory from which that obligation derives. Ad infinitum.

Thanks for this elucidation – it is quite helpful to me. I disagree with some of your points and categorizations here, but I think I am going to leave the lion's share of this topic for another day. This is because 1) it is something I have wanted to discuss with you for some time, so I don’t want to give it short shrift, 2) I would prefer to discuss it in a thread where it is less off-topic, and 3) In the next two months I will only be online for about 3 weeks, so it is a bad time to start a new topic.

Nevertheless, here is a quick observation: You contrast deontology with axiology and claim to be offering a deontological theory rather than an axiological theory, and yet in most literature (including your sources) deontology is contrasted with consequentialism and axiology is associated with consequentialism. Now your theory is inevitably consequentialist, so it is odd that you would class it as deontological. As noted in the thread on objective morality, your goal of welfare is based on a value and so the system seems to be axiological at least to a certain extent, but the more pressing point is that consequentialist theories such as your own are inevitably instrumental whereas deontological theories almost always involve some non-instrumental obligations. I would categorize such a characteristically instrumental theory as consequentialist rather than deontological.

For moral philosophers like Kant morality is the exact opposite of instrumental, so I’m trying to understand why you are using the word in such a different way.

Oh, for Kant morality is very much instrumental. But he thinks there are some innate constraints, i.e., the CI, on how we go about choosing those principles and rules.

It seems to me that for Kant something done for the sake of a personal goal does not count as moral at all. He would say that one who acts in such a way is not acting for moral reasons. This is why, for example, Philippa Foot’s famous paper was such an anti-Kantian project (“Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives”). For Kant the will is involved in freely respecting the law of morality, but the law of morality is not the result of a goal that one chooses.

For example, in the first section of the Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals Kant stresses the moral importance of a “good will” over and against any inclinations or ability to achieve one’s inclinations, and I take it that the desire to carry out instrumental means for the sake of consequentialist goals would be for Kant a kind of inclination.

[LuckyR]

The criteria of taxes being thievery if the taxed receive no benefit from what the tax provides is a very low bar. True it may be easy to show that this or that taxpayer receives no direct benefit, but it is exceedingly difficult to show that there is no indirect, potential or theoretical benefit.

Indirect benefits are chargeable, if you can show them; potential or theoretical benefits, being hypothetical, are not.

Well since taxes are collected first and spent later, potential (future) benefits are perfectly reasonable, from a logic standpoint, since noone can absolutely predict the future.

[GE Morton]

Well since taxes are collected first and spent later, potential (future) benefits are perfectly reasonable, from a logic standpoint, since noone can absolutely predict the future.

Ambiguity of the word "potential." Yes, it can be used to denote anything that may possibly happen in the future, but it is usually used to denote future events whose probability is low or unknown, not future events virtually certain to occur. I order a widget from Amazon and pay today, expecting Amazon will ship the next day and that I'll receive the widget 2 or 3 days later. Receiving the widget is not a "potential" benefit of my payment, as that term is usually used.

[GE Morton]

The principle is surely supported by Christian revelation, but I don't know that someone like Locke would see it as inaccessible to unaided reason.

Locke accepted the principle at face value, but argued that it was inadequate for determining specifically what belonged to whom. So he invokes the first possession rule:

"Sect. 26. God, who hath given the world to men in common, hath also given them reason to make use of it to the best advantage of life, and convenience. The earth, and all that is therein, is given to men for the support and comfort of their being. And tho' all the fruits it naturally produces, and beasts it feeds, belong to mankind in common, as they are produced by the spontaneous hand of nature; and no body has originally a private dominion, exclusive of the rest of mankind, in any of them, as they are thus in their natural state: yet being given for the use of men, there must of necessity be a means to appropriate them some way or other, before they can be of any use, or at all beneficial to any particular man. The fruit, or venison, which nourishes the wild Indian, who knows no enclosure, and is still a tenant in common, must be his, and so his, i.e. a part of him, that another can no longer have any right to it, before it can do him any good for the support of his life . . .

"Sect. 28. He that is nourished by the acorns he picked up under an oak, or the apples he gathered from the trees in the wood, has certainly appropriated them to himself. No body can deny but the nourishment is his. I ask then, when did they begin to be his? when he digested? or when he ate? or when he boiled? or when he brought them home? or when he picked them up? and it is plain, if the first gathering made them not his, nothing else could."

Locke, 2nd Essay on Civil Government, Ch 5.
https://www.gutenberg.org/files/7370/7370-h/7370-h.htm

Locke goes on, of course, to argue that the investment of labor creates private property, not mere first possession, but that theory has severe problems. He should have stopped at the end of the quoted paragraph above.

For example, if Ebenezer has a silo full of grain that cannot be sold and is rotting away while poor people are simultaneously starving, apparently some of that grain should go to those who are starving. Why? Because grain is meant to be eaten. So we could add another moral principle to "do not harm," namely: food is meant to be eaten.

Well, that is not a parallel to the universal destination principle or an example of it. Yes, the grain should be given to the poor (per my Duty to Aid theorem), but those poor have no right to it.

[LuckyR]

Well since taxes are collected first and spent later, potential (future) benefits are perfectly reasonable, from a logic standpoint, since noone can absolutely predict the future.

Ambiguity of the word "potential." Yes, it can be used to denote anything that may possibly happen in the future, but it is usually used to denote future events whose probability is low or unknown, not future events virtually certain to occur. I order a widget from Amazon and pay today, expecting Amazon will ship the next day and that I'll receive the widget 2 or 3 days later. Receiving the widget is not a "potential" benefit of my payment, as that term is usually used.

Very true, yet essentially irrelevant. Let's say you are a typical 20 year old single, childless man, your tax dollars are going towards public education. You are moderately to highly likely to have children who would have access to public education. It is logical to pay taxes towards public education (potential benefit). Say you are a 55 year old single, childless man, you are almost certainly not going to have children, though if public education collapses, there is likely to be huge class based unrest, which is likely to have a negative effect on the market, where your retirement funds are located, thus you benefit (indirectly) from public education. In addition as a child you had access to public education and since the costs of your education were not covered by your parent's taxes for the few years you attended ie it is amortized over the long-term, it is logical to pay taxes towards public education.

It is folly to propose that we are unconnected islands in Modern society. Almost no one nowadays possessed the skils, or frankly the interest to be able to go it alone, though some like to engage in that fantasy.

[GE Morton]

Let's say you are a typical 20 year old single, childless man, your tax dollars are going towards public education. You are moderately to highly likely to have children who would have access to public education. It is logical to pay taxes towards public education (potential benefit).

If I were a 20 year-old childless man who intended/desired to have children, while those children may have access to public schools, I certainly wouldn't send them there. Nor would I pay for them, if given a choice. I'd spend that money to send them to a private school whose programs, focus, faculty qualifications, and curriculum I approved. There would be no potential benefit for me in supporting those public schools.

Say you are a 55 year old single, childless man, you are almost certainly not going to have children, though if public education collapses, there is likely to be huge class based unrest, which is likely to have a negative effect on the market, where your retirement funds are located, thus you benefit (indirectly) from public education.

Sorry, but that is a version of the ad baculum argument ("your money or your life"). It is paying protection money under threat or duress from the person demanding payment, i.e., ransom.

In addition as a child you had access to public education and since the costs of your education were not covered by your parent's taxes for the few years you attended ie it is amortized over the long-term, it is logical to pay taxes towards public education.

Well, yes, they were covered by my parents' taxes; they have to be (on average). That debt is paid in full.

It is folly to propose that we are unconnected islands in Modern society. Almost no one nowadays possessed the skils, or frankly the interest to be able to go it alone, though some like to engage in that fantasy.

Oh, I agree. No one who lives in a social setting "goes it alone." But the "Get what you pay for, pay for what you get" principle doesn't assume or entail that.

[Leontiskos]

Locke goes on, of course, to argue that the investment of labor creates private property, not mere first possession, but that theory has severe problems. He should have stopped at the end of the quoted paragraph above.

It seems that Locke is there arguing for investment of labor rather than first possession. The next sentence shows that he sees the gathering as a form of labor. I think Locke's theory is important. A right to some thing seems to be more fully realized when labor has been invested. I also think the investment of labor question is helpful for looking at the universal destination of goods. Presumably the less labor invested, the more the good falls under that principle. One way to see this is to use your "existence test," where you ask whether the existence of the owner has harmed the person who goes without. The answer to the existence test tends to change with respect to labor invested.

For example, if Ebenezer has a silo full of grain that cannot be sold and is rotting away while poor people are simultaneously starving, apparently some of that grain should go to those who are starving. Why? Because grain is meant to be eaten. So we could add another moral principle to "do not harm," namely: food is meant to be eaten.

Well, that is not a parallel to the universal destination principle or an example of it. Yes, the grain should be given to the poor (per my Duty to Aid theorem), but those poor have no right to it.

I think it is a close parallel to the universal destination principle. Food is a good that is destined for consumption, namely by those who consume (humans or perhaps animals). "God created wheat and gave it to mankind in common," and, "wheat is meant to be eaten," are saying similar things. I suppose I am also assuming the premise that one ought to help his fellow human being who is starving (particularly when the stored wheat is close to rotting away). Usually the universal destination principle is invoked in cases of surplus. In these easy cases of wheat or apples, where little investment of labor is required to produce an edible good, the universal destination principle looms larger, as noted above.

I think your first possession account makes good sense, and I don't think the counterarguments in this thread are very good. That said, there are also other considerations, such as investment of labor or the social, interdependent nature of man (which is more true than ever in the 21st century).

[GE Morton]

It seems that Locke is there arguing for investment of labor rather than first possession. The next sentence shows that he sees the gathering as a form of labor. I think Locke's theory is important. A right to some thing seems to be more fully realized when labor has been invested.

The problems with Locke's "mixing labor" theory of property ownership have been pointed out by many philosophers. Robert Nozick asks, "If I mix my labor with your silverware by stealing it, does it become my property?" Or, if only natural goods "owned in common by all mankind" is meant, "If I stir a glass of my tomato juice into the ocean, does the ocean become my property, or have I just wasted a glass of tomato juice?"

Then there is the problem of fortuitous finds. I stop for a drink of water in a clear creek, and notice a shiny stone beneath the ripples. It proves to be a 4 oz gold nugget. Does the trivial labor I invest to pluck it from the creek merit the $5000 I can get for it?

Others have defended Locke's theory by arguing that by "labor," Locke meant "productive labor," i.e., labor that produces new wealth or adds value to a natural good. But that has problems of its own: labor which produces new wealth or adds value to a natural good would seem to entitle the laborer only to the the new wealth and added value, leaving the original question --- how does one become entitled to natural goods --- unanswered. And, of course, if the natural good is indeed owned by all in common, then the permission of all of those owners would be required before you could do anything to add value to it --- the very problem Locke was trying to solve. (My painting your house may add value to it. But if I paint it without your permission I have vandalized it).

Many Enlightenment era philosophers, no doubt to avoid being persecuted or at least shunned for heresy, sought work-arounds for the problems posed by religious dogmas without seeming to challenge them. In this case, the dogma of an "original common ownership" (for brevity hereafter, "OCO"). Locke could not argue for first possession directly, since, per the OCO, no individual is the first possessor of natural goods --- God is.

I also think the investment of labor question is helpful for looking at the universal destination of goods. Presumably the less labor invested, the more the good falls under that principle. One way to see this is to use your "existence test," where you ask whether the existence of the owner has harmed the person who goes without. The answer to the existence test tends to change with respect to labor invested.

I'm not following you there. Why would the lack of a labor investment in a natural good tend to affirm the OCO? It would seem only to affirm that a claim to it would be dubious, and that the good remained unowned. And whether I invested much or a little labor to secure some good, how would my non-existence change the welfare of anyone else?

One common answer to the non-existence test is, "Well, had Alfie not taken x Bruno would have had an opportunity to take it. Had Alfie not existed he would not have taken x, thereby depriving Bruno of that opportunity." That answer is, of course, self-defeating. An opportunity is something to be seized. If Alfie cannot take x for that reason, then neither can Bruno, since he will thereby deprive Chauncey of that opportunity. So no one may pick the apple, and everyone starves. (This problem also applies to Locke's "enough, and as good" proviso).

I think it is a close parallel to the universal destination principle. Food is a good that is destined for consumption, namely by those who consume (humans or perhaps animals). "God created wheat and gave it to mankind in common," and, "wheat is meant to be eaten," are saying similar things.

Oh, no! What use something has and who owns it are entirely different questions.

I suppose I am also assuming the premise that one ought to help his fellow human being who is starving (particularly when the stored wheat is close to rotting away).

I agree. But that help should be given doesn't establish a right of the beneficiary to it.