Ecurb wrote: ↑July 15th, 2020, 3:11 pm
The tree is not in a "common", but in an uncharted wood. The boys are friends, but there is no implicit or explicit partnership.
If the tree is in an uncharted wood your story loses plausibility. The boys are then pioneers, and "young boys" will not be pioneers exploring uncharted territories; they would not be capable of it and their mothers would not allow it. If they do any exploring it is in their own well-trod neighborhood and nearby commons. And there is an implicit partnership --- if they are traveling together for more than few hours they are cooperating, in deciding which paths to follow, in finding/building shelters at night, securing food, sharing tools and other resources, etc. That establishes a partnership. If they were adults they would enter into some explicit agreement as to how anything of value they discover will be shared. Moreover, merely being friends entails obligations by itself. All of those extraneous factors render your story irrelevant to the issue at hand.
However, since there were enough apples for both boys to eat their fill, there is no reason to postulate "ownership" for the first discoverer of the tree.
Given the relationship between them they are
both discoverers of the tree. Suppose, instead of quarreling over who may eat the apples, they jointly decide to pick all the apples, carry them back to to their village, and sell them at the local farmer's market. Have they no right to do so?
Nobody owns the tree. Anybody can pick and eat the apples.
Only until someone discovers and claims it. That is how all ownership, all property, begins. Until then it is
res nullius, available for taking by anyone who comes along.
It is your notion that the discoverer obtains some "right" that is a reductio ad absurdum (or whatever the Latin term). It leads to the nonsensical conclusion that Morton has some "right" allowing him to deny nourishment to Ecurb.
That is also mistaken. Even if the tree is unquestionably my property I still have a (conditional) duty to give you an apple if you are starving.
Any normal person of reasonable sensibilities reading my little story can only think that Morton is a jerk for trying to prevent Ecurb from eating an apple. I suppose this could be because, although it is legitimate to claim ownership, Morton should share with his friend. But it is more likely that the entire concept of ownership is (in this case) ludicrous.
Yes, he is a jerk, for the first reason you gave. If you think it is because the concept of ownership is ludicrous you'll need to present some explanation for why it is, one that doesn't rely on failures to honor obligations arising from other sources.
The first occupancy principle, BTW, is the foundational, default principle for settling property disputes in courts all over the world, and has been since time immemorial. If It is "ludicrous" you'll have your work cut out for you in convincing people of that.
"The notion that first in time is first in right is an ancient one. It determines the resolution of numerous human conflicts both in law and custom. The legal rules about finding, water rights, nuisance, prescription, patents, wild animals, creditors' rights, franchises, recording and priorities in realty, and scores of other issues are wholly or partially governed by it. People follow it as unwritten law in their social interaction. The line waiting in front of a movie theater obeys its commands. The notion seems to be grounded in something almost instinctual; yet there is much more to it than that. Different policies serve to justify its application in various legal disputes. We discuss here some of the many contexts in which the doctrine is used (or abused), as well as the various policies that serve to justify or undermine it. . . ."
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/view ... ontext=nlr
Morality cannot be determined by logic. As G.K. Chesterton said, we can only discover using logic what we have already discovered without it. (That's because logic is by its nature circular; the conclusion is contained in the premises).
Logic cannot supply the axioms and postulates of a moral theory, but it can constrain the conclusions we draw from those premises. The premises themselves must identify the relevant facts bearing on the subject matter and set forth the goal of the theory.
So we must conclude that the theory of property rights that accepts Morton's behavior is unacceptable, and that Ecurb was justified in plucking an apple and nourishing himself with its juicy flesh.
That is a
non sequitur. Ecurb is indeed justified in taking an apple, but for reasons that have nothing to do with the first occupancy theory of property.