For anyone wondering, the term "mass" has been moved away from because of the realization that a photon may not have mass (but photons are matter) (20) and to have the non-continuity of identity argument account for such. It seems there are arguments that since photons have energy, then they have mass: I am lost on the physics arguments.
I consider that one or more photons may be of the conglomeration of matter that composes an instantaneous identity. It is also understood that the 100-particle entity example may not have been a good example because of wave-particle duality.
LuckyR wrote: ↑February 24th, 2021, 7:50 pm
I know, that's what you posted the first time. I get it. You're still the perfect victim, whether you care about it or not and if true you'll be relentlessly victimized once others figure this out. Unless, of course this is just an online idea that you don't live by.
I (the instantaneous identity that is submitting this post) deny that's what I posted the first time because I did not exist at the time those submissions occurred.
The temporal point of submission of a post is being defined as the instant of which the "Submit" button is tapped (I am using a phone). It is understood that there may be some web processing involved with the submission getting posted, but it is argued that the submitting instantaneous identity had died by then. I did not type up all of what is in this post (such is from previous instantaneous identities), but there will be only one instantaneous identity tapping the submit button; and I submit what is in this post as what I would like to communicate. Other instantaneous identities are having this prepared for submission with the use of "I" to refer to the submitting instantaneous identity, me.
The instantaneous identies using the name Dennis Blewett posted different things. One submission was by an instantaneous identity that had an irrational care for pain and suffering coinciding with its existence because the instantaneous identity did not have a realization that such pain and suffering could not coincide with its existence: There was no "but such a care would be irrational, as I cannot care and experience such pain and suffering at the the same time; thus, I would not care about such pain and suffering occurring" clause. Its argument was that it would care about such pain and suffering IF such pain and suffering coincided with its existence.
Two mental states, "physical states," could not occur at the same time: "Mental state #1" being the caring about such pain and suffering and "mental state #2" the experience of such pain and suffering. Those mental states could not occur simultaneously in one instantaneous identity. It is presumed that a mental state occurs at an instant of time and that an instantaneous identity exists at an instant of time. All instantaneous identities are only able to have one mental state at a time. Depending on how an individual looks at it, the term "mental state" may be interchangeable with "physical state," which is how it is meant in this post. A mental state implies that all the parts of a physical self come together to be represented and experienced as a unified whole.
And it may be understood that one instantaneous identity cannot post a correction, as though the new instantaneous identity has maintained the identity of the submitting poster. What would have been more appropriate would have been the instantaneous identity of the time arguing, "What I think the prior instantaneous identity meant to argue is the following:".
Count Lucanor wrote: ↑February 24th, 2021, 11:00 pm
I never said you literally used the word "farce", but I did say you meant farce, even when you actually wrote "farse", which does not exist as a word in the English language:
Alright. It looks like "farse" is an obsolete variant of "farce," according to Merriam-Webster online. Note taken.
Count Lucanor wrote: ↑February 24th, 2021, 11:00 pm
So, singular entities exist continuously. How is this relevant to the existence of the suspect of a crime and the alleged crimes?
This post will eventually get to the relevancy of the argument. First I will go into some usage in reference to the word "entity."
One of the things I mean to avoid is for someone to say that the term "entity" and "personhood" are synonymous. I hope all of us do not get to that conclusion. An entity is a set of one or more instantaneous identities.
The term entity is meant to indicate how a three-dimensional object (or conglomeration of three-dimensional objects, which at an instant of time is being labeled as an instantaneous identity) goes through one or more physical changes over time.
Let us say at the point of conception there is a zygote, which is the beginning ("t0
") of a conglomeration of three-dimensional objects ("matter"). Presume it (the zygote, a conglomeration of matter) goes through at least one change over time: "It" is made of matter, and all matter changes its spatial position over time because all matter has velocity.
Presuming there is a link between one instantaneous identity and the next, the term "entity" is used to group the instantaneous identities.
Perhaps it is a category error to claim that all instantaneous identities are of an entity. If there is no link between one instantaneous identity and the next, then the instantaneous identities cannot be grouped together as the set of instantaneous identities of an entity: A category error will have been made.
Change in spatial position is not the only thing going on for a zygote, as during development more matter gets added to it (generally) over time. At the least, however, even if addition or subtraction of matter were to occur, it may be argued that matter changes its spatial position over time, which is at the least a change.
A person arguing no-self theory would probably deny the concept of an instantaneous identity. I think if that were to be done, then mental states have to be denied and perhaps the conglomerations of matter in humanoid form may be defined as philosophical zombies.
I guess with denying the cause-and-effect relationship of alleged lightcones, it might be argued there is no link (no causal link may be argued) between one instantaneous identity and the next. Perhaps then it might be argued the idea of an entity is a farce. Perhaps we would be left with the idea of instantaneous identities but no "chain" of instantaneous identities.
So, the suspect of a crime (when being referred to in any moment/instant of time) has been argued to be an instantaneous identity of an entity. However, the instantaneous identity that a suspect is (referred to in that instant of time) is not the instantaneous identity that was in existence at the alleged time of the alleged crime. Even if it is alleged that an actus reus occurred over a span of time, a span of instantaneous identities would be getting referred to (and those instantaneous identities would have died before the instantaneous identity that is being given the title of suspect came into existence).
All entities are made of matter. All matter experiences change over time (at the least, spatial position changes over time).
From what has been listed, it is argued that no defendant is guilty of an alleged crime because no defendant could have fulfilled the elements of an alleged crime. No defendant could have fulfilled the elements of an alleged crime because no defendant (an instantaneous identity being referred to that has the title of defendant, as the matter of discussion, of the entity that is being discussed) would have existed at the alleged time of the alleged crime. No defendant would have existed at the alleged time of the alleged crime because the entity that any defendant is of would have been made of matter at the alleged time of the alleged crime. The entity that any defendant is of would have been made of matter at the alleged time of the alleged crime because all matter changes spatial position over time. All matter changes spatial position over time because all matter has velocity. (I think I properly set up that argument.)
Here is what I have from a draft if it helps make more sense: The defendant (the instantaneous identity being referred to that has the title of defendant, as the matter of discussion, of the entity that is being discussed) did not exist at the alleged time of the alleged crime because the entity that the defendant is of was made of matter at the alleged time of the alleged crime.
Count Lucanor wrote: ↑February 24th, 2021, 11:00 pm
If Peter pushes Rick and this falls into the arms of Mary, who gives him a kiss, then there is a series of events and entities involved in the whole situation. The whole point of my demonstration was to show that once you claimed Peter is not an actual continuous identifiable entity, but a compound illusion, made of many different instances of an ideal Peter changing in time, then the whole chain of entities and events that are linked to Peter in that situation must be claimed to be compound illusions, too. That was the whole point and your reply that "there is only one ever-changing entity" makes no sense.
I deny that entities or instantaneous identities were referred to as illusions. The use of the word illusion feels like the Count Lucanor of the time is arguing that Dennis Blewett argued that there are no instantaneous identities (that the existence of an instantaneous identity is an illusion) and that no-self theory is true, whereby a a belief in the existence of an instantaneous identity is a delusion of the mind. I deny I argued there is an ideal self: That comes off as very Plato's forms.
I reason by "compound illusion" what is meant is how I was referring to how it is ignorant to think that an entity is the same from one moment to the next, and those who think such have been deceived. I reason by "instances" what is meant is "instantaneous identities." I reason by "an ideal Peter" it is meant "an entity that has been given the name Peter through its instantaneous identities."
In line with the idea of there being an entity and instantaneous identities may be of the entity, then Peter at any time is the name of Peter given to an instantaneous identity.
There is no chain of entities.
One or more instantaneous identities (more than one instantaneous identity when discussing the span of more than an instant of time occurring) being given the name Peter pushed "Rick" (the name given to one or more instantaneous identities of that entity) into the arms of "Mary" (the name given to one or more instantaneous identities of that entity).
To add some context to the non-continuity of identity argument, I will provide a rendition of a situation that was thought of during the non-continuity of identity argument's development: (Imagine there is a driver, and the driver fails to stop at a stop sign. A police officer of whom is watching turns on the police vehicles lights and pulls over the person he thinks disobeyed the stop sign. The officer makes the comment that he has to issue a ticket for disobeying a stop sign because of the driver's actions. The driver responds with the defense that who supposedly disobeyed the stop sign and who he is now are different persons.) (I hope readers can put together the idea of how the driver is claiming that an instantaneous identity that is no longer around correlates with the alleged disobeyance of the alleged stop sign.)
When we start talking about how nothing in reality has sufficiency (perhaps best described as "maximal necessary criteria") to be the ideal topic of discussion, things might feel as though they deconstruct (philosophy of deconstructionism). I mean for there to be a disparity between the non-continuity of identity argument an the non-causative agent argument. The non-causative agent takes the personhood argument into consideration, as though personhood as a concept cannot be refuted, and denies that cause-and-effect relationships exist in alleged lightcones and amongst alleged lightcones, which helps deny that a supposed person with personhood caused an actus reus. Even if personhood as a concept is refuted, that no instantaneous identity existed as a causative agent may be argued with the non-causative agent argument.
I think personhood is refutable as a person is not identical from one moment to the next, whereby personhood implies continuity of identity. If we deny that entities exist, then there is is still instantaneous identities to refute. If we refute instantaneous identities, then we are left with no-self theory. To accept no-self theory is to accept the argument that all the parts together should never be taken to be represented as a whole: To do such would be a faulty generalization. Even if no-self theory were accepted, the non-causative agent argument still works: No individual object of matter may be alleged to have caused an actus reus.
How it could be physically (with science) be argued that no-self theory is true is beyond me at the moment.
(20) "Light has no mass so it also has no energy according to Einstein, but how can sunlight warm the earth without energy?" Science Questions with Surprising Answers. Dr. Christopher S. Baird. Internet resource. Accessed February 28th, 2021. https://wtamu.edu/~cbaird/sq/mobile/201 ... ut-energy/