Is Democracy Moral? Is Libertarianism Good?

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Is Democracy Moral? Is Libertarianism Good?

Post by Leontiskos »

This thread flows from an article entitled, "Is Democracy Moral?" It is an excerpt from Zbigniew Stawrowski's book, The Clash of Civilizations or Civil War. Stawrowski's target is Hobbes' political philosophy, but I think the critique will also stick to libertarianism.

I will assume that respondents have read the article, but I can give a quick overview. After making use of Hegel's distinction between the ethical and the moral, Stawrowski's argument takes on a semi-historical form as he considers the axiological foundations of the basic models that states can take. He first considers an ethically homogenous state, such as existed in the ancient world, in which "the political and ethical-religious order constitute one inseparable whole." The second model arose in the time of the Reformation. On this model states must limit themselves to imposing an ethical minimum on account of the ethical diversity in the population. We are told that respect for religious freedom is the foremost principle in such a state. This is the state of classical liberalism, of Locke and Mill.

Using Locke's refusal to tolerate atheists as a point of departure, Stawrowski describes two different conceptions of the "ethically minimum":
Stawrowski wrote:The problem of a state of ethical minimum, therefore, is in the fact that its sense may be understood in two ways, in other words, that it may be penetrated by a dual spirit. Naturally, the main aim of such a state is to guarantee conditions in which people may live in security and peace, in accordance with their conscience, realizing their own idea of a good life. There is, however, a fundamental difference between whether the guaranteed freedom of conscience serves the realization of one or another vision of the common good (which is implicitly contained in the concept of religious freedom), or, whether it supports the emancipation from all ethical obligations. In the case of the latter, the principle of freedom, which lies at the foundations of such a state, is no longer a principle of freedom of conscience—we are dealing rather with the principle of freedom of an outlook on life, which treats as equal diverse ethical outlooks and attitudes (or rather one attitude, which takes on many shapes), radically cutting off interpersonal relations. It is not necessary to add that this last interpretation remains in striking contradiction with the intentions of the above-quoted “founding fathers” of the modern state.

Within the framework of this same state of ethical minimum there can, therefore, exist and co-exist two completely separate societies: the first one, consisting of diverse ethical communities and embracing both religious people of various beliefs as well as irreligious people who are sensitive to the common good; and the second, a society of extreme individualists and egocentrics.
Stawrowski tells us that the modern state tends towards the latter conception of an ethical minimum, and that this conception necessitates a democratic state of law (while the former conception is compatible with a democratic state of law, but does not necessitate it). The third model is of course the Hobbesian state which is premised on the latter conception of an ethical minimum. The article closes:
Stawrowski wrote:When in 1989, Francis Fukuyama wrote: “The triumph of the West, of the Western idea, is evident first of all in the total exhaustion of viable systematic alternatives to Western liberalism,” he did not notice that the real “clash of civilizations,” a truly significant conflict of ideas, goes on within the framework of this same Western civilization. This struggle is about the sense and aim of the liberal democratic state of law, about whether its liberal character should be expressed in the promotion of freedom responsible for the community, or in support for the idea of autonomy understood as liberation from all external (including ethical) limitations; or whether it should be a state of ethical minimum, or of maximum possible freedom; or finally, whether it should be a state of law with a solid framework, in which the appropriate institutions of a democratic political system function and are subordinated, or whether it is to turn into a democracy for which the principles of the state of law will sooner or later appear to be a superfluous limitation.
----------

From this article I infer that Stawrowski favors the classical liberalism of Locke or Mill while rejecting Hobbes. He favors the former conception of an ethical minimum while rejecting the latter. He would prefer a state which sees the human being as a moral and ethical agent, a state which does not deny the ethical nature of man.

In these things I agree with him, and the weaknesses of the Hobbesian state that Stawrowski points to seem to be some of the same basic weaknesses of libertarianism.

Now, it may be obvious that on this website libertarianism is closely associated with GE Morton. I have seen many critiques of Morton's political philosophy, but few of them stand up under scrutiny. I think that libertarianism is, prima facie, a reasonable attempt at political philosophy. When subjected to scrutiny, however, I believe that it begins to fall apart. I think that the way it falls apart, along with the kernels of truth that can be found in the critiques of Morton's political philosophy, are easily observable in Stawrowski's article.
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Re: Is Democracy Moral? Is Libertarianism Good?

Post by Leontiskos »

Another thinker who tackles the same issue from a slightly different angle is Patrick Deneen, who wrote Why Liberalism Failed. Some of his lectures are available online, such as <this one> which was given at Lafayette.

Deneen gives philosophical and sociological arguments for why liberalism has played a significant role in the smothering of our vital institutions, and argues that without correction this trajectory will lead to even worse outcomes. One of his more interesting arguments claims that the market and the state rise or fall together, and that some forms of liberalism--particularly Mill's--license the state to foster liberal mindsets among its citizens in order to free them from the sort of cultural 'determinism' that institutions give rise to.
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Re: Is Democracy Moral? Is Libertarianism Good?

Post by Ecurb »

Attempts to return to ethical homogeneity abound. In Afghanistan, the Taliban have defeated the two major world powers, demonstrating the power of ethical homogeneity. China hardly demonstrates the trimph of Liberalism, and neither do many Islamic states.

The problem with promoting ethical homogeneity is that it is impossible, in this information-rich age.

Protestantism, liberalism, democracy and capitalism arose together at the end of the Enlightenment. "The Dawn of Everything: A New History of Hmanity" by Graeber and Wengrow claims that contact with the New World and its less heirarchical and authoritarian societies influenced Locke, Mill, Hobbes, Rousseau and others. They argue their case persuasively (although where it will lead is unclear, since I'm only about 100 pages into the book). A man named Lahontan wrote a series of dialogues with the Wendat sage Kandiaronk. Kandiaronk was highly critical of European society (he may or may not have travelled to Europe). In any event, Lahontan says that Native Americans who have visited France:
"brand us for slaves... whose life is not worth having, alleging that we degrade ourselves by subjecting ourselves to the king."
Lahontan quotes Kondiaronk as saying:
"What kind of human must Europeans be that they have to be forced to do good, and only refrain from evil because of fear of punishment?"
The Wendat sage continues:
"European society is inhuman, and I genuinely think this can only be the case as long as you stick to your distinctions of "mine" and thine"..... Money is the father of lasciviousness, luxury, intrigues, trickery, lies and betrayal...."
Further on:
"the qualities that we Wendat believe ought to define humanity -- wisdom, reason, equity, etc. --(are incompatible with) separate material interests."
Lahontan's book was written in 1703, and influenced Rousseau and others, but similar dialogues were popular earlier, and doubtless were read by Hobbes, Mill and Locke. The Native American critique of European society remained similar in all of them: an objection to the European infatuation with wealth, and an objection to the European reverence for authority, and obedience to the heirarchies. According to Graeber and Wengrow, these objections fueled enlightenment liberalism, although the liberals concentrated on "freedom", and often ignored the other half of the critique: that objecting to property. The question remains: does inequality of material wealth inevitably suggest some sort of MORAL or POLITICAL inequality? Is it reasonable for the rich to wield more political, social, and cultural authority than others, in a democratic society? (Who cares if they have more luxuries?)

I read the article and the abstract you linked, Leontiskas. But I read them quickly and I'm not well grounded in the jargon (I had to look up "axiology"). When I get some time, I'll comment further. The question posed by Native interlocutors, though, is whether the Libertarian infatuation with property is compatible with their promotion of individual liberty and rights. I'd suggest that it is not (although, of course, no political philosophy is perfect).

Sorry for a rambling post. I wanted to see if I could get some discussion started in response to your interesting topic, Leontiskos, but I haven't much time before my golf tournament. I'll be back.
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Re: Is Democracy Moral? Is Libertarianism Good?

Post by Leontiskos »

Ecurb wrote: January 10th, 2022, 11:53 amSorry for a rambling post. I wanted to see if I could get some discussion started in response to your interesting topic, Leontiskos, but I haven't much time before my golf tournament. I'll be back.
Oh, not a problem. Thanks for your post. Let me just respond to a few of the points you raise.
Ecurb wrote: January 10th, 2022, 11:53 amBut I read them quickly and I'm not well grounded in the jargon (I had to look up "axiology").
Axiology is something like the study of axioms, and is often used to refer to value-axioms. So when Stawrowski speaks of the "axiological foundation" of a particular kind of state, he is thinking of the grounding axioms that inform the entirety of that state's political character, and especially the values it takes to be foundational. As an example, liberty and equality are central pillars of the axiological foundations of modern democratic states.
Ecurb wrote: January 10th, 2022, 11:53 amThe problem with promoting ethical homogeneity is that it is impossible, in this information-rich age.
That's true, and I think Stawrowski would agree. He sets up the argument by saying:

"Let us consider for a moment, three model situations: a state embracing an ethically homogenous community, a state of ethical minimum as a correct solution for an ethically diverse community, and the same state of ethical minimum, in which a democratic political constitution has additionally been introduced."

He maps the threefold schema historically:
  1. The ethically homogenous communities of the ancient world
  2. The religiously tolerant states inaugurated by the Reformation
  3. Modern democratic states of today
Ecurb wrote: January 10th, 2022, 11:53 amThe Wendat sage continues:
"European society is inhuman, and I genuinely think this can only be the case as long as you stick to your distinctions of "mine" and thine"..... Money is the father of lasciviousness, luxury, intrigues, trickery, lies and betrayal...."
Further on:
"the qualities that we Wendat believe ought to define humanity -- wisdom, reason, equity, etc. --(are incompatible with) separate material interests."
Lahontan's book was written in 1703, and influenced Rousseau and others, but similar dialogues were popular earlier, and doubtless were read by Hobbes, Mill and Locke. The Native American critique of European society remained similar in all of them: an objection to the European infatuation with wealth, and an objection to the European reverence for authority, and obedience to the heirarchies. According to Graeber and Wengrow, these objections fueled enlightenment liberalism, although the liberals concentrated on "freedom", and often ignored the other half of the critique: that objecting to property.
First, would you agree that the Native American is part of an ethically homogenous community? It seems to me that they are, and that the "wisdom" that the Wendat sage promotes would include a very rich ethical tradition. It is also curious to me that you say the enlightenment liberals concentrated on freedom. The values of the sage were, "Wisdom, reason, equity..." I actually didn't see freedom represented, and this makes sense to me since ethically homogenous communities would tend to be less interested in freedom, as freedom is the boon of individualistic societies.
Ecurb wrote: January 10th, 2022, 11:53 amLahontan quotes Kondiaronk as saying:
"What kind of human must Europeans be that they have to be forced to do good, and only refrain from evil because of fear of punishment?"
This is a good example of something that, according to Stawrowski, is a strength of ethically rich communities. They are empowered to act on the basis of ethical values, not merely on fear. He says:

"'Lastly, those,' wrote John Locke, 'are not at all to be tolerated who deny the being of God. Promises, covenants, and oaths, which are the bonds of human society, can have no hold upon an atheist. The taking away of God, though but even in thought, dissolves all' (Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration). In order to avoid confusion: the atheist in the understanding of that time was not so much an agnostic of goodwill, but rather today’s nihilist—someone who consciously scorns the customs of his own community or, in other words, a person who is persuaded to observe the binding order exclusively due to fear of punishment. These warnings against rootless people who do not feel bound to any ethical community seem quite prophetic from today’s perspective."

[...]

"A brilliant description of precisely such a 'community of fear' was presented by another 'founding father' of the modern state, a radical representative of the second attitude (not 'ethical', but 'egoistical'), Thomas Hobbes. According to him, 'one must therefore lay it down that origin of large and lasting societies lay not in the mutual human benevolence but in men’s mutual fear' (See: Hobbes, De Cive)."
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Re: Is Democracy Moral? Is Libertarianism Good?

Post by Ecurb »

According to the book, freedom was valued by Native Americans. In fact. many native philosophers wondered why Europeans were so obsequious to their bosses, kings, captains and other leaders. Graeber and Wengrow do say that the Natives quoted in the European texts may have exaggerated the egalitarian nature of their own societies. Most Indian cultures had leaders, and some laws (although enforcement was less draconian than in Europe) and division of labor between men and women was almost universal.

I've heard this same complaint from other smaller and simpler cultures. One Phillipino culture one of my professors studied had recently transformed from hunting and gathering to slash and burn agriculture. Apparently if a farmer was willing to work one hour (or less) a day in his fields (weeding, tending, watering) he could double production. The Natives hated this, though. They wanted to head off to see their cousins in the next valley. They valued their freedom as much as their food. And they saw "freedom" as not merely freedom from being bossed around by others, but freedom of movement, and not being "tied down".
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Re: Is Democracy Moral? Is Libertarianism Good?

Post by Leontiskos »

Ecurb wrote: January 10th, 2022, 7:37 pm According to the book, freedom was valued by Native Americans. In fact. many native philosophers wondered why Europeans were so obsequious to their bosses, kings, captains and other leaders. Graeber and Wengrow do say that the Natives quoted in the European texts may have exaggerated the egalitarian nature of their own societies. Most Indian cultures had leaders, and some laws (although enforcement was less draconian than in Europe) and division of labor between men and women was almost universal.
Okay, interesting.
I've heard this same complaint from other smaller and simpler cultures. One Phillipino culture one of my professors studied had recently transformed from hunting and gathering to slash and burn agriculture. Apparently if a farmer was willing to work one hour (or less) a day in his fields (weeding, tending, watering) he could double production. The Natives hated this, though. They wanted to head off to see their cousins in the next valley. They valued their freedom as much as their food. And they saw "freedom" as not merely freedom from being bossed around by others, but freedom of movement, and not being "tied down".
Sure, but I see this as freedom within the constraints of a firm ethical tradition, as opposed to freedom from all ethical traditions. According to Stawrowski's model they would probably be in the ethically homogenous category, or perhaps in the ethically diverse, but certainly not the third category which is something like ethically liberated. An ethically homogenous community could have liberty as one of their ethical values. Any nomadic people would certainly value freedom of movement.
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Re: Is Democracy Moral? Is Libertarianism Good?

Post by Good_Egg »

I'm thinking that what you're talking about here is a continuum. From polities that identify strongly with an ethos - a belief-system, an ideology, a culture - to those that hold no intrinsic values at all. From government by conviction to government by managerialism. From a state that serves a cause to a state that holds power for its own sake.

The argument goes that Enlightenment liberals took religion out of politics. Moved religion from a concern of the state to a choice of the individual. Which is a step away from the conviction-state. A weakening of the state's ethos. And maybe we all grew up thinking this was a Good Thing.

But at the opposite end of the spectrum, Stawrowski is saying, the state which embodies no ethos appeals to no shared loyalty. Hobbesian, it commands by fear of its power alone. And maybe that's not so great.

It's all tied up with immigration and the idea of multiculturalism. For the British state to identify with British culture would be seen by many as discriminating against immigrant communities. Those ethnic minority subcultures who identify with the nation but not with the majority culture of the nation.

A conviction-state is great if you 100% share the conviction. But seems oppressive if you don't.

Libertarianism seems a logical reaction to Hobbesian multiculturalism. If the state does not represent our culture and beliefs, it is only a provider of "services" to the population. In which case why should it not be shrunk to those services that only the state can provide ?Beyond that, taxation has no moral legitimacy.

The alternative is to recognise that individuals are part of a culture, and that a state that embodies and is inseparable from that culture is part of who we are. That thereby has a legitimate claim on our resources and our affections because it is in a sense Us acting collectively - our culture at large.

Maybe if we have to be estranged from government then libertarianism is better than oppressive overreach of a state of Them. But not as good as a state of Us where that alienation is overcome by the strength of shared culture.

And what of democracy ? The good thing about living in a liberal democracy is the liberal bit - the constitutional rights of the individual. The democracy bit - the occasional voting - is unimportant of itself. But may be instrumentally good if the threat of being voted out keeps the politicians honest.

Democracy is immoral when it is taken to trump both libertarian rights and culture. The doctrine of moral entitlement to whatever you can get a majority of people to vote for is false.

(As a footnote on the use of words, without which we can say nothing, I believe there is a distinction between what is moral and what is merely customary. And therefore a distinction between ethical in the common-usage sense of "relating to a code of morals" and ethical in the sense of "relating to an ethos or culture". So I try to tread carefully...)
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Re: Is Democracy Moral? Is Libertarianism Good?

Post by Leontiskos »

Thanks for your thoughtful reply, Good_Egg. I think there are a lot of interesting ways that you are intersecting with Stawrowski. Let me start by clarifying a few of the ways your approach is different before moving into more substantive issues.

Good_Egg wrote: March 31st, 2022, 6:44 pmMaybe if we have to be estranged from government then libertarianism is better than oppressive overreach of a state of Them. But not as good as a state of Us where that alienation is overcome by the strength of shared culture.
One thing that you have honed in on is the way that different conceptions of the state attenuate or exacerbate estrangement from government. Stawrowski doesn't focus on this aspect too much, but it is surely something that concerns Westerners in general.

I think that rather than looking at that issue of estrangement, Stawrowski is looking more at "the moral assessment of the political order." For him the political order is not the government as opposed to the ordinary citizens (as estrangement presupposes), but rather the entire political order and polity, which includes government and ordinary citizens. For example, he says:

"The moral dimension of democracy is to be found, above all, in its axiological foundation—the values on which it rests and which are expressed through specific institutions of the democratic political order."

So the moral dimension of a liberal democracy is something that permeates the political order through and through, including the values and institutions that are not specifically governmental.
Good_Egg wrote: March 31st, 2022, 6:44 pm(As a footnote on the use of words, without which we can say nothing, I believe there is a distinction between what is moral and what is merely customary. And therefore a distinction between ethical in the common-usage sense of "relating to a code of morals" and ethical in the sense of "relating to an ethos or culture". So I try to tread carefully...)
Agreed. Stawrowski spends four paragraphs explaining the "distinction between 'ethical life' and 'morality'," a distinction which is central to his case that a state of ethical minimum is problematic. He borrows directly from Hegel.
Good_Egg wrote: March 31st, 2022, 6:44 pmI'm thinking that what you're talking about here is a continuum. From polities that identify strongly with an ethos - a belief-system, an ideology, a culture - to those that hold no intrinsic values at all. From government by conviction to government by managerialism. From a state that serves a cause to a state that holds power for its own sake.

...But at the opposite end of the spectrum, Stawrowski is saying, the state which embodies no ethos appeals to no shared loyalty. Hobbesian, it commands by fear of its power alone.
I think there is a continuum in concrete states between the authentically distinct poles that Stawrowski identifies. I think you correctly identified the first pole as a polity which has a thick or somewhat thick ethical life, and also fosters this ethical life. The second pole you compare to "managerialism," "holding power for its own sake," and "commanding by fear of its power alone." I don't think this second pole quite maps to what Stawrowski is saying, although he admits that the modern conception can result in a state that operates on the basis of fear alone. The second pole isn't really a state that is necessarily evil, or totalitarian, or power hungry. The second pole is the "axiological foundation of the modern democratic state," which is for Stawrowski a state which has opted for the Hegelian category of the moral to the exclusion of the ethical. To quote him at length:

"The road to a democratic state of law opened only when the idea of freedom of an outlook on life, in other words, the moral autonomy of man, had moved aside the idea of religious freedom and, in its place, began to play the role of the axiological foundation of the ethical state of minimum. It was, after all, the first modern political thinkers who were responsible for this—most notably, the above-mentioned Hobbes, who in creating the theoretical foundations of the new model of the state, took as a starting point not the existence and conflict of different ethical communities, but the rivalry of egocentric, autonomous individuals. The replacement in philosophical argumentation of the concept of religious freedom by the idea of autonomy deprived it of an important point of reference to everything that conditions the individual and that transgresses it. As a consequence, the perspective of the political community embracing diverse religious and ethical communities was almost unnoticeably replaced by the vision of the state as an association of morally autonomous entities—abstract isolated individuals, torn from their natural communities and thus deprived of their ethical roots and context. In precisely such a vision—the vision of a state, whose only value is moral autonomy of the individual and whose only care is to ensure that all citizens can develop safely and freely—this model has today become an almost universally accepted."
Good_Egg wrote: March 31st, 2022, 6:44 pmIt's all tied up with immigration and the idea of multiculturalism. For the British state to identify with British culture would be seen by many as discriminating against immigrant communities. Those ethnic minority subcultures who identify with the nation but not with the majority culture of the nation.

A conviction-state is great if you 100% share the conviction. But seems oppressive if you don't.
Great point. Immigration is a concrete way Stawrowski's claims are playing out today. I actually recently heard Jonathan Haidt speak to this issue, and I agree with his Durkheimian perspective (timestamped link).

Now, do you think that the British state could organize itself in such a way that would not be oppressive to any visitors or immigrants? Because the first thing I would say is that some ethical arrangements are more "moral" (in the non-Hegelian sense) than others. Muslims in England who find the justice system oppressive because it isn't Sharia Law ought to be "oppressed." There is nothing wrong with their "oppression." The second thing I would say is that any axiological ordering--even that of the modern liberal democratic state--is going to be oppressive to some people. There is no such thing as a neutral or non-oppressive polity. And this goes beyond Stawrowski's article, but I would say that even the axiological foundation of the ethical state of minimum (the modern democratic state) brings with it its own unique ethical convictions. There are not some states that are conviction states and others that aren't, there are just states with different convictions (Adrian Vermeule is good on this). For example, the U.S. has strong convictions regarding freedom of speech, and those who find freedom of speech oppressive would feel oppressed in the U.S.
Good_Egg wrote: March 31st, 2022, 6:44 pmAnd what of democracy ? The good thing about living in a liberal democracy is the liberal bit - the constitutional rights of the individual. The democracy bit - the occasional voting - is unimportant of itself. But may be instrumentally good if the threat of being voted out keeps the politicians honest.
Here is what Stawrowski thinks on that topic:

"The connection between the idea of moral autonomy and the demand for democratic governments seems obvious. The idea of autonomy contains, above all, a factor of sovereign power: my power above myself and above everything that concerns me. If there exists an area in which I have no influence and which represents the limits of my rule, then my freedom and my human nature have not yet been fully realized. As an autonomous being I am lord of myself and I decide about myself, therefore, I have to decide not only about my private affairs, but also about all affairs which are connected with me in one way or another—including matters which are subject to the activities of state power. From this perspective, the demand for participation in power appears to be an outright moral imperative of every individual—and the introduction of democratic political institutions its obvious consequence.

The gradual transformation of the state of law into a democratic state of law, which has taken place during the last two centuries and which continues to take place at an accelerated rate today, is not an external or accidental thing, but is a reflection of the deep transformation of its axiological foundations..."
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Re: Is Democracy Moral? Is Libertarianism Good?

Post by Good_Egg »

Leontiskos wrote: April 3rd, 2022, 4:47 pm I think that rather than looking at that issue of estrangement, Stawrowski is looking more at "the moral assessment of the political order." For him the political order is not the government as opposed to the ordinary citizens (as estrangement presupposes), but rather the entire political order and polity, which includes government and ordinary citizens. For example, he says:

"The moral dimension of democracy is to be found, above all, in its axiological foundation—the values on which it rests and which are expressed through specific institutions of the democratic political order."

So the moral dimension of a liberal democracy is something that permeates the political order through and through, including the values and institutions that are not specifically governmental.
I'm thinking that the distinction between the state and the nation is fundamental to political philosophy. So I've stumbled at the first fence by taking what Stawrowski wrote about the culture of a nation and reading it as being about the state. :oops:

But I struggle with some of these concepts. When we talk about the institutions of British culture, do we mean the BBC ? The House of Lords ? The Church of England ? Or is an institution something less organisationally tangible - cricket, queuing, garden sheds ?

It made sense to me that a cohesive society, strongly bound together by a shared culture, would have a government dedicated to promoting that culture abroad, and defending it against threats from within. (I cannot help feeling that there is something vaguely admirable about this. Even if it's not any of the classical virtues).

Whereas a divided society has more energy invested in the subcultures that distinguish different groups of citizens from each other than in what they have in common. And in such a society, government becomes a tool for each group to try to impose its ideas on the others.

But maybe that's not what Stawrowski was writing about at all.
I think there is a continuum in concrete states between the authentically distinct poles that Stawrowski identifies. I think you correctly identified the first pole as a polity which has a thick or somewhat thick ethical life, and also fosters this ethical life... ...The second pole isn't really a state that is necessarily evil, or totalitarian, or power hungry.
Agreed. It's not that the modern democratic state sets out to oppress. It's that the state lacks a view of its own proper role and purpose, instead putting its strength and capacity for violence at the service of whichever coalition of subcultures can muster the most votes (under whatever voting system pertains, which isn't necessarily a simple nationwide total).

In a sense the Queen can stand as a symbol of unity for the nation because she has no political power and thus no role in the everyday struggle between my autonomy and my neighbour"s.

Democracy which was once a check on monarchs abusing the power of the state became the vehicle for any majority to abuse the power of the state.
"The road to a democratic state of law opened only when the idea of freedom of an outlook on life, in other words, the moral autonomy of man, had moved aside the idea of religious freedom and, in its place, began to play the role of the axiological foundation of the ethical state of minimum. It was, after all, the first modern political thinkers who were responsible for this—most notably, the above-mentioned Hobbes, who in creating the theoretical foundations of the new model of the state, took as a starting point not the existence and conflict of different ethical communities, but the rivalry of egocentric, autonomous individuals. The replacement in philosophical argumentation of the concept of religious freedom by the idea of autonomy deprived it of an important point of reference to everything that conditions the individual and that transgresses it. As a consequence, the perspective of the political community embracing diverse religious and ethical communities was almost unnoticeably replaced by the vision of the state as an association of morally autonomous entities—abstract isolated individuals, torn from their natural communities and thus deprived of their ethical roots and context. In precisely such a vision—the vision of a state, whose only value is moral autonomy of the individual and whose only care is to ensure that all citizens can develop safely and freely—this model has today become an almost universally accepted."
Where's the big difference between freedom of religious dissent and freedom to dissent from every other custom or belief of the majority culture ? Is it just dissent as an individual being contrasted with being part of a dissenting minority culture ? Or is he an atheist contrasting religious dissent with dissent about things that matter ?
Muslims in England who find the justice system oppressive because it isn't Sharia Law ought to be "oppressed." There is nothing wrong with their "oppression."
I don't disagree. But are you saying this as a democrat who believes that their demand becomes legitimate as soon as they number 50%+1 in any given locality ? Or as a secularist who believes that convictions that are rooted in religious belief should never be imposed ? Or are you suggesting that Sharia should not be adopted in England because it isn't English ? That the British state should promote British culture ? That tradition offers a source of legitimacy that doesn't depend on voting ?
The second thing I would say is that any axiological ordering--even that of the modern liberal democratic state--is going to be oppressive to some people. There is no such thing as a neutral or non-oppressive polity. And this goes beyond Stawrowski's article, but I would say that even the axiological foundation of the ethical state of minimum (the modern democratic state) brings with it its own unique ethical convictions. There are not some states that are conviction states and others that aren't, there are just states with different convictions (Adrian Vermeule is good on this). For example, the U.S. has strong convictions regarding freedom of speech, and those who find freedom of speech oppressive would feel oppressed in the U.S.
Doesn't that undermine the whole notion, the whole distinction between thick-ethos government and minimum-ethos government ? Is that not an argument for looking at any minimum-ethos government and describing it as just a different type of ethos or conviction ?

I don't see the US as a minimum-ethos polity, by the way. I think the US stands for a set of values more than most nations do. But less than it used to.

When the US President transparently acts in the world in a particular way because it will prove popular with voters in Kansas, rather than as an assertion of the values that America used to stand for, then we see Shawrowski's thesis in action. Democracy undermining values.

(No offense to Kansas. It just seems to be a place that is geographically further from the world outside America and thus psychologically less interested in understanding the world outside America than some of the coastal states).
"The connection between the idea of moral autonomy and the demand for democratic governments seems obvious. The idea of autonomy contains, above all, a factor of sovereign power: my power above myself and above everything that concerns me. If there exists an area in which I have no influence and which represents the limits of my rule, then my freedom and my human nature have not yet been fully realized. As an autonomous being I am lord of myself and I decide about myself, therefore, I have to decide not only about my private affairs, but also about all affairs which are connected with me in one way or another—including matters which are subject to the activities of state power. From this perspective, the demand for participation in power appears to be an outright moral imperative of every individual—and the introduction of democratic political institutions its obvious consequence.
Libertarianism seeks to maximize autonomy by keeping the private sphere large and the sphere of state control small. Democracy offers the individual a tiny sliver of power to control the state. And thus the temptation to exert power through the state, to expand the minimally-controlled-by-self sphere of the state at the expense of the not-controlled-by-self-ar-all spheres of other people's private lives.

The more you talk up that sliver, pretending that democracy satisfies the desire for autonomy, the less liberal the democracy becomes.
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Re: Is Democracy Moral? Is Libertarianism Good?

Post by Leontiskos »

Good_Egg wrote: April 6th, 2022, 6:36 pm
Leontiskos wrote: April 3rd, 2022, 4:47 pm I think that rather than looking at that issue of estrangement, Stawrowski is looking more at "the moral assessment of the political order." For him the political order is not the government as opposed to the ordinary citizens (as estrangement presupposes), but rather the entire political order and polity, which includes government and ordinary citizens. For example, he says:

"The moral dimension of democracy is to be found, above all, in its axiological foundation—the values on which it rests and which are expressed through specific institutions of the democratic political order."

So the moral dimension of a liberal democracy is something that permeates the political order through and through, including the values and institutions that are not specifically governmental.
I'm thinking that the distinction between the state and the nation is fundamental to political philosophy. So I've stumbled at the first fence by taking what Stawrowski wrote about the culture of a nation and reading it as being about the state. :oops:
Maybe it would be easiest to say that Stawrowski is looking at all of these various things insofar as they are connected. At the beginning of the excerpt he says, "Does an essential connection exist between the moral erosion in contemporary societies of the West and their democratic constitutional forms?" One of the underlying presuppositions is that cultural realities and governmental forms are mutually interdependent, rather than the idea that they are mutually opposed. In some sense he is undertaking a genealogical approach to political philosophy, and a large part of what he is doing is identifying historical trends of political philosophy descriptively. He does have a critique, but it is not a critique of a bad governmental form that oppresses citizens. The target of the critique is rather the entirety of the modern democratic society, including the governmental form, the values, and the institutions, but especially the "axiological foundation."

Of course, the excerpt from Stawrowski is very complex and nuanced, so it's perfectly possible that you are seeing things that I am missing.
Good_Egg wrote: April 6th, 2022, 6:36 pmBut I struggle with some of these concepts. When we talk about the institutions of British culture, do we mean the BBC ? The House of Lords ? The Church of England ? Or is an institution something less organisationally tangible - cricket, queuing, garden sheds ?
My guess is that Stawrowski would see the first three as institutions and the latter three as something like values, but yes, all of those things are at play. For example queuing and the underlying principle of, "First come, first served," might be a practical example of a democratic-egalitarian practice. The more egalitarian a society is, the less they would countenance attempts to cut in line on the basis of status.
Good_Egg wrote: April 6th, 2022, 6:36 pmIt made sense to me that a cohesive society, strongly bound together by a shared culture, would have a government dedicated to promoting that culture abroad, and defending it against threats from within. (I cannot help feeling that there is something vaguely admirable about this. Even if it's not any of the classical virtues).

Whereas a divided society has more energy invested in the subcultures that distinguish different groups of citizens from each other than in what they have in common. And in such a society, government becomes a tool for each group to try to impose its ideas on the others.

But maybe that's not what Stawrowski was writing about at all.
I think this is related to what he is saying. For example, a society that values the Hegelian 'moral' above everything else will be a very litigious and individualistic society with little group cohesion.
Good_Egg wrote: April 6th, 2022, 6:36 pm
Leontiskos wrote: April 3rd, 2022, 4:47 pmI think there is a continuum in concrete states between the authentically distinct poles that Stawrowski identifies. I think you correctly identified the first pole as a polity which has a thick or somewhat thick ethical life, and also fosters this ethical life... ...The second pole isn't really a state that is necessarily evil, or totalitarian, or power hungry.
Agreed. It's not that the modern democratic state sets out to oppress. It's that the state lacks a view of its own proper role and purpose, instead putting its strength and capacity for violence at the service of whichever coalition of subcultures can muster the most votes (under whatever voting system pertains, which isn't necessarily a simple nationwide total).
Yes, in some ways, but it seems like you are conceiving of the pre-modern state as something which has a self-conscious role and purpose, whereas the modern state does not. That may even be true in some ways, but I would want to be careful not to define the modern state in an entirely negative way (where "negative" means "what the state is not, or what it lacks"). I would want to try to identify the self-conscious role and purpose that the modern state has, if there is one. Stawrowski seems to think that the preeminent value of the modern democratic state is Kantian moral autonomy, and that this positive value explains much of what has happened.
Good_Egg wrote: April 6th, 2022, 6:36 pm
Leontiskos wrote: April 3rd, 2022, 4:47 pm "The road to a democratic state of law opened only when the idea of freedom of an outlook on life, in other words, the moral autonomy of man, had moved aside the idea of religious freedom and, in its place, began to play the role of the axiological foundation of the ethical state of minimum. It was, after all, the first modern political thinkers who were responsible for this—most notably, the above-mentioned Hobbes, who in creating the theoretical foundations of the new model of the state, took as a starting point not the existence and conflict of different ethical communities, but the rivalry of egocentric, autonomous individuals. The replacement in philosophical argumentation of the concept of religious freedom by the idea of autonomy deprived it of an important point of reference to everything that conditions the individual and that transgresses it. As a consequence, the perspective of the political community embracing diverse religious and ethical communities was almost unnoticeably replaced by the vision of the state as an association of morally autonomous entities—abstract isolated individuals, torn from their natural communities and thus deprived of their ethical roots and context. In precisely such a vision—the vision of a state, whose only value is moral autonomy of the individual and whose only care is to ensure that all citizens can develop safely and freely—this model has today become an almost universally accepted."
Where's the big difference between freedom of religious dissent and freedom to dissent from every other custom or belief of the majority culture ? Is it just dissent as an individual being contrasted with being part of a dissenting minority culture ? Or is he an atheist contrasting religious dissent with dissent about things that matter ?
Yeah, that's a good question. Since you phrased it in terms of dissent, the first thing I would say is that the difference is freedom of religion vs. dissent of individuals. When it was first enacted freedom of religion didn't primarily mean that you could dissent from some religion. More properly, it meant that you could belong to a different religion. A strong supposition still existed that everyone would be religious. In that way it strikes me more as a freedom to organize into cultural groups rather than a specific freedom to dissent. If you do a word search on "atheist" in the article it will take you to a paragraph where John Locke argues for a refusal to tolerate "atheists" (those who are mere ethical dissenters). That paragraph is very much on point.

The second point is one that you've already identified: the difference between recognizing the autonomy of ethical sub-cultures and groups and recognizing the autonomy of individuals. The former continues to promote strong ethical values in a way that the latter does not.

The third thing I would say is that a religion is the paradigmatic ethical-cultural community, and in the past it was often difficult to distinguish cultures from religions. So "freedom of religion" naturally occurred first historically, and since religion is the paradigmatic ethical-cultural unit, this eventually winds up being synonymous with freedom of ethical-cultural ...cult (not sure what word to use). So I think the freedom to belong to alternative cultural identities is essentially the same as freedom of religion, although I wouldn't phrase it as "freedom to dissent from every other custom or belief of the majority culture," for that has much more to do with individual moral autonomy than any form of ethical incorporation.
Good_Egg wrote: April 6th, 2022, 6:36 pm
Leontiskos wrote: April 3rd, 2022, 4:47 pmMuslims in England who find the justice system oppressive because it isn't Sharia Law ought to be "oppressed." There is nothing wrong with their "oppression."
I don't disagree. But are you saying this as a democrat who believes that their demand becomes legitimate as soon as they number 50%+1 in any given locality ? Or as a secularist who believes that convictions that are rooted in religious belief should never be imposed ? Or are you suggesting that Sharia should not be adopted in England because it isn't English ? That the British state should promote British culture ? That tradition offers a source of legitimacy that doesn't depend on voting ?
I would affirm those last three stances. It should not be adopted in England because it isn't English. There are other reasons, too, but that is the one I was intending with my statement.
Good_Egg wrote: April 6th, 2022, 6:36 pm
Leontiskos wrote: April 3rd, 2022, 4:47 pm The second thing I would say is that any axiological ordering--even that of the modern liberal democratic state--is going to be oppressive to some people. There is no such thing as a neutral or non-oppressive polity. And this goes beyond Stawrowski's article, but I would say that even the axiological foundation of the ethical state of minimum (the modern democratic state) brings with it its own unique ethical convictions. There are not some states that are conviction states and others that aren't, there are just states with different convictions (Adrian Vermeule is good on this). For example, the U.S. has strong convictions regarding freedom of speech, and those who find freedom of speech oppressive would feel oppressed in the U.S.
Doesn't that undermine the whole notion, the whole distinction between thick-ethos government and minimum-ethos government ? Is that not an argument for looking at any minimum-ethos government and describing it as just a different type of ethos or conviction ?
Yeah, maybe, haha. :D

That was a bit of a tangent on my part, but I tend to think that Stawrowski and Vermeule could be fit together with some effort. The first thing to ask is whether a country full of individualists who value moral autonomy constitutes, by that very fact, an ethical community. It is difficult to say, but at the very least we would say that the community bound together by a shared belief in negative, individual rights is not an ethical community in the traditional sense. I would also say that it is undeniably a community that is bound up with convictions, even if we don't want to call it an ethical community. What do you think?
Good_Egg wrote: April 6th, 2022, 6:36 pmI don't see the US as a minimum-ethos polity, by the way. I think the US stands for a set of values more than most nations do. But less than it used to.

When the US President transparently acts in the world in a particular way because it will prove popular with voters in Kansas, rather than as an assertion of the values that America used to stand for, then we see Shawrowski's thesis in action. Democracy undermining values.

(No offense to Kansas. It just seems to be a place that is geographically further from the world outside America and thus psychologically less interested in understanding the world outside America than some of the coastal states).
Haha - fair enough. But then what would you take as an example of a state of minimum conviction? I wonder if such an idea is analogous to the common incredulity elicited when someone is accused of having an accent. Everyone has idiosyncratic convictions just as everyone has idiosyncratic accents, we just don't tend to notice them.
Good_Egg wrote: April 6th, 2022, 6:36 pm
Leontiskos wrote: April 3rd, 2022, 4:47 pm "The connection between the idea of moral autonomy and the demand for democratic governments seems obvious. The idea of autonomy contains, above all, a factor of sovereign power: my power above myself and above everything that concerns me. If there exists an area in which I have no influence and which represents the limits of my rule, then my freedom and my human nature have not yet been fully realized. As an autonomous being I am lord of myself and I decide about myself, therefore, I have to decide not only about my private affairs, but also about all affairs which are connected with me in one way or another—including matters which are subject to the activities of state power. From this perspective, the demand for participation in power appears to be an outright moral imperative of every individual—and the introduction of democratic political institutions its obvious consequence.
Libertarianism seeks to maximize autonomy by keeping the private sphere large and the sphere of state control small. Democracy offers the individual a tiny sliver of power to control the state. And thus the temptation to exert power through the state, to expand the minimally-controlled-by-self sphere of the state at the expense of the not-controlled-by-self-ar-all spheres of other people's private lives.

The more you talk up that sliver, pretending that democracy satisfies the desire for autonomy, the less liberal the democracy becomes.
Perhaps, but is there some alternative political form that can accommodate autonomy? If individual autonomy is the value, then it seems that democracy must be the political form. I think that is what Stawrowski is saying: our predilection for moral autonomy demands democracy.

In response to your contention I would say that those who leverage democracy to transgress the autonomy of others are not motivated by the consideration of autonomy, but rather by some other consideration. Granted, it could happen that an emphasis on autonomy destroys a democracy, but this would seem to happen because the social cohesion is undermined, or else because citizens are acting selfishly in the name of autonomy, in which case the culprit is no longer bone fide autonomy.
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Re: Is Democracy Moral? Is Libertarianism Good?

Post by Good_Egg »

Sorry, Leontiskos , I was too negative. You're right that it's hard to envisage a state without values/convictions/principles. Because a state without values is holding a particular value - the value of not holding all the values it doesn't hold. In the case we're talking about, the subordination of all other values to the will of the people. Similarly, if a person is distrustful of general principles then that becomes for them a general principle.

The challenge is to describe such a position in terms that are non-contradictory. Without losing its distinctive character.

To pick out a couple of other key points from this discussion, while trying to keep this short:

As one who would prefer to live in a liberal monarchy than an illiberal democracy, I tend to think that libertarianism satisfies the "predilection for autonomy" better than democracy does.

If you believe that there are right answers, then putting anything to a popular vote risks getting the wrong answer. I suspect that after Brexit there are a lot of people who think that the demos came up with the wrong answer.

So putting the location of the limits to state power to a popular vote could well result in less autonomy.

(Arguably the Brexit vote was a vote for "taking back control", I.e. motivated by a desire for greater autonomy).

I think you're right to make the link to Locke's distinction between the freedom to belong to a different religion and the freedom to have no religion at all.

But I think Locke got it the wrong way round. A shared heresy (as one religion might view another) is not preferable to an individual one.

A strong culture can afford to be worn lightly by its adherents. A nation with a clear shared idea of God, that individuals are free to believe in or not to various degrees, seems to me healthier than a nation in which multiple contradictory religious notions are strongly held by groups.

Humans need community as well as autonomy, belonging as well as freedom. Individual liberty within a common culture seems to me a better way to deliver that than multiculturalism. A single broad church is better than multiple narrow ones.
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Re: Is Democracy Moral? Is Libertarianism Good?

Post by NewToThinkingGuy »

Good_Egg wrote: April 7th, 2022, 7:42 pm Sorry, @Leontiskos , I was too negative. You're right that it's hard to envisage a state without values/convictions/principles. Because a state without values is holding a particular value - the value of not holding all the values it doesn't hold. In the case we're talking about, the subordination of all other values to the will of the people. Similarly, if a person is distrustful of general principles then that becomes for them a general principle.

The challenge is to describe such a position in terms that are non-contradictory. Without losing its distinctive character.

To pick out a couple of other key points from this discussion, while trying to keep this short:

As one who would prefer to live in a liberal monarchy than an illiberal democracy, I tend to think that libertarianism satisfies the "predilection for autonomy" better than democracy does.

If you believe that there are right answers, then putting anything to a popular vote risks getting the wrong answer. I suspect that after Brexit there are a lot of people who think that the demos came up with the wrong answer.

So putting the location of the limits to state power to a popular vote could well result in less autonomy.

(Arguably the Brexit vote was a vote for "taking back control", I.e. motivated by a desire for greater autonomy).

I think you're right to make the link to Locke's distinction between the freedom to belong to a different religion and the freedom to have no religion at all.

But I think Locke got it the wrong way round. A shared heresy (as one religion might view another) is not preferable to an individual one.

A strong culture can afford to be worn lightly by its adherents. A nation with a clear shared idea of God, that individuals are free to believe in or not to various degrees, seems to me healthier than a nation in which multiple contradictory religious notions are strongly held by groups.

Humans need community as well as autonomy, belonging as well as freedom. Individual liberty within a common culture seems to me a better way to deliver that than multiculturalism. A single broad church is better than multiple narrow ones.
I don't disagree with you, but with the last paragraph there I struggle to see good justification for which broad church a given society should be. Note I said objective, subjectively I know exactly what broad church values I want my society to be, but others may disagree.

Many of the societal disagreements I see are people arguing from a position that society should be united under that values of a broad church - their broad church.

Is there an objective way to overrule the values of one particular group and enforce the broad church of the other group? That to me is a connundrum.
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Re: Is Democracy Moral? Is Libertarianism Good?

Post by Leontiskos »

Good_Egg wrote: April 7th, 2022, 7:42 pm Sorry, @Leontiskos , I was too negative. You're right that it's hard to envisage a state without values/convictions/principles. Because a state without values is holding a particular value - the value of not holding all the values it doesn't hold. In the case we're talking about, the subordination of all other values to the will of the people. Similarly, if a person is distrustful of general principles then that becomes for them a general principle.

The challenge is to describe such a position in terms that are non-contradictory. Without losing its distinctive character.
Right. Aquinas would say that the notion of bad presupposes the notion of good. For example, the society which prohibits murder does so because they value life, or the safety of innocent life, or something like that. So I think it is important to identify the underlying societal values that ground things like distrust of power.
Good_Egg wrote: April 7th, 2022, 7:42 pmTo pick out a couple of other key points from this discussion, while trying to keep this short:

As one who would prefer to live in a liberal monarchy than an illiberal democracy, I tend to think that libertarianism satisfies the "predilection for autonomy" better than democracy does.

If you believe that there are right answers, then putting anything to a popular vote risks getting the wrong answer. I suspect that after Brexit there are a lot of people who think that the demos came up with the wrong answer.

So putting the location of the limits to state power to a popular vote could well result in less autonomy.

(Arguably the Brexit vote was a vote for "taking back control", I.e. motivated by a desire for greater autonomy).
True.
Good_Egg wrote: April 7th, 2022, 7:42 pmI think you're right to make the link to Locke's distinction between the freedom to belong to a different religion and the freedom to have no religion at all.

But I think Locke got it the wrong way round. A shared heresy (as one religion might view another) is not preferable to an individual one.

A strong culture can afford to be worn lightly by its adherents. A nation with a clear shared idea of God, that individuals are free to believe in or not to various degrees, seems to me healthier than a nation in which multiple contradictory religious notions are strongly held by groups.

Humans need community as well as autonomy, belonging as well as freedom. Individual liberty within a common culture seems to me a better way to deliver that than multiculturalism. A single broad church is better than multiple narrow ones.
I would say that it is important to recognize and understand why religious freedom precedes individual freedom both historically and actually. Humans are social beings, and law is a societal reality. Groups therefore always have a much stronger impact on society and law than individuals do. Groups are made of individuals, but without groups individuals can make no difference. Further, the family is the basic unit of society, not the individual, and the family is prior to the individual. We are members of families before we are (or become) individuals.

Of course the party system and group ideology are also group-based rather than individual-based, and this is what makes them powerful and also pernicious. Yet religion differentiates itself from these constructs due to its ethical-cultural nature. That is, religion not only has the rational side of doctrine and worldview, but it also has deep ethical and cultural roots. Religion represents a perfect society, whole and complete. On the other hand, partisan political outlooks or political ideologies like Libertarianism remain relatively shallow and superficial, being composed of isolated ratiocination that abides at a relatively superficial and unrooted level.
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Re: Is Democracy Moral? Is Libertarianism Good?

Post by Good_Egg »

Leontiskos wrote: June 30th, 2022, 1:52 pm That is, religion not only has the rational side of doctrine and worldview, but it also has deep ethical and cultural roots. Religion represents a perfect society, whole and complete. On the other hand, partisan political outlooks or political ideologies like Libertarianism remain relatively shallow and superficial, being composed of isolated ratiocination that abides at a relatively superficial and unrooted level.
Is a culturally-rich state then felt as more satisfying for those within that culture, but felt as more oppressive for those outside of or who have rejected that culture ?

So the argument for a minimal state is a version of Rorty's Blindfold - it's what a person might rationally choose if they didn't know whether they would be born into and brought up in the majority culture or a minority culture ?
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Re: Is Democracy Moral? Is Libertarianism Good?

Post by Ecurb »

All laws are violent and coersive. If violence and coersion are deplorable (although sometimes justified), utopia must be an anarchy. My endless arguments with GE (no reason to rehash them here, GE) revolve around my claim that Libertarianism wants to limit the role of governement (as does anarchy) except in terms of protecting property rights. But why (I have asked) should property rights be sacrosanct?

More to the point of this thread (and perhaps Leon can offer an answer) is this question. Given the above, can heaven be a utopia if God is a ruling king? I don't know theology well enough to answer, but I see a couple of possibilities.

1) God "rules", but his "subjects" find their true joy in doing whatever He wants. Therefore His rule is not violent or coersive. This theory is dubious, given that Lucifer and his angels were expelled from heaven for defying God's rule. According to "Paradise Lost". Lucifer resented Jesus, whom God chose to lead His armies instead of Lucifer (I have no idea if there is any theological justification for Milton's theory).

2) Since God created the universe, He has a unique "right" to rule over it. Every parent who has built dams with his children knows that whoever builds the dam has the unique right to destroy it and gleefully watch the flood.

3) Since God is omnibenevolent, His rule is uniquely untroubling, even though it may be violent and coersive. (That it is violent and coersive is clear, not only from Lucifer's expulsion, but from the expulsion from Eden, the Flood, the Passoverm Sodom and Gomorrah, and other Bible stories.)
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