Is Democracy Moral? Is Libertarianism Good?

[Good_Egg]

All laws are violent and coersive. If violence and coersion are deplorable (although sometimes justified), utopia must be an anarchy... ...But why (I have asked) should property rights be sacrosanct?

Laws are not violent and coercive. The enforcement of law is coercive and may sometimes be violent.

There is no coercion and no violence if everybody voluntarily keeps the law.

One of the features of heaven is that there is an entrance requirement, which amounts to a disposition to keep the law. And the law of heaven is not arbitrary. It is indivisible, flowing from the single pure nature of God. So that all who are attuned to the nature of God will wish to keep it.

I think maybe you're confusing libertarianism with anarchy. The libertarian state is not non-existent, merely in some sense minimal. And therefore law enforcement is an element of such a state.

A minimal set of laws is "culturally thin". It favours no culture, but to the maximum possible extent leaves groups and individuals free to create and practice whatever culture they wish, and engage with other individuals and groups on a voluntary basis.

That necessary minimum seems to me to include much of what in the 18th century laissez-faire tradition was considered the role of government:
-- defence of the realm against external threat
- redress against assault on the person, property or reputation of another citizen
- redress against breach of contract
- maintaining a sound currency
- defence of that minimal state against insurrection..

[Ecurb]

Laws are not violent and coercive. The enforcement of law is coercive and may sometimes be violent.

There is no coercion and no violence if everybody voluntarily keeps the law.

True. The "law of gravity" is not violent and coercive (sorry for misspelling coercive), "gravity" is. (My mistake, I could have written "all legal systems are violent and coercive.")

One of the features of heaven is that there is an entrance requirement, which amounts to a disposition to keep the law. And the law of heaven is not arbitrary. It is indivisible, flowing from the single pure nature of God. So that all who are attuned to the nature of God will wish to keep it.

Is that true? How did the angels get to heaven? One of my pet peeves is all of those movies that see angels as dead people who have to "get their wings". Angels are not, and never were, human. I don't think we know what, if any, entrance requirements were made of them.

I think maybe you're confusing libertarianism with anarchy. The libertarian state is not non-existent, merely in some sense minimal. And therefore law enforcement is an element of such a state.

A minimal set of laws is "culturally thin". It favours no culture, but to the maximum possible extent leaves groups and individuals free to create and practice whatever culture they wish, and engage with other individuals and groups on a voluntary basis.

That necessary minimum seems to me to include much of what in the 18th century laissez-faire tradition was considered the role of government:
-- defence of the realm against external threat
- redress against assault on the person, property or reputation of another citizen
- redress against breach of contract
- maintaining a sound currency
- defence of that minimal state against insurrection..

Of course I'm aware of the differences between Libertarians and anarchists. But I disagree that libertarians "favor no culture". That's my complaint. They favor Capitalism and property ownership. They try to portray themselves as in favor of "liberty" (see "libertarianism"), when in fact they support coercive control of some people by other people (property ownership). They claim to support a "minimal set of laws", but those they do support are invariably supportive of one particular (economic) culture. However, my main interest here is the question of heaven. Is it an anarchy or an autocracy? What do the theologians say?

[Leontiskos]

That is, religion not only has the rational side of doctrine and worldview, but it also has deep ethical and cultural roots. Religion represents a perfect society, whole and complete. On the other hand, partisan political outlooks or political ideologies like Libertarianism remain relatively shallow and superficial, being composed of isolated ratiocination that abides at a relatively superficial and unrooted level.

Is a culturally-rich state then felt as more satisfying for those within that culture, but felt as more oppressive for those outside of or who have rejected that culture ?

Yes, I should think so.

So the argument for a minimal state is a version of Rorty's Blindfold - it's what a person might rationally choose if they didn't know whether they would be born into and brought up in the majority culture or a minority culture ?

I think Rawls' "Veil of Ignorance" is a common argument in support of a minimal state in the Anglophone world, but criticism's of this argument abound. The key problem with such arguments is that they presuppose the idea of a neutral culture or personality, and that doesn't exist.

[Leontiskos]

All laws are violent and coersive. If violence and coersion are deplorable (although sometimes justified), utopia must be an anarchy.

I think it is important to consider coercion and how it is justified in certain cases. I recently listened to Alasdair MacIntyre's lecture, "The Justification of Coercion and Constraint." It was an interesting paper, but I don't know that he spent enough time on that central question.

I think maybe you're confusing libertarianism with anarchy. The libertarian state is not non-existent, merely in some sense minimal. And therefore law enforcement is an element of such a state.

A minimal set of laws is "culturally thin". It favours no culture, but to the maximum possible extent leaves groups and individuals free to create and practice whatever culture they wish, and engage with other individuals and groups on a voluntary basis.

Of course I'm aware of the differences between Libertarians and anarchists. But I disagree that libertarians "favor no culture". That's my complaint. They favor Capitalism and property ownership. They try to portray themselves as in favor of "liberty" (see "libertarianism"), when in fact they support coercive control of some people by other people (property ownership). They claim to support a "minimal set of laws", but those they do support are invariably supportive of one particular (economic) culture.

Yes, that is an important consideration.

However, my main interest here is the question of heaven. Is it an anarchy or an autocracy? What do the theologians say?

More to the point of this thread (and perhaps Leon can offer an answer) is this question. Given the above, can heaven be a utopia if God is a ruling king? I don't know theology well enough to answer, but I see a couple of possibilities.

1) God "rules", but his "subjects" find their true joy in doing whatever He wants. Therefore His rule is not violent or coersive. This theory is dubious, given that Lucifer and his angels were expelled from heaven for defying God's rule. According to "Paradise Lost". Lucifer resented Jesus, whom God chose to lead His armies instead of Lucifer (I have no idea if there is any theological justification for Milton's theory).

2) Since God created the universe, He has a unique "right" to rule over it. Every parent who has built dams with his children knows that whoever builds the dam has the unique right to destroy it and gleefully watch the flood.

3) Since God is omnibenevolent, His rule is uniquely untroubling, even though it may be violent and coersive. (That it is violent and coersive is clear, not only from Lucifer's expulsion, but from the expulsion from Eden, the Flood, the Passoverm Sodom and Gomorrah, and other Bible stories.)

I think Good_Egg had some good thoughts on this. Generally speaking the Christian understanding of the eschaton is going to transcend earthly realities and categories, in particular the categories of heteronomy (autocracy) and autonomy (autocracy). As Hans Urs von Balthasar says in the book, Principles of Christian Morality, "The Christian imperative lifts us beyond the problems involved in autonomy and heteronomy." The key idea here is that God is not ontologically comparable to an earthly potentate, especially in relation to the denizens of Heaven.

In general a helpful writing on this topic is Joseph Ratzinger's essay, "Eschatology and Utopia" (link). One relevant excerpt from that essay:

• The negative message of eschatology, that is, the renunciation of the intrinsic perfectibility of history, does not need to be proved to us nowadays. If that were all eschatology had to say, the only conclusion one could draw would be complete resignation and naked pragmatism. But we need to pay attention to the positive message, too: eschatology asserts, together with the intrinsic imperfectibility of history, its perfectibility, although, admittedly, outside itself. But this completion outside itself is, in spite of that, really a completion of history. What is outside it is still its perfection. From the logic of this idea it follows that the rejection of the chiliastic attempt and the adoption of eschatology as eschatology is the only way to maintain the meaningfulness of history. For, while history cries out for a meaning, it cannot contain within itself its meaning for good and all. Thus, either it is meaningless, or it is consummated as itself outside itself and then has meaning in transcending itself. This leads to the insight that eschatology, precisely because it is not a political goal, functions as guarantor of meaning in history and makes possible the “utopia” that in this ideal model constructs the maximum of justice and elevates it as a task for political reason. (Ratzinger, Church, Ecumenism and Politics, 232)

[Good_Egg]

One of my pet peeves is all of those movies that see angels as dead people who have to "get their wings". Angels are not, and never were, human. I don't think we know what, if any, entrance requirements were made of them.

You're right about saints in heaven not being angels. I think the mythos has it that angels were created in heaven as servants of the Most High.

Labels of human systems of government are inadequate similes for heaven. But monarchy is generally considered to come closest.

I disagree that libertarians "favor no culture". That's my complaint. They favor Capitalism and property ownership.

A libertarian state gives capitalist groups the same minimal rights against communist groups as vice versa. Voluntary collective ownership amongst a group is not forbidden. Private ownership by an individual is not forbidden. A libertarian state will not forbid you from joining a commune, and holds no philosophy that owning more stuff is a good thing.

...in fact they support coercive control of some people by other people (property ownership).

How exactly does my owning a widget constitute coercive control of anyone ?

They claim to support a "minimal set of laws", but those they do support are invariably supportive of one particular (economic) culture.

You may have come across a particular flavour of libertarian...

A libertarian state is biased, but only against that which is coercive in any ideology. It does not compel Alfie to share with Bruno, or to take responsibility for meeting any of Bruno's needs. Relationships in such a state are voluntary.

Every culture has some concept of what can and cannot be owned. Not sure how far changes to that concept constitute a move away from a minimal state ?

I think Rawls' "Veil of Ignorance" is a common argument in support of a minimal state in the Anglophone world, but criticism's of this argument abound. The key problem with such arguments is that they presuppose the idea of a neutral culture or personality, and that doesn't exist.

That's the one I was misremembering - glad you knew what I meant.

The argument seems sound to me. I thought you'd just agreed that any addition to the minimal state will satisfy some (those whose culture it is in tune with) and feel oppressive to others. How could you think that a good thing if you don't know which of those two groups you're destined to belong to ?

You're right that there's no neutral culture - a libertarian state is pro-liberty (more precisely pro a particular conception of liberty for its citizens). And maybe pro-minimalism...

Maybe the missing part of the argument is that any voluntary association (thinking particularly of a religion, but it holds for any group that people actively engage in) has its own subculture. Which is overlaid upon the local culture of its members. But it's easier to add than to take away - easier for a subculture to provide missing satisfaction than to mitigate oppression.

[Leontiskos]

I think Rawls' "Veil of Ignorance" is a common argument in support of a minimal state in the Anglophone world, but criticism's of this argument abound. The key problem with such arguments is that they presuppose the idea of a neutral culture or personality, and that doesn't exist.

That's the one I was misremembering - glad you knew what I meant.

Haha - I had to check to make sure Rorty didn't carve out his own version.

The argument seems sound to me. I thought you'd just agreed that any addition to the minimal state will satisfy some (those whose culture it is in tune with) and feel oppressive to others. How could you think that a good thing if you don't know which of those two groups you're destined to belong to ?

The problem is that the "minimal state" itself is satisfactory to some and oppressive to others. Or rather, it's not clear why the "minimal state" represents anything other than Rawls' personal predilection (or more accurately, the liberal-secular West's presuppositions). The error is in assuming that the starting point is absolute. If the starting point were absolute, then the argument would be sound.

Further, this sort of reasoning purports to transcend established political philosophy, but it seems to me that it does no such thing and instead ends up begging the question. For example, supposing that some addition to the minimal state would satisfy the vast majority of people, wouldn't our wager then require us to adopt it? But this is veiled majoritarianism, not a new form of political reasoning.

If you wanted to start a thread on Rawls it might be a popular one.

You're right that there's no neutral culture - a libertarian state is pro-liberty (more precisely pro a particular conception of liberty for its citizens). And maybe pro-minimalism...

Hobbesian anthropology is probably one of the central tenets of libertarianism. It is this radical individualism which separates libertarianism from other political philosophies.

Maybe the missing part of the argument is that any voluntary association (thinking particularly of a religion, but it holds for any group that people actively engage in) has its own subculture. Which is overlaid upon the local culture of its members. But it's easier to add than to take away - easier for a subculture to provide missing satisfaction than to mitigate oppression.

The central puzzle piece is always the "local culture," and that is what everyone is fighting for in the end. I don't think a culture can be said to be good in virtue of being minimal, or in promoting blind liberty. I think the reason that libertarianism has flourished in the last century is because the basic culture was healthy and prosperous. Placing undue burdens on a culture which is already healthy and prosperous is of course foolish (and this is true whether those burdens pertain to idiosyncratic impositions or anti-liberty coercion or anything else). But I rather doubt that the health and prosperity of post-war culture was due in any special way to minimalism or liberty, and this is why libertarianism is misguided. The culture in which libertarians were allowed to flourish (along with everyone else) was not made good solely or even primarily by minimalism and liberty, and injecting those value into a now-souring culture will not save it.

[Ecurb]

...in fact they support coercive control of some people by other people (property ownership).

How exactly does my owning a widget constitute coercive control of anyone ?

As Marx correctly said, property is (and can be) nothing other than one person's control of other people. If you own a car, you can have anyone who drives it without your permission arrested. If you own a house, you can call the police if anyone tries to sleep in it uninvited. If you own land, you can put up "no tresspassing" signs. The car, the house, and the land are, of course, unaffected by any property rights; only other people are.

A libertarian state is biased, but only against that which is coercive in any ideology. It does not compel Alfie to share with Bruno, or to take responsibility for meeting any of Bruno's needs. Relationships in such a state are voluntary.

Every culture has some concept of what can and cannot be owned. Not sure how far changes to that concept constitute a move away from a minimal state ?

Most cultures have some concept of ownership, but the concepts vary considerably. In addition, the extent to which the State coercively enforces property rights (i.e. the right of owners to control other people) varies. Obviously, in communist states the means of production are not owned by individuals (although some private propety rights often continue to exist). Clearly, relations between Alfie and Bruno vis a vis property are not "voluntary". They are determined by legal property rights, and enforced with the billy clubs, handcuffs and jails of the State.

[Good_Egg]

Clearly, relations between Alfie and Bruno vis a vis property are not "voluntary". They are determined by legal property rights, and enforced with the billy clubs, handcuffs and jails of the State.

Are you arguing that a libertarian state isn't minimal enough ? That a truly minimal state would not recognise and enforce property rights ? You'd prefer anarchy ?

Yes violence is an inherent part of the state; that's part of the argument for minimising it.

Legal recognition and enforcement of property rights does not compel Alfie or Bruno to be in a non-voluntary relationship with the other. They are free to share their stuff consensually, or to ignore each other as they choose. The only thing they are not free to do is to steal from each other.

But if Alfie moves into Bruno's house without his consent, he has coerced Bruno into a "housemate" relationship...

For all relationships to be voluntary requires that there be a remedy against one person imposing themselves on another.

The problem is that the "minimal state" itself is satisfactory to some and oppressive to others. Or rather, it's not clear why the "minimal state" represents anything other than Rawls' personal predilection (or more accurately, the liberal-secular West's presuppositions). The error is in assuming that the starting point is absolute. If the starting point were absolute, then the argument would be sound.

I agree that the argument defeats itself if it can be applied equally to any starting point, i.e. if the starting point is arbitrary.

But I'd argue that neutrality (between Christianity and Islam, for example) is a well-defined and non-arbitrary starting point.

A state could of course be hostile to both equally or permissive to both equally.

Can one be oppressed by an absence ? People can be oppressed by bad actors in the absence of state protection, but it isn't the state that is doing the oppressing. Seems to me that recognition of that neutral point between help and harm is philosophically important.

It is only a coercive ideology that claims to be oppressed by the permission of alternatives.

...supposing that some addition to the minimal state would satisfy the vast majority of people, wouldn't our wager then require us to adopt it?

Utilitarianism essentially asserts that the probability distribution of outcomes is knowable and the utility of those outcomes to each person is knowable, so that it is rational to choose to do something if the expected net utility is positive.

By contrast, the Veil of Ignorance argument assumes that the decision-maker has no idea of the likelihood that they will be one of those who gains or loses from a particular choice, and therefore asserts that it is rational to adopt a "maximin" decision rule - one which minimises the disbenefit to the worst-affected person. Because it could be you...

You may disagree with either. But they're based on opposing assumptions, so I don't think you can reasonably combine the two.

I don't think a culture can be said to be good in virtue of being minimal, or in promoting blind liberty... ...The culture in which libertarians were allowed to flourish (along with everyone else) was not made good solely or even primarily by minimalism and liberty, and injecting those value into a now-souring culture will not save it.

I don't think it good to have minimal culture. I'm suggesting that it is good for people to live within a rich culture that is expressed and built up through voluntary associations, rather than being mandated by the state.

[Ecurb]

Are you arguing that a libertarian state isn't minimal enough ? That a truly minimal state would not recognise and enforce property rights ? You'd prefer anarchy ?

Yes violence is an inherent part of the state; that's part of the argument for minimising it.

I'm actually quite capable of arguing for exactly what I am arguing for: that libertarianism supports a minimal state in some ways, and not in others. Why anyone would think that means I oppose a libertarian state, property rights, or the rule of law is a mystery to me. All one has to do is say, clearly and correctly, that property rights allow one person to control other people vis a vis the property, and that is ALL they do, and people start accusing one of supporting anarchy, of despising private property, and of consorting with Communists. However, seeing property for exactly what it is (and the only thing it can possibly be) does NOT suggest antipathy for the concept.

[Leontiskos]

The problem is that the "minimal state" itself is satisfactory to some and oppressive to others. Or rather, it's not clear why the "minimal state" represents anything other than Rawls' personal predilection (or more accurately, the liberal-secular West's presuppositions). The error is in assuming that the starting point is absolute. If the starting point were absolute, then the argument would be sound.

I agree that the argument defeats itself if it can be applied equally to any starting point, i.e. if the starting point is arbitrary.

But I'd argue that neutrality (between Christianity and Islam, for example) is a well-defined and non-arbitrary starting point.

A state could of course be hostile to both equally or permissive to both equally.

I actually disagree. Religious isn't as separable from culture as the secular West supposes. Heck, they used to be one and the same, for the root of "culture" is cultus (cult).

For example, if you look at the way that Christianity and Islam understand law it would be impossible for some new Western State to take up a stance of neutrality vis-a-vis those conceptions of law. It will either tend towards natural/intellectualistic or positive/voluntaristic, and this will in turn be hugely important for how the two religions fit into that legal culture. The whole secular premise here is that religion is superfluous and easily excisable, in which case establishing a religiously neutral state would be quite easy. Nevertheless, that premise is shown to be absurd under closer inspection, and this is why even professedly atheistic states like the Marxist regimes ended up fashioning their own unique metaphysical positions, such as dialectical materialism.

The secular West's presumption of neutrality is a bit like the fellow who is convinced that he has no accent. "It's other people who have accents!"

Can one be oppressed by an absence ?

The fellow who has no access to medical care or work is oppressed by an absence. If you really want to understand how the secular West is oppressed by absence you should read Charles Taylor.

Seems to me that recognition of that neutral point between help and harm is philosophically important.

I would say that if there is a neutral point then Rawls didn't find it.

It is only a coercive ideology that claims to be oppressed by the permission of alternatives.

The idea that choice and liberty constitute the absolute starting point seems to me to have been disproven by our culture. A fair bit has been written recently in psychology, sociology, and economics about how an excessive multiplication of choice and autonomy has given birth to generations who have been immobilized by the sheer number of choices that confront them. "Paralysis by analysis" is one of the catch phrases meant to capture this phenomenon.

...supposing that some addition to the minimal state would satisfy the vast majority of people, wouldn't our wager then require us to adopt it?

Utilitarianism essentially asserts that the probability distribution of outcomes is knowable and the utility of those outcomes to each person is knowable, so that it is rational to choose to do something if the expected net utility is positive.

By contrast, the Veil of Ignorance argument assumes that the decision-maker has no idea of the likelihood that they will be one of those who gains or loses from a particular choice, and therefore asserts that it is rational to adopt a "maximin" decision rule - one which minimises the disbenefit to the worst-affected person. Because it could be you...

You may disagree with either. But they're based on opposing assumptions, so I don't think you can reasonably combine the two.

Why think that "maximin" is the only relevant consideration on the Veil of Ignorance? Once the pool receiving a strong benefit reaches a large majority the "maximin" rule will fly out the window, as it does in everyday life when fat boons cause people to throw caution to the wind. There is no reason to believe that a Veil of Ignorance would make people focus exclusively on aversion to disbenefit rather than on attraction to benefit. It will always depend on the particular benefits and disbenefits as well as their distribution. Further, ontologically benefit always trumps disbenefit because a disbenefit is always based on an opposite and prior benefit (e.g. you can only hate if you first love).

I don't think a culture can be said to be good in virtue of being minimal, or in promoting blind liberty... ...The culture in which libertarians were allowed to flourish (along with everyone else) was not made good solely or even primarily by minimalism and liberty, and injecting those value into a now-souring culture will not save it.

I don't think it good to have minimal culture. I'm suggesting that it is good for people to live within a rich culture that is expressed and built up through voluntary associations, rather than being mandated by the state.

Okay.

[Good_Egg]

if you look at the way that Christianity and Islam understand law it would be impossible for some new Western State to take up a stance of neutrality vis-a-vis those conceptions of law. It will either tend towards natural/intellectualistic or positive/voluntaristic, and this will in turn be hugely important for how the two religions fit into that legal culture.

I agree that there are either/or decisions where no neutral position exists. (If an example is needed, I'd suggest that the Anglican church's struggles with the issue of homosexuality are linked to the non-existence of a neutral stance between opposing concepts).

Happy to take your word for it that the basis of law is such an issue.

But I'm not convinced that this prevents a secular state from adopting a neutral stance regarding religious practice by its citizens.

The fellow who has no access to medical care or work is oppressed by an absence.

No, that's putting it backwards. A man may be oppressed by sickness, or by poverty, or by boredom, and see medical care or a steady job as the solution. But it is the problem rather than the absence of solution that is the causal factor in his oppression.

The distinction is important for example, when it comes to mental health. If a man is tormented by unsatisfied desires, he can be relieved either by satisfaction of those desires or their removal. Or their modification into a desire for something slightly different. The nature of desire is that we naturally identify getting what we think we want as the issue. But that's too narrow a focus.

A fair bit has been written recently in psychology, sociology, and economics about how an excessive multiplication of choice and autonomy has given birth to generations who have been immobilized by the sheer number of choices that confront them. "Paralysis by analysis" is one of the catch phrases meant to capture this phenomenon.

I don't disagree. But culture gives us a guide through all the things that we could conceivably legally do.

Why think that "maximin" is the only relevant consideration on the Veil of Ignorance?

Because if you take the utilitarian view then the Veil is redundant. The calculation you'd do (as a card-carrying utilitarian) to maximize expected total utility is the calculation you'd do under a version of the Veil of Ignorance with an equal chance to experience the known benefit/disbenefit accruing to each person.

The Veil of ignorance - as I understand it - is an argument for not having a scapegoat - because you could end up as the scapegoat! Even when a utilitarian nods approvingly and agrees that blaming one person for everything is an efficient process for maximising human satisfaction...

I'm actually quite capable of arguing for exactly what I am arguing for: that libertarianism supports a minimal state in some ways, and not in others. Why anyone would think that means I oppose a libertarian state, property rights, or the rule of law is a mystery to me.

OK, setting your preferences entirely to one side, are you dispassionately suggesting that a minimal functional state would have fewer laws than a libertarian state or more laws ? Seeing as you think I'm mistaken in equating the two...

All one has to do is say, clearly and correctly, that property rights allow one person to control other people vis a vis the property, and that is ALL they do

Again, it is the enforcement of property rights that exerts a coercive control of others' behaviour.

And the choice is between the state enforcing these rights for everyone, and a situation where the stronger man can enforce his own rights and ignore the rights of the weaker man.

(Noting that sronger doesn't necessarily refer to physical strength. It could equally describe a system where disputes are decided in favour of whoever can pay for the most expensive lawyer, or whoever has connections with the most powerful gang leader.)

[d3r31nz1g3]

I will say that democracy is an archaic concept before the market forces that be.

[Leontiskos]

if you look at the way that Christianity and Islam understand law it would be impossible for some new Western State to take up a stance of neutrality vis-a-vis those conceptions of law. It will either tend towards natural/intellectualistic or positive/voluntaristic, and this will in turn be hugely important for how the two religions fit into that legal culture.

I agree that there are either/or decisions where no neutral position exists. (If an example is needed, I'd suggest that the Anglican church's struggles with the issue of homosexuality are linked to the non-existence of a neutral stance between opposing concepts).

Happy to take your word for it that the basis of law is such an issue.

But I'm not convinced that this prevents a secular state from adopting a neutral stance regarding religious practice by its citizens.

Keeping to the example I already gave, if the state adopts a legal philosophy akin to natural law, it will favor Christianity, and if it adopts a legal philosophy akin to positive law, it will favor Islam. Do you suppose that there is some neutral legal philosophy for the state to adopt?

(In reality religion is much more fundamental than secularism, and this is why all “secular” states are already implicitly religious, and why a Chinese “secular” state will look so different from an English “secular” state.)

The fellow who has no access to medical care or work is oppressed by an absence.

No, that's putting it backwards. A man may be oppressed by sickness, or by poverty, or by boredom, and see medical care or a steady job as the solution. But it is the problem rather than the absence of solution that is the causal factor in his oppression.

Is not sickness the absence of health, poverty the absence of goods, and boredom the absence of enjoyment or drive?

Why think that "maximin" is the only relevant consideration on the Veil of Ignorance?

Because if you take the utilitarian view then the Veil is redundant. The calculation you'd do (as a card-carrying utilitarian) to maximize expected total utility is the calculation you'd do under a version of the Veil of Ignorance with an equal chance to experience the known benefit/disbenefit accruing to each person.

The Veil of ignorance - as I understand it - is an argument for not having a scapegoat - because you could end up as the scapegoat! Even when a utilitarian nods approvingly and agrees that blaming one person for everything is an efficient process for maximising human satisfaction...

But as you’ve expressed it the only difference between Rawls and Utilitarianism is a stipulation of ignorance, and this is an accidental difference. Apart from that stipulation of ignorance the ethical calculus is precisely the same. What I already wrote above also addresses the “scapegoat” case. The utilitarian would simply be willing to accept the risk that they are the scapegoat given their odds. I haven’t read Rawls in a long time, but as you’ve characterized it the only difference between Rawls and a utilitarian is their level of risk aversion.

[Good_Egg]

Is not sickness the absence of health, poverty the absence of goods, and boredom the absence of enjoyment or drive?

All those characterisations seem to me to express a truth.

And because of that truth, it's difficult to say anything about sickness/poverty/boredom without (at least implicitly) contrasting it with some level of health/wealth/engagement.

And what I think we're talking about here is how far there is or is not a natural point of comparison, a non-arbitrary counterfactual, against which we can say meaningful things.

For example, it seems to me that a typical western approach to medicine takes a state of health as the counterfactual. The doctor looks at you and aims to identify what virus or disease, what trauma or impact, has taken you away from a "natural" state of health, and therefore what has to be done to defeat the virus or whatever and to repair the damage. To restore you to what you were before you fell ill.

And we're all happy with that where such an approach is applicable. But where it isn't - e.g. medication to improve sporting performance beyond what it was "naturally" - we feel uneasy, we're outside the paradigm.

And where we started with all this is what counterfactual is relevant when talking about the minimal state.

I find I have a mental picture of a fictitious "state of nature" where each family engages in subsistence agriculture on their own plot of land which their ancestors have carved out from primeval wilderness. And engages with their neighbours as much or as little as they choose on a voluntary basis. A baseline in which everyone starts off with a moral right to what they have, and nobody is oppressed.

So when we talk about what a minimal state is or isn't, what it does or doesn't do, it's against that sort of implicit counterfactual.

If one accepts the premise that coercion is morally wrong - that it necessarily involves doing unto others as you would not have them do unto you, then the ideal state would be as non-coercive as possible.

We know that that runs into free-rider problems - that there are services which it is not practically feasible to offer only to those who opt in. Hence taxation as a necessary evil...

[Leontiskos]

Is not sickness the absence of health, poverty the absence of goods, and boredom the absence of enjoyment or drive?

All those characterisations seem to me to express a truth.

Yes, of course. Absences are truly absent.

For example, it seems to me that a typical western approach to medicine takes a state of health as the counterfactual. The doctor looks at you and aims to identify what virus or disease, what trauma or impact, has taken you away from a "natural" state of health, and therefore what has to be done to defeat the virus or whatever and to repair the damage. To restore you to what you were before you fell ill.

And we're all happy with that where such an approach is applicable. But where it isn't - e.g. medication to improve sporting performance beyond what it was "naturally" - we feel uneasy, we're outside the paradigm.

...and we would naturally and rightly say that a performance enhancing drug is not medicine because it is not rectifying a deficient state of health.

And where we started with all this is what counterfactual is relevant when talking about the minimal state.

Or more precisely, whether the minimal state represents a neutral or absolute starting point.

I find I have a mental picture of a fictitious "state of nature" where each family engages in subsistence agriculture on their own plot of land which their ancestors have carved out from primeval wilderness. And engages with their neighbours as much or as little as they choose on a voluntary basis. A baseline in which everyone starts off with a moral right to what they have, and nobody is oppressed.

You are a Hobbesian in this matter, and this is not uncommon.

If one accepts the premise that coercion is morally wrong - that it necessarily involves doing unto others as you would not have them do unto you, then the ideal state would be as non-coercive as possible.

The problem is that the state is coercive by definition, so you conceive of the state as fundamentally immoral.

We know that that runs into free-rider problems - that there are services which it is not practically feasible to offer only to those who opt in. Hence taxation as a necessary evil...

If you wish to contextualize the conversation, then we should note that you were more or less arguing that one cannot be oppressed by an absence, and since the minimal state is the most-absent option as far as states go, it is also the least oppressive. But all of my points about absences hold true. A doctor who offers only minimal interventions is not the least oppressive doctor. Doctors and states exist for a purpose and must be tailored to fulfill their role. There is no correlation between minimalism and role-effectiveness. I think at bottom you are struggling with the paralysis of skepticism that results from wide pluralism. Pluralism prevents you from assigning any role or nature to the state, and the pivot to coercion/consent is a natural move.