Is Democracy Moral? Is Libertarianism Good?

[Good_Egg]

Even if Bruno has a right to the products of his unassisted labor... ...very little of his labor is "unassisted".

Doesn't matter. If he legitimately possesses what he has made unassisted, he legitimately possesses the tools he trades that for, and then legitimately possesses what he makes with the tools, etc.

The factory worker must turn the product of his labor over to the factory owner....

Irrelevant. Trapper Bruno isn't part of a society, capitalist or communist or otherwise. Barter-trade is more basic than any of that social organisation stuff.

Clearly it is morally wrong to wantonly destroy a wooden chair, or trample a garden... ...The evil comes in harming other people -- not in harming "their property".

The evil is in depriving people of their possessions. It makes no difference to Bruno whether the chair is destroyed or taken away by Alfie into the wilderness never to be seen again.

And it is possession, not ownership. If Alfie steals a chair that Carlos had lent to Bruno, it is still Bruno the possessor not Carlos the owner who is wronged. (What happens when the time comes for Bruno to return it ? Never mind - that's a tangent).

In many frontier areas, "hosts" had traditiional (if not legal) obligations. If a traveler stopped by on a cold winter night, the person who had built the house was morally obliged to put him up for the night. This was a traditional condition of house "ownership".

Many societies have a custom which grants travellers a "customary right" of hospitality. It's part of their culture.

But the point of the wilderness setting with the log cabin and all that is that these trappers are outside of society and culture. They are not bound by law and custom. The rights they have are only natural rights. If Trapper Alfie wrongs Trapper Bruno, it is not a wrong because of any statute or custom in the society that they left behind in order to live independent lives in the wilderness, but because it is a wrong in natural law.

I'd suggest that natural rights, or "unalienable rights" as they are called in the Declaration of Independence include life and liberty.

What that means is that it is wrong to take another's life and wrong to take another's liberty (i.e. to prevent them from doing what they choose to do). There's an obvious limit on that to avoid contradiction . You have no right to life at the expense of another's life, and no right to liberty at the expense of another's liberty. Hence self-defence is morally permissible and refusing people the liberty to deprive you of the same liberty is permissible.

The liberty that you say that property rights limit is precisely that self-contradictory liberty which can only be realised by depriving another.

To return to copyrights, they (and other forms of intellectual property) clearly limit liberty (freedom to say what one wants to say, and write what one wants to write).

As indicated before, the sort of copyright law which I would expect libertarians to support does not prevent you from saying what you want to say (in either spoken or written language), but only from keeping the profit on what is not yours to sell.

Nobody should prevent you from walking down the street expressing yourself by singing someone else's words to someone else's tune. But if you make money out of their words and music you have a moral obligation to give them their fair share of that money.

Social convention may determine how large that fair share is considered to be. But the obligation and right are part of natural law, and not at anybody's whim to grant.

[Ecurb]

Even if Bruno has a right to the products of his unassisted labor... ...very little of his labor is "unassisted".

Doesn't matter. If he legitimately possesses what he has made unassisted, he legitimately possesses the tools he trades that for, and then legitimately possesses what he makes with the tools, etc.

The factory worker must turn the product of his labor over to the factory owner....

Irrelevant. Trapper Bruno isn't part of a society, capitalist or communist or otherwise. Barter-trade is more basic than any of that social organisation stuff.

Barter trade is not a human universal. Gift giving, based on friendship and consanguinity is often the primary method of exchange in simple societies. Raiding and other methods of gaining goods are also often accepted. "Legitimately possesses" appears to mean "legally possesses". In that case I agree. In general, people should follow the norms and laws of the societies in which they live.

Clearly it is morally wrong to wantonly destroy a wooden chair, or trample a garden... ...The evil comes in harming other people -- not in harming "their property".

The evil is in depriving people of their possessions. It makes no difference to Bruno whether the chair is destroyed or taken away by Alfie into the wilderness never to be seen again.

And it is possession, not ownership. If Alfie steals a chair that Carlos had lent to Bruno, it is still Bruno the possessor not Carlos the owner who is wronged. (What happens when the time comes for Bruno to return it ? Never mind - that's a tangent).

That depends on what we mean by "their possessions". GE, for example, seems to think that workers "legitimately possess" their salaries, and the government is robbing them by taxing them for expenditures of which they disaprove. But, of course, the workers do NOT legitimately possess their salaries. They earn them under a system which deducts taxes. In addition, your above statements seem to imply that if Alfie sneaks into Bruno's house when Bruno is gone, and "possesses" one of his chairs, it would be wrong of Bruno to grab it back. Surely you can't mean that.

But the point of the wilderness setting with the log cabin and all that is that these trappers are outside of society and culture. They are not bound by law and custom. The rights they have are only natural rights. If Trapper Alfie wrongs Trapper Bruno, it is not a wrong because of any statute or custom in the society that they left behind in order to live independent lives in the wilderness, but because it is a wrong in natural law.

Well, Alfie may think he has a natural right to sleep in the house Bruno built, because it is cold outside and the house offers him shelter. Tough tooties to Bruno (who has no way of preventing this other than violence or the pathetic cry, "It's morally wrong according to natural law").

What that means is that it is wrong to take another's life and wrong to take another's liberty (i.e. to prevent them from doing what they choose to do). There's an obvious limit on that to avoid contradiction . You have no right to life at the expense of another's life, and no right to liberty at the expense of another's liberty. Hence self-defence is morally permissible and refusing people the liberty to deprive you of the same liberty is permissible.

The liberty that you say that property rights limit is precisely that self-contradictory liberty which can only be realised by depriving another.

Incorrect. Sometimes stealing does deprive another. Sometimes someone might borrow a car without permission for a joy ride, and bring it back with a full tank of gas. Sometimes someone may trespass without causing any harm or damage. Sometimes someone might grow crops on land "owned" by someone else -- the crops are the product of HIS labor, but owner of the land may seek to deprive him of them.

As indicated before, the sort of copyright law which I would expect libertarians to support does not prevent you from saying what you want to say (in either spoken or written language), but only from keeping the profit on what is not yours to sell.

Nobody should prevent you from walking down the street expressing yourself by singing someone else's words to someone else's tune. But if you make money out of their words and music you have a moral obligation to give them their fair share of that money.

Social convention may determine how large that fair share is considered to be. But the obligation and right are part of natural law, and not at anybody's whim to grant.

Nonsense. Every cover band playing copyrighted songs in a cheap bar is, according to your edicts, obliged to pay the song writer. But they don't. The law is impossible to enforce, and the cover bands are well within their moral rights. They probably bought the album in order to learn how to play the song. That constitutes sufficient recompense.

Also, copyrights often last well beyond the holder's death. Are you stealing from his heirs? I knew a woman who directed high school plays. She had to pay fees to the heirs of long dead playwrights, despite the fact that no high school play has ever turned a profit.

I agree in general that commercial speech should be limited more extensively than non-commercial speech. Laws preventing fraud, false advertising, etc. are reasonable; laws preventing fishermen from exaggerating their success are not. Intellectual property is an interesting topic. But the notion that there is a "natural right" to profit from one's art or inventions is silly. What rights there are change dramatically from one era to another, and one society to another. Changing technology necessitates that. I remember TV networks trying to ban VCRs because people would fast forward through commercials. The attempt (reasonably) didn't fly.

[Good_Egg]

The evil is in depriving people of their possessions...
...And it is possession, not ownership.

That depends on what we mean by "their possessions"...
...your above statements seem to imply that if Alfie sneaks into Bruno's house when Bruno is gone, and "possesses" one of his chairs, it would be wrong of Bruno to grab it back. Surely you can't mean that.

Do you cease to possess something when you no longer have it on your person ? Clearly not - you don't carry your furniture around with you.

So how does Alfie know that the chair is Bruno's ?

Any society has social signals about what things are possessed and unpossessed. But such signals communicate possession, they do not create it.

Alfie may think he has a natural right to sleep in the house Bruno built, because it is cold outside and the house offers him shelter. Tough tooties to Bruno (who has no way of preventing this other than violence or the pathetic cry, "It's morally wrong according to natural law").

Some people argue that there is no such thing as natural law. That might is right, or more precisely that might is all there objectively is, and talk of "rights" is just the pathetic bleating of those who lack the might to enforce their purely-subjective desires.

I'd understood that that is not your position - you've said that natural right exists, it just doesn't include any rights related to property. So we don't need to address the sceptics in discussing the point at issue.

Casting doubt on the whole concept of natural law when we're talking about rights you don't like but asserting the reality of natural law for rights you do like is not a valid argument for your position.

Sometimes someone might borrow a car without permission for a joy ride, and bring it back with a full tank of gas. Sometimes someone may trespass without causing any harm or damage. Sometimes someone might grow crops on land "owned" by someone else.

That's a good question - is stealing wrong if the victim doesn't notice at all ? I think the libertarian answer is "no".

Which doesn't prevent small deprivations from adding up to significant ones. One person sneaks through your garden without damaging anything and without you noticing, that's no harm done. Everyone in the village using your garden as a thoroughfare with a resulting total loss of privacy, that's a wrong.

As indicated before, the sort of copyright law which I would expect libertarians to support does not prevent you from saying what you want to say (in either spoken or written language), but only from keeping the profit on what is not yours to sell.

Every cover band playing copyrighted songs in a cheap bar is, according to your edicts, obliged to pay the song writer. But they don't. The law is impossible to enforce, and the cover bands are well within their moral rights. They probably bought the album in order to learn how to play the song. That constitutes sufficient recompense.

...I knew a woman who directed high school plays. She had to pay fees to the heirs of long dead playwrights, despite the fact that no high school play has ever turned a profit.

I think we're agreed that a libertarian state would not have copyright law as it currently exists in modern societies. (So-called "software piracy" involves no deprivation, relative to the appropriate do-nothing baseline).

I'm arguing that a copyright system that is limited to enforcing a moral claim on a share of the profits from use without consent is consistent with a night-watchman state.

Noting the above point about no deprivation existing if the victim doesn't notice. And the idea that moral claims are not heritable - the natural right of inheritance is limited to what the deceased possessed.

[Ecurb]

Do you cease to possess something when you no longer have it on your person ? Clearly not - you don't carry your furniture around with you.

So how does Alfie know that the chair is Bruno's ?

Any society has social signals about what things are possessed and unpossessed. But such signals communicate possession, they do not create it.

This is where I disagree. The "social signals" (norms) create possession. If a property "RIGHT" involves nothing more than a legal or moral obligation on the part of other people to allow the "owner" to control them vis a vis the property (as is clearly the case, and is the only thing a property right can possibly confer) how could this be otherwise? The "right" of possession means absolutely nothing unless it is honored, and honoring it means accepting the social signals.

Some people argue that there is no such thing as natural law. That might is right, or more precisely that might is all there objectively is, and talk of "rights" is just the pathetic bleating of those who lack the might to enforce their purely-subjective desires.

I'd understood that that is not your position - you've said that natural right exists, it just doesn't include any rights related to property. So we don't need to address the sceptics in discussing the point at issue.

Casting doubt on the whole concept of natural law when we're talking about rights you don't like but asserting the reality of natural law for rights you do like is not a valid argument for your position.

I'm no expert on the jargon. "Natural Law" tends to mean "endowed by the creator", which I don't buy. But there are more basic rights (obligations) and less basic ones. It seems to me that life and liberty are very basic rights -- in other words people are obliged not to kill or imprison someone without good reason. Property rights are less basic. They are often reasonably amended by taxes, usufruct exceptions, etc. This is utterly proper,in my opinion.

I think we're agreed that a libertarian state would not have copyright law as it currently exists in modern societies. (So-called "software piracy" involves no deprivation, relative to the appropriate do-nothing baseline).

I'm arguing that a copyright system that is limited to enforcing a moral claim on a share of the profits from use without consent is consistent with a night-watchman state.

Noting the above point about no deprivation existing if the victim doesn't notice. And the idea that moral claims are not heritable - the natural right of inheritance is limited to what the deceased possessed.

Intellectual prop0erty is controversial. Drug company patents, for example, prevent millions of Africans from receiving life-saving HIV drugs. At the same time, the drugs may never have been developed without the profit motive. As a supporter of free speech I'd support slightly less restrictive copyrights and patents. However, my motives have nothing to do with any notions of who "possesses" words, or an idea. These are not things that can be "possessed". Instead, I'd base my decisions on what I think will be benefical to the society and the culture, while not unduly restricting freedom. I probably tend to agree with Libertarians here -- for example I disaprove of anti-hate speech laws in Europe.

[Good_Egg]

"Natural Law" tends to mean "endowed by the creator", which I don't buy.

I respect your atheism. Do you prefer the term "natural rights" ? I.e. rights which are present in nature, which are prior to any decision by humans as to how they want to run their societies. (Avoiding any implication that there is a Cosmic Lawgiver who stands behind nature)?

Laws can only create legal rights. They cannot create or remove natural rights. It may be legal to kill a Welshman (except on Sundays); if you believe there is a natural right to life then it is wrong to do so any day of the week.

It seems to me that life and liberty are very basic rights -- in other words people are obliged not to kill or imprison someone without good reason.

That "without good reason" undermines the entire sentence. A right to life means people are obliged not to kill someone full stop. (A legal right means a legal obligation, a natural right means a moral obligation - something they ought to do or not do).

If you mean "right" you don't mean "without good reason". If you mean the "without good reason" bit then it seems that what you are saying is that life should carry a high weight in the utilitarian calculus of consequences by which moral decisions are made.

Rights are essentially absolute. Not trade-offable. To say that someone has a right to life is to say that you ought not to kill them even if the world would be a better place thereby.

Do you mean rights ? Or are you saying "more of a guideline, really" ? A rule of thumb that we can ignore when we feel that it's reasonable to do so ?

[Ecurb]

That "without good reason" undermines the entire sentence. A right to life means people are obliged not to kill someone full stop. (A legal right means a legal obligation, a natural right means a moral obligation - something they ought to do or not do).

If you mean "right" you don't mean "without good reason". If you mean the "without good reason" bit then it seems that what you are saying is that life should carry a high weight in the utilitarian calculus of consequences by which moral decisions are made.

Rights are essentially absolute. Not trade-offable. To say that someone has a right to life is to say that you ought not to kill them even if the world would be a better place thereby.

Do you mean rights ? Or are you saying "more of a guideline, really" ? A rule of thumb that we can ignore when we feel that it's reasonable to do so ?

Right
: something to which one has a just claim: such as
a
: the power or privilege to which one is justly entitled

A "just claim" may be obviated by other just claims. One's right to life (obligation not to kill) may be obviated by the just claim of self defense, or a just war, or just punishment (if one believes in the death penalty). In the case of self defense, one must decide whether one's own or one's attacker's right to life bears more weight. A reasonable argument would be that since the attacker is attempting to violate YOUR right to life, he has obviated your obligation to honor his.

Of course one is "justly entitled" to certain property rights under our system of law and moral norms. I'm not trying to deny that -- merely to suggest that these laws and norms are not human universals, unlike the rights to life and liberty. I'd suggest the "natural rights' would be better construed as "universal rights", rights (obligations) which are universally (or almost universally) conferred in human cultures. Rights that differ from culture to culture are best thought of as "legal" or "normative" rights. Property falls in this latter category (less so for certain proprietary categories, such as items one has made himself for personal use).

Of course any moral precept (including obligations and rights) can (and should) be ignored when it is reasonable to do so. It would be oxymoronic to claim otherwise. It it is "unreasonable" to honor a "right" surely we should not honor it. This seems axiomatic, simply from the meanings of the words.

In general, I think all rights are culturally constituted, and subject to cultural differences. They do not constitute the essence of morality, which is better elucidated through more general (and positive) moral edicts, like, "Do unto others..." or "Love your neighbor as yourself." Perhaps a reasonable person would think, "If I ever become a mass murderer and start shooting kindergarten kids, I hope the police will stop me, by shooting me if necessary." "Do unto others..." of "love your neighbor" would then justify the use of deadly force on others in the same situation.

[Good_Egg]

A "just claim" may be obviated by other just claims.

.
Yes, just claims may conflict. This creates an issue of use of language. Do we use the term "right" of any claim-in-justice or only of the claim which we conclude should be honoured (because it is stronger or more basic than the other claim). ?

I don't think it makes a substantial difference which usage we adopt - it's just a matter of clarity and avoiding misunderstanding.

One's right to life (obligation not to kill) may be obviated by the just claim of self defense, or a just war, or just punishment (if one believes in the death penalty).

Just war I would class as a sub-category of self-defence. Self-defence is not a claimed "right to life" being traded-off against and sometimes having to give way to some other claim. It is the avoidance of logical contradiction - right to life cannot be a stronger claim than itself.

Of course one is "justly entitled" to certain property rights under our system of law and moral norms. I'm not trying to deny that -- merely to suggest that these laws and norms are not human universals, unlike the rights to life and liberty. I'd suggest the "natural rights' would be better construed as "universal rights", rights (obligations) which are universally (or almost universally) conferred in human cultures. Rights that differ from culture to culture are best thought of as "legal" or "normative" rights.

Societies have legal rights, which are formally decided upon, and can be changed if those in power choose to. And customary rights (cultural behavioural norms, which if violated may lead to informal social sanctions), which sort of emerge in a social setting.

Seems to me that the questions we're debating are:
1)whether there are natural rights - claims in natural justice - that have their origin in human nature rather than in legal decision or social convention, but are reflected in law and custom
2) if there are natural rights, whether these cover property, or only life and liberty
3) whether the language of "ought" applies to natural rights, or to legal and customary rights, and what if they conflict ?

I think you're suggesting that if all (or nearly all) societies have the same legal or customary right then that is evidence (although falling short of absolute proof) that such laws and customs probably reflect some underlying natural right. Something in human nature which means that such laws/customs are morally good laws/customs to have.

Which is fair enough.

But note that's answering the question "how can we know?" It's not denying that human nature, prior to any society, is the source and origin of natural rights.

Note also that an individual's failure to heed a law is not evidence that the law does not exist, because law is prescriptive not descriptive. Similarly, that some cultures do not respect a natural right cannot be proof that it doesn't exist. Although I would tend to agree with you that it is evidence. If no culture in history has ever thought that some modern trend in western culture should constitute a legal right, that's evidence that tends to suggest it isn't a natural right., so we're morally free not to heed it.

Would you say, for example, that all societies ought to have a law against murder, because murder is a breach of natural right ? Alongside saying that we know that there is a natural right to life because the number of societies that recognise this natural right by embodying it in a customary or legal right is too great to be a coincidence ?

Part of the question is whether natural rights provide a moral standard against which societies with their laws and customs can be judged, or whether each individual society is the highest authority you can envisage.

Property falls in this latter category (less so for certain proprietary categories, such as items one has made himself for personal use).

How can it be "less so" ? There can be greater degree of commonality in respect of laws regarding such property, and therefore (by your argument) greater certainty that there is a natural right involved. But being a natural right or not seems like a yes/no question. Can you have a little bit of a natural right ?

Of course any moral precept (including obligations and rights) can (and should) be ignored when it is reasonable to do so. It would be oxymoronic to claim otherwise. If it is "unreasonable" to honor a "right" surely we should not honor it. This seems axiomatic, simply from the meanings of the words.

"Reasonable" is sometimes used merely as a term of subjective approval. What does it mean otherwise ?

[Ecurb]

I don't think it makes a substantial difference which usage we adopt - it's just a matter of clarity and avoiding misunderstanding.

Just war I would class as a sub-category of self-defence. Self-defence is not a claimed "right to life" being traded-off against and sometimes having to give way to some other claim. It is the avoidance of logical contradiction - right to life cannot be a stronger claim than itself.

That's a reasonable position, but there are other equally reasonable excuses for killing. Oliver O'Donovan, former Professor of Moral Theology aqt Oxford (and an Anglican Priest), proposed that self defense is not an acceptable reason for killing, given that Christians are enjoined to "turn the other cheek." Instead, fiat justicia, ruat cielum. "Let justice be done thought he heavens fall." The justification for war is to restore justice to the world, not self defense. I read the book years ago and don't remember the whole argument, but if "justice" is one of the Christian virtues, it makes sense that it might trump even the right to life.

Seems to me that the questions we're debating are:
1)whether there are natural rights - claims in natural justice - that have their origin in human nature rather than in legal decision or social convention, but are reflected in law and custom
2) if there are natural rights, whether these cover property, or only life and liberty
3) whether the language of "ought" applies to natural rights, or to legal and customary rights, and what if they conflict ?

I think you're suggesting that if all (or nearly all) societies have the same legal or customary right then that is evidence (although falling short of absolute proof) that such laws and customs probably reflect some underlying natural right. Something in human nature which means that such laws/customs are morally good laws/customs to have.

Which is fair enough.

But note that's answering the question "how can we know?" It's not denying that human nature, prior to any society, is the source and origin of natural rights.

Note also that an individual's failure to heed a law is not evidence that the law does not exist, because law is prescriptive not descriptive. Similarly, that some cultures do not respect a natural right cannot be proof that it doesn't exist. Although I would tend to agree with you that it is evidence. If no culture in history has ever thought that some modern trend in western culture should constitute a legal right, that's evidence that tends to suggest it isn't a natural right., so we're morally free not to heed it.

Would you say, for example, that all societies ought to have a law against murder, because murder is a breach of natural right ? Alongside saying that we know that there is a natural right to life because the number of societies that recognise this natural right by embodying it in a customary or legal right is too great to be a coincidence ?

Part of the question is whether natural rights provide a moral standard against which societies with their laws and customs can be judged, or whether each individual society is the highest authority you can envisage.

I don't think there is a clear distinction between "natural" and "fiat" rights. Nonetheless, it's reasonable to emphasize some rights more than others, including life and liberty. That's because they are "natural" in the sense that they occur organically, and are violated only by outside interference. This is definitely not the case with property rights. Instead of occuring naturally in lieu of interference, they interfere with the liberty of other people. Indeed, that's all they do and all they can do. I'll grant that liberty is often properly interfered with -- all laws do that. Still, it demonstrates a difference in kind between the right to life and liberty, and the right to property. One asks people not to interfere with others; the other gives people the legal right to interfere, and obliges others to allow themselves to be interfered with.

Of course any moral precept (including obligations and rights) can (and should) be ignored when it is reasonable to do so. It would be oxymoronic to claim otherwise. If it is "unreasonable" to honor a "right" surely we should not honor it. This seems axiomatic, simply from the meanings of the words.

"Reasonable" is sometimes used merely as a term of subjective approval. What does it mean otherwise ?

Loving our neighbors is subjective, because love is subjective. It's impossible to create an objective morality, because the goals toward which we strive are ideals, which are subjective.

[Good_Egg]

It's impossible to create an objective morality, because the goals toward which we strive are ideals, which are subjective.

Seems like you don't actually have any principles at all.

It is axiomatic to you that you are not morally obliged to do or refrain from anything if you judge such an obligation unreasonable, and that judgment can be totally idiosyncratic.

If you choose to strive towards the ideal of being the tallest person in the world, and state that achieving this by murdering everyone who is taller than you are is "reasonable" then everyone should just accept that, because nothing could conceivably be wrong with it. Your judgment of reasonableness is the last word, the bottom line.

In short, you think you're God.

Of course, that may not be what you intended to say...

[Ecurb]

It's impossible to create an objective morality, because the goals toward which we strive are ideals, which are subjective.

Seems like you don't actually have any principles at all.

It is axiomatic to you that you are not morally obliged to do or refrain from anything if you judge such an obligation unreasonable, and that judgment can be totally idiosyncratic.

If you choose to strive towards the ideal of being the tallest person in the world, and state that achieving this by murdering everyone who is taller than you are is "reasonable" then everyone should just accept that, because nothing could conceivably be wrong with it. Your judgment of reasonableness is the last word, the bottom line.

In short, you think you're God.

Of course, that may not be what you intended to say...

I intended to say exactly what I did say. I'ts not my fault if you can't understand it. It's written in clear English.

I specifically listed those principles which I prefer to a list of legalistic ones. I'll quote myself:

In general, I think all rights are culturally constituted, and subject to cultural differences. They do not constitute the essence of morality, which is better elucidated through more general (and positive) moral edicts, like, "Do unto others..." or "Love your neighbor as yourself."

I then claimed that I think all ideals are subjective. You seem to be conflating "subjective" with "idiosyncratic". The principles I specifically listed are hardly "idiosyncratic". In fact, they are the precise principles which have been the basis for Western (and some Eastern) morality for two millenia.

It is not only I, but every thinking person, who thinks that we are not morally obliged to do anything if the obligation is unreasonable. Surely even you (who are apparently confused) will eschew unreasonable obligations. If, for example, you support the right of someone else to limit your freedom of movement (property rights), you might still find it reasonable to violate your obligation to obey their edicts if you were standing on a small, one yard square of land completely surrounded by a neighbor's "property" pocked with "no trespassing" signs. Your options: conform to your obilgations and starve, or ignore them and walk away. Which would you choose?

I do not have an ideal of being the tallest person in the world, but even if I did, murdering everyone taller than I would clearly violate my above-stated principles.

Those rights (life and liberty) which I argued are "basic" (because they are violated only by interference from other people) can still be reasonably violated under certain circumstances. Those circumstances must, of course, conform to the two more basic principles I offer above. "If I were to become a mass murderer shooting kndergarten kids, I hope the police will kill me before I do more harm," the reasonable person may think. "Do unto others."

Also, not only do I not think I am God, but I also don't think God is God. This may be both illogical and true. So much for logic. (You may figure out what I mean, if you can.)

[Good_Egg]

It is not only I, but every thinking person, who thinks that we are not morally obliged to do anything if the obligation is unreasonable.

Most people would agree, but they would be meaning different things by "reasonable".

The original meaning of a reasonable man is one who acts out of principle and can therefore be reasoned out of a proposed action by reference to that principle.

Reason is not itself a principle of conduct, it is logical thinking that can be applied to principles of conduct.

But you mean the opposite - seems that for you "reasonable" is a get-out clause that allows you to deny that any principle of conduct is binding on you.
It is a way of setting your subjective judgment above everything. You'll refrain from murder unless murdering someone seems to you a reasonable thing to do.

You use "reasonable" as a label without content.

(Or so it seems. I can understand you only from what you say, and miscommunication is always possible).

I do not have an ideal of being the tallest person in the world, but even if I did, murdering everyone taller than I would clearly violate my above-stated principles.

What principles ? You say that any moral precept can (and should) be ignored whenever you think it is "reasonable" to do so. According to you, any precept (such as "love thy neighbour") is not binding on you, but is only something you may arbitrarily choose to follow. Sometimes.

Those rights (life and liberty) which I argued are "basic" (because they are violated only by interference from other people)...

Trapper Bruno's property right to the chair that he has made and the log cabin that he has made also meets your criterion of being violated only by interference from other people.

[Ecurb]

What principles ? You say that any moral precept can (and should) be ignored whenever you think it is "reasonable" to do so. According to you, any precept (such as "love thy neighbour") is not binding on you, but is only something you may arbitrarily choose to follow. Sometimes.

Wrong again. I clearly stated my principles, and clearly saId that "do unto others" and "love your neighbor" are binding (read the second to last paragraph of my last post)). Where do you get this stuff? It's difficult to discuss things with someone who constantly misrepresents my clearly stated position. Quit prevaricating!

Those rights (life and liberty) which I argued are "basic" (because they are violated only by interference from other people)...

Trapper Bruno's property right to the chair that he has made and the log cabin that he has made also meets your criterion of being violated only by interference from other people.

I disgree. Bruno's property right exerts control over other people. Other people only interfere with Bruno's property right if we assume a property right. If Bruno makes a chair, and there is no property right, then anyone who sits in the chair without permission is not interfering with Bruno at all (unless Bruno is sitting there first, and the other person sits in his lap). This is obvious. Why you would think otherwise is inexplicable.

[Ecurb]

What principles ? You say that any moral precept can (and should) be ignored whenever you think it is "reasonable" to do so. According to you, any precept (such as "love thy neighbour") is not binding on you, but is only something you may arbitrarily choose to follow. Sometimes.

Wrong again. I clearly stated my principles, and clearly saId that "do unto others" and "love your neighbor" are binding (read the second to last paragraph of my last post)). Where do you get this stuff? It's difficult to discuss things with someone who constantly misrepresents my clearly stated position. Quit prevaricating!

Those rights (life and liberty) which I argued are "basic" (because they are violated only by interference from other people)...

Trapper Bruno's property right to the chair that he has made and the log cabin that he has made also meets your criterion of being violated only by interference from other people.

I disgree. Bruno's property right exerts control over other people. Other people only interfere with Bruno's property right if we assume a property right. If Bruno makes a chair, and there is no property right, then anyone who sits in the chair without permission is not interfering with Bruno at all (unless Bruno is sitting there first, and the other person sits in his lap). This is obvious. Why you would think otherwise is inexplicable.

[Good_Egg]

I clearly stated my principles, and clearly saId that "do unto others" and "love your neighbor" are binding.

What you said about these principles is that
- you prefer them (implying that you're not obliged to follow them but are free to choose others according to your personal preference).
- they are culturally constituted (implying that if you chose to go and live in a different culture you wouldn't be bound by them)
- you'll ignore them whenever you think it "reasonable" to do so.

How can say these things and mean by them that the principles are binding ?

Other people only interfere with Bruno's property right if we assume a property right. If Bruno makes a chair, and there is no property right, then anyone who sits in the chair without permission is not interfering with Bruno at all (unless Bruno is sitting there first, and the other person sits in his lap).

OK, you've put forward a criterion of "interference" (which I tend to agree with, by the way).

And are now criticising it on the grounds that it is circular. That if Bruno has a property right to his chair then sitting in it without his consent is interference, and then from the fact of that interference we reason that he has a property right. Whereas if he has no property right then sitting in his chair does not constitute interference.

Have I understood your point correctly ? That doesn't seem right. You were saying that life and liberty are basic rights because they are only violated by interference. But if property rights are non-basic, their existence still justifies the term "interference". So your argument for circularity fails.

And we've already established that the wrong that corresponds to breach of property right is one of depriving the rightful possessor. If Alfie goes to visit Bruno, finds him absent, and sits in his chair on his front porch awaiting his return, no wrong is involved. Refusing to vacate the chair when Bruno desires to use it, or refusing to vacate the house when Bruno has had enough of Alfie's company and desires privacy, is a deprivation, and thereby lies the wrong.

I would guess that the problem is that you have in mind some other example. Maybe Duke Carlos passes a law that declares the forest to be his private hunting preserve and then punishes trespassers ? Such a property right is indeed nothing but a deprivation of the liberty of others, as you've been saying. But that is the sort of "fiat right" - a law that corresponds to no natural right - which libertarians oppose.

It's very simple, so long as you're clear about what the baseline is - what non-interference looks like.

I think your problem is that you want there to be certain categories of interference with other people - those you consider "reasonable" - which don't count as interference...

[Ecurb]

I clearly stated my principles, and clearly saId that "do unto others" and "love your neighbor" are binding.

What you said about these principles is that
- you prefer them (implying that you're not obliged to follow them but are free to choose others according to your personal preference).
- they are culturally constituted (implying that if you chose to go and live in a different culture you wouldn't be bound by them)
- you'll ignore them whenever you think it "reasonable" to do so.

How can say these things and mean by them that the principles are binding ?

I can say themn very easily, because the meaning is clear to any reasonbly competent English speaker. If principles are "binding", then preferring one principle to another in no way compromises the extent to which it is binding, Why would it? This is standard English usage.

Principles are culturally constituted, obviously. Language is culturally constituted. Principles are phrased in terms of language. In addition, many principles are traditional, and gain credence both by philosophical argument and by traditional use.

Third, if it is "reasonable" to change or ignore principles, of course everyone would do so. That's what "reasonable" means. In fact, you would probably like others (including me) to accept some of your principles because you think them "reasonable". YOur caveat is nonsensical.

Other people only interfere with Bruno's property right if we assume a property right. If Bruno makes a chair, and there is no property right, then anyone who sits in the chair without permission is not interfering with Bruno at all (unless Bruno is sitting there first, and the other person sits in his lap).

OK, you've put forward a criterion of "interference" (which I tend to agree with, by the way).

And are now criticising it on the grounds that it is circular. That if Bruno has a property right to his chair then sitting in it without his consent is interference, and then from the fact of that interference we reason that he has a property right. Whereas if he has no property right then sitting in his chair does not constitute interference.

Have I understood your point correctly ? That doesn't seem right. You were saying that life and liberty are basic rights because they are only violated by interference. But if property rights are non-basic, their existence still justifies the term "interference". So your argument for circularity fails.....

And we've already established that the wrong that corresponds to breach of property right is one of depriving the rightful possessor. If Alfie goes to visit Bruno, finds him absent, and sits in his chair on his front porch awaiting his return, no wrong is involved. Refusing to vacate the chair when Bruno desires to use it, or refusing to vacate the house when Bruno has had enough of Alfie's company and desires privacy, is a deprivation, and thereby lies the wrong.

I would guess that the problem is that you have in mind some other example. Maybe Duke Carlos passes a law that declares the forest to be his private hunting preserve and then punishes trespassers ? Such a property right is indeed nothing but a deprivation of the liberty of others, as you've been saying. But that is the sort of "fiat right" - a law that corresponds to no natural right - which libertarians oppose.

It's very simple, so long as you're clear about what the baseline is - what non-interference looks like.

I think your problem is that you want there to be certain categories of interference with other people - those you consider "reasonable" - which don't count as interference...

Oh, bunk. Anyone who can't see how life and liberty differ from property is not looking very hard. Who IS the "rightful possessor"? You have to make up some obtruse rule of "rightful possession" to establish what it involves. Of course if we believe that there is such a thing as "rightful possession", then we probably believe in "natural property rights". The two phrases are synonymous. Therefore, it is not I, but you, who is employing circular reasoning. IN many culutres, ideas about property vary wildly from those in ours. Nor are these cultures always primitive hunters and gatherers. Modern Communists, for example, have notions of property wildly distinct from yours.

People may have different ideas about what the "right to life" or "right to liberty" might mean -- but "life" and "liberty" are clear concepts in any culture or language. "Property" is not.