meadowsem wrote: ↑January 25th, 2023, 2:37 pm
Hi Scott -
Fun question! The first sentence I didn't understand was on page 27. You say, "One could even argue that the differences between most forms of dualism and monism are merely semantics." I am not a philosopher, and while I understand 2 versus 1, I don't know the arguments around the two concepts. I read that paragraph, oh, ten times? Overall I understood (and agreed with) the concept that there are two selves - the spirit/soul and the physical self/body. My spirit is strong whereas my body gets in the way sometimes.
Thank you for your reply!
Here is the quote in context:
Eckhart Aurelius Hughes (In It Together, page 27) wrote:
When we speak about ‘you’, there are actually at least two different yous about whom we speak.
That is not a reference to some kind of philosophical metaphysical dualism. Rather, the truths in this book are agreeable
to metaphysical dualists and monists alike. One could even argue that the differences between most forms of dualism and monism
are merely semantics.
[...]
Rather, this duality is a conceptual duality, not a metaphysical duality.
In analogy, if one claims that the vague term ‘your computer’ can refer to two different things: your laptop or your desktop, it doesn’t propose some grand philosophical dualism entailing a magical realm of laptop-substance versus desktop-substance.
Rather, the conceptual duality and two meanings for the same word are simply a symptom of the vagueness and equivocality of
human language.
The specific sentence was a tangential remark primarily referencing the
Mind-Body Problem. The
Mind-Body Problem is one of the most known and debated issues in philosophy. The way I would describe it: Dualism is generally the belief that the body (i.e. physical material) and conscious mind both really exist in an absolute sense and are each made up two separate
irreducible substances. In contrast, monism generally says there are
not two substances and essences but rather they
reduce to one. That
reduction from two to one (i.e. from dualism to monism) would generally logically need to take one of the following three forms:
(1) the belief that body (i.e. physical material) is either not fundamentally and absolutely real or reduces to mind (i.e. consciousness or the spirit)
(2) the belief that mind (i.e. consciousness or spirit) is either not fundamentally and absolutely real or reduces to the body (i.e. physical material)
(3) the belief that body (i.e. the physical) and the conscious mind (i.e. the spirit) both reduce to some third singular thing, which is analogous to they way electricity and magnetism were long thought to be two different things but were discovered to both reduce to and actually be the same one thing: electromagnetism.
The three above categories are just broad categories of monism. Much like all the countless religions in the world, there are countless variations of each, some of which bend or blend the lines between the above categories.
So let's go back to the original issue this post is meant to address: What do I mean when I say that the disagreements philosophers have about the above issues are arguably merely semantics. I mean that I think the answer of whether dualism is true or monism is true changes and is different depending on how one happens to define the related words such as 'body', 'mind', 'spirit', 'consciousness', 'physical', and 'material'. Different people use those equivocal words to mean different things.
For example, it can sound like and seem like two people disagree when one yells, "Mind and body are fundamental dualistic", and the other person screams back, "Mind and body reduce to the same thing and are thus fundamentally monistic!" But I think it could be mere semantics in the same way that it could be a semantic difference rather than a real disagreement if two people are looking roughly in the direction of a bowl of frozen ice cream on the ground in the Sahara, and one writes, "the desert is hot", and the other writes, "the desert is cold". Do they disagree? Not necessarily. It sounds like disagreement, but they could both be saying two different compatible things, namely because they could be talking about two completely different things. They might even think they disagree even though they don't. They might not realize that their seeming disagreement is just a semantic issue caused by the equivocality of language (i.e. that the same word can mean two very different things to two different people).
Just imagine if we put a pair of sunglasses on the bowl of ice cream in the Sahara. Then it would be even more confusing to talk about whether or not the desert was cool.
I hope this helped clarify what I meant by the quoted sentence in the book, but please do let me know if you have any further questions about that sentence or anything.
My entire political philosophy summed up in one tweet.
"The mind is a wonderful servant but a terrible master."
I believe spiritual freedom (a.k.a. self-discipline) manifests as bravery, confidence, grace, honesty, love, and inner peace.