Having problems with superscript tags
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Having problems with superscript tags
This is a request to add superscript tags to the post in thread I submitted to the Philosophy of Politics board. Also, I request subscripting to the H2O terms in the post and removal of the asterisk note. A look at what I paste in this thread should aid in what edits I am requesting (Thank you in advance).
Here is a pasting of my work from WPS Office that was not showing superscripts. Maybe someone can decipher what happened. The subscripting held but not the superscripting.
This thread will cover arguments that I have considered that exist as refutations to the allegation that a defendant is guilty of a crime [sup](1)[/sup]. These arguments may analogously be applied to the realm of civil law, but my focus will be on criminal law. Inherit in either system is the philosophy of legal compatibalism [sup](2)[/sup], which holds that persons are legal actors and responsible for their actions.
The two types of arguments that I have generated are as follows:
(1) The argument against a claim of guilt against a defendant because the claimant is an authority (the authority-based claim).
(2) The argument against a claim of guilt against a defendant because the defendant allegedly fulfilled the elements of the crime.
In the second type of argument, I focus on different premises that might be used to deny that a defendant fulfilled the elements:
a. The defendant did not fulfill the elements of the crime because the defendant did not exist at the alleged time of the alleged crime ("the non-continuity of identity" argument) [sup](3), (4)[/sup].
b. The defendant did not fulfill the elements of the crime because the defendant was interdependent with the dimensions of space and the dimension of time, whereby such interdependence is proven by the theory of special relativity ("the non-causative agent" argument).
Of these arguments, upon much reflection, I think (2)(a.) is the strongest. I consider that society may reject the argument and the belief that an individual's identity is non-continuous [sup](5), (6), (7)[/sup]. In such a case, I believe that argument (2)(b.) may be used to refute such persons with such mentality.
My general belief is that criminal law would most likely shy away from the charge that a defendant is guilty because the adjudicator is an authority on such. It appears to me that such charge requires that the adjudicator's authority be absolute, leading to a recursion of premises that are all valid in nature to support the argument by authority and avoid the problem of the Münchhausen trilemma.
To bring back discussion to the premises of the second type of argument, I believe there are premises to support the arguments that are worth defending, despite the problem of the Münchhausen trilemma. Here, we enter into the realm of science, but there shall be some philosophy mixed in.
The legal system makes the presumption that there is continuity to personhood (which appears to be an outcome of its compatibalist beliefs). For example, a legal actor's personhood is presumed to have continuity, such as from the point of arrest (formal charge) to the point of trial. The defendant is presumed to be the same person during those points in time. That presumption involves generalizing that the instances of an entity over time may be defined as a single person. However, that presumption is a faulty generalization because each moment of time that passes generates a new person. It is not the situation that part of a person has changed; the whole person has changed. An ever-changing entity may use the same name over time, but such use does not preclude that the entity is the same person for each instance of time the name is used.
I have different versions of (2)(a.). However, I will provide one version that I think is fairly accurate.
The defendant is not guilty because the defendant did not fulfill the elements of the crime; the defendant (the bodies of mass that compose the individual in the now) did not exist (were not in the configuration, such as spatial position in time, they are now); (this premise is a guess due to limited physics knowledge) if the bodies of mass that compose the defendant hadn't been in a different configuration (such as spatial positions), then their mass would be undefined [sup](8), (9)[/sup].
I will now move onto the non-causative agent argument.
One of the first things I would like to mention about this argument is that it argues that the defendant is interdependent (interwoven) with the dimensions of space and the dimension of time [sup](9)[/sup]. This means that the defendant is not independent of those dimensions. Being bound (delimited) to those dimensions means the defendant is not free to manipulate matter in those dimensions. A defendant cannot escape the dimensions of space and the dimension of time and generate matter to exist in the dimensions of space at some point in time.
It is considered that a physical definition of free will is independence from the dimensions of space and the dimension of time with the ability to manipulate matter in those dimensions. To think that one has free will to pick up a pencil while he or she is sitting at a desk would be like him or her existing outside of those dimensions and drawing matter into various spatial and temporal positions. An analogy might be considered of what it is like to make a Macromedia Flash animation with drawing in scenery, a person, the person's actions, and so on with various animation timeline frames over time: The animated person-drawing becomes an extension of self.
These aspects of a defendant being interdependent with the dimensions of space and the dinension of time argue against a defendant having free will and argue against a defendant causing an actus reus with free will. Although being able to deny free will may aid in denying guilt, the government charges that being a causative legal actor to an actus reus makes a defendant liable to guilt.
For instance, consider the strict liability crime of driving 10 MPH over the speed limit [sup](10)[/sup]. It does not matter whether or not a person drives at such speed with the belief of conscious control ("free will"). A driver may be driving at such speeds without paying attention to the speedometer. What matters is whether or not the driver was the causative agent of the speeding. A fact-finder (adjudicator/jury) might argue that a driver is responsible as the causative agent, as it was the defendant's foot on the gas pedal and no one was forcing the driver's foot to be on the gas pedal.
In its current formulation, the theory of special relativity argues that causality exists for persons. The non-causative agent argument relies on the theory of special relativity with a caveat: I deny the allegation that there exists a cause-and-effect relationship in any light cone, which is a theoretical structure employed in support of the theory of special relativity. In doing such, I deny that any defendant exists as a causative agent ("actor").
Persons are composed of matter. Matter is alleged to be able to exist at a light cone "event." And an event is alleged to be the cause [sup](11)[/sup] of a "future light cone."
Supposedly, objects in a future light cone of some light cone may "causally influence" objects in the past light cone of a different light cone [sup](12)[/sup].
Foundationally, I believe there are only correlations, such as a correlation between an alleged "past light cone" and an alleged "event" and a correlation between an alleged "event" and an alleged "future light cone."
There is no "causal influence" from objects in an alleged light cone's alleged future light cone toward the objects of an alleged past light cone of a different alleged light cone because no actual light cones exist.
For what I understand, Minowski proposed the idea that the "past light cone" is the cause of the "event" (the effect) in a light cone and the "event" in a light cone the cause of a "future light cone" (the effect of the "event"). My interpretation of Minowski's arguments is that his critical thinking was not present, perhaps moreso that he held a cognitive bias to support the philosophy of determinism as an act of mutualism to survive in a world where those in power upheld such a philosophy (evolutionary mutualism). I consider his behavior strongly correlates with an absence of philosophy background on issues, such as sampling bias, faulty generalizations [sup](13)[/sup], category errors, the problem of induction [sup](14)[/sup], and cause-and-effect relations: He just wasn't critical enough.
Let me provide a modern example of a conundrum in science that involves a faulty generalization:
NaOH (aq) + HCl (aq) -> NaCl (aq) + H2O (l)
For those of whom have studied inorganic chemistry, the equation reads, "Sodium hydroxide in its aqueous form and hydrochloric acid in its aqueous form combine to cause aqueous sodium chloride and liquid water to form." Science, with that chemical theory makes the argument, "if A occurs, then B occurs."
"A" in the chemical equation is the mixture of NaOH (aq) and HCl (aq); "B" in the chemical equation is the formation of NaCl (aq) and H2O (l).
The problem here is with the issue of identity, consistency of identity of substances from one experiment to the next. One may further elaborate on the thought of identity by thinking about the concepts of necessary and sufficient criteria. I deny that there can ever be sufficient criteria and claim that all sufficiency arguments are premised on authority, whereby such authority (unless from an absolute authority, which would guarantee an argument of sufficiency) would be invalid.
To make sense of the issue, question the following: "What are the necessary and sufficient criteria that qualify a substance as aqueous sodium hydroxide?"
Aqueous sodium hydroxide is a theoretical construct. For a substance to be aqueous sodium hydroxide, it must fulfill the necessary criteria. The positioning of molecules, their place in space and time, how they are rotated in space, and how they physically appear (in general) is different from one experiment to the other. No one alleged molecule of NaOH is identical to any other alleged molecule of NaOH. The theory, however, presupposes the possibility of such in that it argues that there exist molecules that qualify as NaOH by fulfilling the necessary criteria. Such is a faulty generalization. The ionic particles of NaOH and HCl are not identical from one aqueous solution to the next.
The chemical equation purports the following:
(1) If A, then B.
(2) A.
Therefore, B.
However, as may be observed, the reactants and products are not identical from one experiment to the next. Yet the equation defines any NaOH (aq) + HCl (aq) mixture as "A." Such is a faulty generalization. Only "A" equals "A." Something that looks like "A" is not identical to an "A." The same may be said about "B."
With the light cone, as found in the theory of special relativity, all past light cones with their contents are generalized as identical, despite their individual properties. However, no past light cone is identical to any other past light cone.
The cause-and-effect relation between an alleged past light cone ("P") and an alleged event ("Q") is alleged to have the following reasoning:
(1) If P, then Q.
(2) P.
Therefore, Q.
All "past light cones" are alleged to be of the set of P's: All are alleged to categorically be P's. All "events" are alleged to be of the set of Q's: All are alleged to categorically be Q's. However, no two past light cones of the set of P's cause the same effect (cause the same, identical event).
This situation is similar to the chemistry example with the product from one sample of observation never being the same to another sample of observation. It is considered that if P caused Q, then all Q's would be identical. However, not all Q's are identical.
All alleged past light cones might categorically be P's but not all alleged events are Q's.
Consider the following syllogism:
(1) If a household cat is present in my bedroom, it will meow.
(2) A household cat is present in my bedroom.
Therefore, it will meow.
Again, there is the issue of whether or not any animal can necessarily qualify as a household cat. However, not all meows are equal. The word "meow" might be interpreted as a specific kind of meow, unique in its character.
All household cats might be grouped together, but not all meows will be the same. Upon a more critical analysis, it might be argued that no animal could categorically be a household cat due to never being able to fulfill the necessary criteria of the grouping and that a household cat only exists in theory.
The question arises, "For any alleged light cone, is its alleged past light cone the cause of the light cone's respective alleged event?"
Alleged past light cone being the cause of Q is alleged to have the following reasoning:
(1) If P, then Q.
(2) P.
Therefore, Q.
Is an object classifiable as a past light cone ("P") if it has properties that differ from other similar objects that look like "P"?
In theory, it is alleged that there is such a thing as a "past light cone." I argue that this construct is an object that only exists in theory as an abstract concept because no object in reality qualifies itself as a past light cone; no object in reality has the necessary criteria to qualify itself as a "past light cone."
All objects in reality are different from each other with no object being identical to the other: Any object will have more or less properties than the maximal necessary criteria.
For instance, let's presume that for an object to be a "past light cone," ("P"), an object must have X, Y, and Z criteria. If an object has W, X, Y, and Z (more than X, Y, and Z) or only X and Y (less than X, Y, and Z), then the object fails to meet the maximal necessary criteria to be a past light cone: The concept of a past light cone exists only in theory.
From understanding this, we may argue that no object may be defined as a past light cone because no object in reality has the necessary criteria to qualify itself as a "past light cone."
In reality, past light cones do not exist: They are of theory.
This situation is similar to the chemical equation problem: No substance will ever match the theoretical reactants or products; all substances will have something different about them that prevents them from being categorized as the theoretical substances. HCl is a theorized molecule with its presence in an aqueous solution theorized.
The concept of sufficiency is a farse. Without all qualifications being met, an object cannot be the same as the theorized object.
With these things argued, no object in reality exists categorically as a P: There is a difference between reality (that of which exists outside of theory, perhaps better argued as observable nature) and theory. No object may exist as a Q. Only in theory does P cause Q. But in reality, no P's exist to bring about a Q.
All alleged past light cones are unrepresentative [sup](15)[/sup] and cannot be alleged to be a actual past light cones that cause events because none of them are actual past light cones.
(1) If P, then Q.
(2) Not P. (No P's in reality exist)
Therefore, not Q.
Correlation does not imply causation.
Let the theoretical construct of a light cone event be labeled as "Q" and the theoretical construct of a future light cone be labeled "R":
(1) If Q, then R.
(2) Not Q. (No actual Q's exist)
Therefore, not R.
No alleged event between an alleged past light cone and an alleged future light cone causes a future light cone. No alleged event has the necessary criteria of a theorized event between a theoretical past light cone and a theoretical future light cone. All parts of a light cone are theoretical and do not exist in reality.
See also:
(1) Elements of Crime
(2) "The Secret Politics of the Compatibilist Criminal Law" by Anders Kaye; Thomas Jefferson School of Law; Kansas Law Review, Vol. 55, p. 365, 2007; TJSL Legal Studies Research Paper; No. 979421; 63 Pages; Posted: 12 Apr 2007; Last revised: 5 Aug 2008. (Note: This source of information is being cited because it is where I was introduced to the concept of legal compatibalism, for what I recall.)
(3) "Personal identity." Section: No-self theory. Wikipedia. As accessed on February 14th, 2021 at 9:52 p.m..
(4) Ship of Theseus.
(5) Perdurantism or perdurance theory. "Perdurantism." Wikipedia. As accessible at 7:35 p.m. on February 12th, 2021.
(6) Endurantism or endurance theory. "Endurantism." Wikipedia. As accessible at 7:38 p.m. on February 12th, 2021.
(7) Four-dimensionalism. Wikipedia. As accessible at 7:37 p.m. on February 12th, 2021.
(8) Note: Velocity is a function of change in spatial position over time. The mass of a body in motion is dependent on the variable of velocity and becomes undefined if the velocity is zero.
(9) The theory of special relativity
(10) 625 ILCS 5/11-610 (from Ch. 95 1/2, par. 11-610) - Illinois Compiled Statutes
(11) Causality (physics). Section: As a physical concept. Wikipedia. As accessible at 9:46 a.m. on February 14th, 2021.
(12) Krioukov, Dmitri & Kitsak, Maksim & Sinkovits, Robert & Rideout, David & Meyer, David & Boguñá, Marián. (2012). Network Cosmology. Scientific reports. 2. 793. 10.1038/srep00793. (Note: It is suggested to focus reading on "Figure 1" and its note.)
(13) Fallacy of defective induction
(14) "David Hume: Causation." Author: C. M. Lorkowski. Kent State University, U. S. A.. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Date accessed: February 14th, 2021 at 10:13 a.m..
(15) Fallacy of unrepresentative samples
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Re: Having problems with superscript tags
H2O
It seems to be working for short posts but, for some reason, no joy with yours. Will send a message to Scott.
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Re: Having problems with superscript tags
Rather, it appears the use of parenthesis within the superscript or subscript is what is causing the BBCode to not be processed.
For example, the following will work:
Code: Select all
[sup]1[/sup]
Code: Select all
[sup](1)[/sup]
"The mind is a wonderful servant but a terrible master."
I believe spiritual freedom (a.k.a. self-discipline) manifests as bravery, confidence, grace, honesty, love, and inner peace.
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