The March Philosophy Book of the Month is Final Notice by Van Fleisher. Discuss Final Notice now.
The April Philosophy Book of the Month is The Unbound Soul by Richard L. Haight. Discuss The Unbound Soul Now
The May Philosophy Book of the Month is Misreading Judas by Robert Wahler.
January 2019 Philosophy Book of the Month: The Runaway Species: How Human Creativity Remakes the World by David Eagleman and Anthony Brandt
February 2019 Philosophy Book of the Month: The Fourth Age: Smart Robots, Conscious Computers, and the Future of Humanity by Byron Reese (Nominated by RJG)
March 2019 Philosophy Book of the Month: Final Notice by Van Fleisher
April 2019 Philosophy Book of the Month: The Unbound Soul: A Visionary Guide to Spiritual Transformation and Enlightenment by Richard L. Haight
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What do you think of this chapter? What do you think of Papineau's ideas and arguments? If you chose mostly disagree or utterly disagree for the poll, then on what specifically do you disagree with Papineau?
While I do not adhere to the MWI, I agree with much of David Papineau's points about probability and the overall rebuttal of the claim that EQM has more trouble with probability than single-world physics. However, in some ways, I think Papineau gives into the opposition to much by even engaging the issue of probability as such. Indeed, I might argue that "objective probability" simply doesn't exist. Of course, that would render the principal principle in such a case moot. In other words, I think all there is is subjective or epistemic probability in a deterministic world. In that sense, single-world interpretations seem to struggle with probability simply because they have to not only assert that some truly random but seemingly probability-obeying events occur which make the world not deterministic and then find a way to justify behavior and credence based on that. I agree that MWI and EQM don't struggle in those ways, but I think Papineau's arguments while essentially saying a similar story in other semantics give too much leeway for argument. I think the same point can be made by denying objective probability. Alternatively, if we believe "objective probability" exists in a deterministic universe such as presumably under MWI, then I think we need yet a third category of probability, perhaps called 'ontological probability', based on an ontological randomness (i.e. indeterminacy) which perhaps by definition does not exist in MWI.
Anyway, what do you think?
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