Objective Moral Conundrum

[Belindi]

I suggest the new framing will be historically based and along the same reasoning as the Black Lives Matter movement.That movement , so far ,is universalistic as opposed to tribal.

Well, that is a curious comment. A "Black Lives Matter" movement is universal, not tribal? Wouldn't an "All Lives Matter" movement be the universal version?

Yes it would in a way. However there is movement in historiography like a pendulum, and at this particular juncture we need to redress the balance.

[Gertie]

Gertie wrote:

I also think that the current chaotic, relativistic vacuum which is allowing phenomena like the rise of the alt-right, strongman demagogue daddies to sort it all out for us, and a reactionary return to religious fundamentalism to flourish, will show itself to be unsatisfying, if not downright catastrophic. We see the tide beginning to turn in America, which is hugely influential on the wealthy west at least, and can **** things up globally. And maybe people will be ready for a new framing which they can feel better about. Hope so anyway...

To lack a guiding star does make a person fearful and tribally inclined. I suggest the new framing will be historically based and along the same reasoning as the Black Lives Matter movement.That movement , so far ,is universalistic as opposed to tribal.

I think BLM taking off big time in this moment is perhaps a signifier of a thirst for recognition of our shared humanity. Most people instinctively get such an appeal (especially if they see it on video, triggering empathetic responses), and many feel the need to assert basic moral principles in this swirl of relativistic chaos, to feel anchored to something good.

[GE Morton]

* Evolutionary psychology/neurobiology - we're beginning to understand the evolutionary basis of our 'moral pre-dispositions', undermining the very notion of morality as anything but an explainable happenstance. (Pat Churchland is very good on this imo, a philospher of neuroethics who went off and studied neurobiology https://patriciachurchland.com/ )

Trying to derive sound moral principles from neurobiological facts a la Churchland et al, suffers two problems, both fatal: first, those "moral predispositions" are highly variable from person to person. Whose moral predispositions should we follow, those of chimpanzees or bonobos? Both are present, in varying degrees, in humans. Second, the approach falls headfirst into the "is-ought" gap. Whatever predispositions behavioral research might reveal, the question of whether they are moral remains.

These two comments are interesting:

I think Harris's nifty summation of The Welfare of Conscious Creatures provides a constructive and justifiable way out. I like Goldstein's associated notion of Mattering too. This is an area where philosophy can offer something useful to the world, and we're crying out for it for right now. Instead we see endless stale subjective v objective debates which get us nowhere useful.

And,

But as you say, people buying into it is another thing. Some abstract philosophical formulation is a tough sell, when competing with our gut feelings, religious indoctrination, cultural influence, personal views born of affecting personal experience and so on.

You don't seem to grasp that the only thing philosophy offers to the world is a methodology for rationally analyzing and solving problems. Rationality implies objectivity. The only morality that has a chance of displacing those moral "intuitions" based on gut feelings, cultural conditioning, religious indoctrination, etc., is one derived from a goal taken to be axiomatic, that is consistent with publicly verifiable facts about the world and the social environment, and conclusions logically drawn from that axiom and those facts. It is certainly the only sort of morality deserving of being called philosophical.

[Wossname]

y Gertie » Yesterday, 6:54 pm

Thank you for the link Gertie.

[Wossname]

You don't seem to grasp that the only thing philosophy offers to the world is a methodology for rationally analyzing and solving problems. Rationality implies objectivity. The only morality that has a chance of displacing those moral "intuitions" based on gut feelings, cultural conditioning, religious indoctrination, etc., is one derived from a goal taken to be axiomatic, that is consistent with publicly verifiable facts about the world and the social environment, and conclusions logically drawn from that axiom and those facts. It is certainly the only sort of morality deserving of being called philosophical.

I have no wish to intrude on private grief, but can I say that I am still finding your notion of objectivity in relation to morality a bit curious? Firstly, as an aside, I agree it is relatively easy, generally speaking, to establish whether someone is alive or not, and that again, generally speaking, this seems easier than deciding if someone’s wellbeing is being promoted. But the relative ease of the task would be an odd criterion on which to hang a moral system. The issue is whether an action is morally right, not whether it is easy to check. I would venture that the moral scope of “liberty” may be a somewhat tricky notion to delineate and your liberty, and mine, is rightly curtailed in a number of ways (and not just to protect life). As to the pursuit of happiness, well sorry Mr. President but happiness seems pretty much on a par with wellbeing. To discover if someone’s happiness was being pursued you could ask them, ditto for if their wellbeing was being promoted, and answers here might not necessarily reflect the truth. Messy.

But such issues aside, whether someone has a right to their life is another matter. That is a matter of decision and it must turn on the moral axioms you accept. But whatever axiom you accept is arbitrary, not something objective in the sense that the axiom is open to be observed and agreed upon. If I have understood it we are currently debating the merits of two axioms: One axiom is “One ought not inflict losses or injuries on other moral agents”, put forward in discussion by your good self as the underpinning to claims about natural rights, and the other is “We should seek to maximise the wellbeing of conscious creatures” put forward by Gertie. These seem to have the same objective status, i.e. neither are.

An attraction of a claim that someone has a natural right to life and liberty is that it provides an objection to those who might claim your life as belonging to them to own and do with as they please. When some monarch or pope (doubtless in the name of God) makes such claims on you, you can object that your right to life or liberty is being violated. But as you have repeatedly, patiently explained, the terms have a historical meaning, i.e. they are a description of a relationship, (between you and the things you bring into the world) and so it means diddly squat to anyone who denies the relationship exists. That is, if they deny that having a life automatically confers self-ownership of it, then your objections become correspondingly irrelevant and fall on deaf ears. No says the monarch, your life belongs to me, end of. Like you say, there is no arguing with some people, a charge some people might equally direct at you.

Of course you will know that in practice these “rights” are violated all the time and our governments are as culpable as any, (e.g. state sponsored warfare). You can claim that you find such behaviour appalling and I would agree. But to claim it is objectively wrong seems dubious. The government would (of course) deny it. What are you pointing to apart from the claim itself? You seem to be saying you are wrong IF you accept my axiom. But that is a big if. And how is that different from claims about morality derived from any moral axiom? People can, and do dismiss such claims out of hand and replace them with their own counter-claims. There seems no more objectivity here than elsewhere, (e.g. a claim we should seek to maximise the wellbeing of conscious creatures).

Both claims/axioms seem to me to be equally arbitrary, and though they both have their attractions I fear they both seem currently to be having distressingly little impact. Given that, it seems reasonable to reflect on why such axioms are or are not likely to find general acceptance, what any barriers to their acceptance might be, and how their acceptance might be promoted, such promotion being necessary precisely because most people do not consider them to be self-evident truths. I would suggest that the utility of an axiom is largely improved to the extent that others accept the axiom. Since they are not objective self-evident truths, they need to be argued for, and that falls within the scope of philosophy.

[GE Morton]

I have no wish to intrude on private grief, but can I say that I am still finding your notion of objectivity in relation to morality a bit curious? Firstly, as an aside, I agree it is relatively easy, generally speaking, to establish whether someone is alive or not, and that again, generally speaking, this seems easier than deciding if someone’s wellbeing is being promoted. But the relative ease of the task would be an odd criterion on which to hang a moral system. The issue is whether an action is morally right, not whether it is easy to check.

I'm not quite sure what point you're trying to make there. Whether an act (or public policy) is morally right is answered by determining whether or not it is consistent with a sound moral theory. It has nothing to do with the ease of determining any facts --- although if the facts concerning an act cannot be determined, then the morality question can't be answered. E.g., suppose Alfie kills Bruno, thus presumptively violating his right to life. But Alfie claims he acted in self-defense. There were no witnesses and no evidence either confirming or contradicting Alfie's claim. That issue is thus undecidable.

There will also be cases where whether a certain act does or does not increase or reduce someone else's well-being can't be determined. Those cases are likewise undecidable. But most cases are not undecidable --- if Alfie steals Bruno's bicycle, he will have reduced Bruno's well-being. We know that because we know Bruno worked many hours to earn the money to buy the bicycle, and that he rides it regularly. Hence we know he values the bicycle, and taking something he values from him reduces his well-being, by definition.

The fact that there will be some undecidable cases doesn't invalidate a moral theory or principle. The morality of an act always turns on the facts of the case, and those will sometimes remain unknown. We're not omniscient.

I would venture that the moral scope of “liberty” may be a somewhat tricky notion to delineate and your liberty, and mine, is rightly curtailed in a number of ways (and not just to protect life).

Absolutely. The exercise of all rights is limited by others' rights. "My right to swing my fist ends where your nose begins." My right to free speech does not extend to libeling you, or falsely accusing you in a courtroom.

As to the pursuit of happiness, well sorry Mr. President but happiness seems pretty much on a par with wellbeing. To discover if someone’s happiness was being pursued you could ask them, ditto for if their wellbeing was being promoted, and answers here might not necessarily reflect the truth. Messy.

Quite right. Hence subjective assessments and reports of well-being are ruled out tout court. The only claims of gains or losses of well-being admissible are those supported by objective evidence (such as the bicycle theft above). An agent's disappointment, disapproval, or hurt feelings resulting from someone else's act don't count as losses of well-being. Why not? Because counting them would render virtually every moral question undecidable.

But such issues aside, whether someone has a right to their life is another matter. That is a matter of decision and it must turn on the moral axioms you accept.

Actually, no. Whether someone has a right to life (or to any thing else to which he may claim a right) is not a moral question; it is a question of fact. He will have the right to whatever he claims if he acquired the thing righteously, i.e., without inflicting losses or injuries on anyone else. Which is a factual question. The moral question is whether or not we ought to respect that right.

But whatever axiom you accept is arbitrary, not something objective in the sense that the axiom is open to be observed and agreed upon. If I have understood it we are currently debating the merits of two axioms: One axiom is “One ought not inflict losses or injuries on other moral agents”, put forward in discussion by your good self as the underpinning to claims about natural rights, and the other is “We should seek to maximise the wellbeing of conscious creatures” put forward by Gertie. These seem to have the same objective status, i.e. neither are.

That is true, except "“One ought not inflict losses or injuries on other moral agents" is not an axiom; it is a theorem derivable from the axiom, "“We should seek to maximise the wellbeing of [all] conscious creatures." That is Gertie's formulation. My own is, "Develop rules of interaction among agents in a social setting which enable all agents in that setting to maximize their welfare." I take the two formulations to be substantively equivalent. (I added the quantifier "all" to Gertie's version, because without it is logically incomplete).

But you're right that the axiom, either version, is not objective. It is not a statement of fact; it is a goal statement, to be accepted as self-evident, as expressing the aim of virtually all moral theories and systems over the centuries. Anyone who disagrees with it will have some radically different conception of what morality is all about, and moral discussions with such persons would be futile and fruitless.

An attraction of a claim that someone has a natural right to life and liberty is that it provides an objection to those who might claim your life as belonging to them to own and do with as they please. When some monarch or pope (doubtless in the name of God) makes such claims on you, you can object that your right to life or liberty is being violated. But as you have repeatedly, patiently explained, the terms have a historical meaning, i.e. they are a description of a relationship, (between you and the things you bring into the world) and so it means diddly squat to anyone who denies the relationship exists.

Well, denying that relationship exists, when it does, is simply a false claim --- just as false as, say, denying that Alfie is Bruno's brother when they have the same parents, or denying that the sun rises in the East and sets in the West. One can, to be sure, deny any common rights claim (most property rights claims) by denying that the claimant actually acquired the thing righteously. So then we need to determine what the available evidence shows (as is done regularly in "quiet title" lawsuits). But natural rights claims --- claims to things one brought with one into the world --- cannot possibly be false, or honestly denied.

That is, if they deny that having a life automatically confers self-ownership of it, then your objections become correspondingly irrelevant and fall on deaf ears.

Well, that objector would be assuming some alternative criterion for ownership, and have the burden of articulating it and presenting a moral defense of it.

Of course you will know that in practice these “rights” are violated all the time and our governments are as culpable as any, (e.g. state sponsored warfare). You can claim that you find such behaviour appalling and I would agree. But to claim it is objectively wrong seems dubious.

It is objectively wrong IF you accept the axiom given. That it is inconsistent with that axiom is an objective fact, just as objective as, say, the Pythagorean Theorem. And, as said, if you don't accept that axiom then fruitful moral argument is no longer possible; the only "argument" left is the ad baculum argument --- "might makes right."

[Wossname]

y GE Morton » Today, 3:02 pm

Wossname wrote: ↑Yesterday, 9:56 pm

Thanks for the reply. Again, that has clarified matters for me. The odd issue remains though.

y GE Morton » Today, 3:02 pm

The fact that there will be some undecidable cases doesn't invalidate a moral theory or principle. The morality of an act always turns on the facts of the case, and those will sometimes remain unknown. We're not omniscient.

We are in agreement here.

Also we are agreed that any moral system is built on axioms (assumptions) that in themselves are not objective.

And further, we can objectively make claims about the extent to which behaviour may deviate from an axiom and so make objective claims (with varying degrees of certainty) about whether an act is morally good or bad in relation to it. It seems you believe that you and Gertie share very similar moral axioms! That could be another discussion, but here I will just say your reply surprised me since elsewhere, when I asked why we were obliged to accept someone had a right to X you wrote:

"Yes, if we accept as a moral axiom that one ought not inflict losses or injuries on other moral agents, then we are morally obliged to regard acts or acquisitions which do not inflict loss or injury on others "righteous …".

But now we have
“One ought not inflict losses or injuries on other moral agents" is not an axiom”

You understand my confusion but no matter.


Of course different axioms are possible and have been expressed over the centuries. For example, someone might argue that you are God’s child, His claims on your soul and life predate and supersede all others. And a monarch or pope might claim that they are God’s representative of earth, their word represents His and you are free, therefore, only to do what they say. Your life is not, in fact, yours and never can be. You say you have a righteous claim but they say you do not. You can never claim for yourself what was never yours to begin with. That you have harmed no-one may be an accurate description of events, but you cannot righteously acquire that which already belongs to another. Your life is not and never can be yours. The simple fact of your birth accrues you no rights.

You say
“ claims to things one brought with one into the world --- cannot possibly be false, or honestly denied”.

That does not seem obviously true given the axiom outlined above. The truth condition seems dependent on the axiom you accept.


And so things are getting a bit murky for me. You say rights exist as a matter of fact independently of the axiom. Rights, if I understand you, exist as objective facts. The facts here constitute a relationship. I still believe it is open to someone to say they see no relationship, what are you pointing to? If they adopt a different axiom it provides a contrary answer (as above), in which such claims to rights do amount to diddly squat.

So it remains unclear to me that there are any objective facts of that kind to be had, though it seems that once we have agreed on an axiom we can discuss facts in relation to it. As you say we can discuss the number of degrees in a triangle depending on whether the geometry we accept is Euclidian or otherwise. I would venture that the level of disagreement on moral issues suggests that moral axioms may be more difficult to derive than those of plane geometry. You say

“But you're right that the axiom, either version, (meaning here yours or Gertie’s), is not objective. It is not a statement of fact; it is a goal statement, to be accepted as self-evident, ..... Anyone who disagrees with it will have some radically different conception of what morality is all about, and moral discussions with such persons would be futile and fruitless”.

I say you are likely right there, and that kind of highlights the problem. But philosophers enjoy a good argument, they sometimes have had influence so all hope may not be lost. I also think the level of disagreement on issues reflects that moral axioms are not really all that self-evident and the extent to which they are perceived to be so likely reflects the cultural conditioning that seems to concern you.

[Gertie]

Woss

I disagree with the objective/arbitrary distinction you make here. Bear with me because it takes a bit of explaining which can be awkward to get your head round.

But such issues aside, whether someone has a right to their life is another matter. That is a matter of decision and it must turn on the moral axioms you accept. But whatever axiom you accept is arbitrary, not something objective in the sense that the axiom is open to be observed and agreed upon. If I have understood it we are currently debating the merits of two axioms: One axiom is “One ought not inflict losses or injuries on other moral agents”, put forward in discussion by your good self as the underpinning to claims about natural rights, and the other is “We should seek to maximise the wellbeing of conscious creatures” put forward by Gertie. These seem to have the same objective status, i.e. neither are.

The argument requires thinking afresh about what morality is, and what it's for, rather than assuming anything which isn't objectively measurable and observable can't be axiomatic. Conscious states aren't objectively observable/measurable, but they are real and known. And I'd argue morality lies within the realm of experiencing Subjects, and all that being a Subject entails.

If you get your head around this, and agree, then we have a basis for letting go of historical notions of objective morality which no longer look justifiable and don't serve us well in our modern world. We can start thinking about morality afresh, based on what we now understand.

A world of dead rocks has no interests, no use for morality, a rock can't be harmed in a way which is meaningful to the rock. Morality is created by experiencing Subjects, important to subjects, impacts subjects' quality of life. and because subjects have different experiences and opinions, argued over by subjects. And should be grounded in subjects' interests, aka their wellbeing, because actions have consequences which can help or harm subjects' interests.

That is the bridge from Is to Ought. Experiencing Subjects have a quality of life (unlike rocks, toasters and trees) which can be impacted by our actions.

That is the basis for an axiomatic grounding of morality which accepts it is subjective, in that it only exists because subjects exist, embraces all that being a subject means, and says morality is still meaningful.

Conscious subjective experience brings meaning, value, mattering and Oughts into the world, it is the very category morality is relevant to. Because only conscious subjects have a quality of life, and that is the thing of value which is lost when a subject dies.

Hence it matters if I harm or help you, and that's the appropriate basis for Oughts. Regardless of tribe, religion, objective measurability, evolutionary history - wellbeing still matters. We have a whole separate vocabulary which acknowledges the inherently qualiative 'what it's like' nature of being a conscious subject. Happy, sad, pain, joy, harm, care, meaning, value, mattering. In a nutshell, wellbeing. We all get it, we all know these things are real even if they're not describable/measurable in the quantitive types of ways physical objects are. It's the qualiative nature of being a conscious subject which makes morality real.

Subjective experience also is messy, idiosyncratic, hard to measure 'objectively' and such, which makes it tricky to form hard and fast rules for Oughts, and means some individual freedom needs to written in. But as you say, that doesn't mean we shouldn't accept it's important and do our best to get it right.

[Wossname]

by Gertie » 10 minutes ago

I think I agree with everything you have written.
I am content with the axiomatic grounding you suggest.

What I (think) I am trying to say in relation to arbitrariness is that I am not sure others may accept it all the same.
It must be explained and argued for (as you are with me - thank you), and then accepted.

Could others see the argument and still reject it?
Well yes, for some religious or ideological reasons or whatever.
Depends on the kinds of ideas that you are willing to shape your axiom.
But you know this.

So I think I may have missed your point.
I will reflect and try and get my head around it.

[Gertie]

by Gertie » 10 minutes ago

I think I agree with everything you have written.
I am content with the axiomatic grounding you suggest.

What I (think) I am trying to say in relation to arbitrariness is that I am not sure others may accept it all the same.
It must be explained and argued for (as you are with me - thank you), and then accepted.

Could others see the argument and still reject it?
Well yes, for some religious or ideological reasons or whatever.
Depends on the kinds of ideas that you are willing to shape your axiom.
But you know this.

So I think I may have missed your point.
I will reflect and try and get my head around it.

Thanks. I do struggle to explain it clearly.

I take your point 'axiomatic' might not be right, and I don't see much point in delving into whether its justifiable in some esoteric way.

You're right it's a position which has to be argued rather than simply pointed at like an apple and asking if you see the apple too. First person 'qualiative experiential realities' aren't a good fit with that inter-subjective/objective observational type of basis for axioms. We can agree we both see the apple, in a way we can't agree who gets to eat it.


So I'm making a claim for the wellbeing of conscious creatures as a universally appropriate grounding for morality (based on the experiential nature of being a subject), rather than an axiomatic grounding. And maybe that's that's the best we can do when dealing with such a concept.


The foundational primacy of subjects' wellbeing still needs arguing for though (by someone better able to articulate it than me!), you make a fair point.

[Gertie]

TLDR version -

If you accept my argument -

It follows from the nature of subjective experience that it's the foundational assumption which should be treated as axiomatic, not specific oughts/rules which we can infer as appropriate for that foundation. These should be tentative, and we should be prepared to go back and test their consequences against our foundational principle.

[Wossname]

by Gertie » Today, 12:19 am

TLDR version -

If you accept my argument -

It follows from the nature of subjective experience that it's the foundational assumption which should be treated as axiomatic, not specific oughts/rules which we can infer as appropriate for that foundation. These should be tentative, and we should be prepared to go back and test their consequences against our foundational principle.

Yes I quite like that. The broad axiom can be derived from the nature of subjective experience.

I think you understand that I am not assuming that things which are not objectively measurable or observable cannot be the foundation for a moral theory. And clearly, things which are incapable of subjective experience are not obviously things which have interests which should morally concern us, and those which do have subjective experience do have such interests. I feel you may be saying something more here, and I am still grasping for it (my bad).

If we argue that X’s wellbeing is promoted this far at the theoretical cost to the wellbeing of Y of that much then there is some theoretical sum to be calculated. But that is not how people naturally think, and all I am suggesting is that I can still see arguments concerning whether the subjective experiences of X are equivalent to the subjective experiences of Y. The lack of objective measurement here gives scope for disagreement. Although we might wish to promote egalitarian principles I fear that, by nature, humans are more parochial and we will therefore ever be back to dealing with prejudices. You can relatively easily convince people that, by reason of its sentience, they should be concerned for the wellbeing of a cow. Sculptor, for example, would argue it should be well treated. He is still happy to eat a steak and he is not alone in that.

You understand that equality requires equal consideration of interests, and prejudice arises when some interests are considered more important than others. If the interests of those of a different skin colour, gender, age group, religious belief, species or whatever are not considered equally then promoting their interests, or wellbeing, may only go so far. So what I am suggesting is that prejudice is still a main arena for battle, and the argument is very far from done. Humans want to look after their own. That is what really matters to them. The axiom has a universally appropriate grounding, but this creates tension with our natural impulses. Promoting the broad axiom is one thing, interpreting it another. And when it comes to working out the specific rules, the devil is, as per, all in the detail.

That’s not a reason to abandon the axiom. Morality is, we agree, messy and the argument will never end. In one way, that is how it should be. In another, I fear people will be looking at philosophers as some weird cerebral nutcases while they burn the planet to the ground around our ears.

So much beer. So little time.

[Pattern-chaser]

Also we are agreed that any moral system is built on axioms (assumptions) that in themselves are not objective.

You talk of things not being objective, but then you describe a "moral system", whose construction sounds a lot like the construction of a mathematical/scientific hypothesis/theory. Built on axioms? Isn't such an approach rather too, er, objective for such a subjective topic? Wouldn't a freer (i.e. less formal) format encourage greater understanding of this non-objective topic?

[GE Morton]

It seems you believe that you and Gertie share very similar moral axioms! That could be another discussion, but here I will just say your reply surprised me since elsewhere, when I asked why we were obliged to accept someone had a right to X you wrote:

"Yes, if we accept as a moral axiom that one ought not inflict losses or injuries on other moral agents, then we are morally obliged to regard acts or acquisitions which do not inflict loss or injury on others "righteous …".

But now we have
“One ought not inflict losses or injuries on other moral agents" is not an axiom”

Yes, that first was a careless use of "axiom." It is a theorem.

Of course different axioms are possible and have been expressed over the centuries. For example, someone might argue that you are God’s child, His claims on your soul and life predate and supersede all others. And a monarch or pope might claim that they are God’s representative of earth, their word represents His and you are free, therefore, only to do what they say. Your life is not, in fact, yours and never can be. You say you have a righteous claim but they say you do not. You can never claim for yourself what was never yours to begin with. That you have harmed no-one may be an accurate description of events, but you cannot righteously acquire that which already belongs to another. Your life is not and never can be yours. The simple fact of your birth accrues you no rights.

Quite right. That has, in fact, been the most widely accepted alternative to utilitarianism as the "fundamental principle" of ethics. But relying as it does on superstition --- unobservable "supernatural" forces and entities and unfalsifiable claims --- it is far from being self-evident. (And, yes, my axiom, and Gertie's, is utilitarian).

You say
“ claims to things one brought with one into the world --- cannot possibly be false, or honestly denied”.

That does not seem obviously true given the axiom outlined above. The truth condition seems dependent on the axiom you accept.

It is obviously true simply by virtue of the meanings of the words and the observable facts. It's truth does not depend upon any axiom.

You say rights exist as a matter of fact independently of the axiom. Rights, if I understand you, exist as objective facts. The facts here constitute a relationship. I still believe it is open to someone to say they see no relationship, what are you pointing to? If they adopt a different axiom it provides a contrary answer (as above), in which such claims to rights do amount to diddly squat.

I'm not sure what relationship this person would be denying. Suppose Alfie claims a right to a spear. He claims he fashioned the spear from fallen tree branch he found in the woods and a smooth flat stone from the bed of a nearby creek. He carved the stick straight, chipped sharp edges onto the stone, and attached it to a groove he had cut into the end of the stick. His pals Bruno and Chauncey, who were with him at the time, confirm his story. Hence there is a specific historical relationship between Alfie and that spear. Nor does anyone else step forward to claim Alfie stole the spear from him. What would be the basis for someone's denial of that relationship?

That factual relationship, however, does have moral import --- given the known circumstances of Alfie's acquisition of the spear no losses or injuries were inflicted on anyone else thereby. That is also a fact, and has moral import.

So it remains unclear to me that there are any objective facts of that kind to be had . . .

Are you suggesting the facts given above are not objective?

I've noticed a tendency to confuse the basis for a right, which is factual, with the moral status of a right, which, as you say, depends upon the moral theory one holds. Hence someone who rejected the axiom given could well argue that, yes, Alfie has a right to the spear, but that right is inconsequential, morally speaking. That critic would presumably consider the fact that Alfie inflicted no losses or injuries in acquiring the spear a matter of no moral significance.

But you're right that the axiom, either version, (meaning here yours or Gertie’s), is not objective. It is not a statement of fact; it is a goal statement, to be accepted as self-evident, ..... Anyone who disagrees with it will have some radically different conception of what morality is all about, and moral discussions with such persons would be futile and fruitless.

I say you are likely right there, and that kind of highlights the problem. But philosophers enjoy a good argument, they sometimes have had influence so all hope may not be lost. I also think the level of disagreement on issues reflects that moral axioms are not really all that self-evident and the extent to which they are perceived to be so likely reflects the cultural conditioning that seems to concern you.

Well, even Euclid's axioms can be challenged, and have been, if one adhere's to some esoteric cosmology with bizarre conceptions of space and time (challenges to his 5th Postulate led to non-Euclidean geometries). But that the dominant underlying aim of moral theories and principles over the centuries has been to protect and enhance human well-being is not, I think, controversial.

[GE Morton]

Wouldn't a freer (i.e. less formal) format encourage greater understanding of this non-objective topic?

You're begging the question.