A Moral Universe

[Angel Trismegistus]

You are in error, sir.
#1 is a postulate; #2, a definition. There is no argument there, and so no circular argument.


The analogy is confused and incoherent. You need to revise it and make the points of analogy clear.

Will get to the remainder of your errors after morning laxation.

No, it is you that is full of **** not me "SIR"!! lol
Your entire thread is simple wrong.

Since you insist on gutter-talk dismissals and don't appear to have anything more than that to contribute to the discussion, I'll ignore the rest of the errors in your post and advise you with the utmost sincerity to take a well-earned hike.

[Angel Trismegistus]

"In what way inadequate?" was the question.

I'm only interested in you briefly answering the question in your next response, summarizing how we get from the facts I noted to any normatives. Is that not something you're capable of doing?

And I'm only interested in what you found "inadequate," as you declared two posts ago, in the summary offered in the thread "On Morality: a dialogue," inasmuch as my "capability" has already been demonstrated there and inasmuch as you represented yourself as having at least enough acquaintance with that summary to judge it "inadequate." Looks like a conflict of interests.

[Angel Trismegistus]

I'm as disinclined as you to get into logical technicalities, Gertie, and we don't need to get into logical technicalities in order to deconstruct Hume's Is-Ought distinction. We can proceed using our own language and basis of understanding. So let's consider the following :

1. "the shift from Is talk to Ought talk notes a shift which needs explaining"
2. "he doesn't see how you can deduce Oughts from Ises"
3. Ought and Is "are too different,...different categories of things"

Let's talk about #3 first.

So, "Is talk" and "Ought talk" are not "things" except in the most general sense of the word. What they are, rather, are different kinds of discourse.

Can we agree on that?

If we can agree on that, let's ask ourselves what the difference is between the two kinds of discourse, or what the difference is according to Hume?

Is the difference merely the difference in the mood of the predications -- declarative in Is talk, imperative in Ought talk?

Or does the difference go deeper than language?

All "ought's" are derived from "is's". One first begins with the facts of reality as it is, and then imagine reality as it could be, and then morally judge how reality ought to be. That's how we get from "is's" to "ought's".

This sounds reasonable to me. I wonder if this answers Hume to the satisfaction of our Humeans?

[Terrapin Station]

I'm only interested in you briefly answering the question in your next response, summarizing how we get from the facts I noted to any normatives. Is that not something you're capable of doing?

And I'm only interested in what you found "inadequate," as you declared two posts ago, in the summary offered in the thread "On Morality: a dialogue," inasmuch as my "capability" has already been demonstrated there and inasmuch as you represented yourself as having at least enough acquaintance with that summary to judge it "inadequate." Looks like a conflict of interests.

You met my expectations at least. Though in this case I wish my prediction had been wrong.

[Steve3007]

And THAT is exactly why the US is a moral vacuum.

You really don't set no store by no shades of grey do you Sculp?

[Angel Trismegistus]

And I'm only interested in what you found "inadequate," as you declared two posts ago, in the summary offered in the thread "On Morality: a dialogue," inasmuch as my "capability" has already been demonstrated there and inasmuch as you represented yourself as having at least enough acquaintance with that summary to judge it "inadequate." Looks like a conflict of interests.

You met my expectations at least. Though in this case I wish my prediction had been wrong.

Likewise.

[Gertie]

All "ought's" are derived from "is's". One first begins with the facts of reality as it is, and then imagine reality as it could be, and then morally judge how reality ought to be. That's how we get from "is's" to "ought's".

This sounds reasonable to me. I wonder if this answers Hume to the satisfaction of our Humeans?

It's a description of a process which includes a moral judgement. But it doesn't say how any particular facts of reality logically justify any particular moral judgement, or facts of reality generally logically justify Oughts

[Terrapin Station]

You met my expectations at least. Though in this case I wish my prediction had been wrong.

Likewise.

I can explain in as much detail as you like why it was inadequate in my view, but we'd never get to you actually explaining how we get to any normatives from the facts at hand. Maybe I'd do it if you'd take turns, where I post a sentence about why it was inadequate, and then you post the first sentence explaining how we get to normatives, but I doubt you'd do that.

[Angel Trismegistus]

OK. Well I think most people don't have any problem understanding the Is/Ought distinction. And the prescriptive difference in language is doing the job of referencing a particular connotation morality has. Namely there's an additional (moral) consideration or obligation involved in Oughts. And as Oughts are usually about actions rooted in a particular way of thinking about ourselves and the world, yes the 'prescriptive' aspect goes deeper than language.

We can agree that "there's an additional (moral) consideration or obligation involved in Oughts." Check.
We can agree that "Oughts are usually about actions rooted in a particular way of thinking about ourselves and the world." Check.

Based on our further agreement, we can ask ourselves whether moral prescriptions account for the whole of morality without remainder? That is to say, does this obligation language, even if it reflects a line of thought deeper than language, exhaust moral reflection and moral expression? In other words, is there more to moral discourse (and the thought behind moral discourse) than Oughts?

We might also ask ourselves whether this pre-linguistic moral thinking is natural to man -- that is to say, is this deeper-than-language moral thought sourced in human nature? Or is it conditioned by the very discourse we have supposed it is deeper than?

[Angel Trismegistus]

Likewise.

I can explain in as much detail as you like why it was inadequate in my view, but we'd never get to you actually explaining how we get to any normatives from the facts at hand. Maybe I'd do it if you'd take turns, where I post a sentence about why it was inadequate, and then you post the first sentence explaining how we get to normatives, but I doubt you'd do that.

Fair enough. Post a sentence pointing out an inadequacy in my account of the foundation of morality (from that other thread) and I'll defend my account.

[Terrapin Station]

I can explain in as much detail as you like why it was inadequate in my view, but we'd never get to you actually explaining how we get to any normatives from the facts at hand. Maybe I'd do it if you'd take turns, where I post a sentence about why it was inadequate, and then you post the first sentence explaining how we get to normatives, but I doubt you'd do that.

Fair enough. Post a sentence pointing out an inadequacy in my account of the foundation of morality (from that other thread) and I'll defend my account.

No --not you defending what I'm addressing. You'd need to start giving the explanation of how we get to normatives. That's what I'm looking for that I'm predicting you'll never get to no matter what I do.

[Angel Trismegistus]

Fair enough. Post a sentence pointing out an inadequacy in my account of the foundation of morality (from that other thread) and I'll defend my account.

No --not you defending what I'm addressing. You'd need to start giving the explanation of how we get to normatives. That's what I'm looking for that I'm predicting you'll never get to no matter what I do.

How can I not address a charge of inadequacy? Just show me you have a passing acquaintance with the account you call inadequate and I'll answer your question directly.

[Terrapin Station]

No --not you defending what I'm addressing. You'd need to start giving the explanation of how we get to normatives. That's what I'm looking for that I'm predicting you'll never get to no matter what I do.

How can I not address a charge of inadequacy? Just show me you have a passing acquaintance with the account you call inadequate and I'll answer your question directly.

You can address it, but you'd need to start giving your explanation of how we get to normatives, too. I'm not going to go through some extended back and forth where you never deliver what I'm looking for, and I'm not about to just take your word that we'd get to it.

[Angel Trismegistus]

How can I not address a charge of inadequacy? Just show me you have a passing acquaintance with the account you call inadequate and I'll answer your question directly.

You can address it, but you'd need to start giving your explanation of how we get to normatives, too. I'm not going to go through some extended back and forth where you never deliver what I'm looking for, and I'm not about to just take your word that we'd get to it.

You apparently did not understand this sentence: "Just show me you have a passing acquaintance with the account you call inadequate and I'll answer your question directly."

[Marvin_Edwards]

OK. Well I think most people don't have any problem understanding the Is/Ought distinction. And the prescriptive difference in language is doing the job of referencing a particular connotation morality has. Namely there's an additional (moral) consideration or obligation involved in Oughts. And as Oughts are usually about actions rooted in a particular way of thinking about ourselves and the world, yes the 'prescriptive' aspect goes deeper than language.

We can agree that "there's an additional (moral) consideration or obligation involved in Oughts." Check.
We can agree that "Oughts are usually about actions rooted in a particular way of thinking about ourselves and the world." Check.

Based on our further agreement, we can ask ourselves whether moral prescriptions account for the whole of morality without remainder? That is to say, does this obligation language, even if it reflects a line of thought deeper than language, exhaust moral reflection and moral expression? In other words, is there more to moral discourse (and the thought behind moral discourse) than Oughts?

We might also ask ourselves whether this pre-linguistic moral thinking is natural to man -- that is to say, is this deeper-than-language moral thought sourced in human nature? Or is it conditioned by the very discourse we have supposed it is deeper than?

Pre-linguistic moral thinking is apparently common in other species. For example, see this YouTube on two Capuchin monkeys given unequal pay for the same work: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=meiU6TxysCg