Hello fellow travellers,
I think the main problem here is the distinction made, or rather not made, between the will or the potentiality and the effects made of it, and their ontological status. I think the following at least needs to be said:
1. When we want to have an understatement, even a slight conception of what freedom could mean for the will, we need to know which's will it is, and thus require a complete understatement of the self, a theory of subjectivity, without which the category, in which freedom of the will could oppose enslavement, is certainly most dubious. This once again shows the necessarily systematic nature of philosophy, as much as it has been laughed at in the modern day by anti-hegelians and anti-platonics; and it shows also, that in this question, neutrality of a standpoint is impossible, because this very definition asks us to say what the mind is, and in what way the will exists. I shall not flee this for it though, and will provide a definition, as much as it will be disliked for it's disconnection (as asked previously) with the modern sciences: I, the subject, am existence, that is, I am the oneness, το έν, that connects the opposing contents of my experience. I am in this way opposite not just to all things, including to my own body, but also to my thoughts. I am not anything, as itself, it might even be said that I don't exist (and if I only ask about the possibility of existing without contradictions, than that is correct, as Plato did prove the inexistence of το έν in Parmenides through contradiction; which does not bother me, for I believe to fundamentally be a contradiction), but instead I am the form in which that, what is, is, and whatever I am is nothing but the way, in which things to me appear, those which I can influence an those which I can not. I am the existence-towards-me, and in that the misunderstanding and despair, that is the self-missing and invisibility of every perspective for itself, the blind spot that is the first person pronoun.
2. The will to me is a modification of things in as far as they appear. First, things do appear in me, and thus I do exist; but this Cartesian proof must be extended twofold: once in the direction of the possible, and once in the direction of the real. In what is possible, things are modified under my imagination. I imagine, phantasize, whatever I think, in that I think them, because what actually is is to me it's being-to-me, and therefore always already a modified being, not a being in or for itself. In what is real, the modification is towards that of the will: whatever is, is there partially already modified under my will to existence, be it under curiosity or fear (in their dialectical correlation), disgust, habitual normality, or indifference. In any way, this fundamental modification of will is not one of what is (in the same way as that of the imagination: not a different thing, but the thing itself appears, and φαινόμενα are not other things, but actions and movements that the νοούμενα make inside and towards the self, that is all of existence, and which brings it to reality); but also it does not change the ontological status of it's object. If I look at something in disgust, I don't change how it appears to me; rather, it already presumes it. The will, in a fundamental way, is later than epistemology. It decides if an action of understanding, that already took place, found me something I want; or rather something, of which I, through it's worthiness of investigation, want to see other qualities and details to be existing and experienced parts of reality.
3. There now is a curious problem, of which the problem of the freedom of will arises, and that is the fact, that a) I see all my thoughts in their content mirrored in the brain of my body, and b) that the physical world appears to have a consistent structure of causality, that seems to contradict the way, in which the will modifies reality after it exists. (This, by the way, also shows why the free will is really only discussed in the context of physicality, or in that related to the physical world, and not in that, while not related to it, which has a similar structure of existence as the will had to reality, as e.g. the decision of what is worthy of being defined in a mathematical proof, or which story of my imagination of a fabled place shall become part of a novel and which not.)
4. I therefore would define free will thusly: My will is free, if the thoughts of the decision of investigation, that follow from the modifications of existent things as already experienced (after epistemology), have the same immediate necessity, than those which are indistinguishably tied to it's understanding (transcendental qualities of imagination, of the action of existence, το φαίνεσθαι). This does mean a break in causality, if you believe that the epistemic process of knowledge and the post-epistemic process of will-full modification is inside the same time as the physical world, as it does create an already constituted reality, that still is free to be modified as worthy/ unworthy of certain thoughts to exists.
I must add that this clashes only with a certain form of causality, one which presumes the past as fixed an the future as it's function (one could call it laplacian, after Laplace's demon); I think, that a causality, that considers the past and future as function of the present, and therefore of my consciousness and reality now, while not just solving this problem, also does more accurately reflect the strange and not often straight-forward notion of causality in scientific research, that is more influenced by known results, which we search for definitions of, and by definitions, than we usually are willing to admit, and in which way our presence more clearly influences our understanding of our past and it's results than the other way around. To then put it, in the clearest, most shocking way, when translation this belief in the other dictionary: free will is my power to reach back at the beginning of time, to before the big bang, to create conditions such as that the reflection of my will in my body's brain is, after such changed past and conditions of the universe, in agreement with the things, that, in its transcendental reality, it changed and only after it's self-existence made them to be what they are, not just things, but willed, modified-towards-me things. My free will is the power, in which I bring the universe into existence as something, that is ontologically later than itself .
In regards of the truth, and in the name of a plushies tears,