Animal Rights (Chile)

[Sy Borg]

Returning to the OP, should animals have the same rights as humans? Clearly not. Women may have won the right to vote and to have their own bank accounts, but a wombat cannot claim such rights.

Do animals have the right to be left alone? Yes.

No. There is no such right. There is no-one and nothing that grants this 'right'.

Do humans and other species have the right to prey on them? Yes.

No. There is no such right. There is no-one and nothing that grants this 'right'.

And yet the first 'right' is ignored, and the predators prey anyway. These things we blithely refer to as 'rights' are conferred by humans, and enforced by humans, or they would (could) not exist.

I recognise only one 'right' is this context: that all living things are entitled to respect. That is to say, their lives are not to be taken needlessly or gratuitously. Sadly for the preyed-upon, this does not mean that predators may not kill and eat their prey, but only that they should not do so needlessly or gratuitously.

Agree re: respect for animals. A failure to respect other species reflects purely on the human lacking the simple wisdom to respect others, not on the other animals and their so-called "limitations" that are used to objectify them.

Sure, legally, most wild animals have no right to left alone because humans did not confer that right to most of them, now deceased. I could have been clearer in saying that I think that animals should have that right, especially now that most large species are vastly less numerous than humans (who are a dime a dozen these days).

Still, I see human as having as much right to prey on other animals as any other omnivore. However, due to sustainability issues, responsible carnivory is becoming ever more important. In a sense, respect of other species is increasingly a matter of human survival.

[value]

So what is the "cosmos", and whereabouts in it might we discover morality?

The argument is that signification or 'the act of valuing' - the logical origin of value - is vitally morality (moral valuing) although morality itself is a humanly concept.

Whatever the cosmos is would fundamentally have originated from morality - the act of valuing or 'signification' which would explain the 'Sixth Sense' idea of a moral compass.

I recently listened to a podcast with as guest Lisa Monaco, a former Counterterrorism Advisor of President Barack Obama. She specifically addresses the significance of a sound moral compass and hints that it might involve more than social and cultural instincts (in the podcast she mentioned a 'sixth sense').

Podcast: https://listennotes.com/podcasts/the-le ... li-5dvNUT/

Signification would be the fundamental origin of a subjective perspective and 'the cosmos' would be a perceived totality within that subjective perspective while on a fundamental level the origin of the cosmos would be true ∞ Infinite (beginning-less) of nature.

Evidence that the idea is not juts 'gibberish' as GE Morton argues is the fact that French philosopher Emmanuel Levinas - an icon of Western philosophy that is researched by dedicated scholars today - says the following:

"in renouncing intentionality as a guiding thread toward the eidos [formal structure] of the psyche … our analysis will follow sensibility in its pre-natural signification to the maternal, where, in proximity [to what is not itself], signification signifies before it gets bent into perseverance in being in the midst of a Nature. (OBBE: 68, emph. added) "
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/levinas/

"The creation of the world itself should get its meaning starting from goodness." (Levinas in film Absent God 1:06:22)

The indicated goodness would be 'good per se' (good that cannot be valued) and it would be the origin of 'the act of valuing' which Levinas describes as signification.

[Pattern-chaser]

So what is the "cosmos", and whereabouts in it might we discover morality?

The argument is that signification or 'the act of valuing' - the logical origin of value - is vitally morality (moral valuing) although morality itself is a humanly concept.

So we agree that morality is a human invention. And yet you don't say what you mean by the "cosmos", and you seem to admit that morality may NOT be found in "the cosmos", contrary to your claim(s). Beyond these suppositions, you have said little that is easily understood (by me). To assign moral values, one would first need morality, and if morality is a human invention, then only a human can/could assign moral values to things. This 'valuation' is also not part of "the cosmos", but is merely an idea associated with humanity.

I'm afraid I find the claims you make to be confused and wrong.

[GE Morton]

The argument is that signification or 'the act of valuing' - the logical origin of value - is vitally morality (moral valuing) although morality itself is a humanly concept.

Value has no "logical origin." There is nothing "logical" about assigning a value to something. "Value" is just a term used to quantify someone's desire for or approval of something, so that we can say such things as, "Alfie values his dog more than his car." Value doesn't exist until some sentient creature assigns one to something, which we can determine by observing his behavior with respect to it, and what people value varies widely and wildly from person to person. No doubt there is some complex neurological explanation for why Alfie prefers chocolate to vanilla ice cream --- values it more --- but no "logic" is involved in those subjective responses to things.

Moreover, "moral valuing" is a confused concept. It confuses deontology (theories of moral rules) with axiology (theories of value). A morality is a set of rules governing human conduct. "Valuing" is the act of assigning a value to something, i.e., expressing or exhibiting a desire for it.

Whatever the cosmos is would fundamentally have originated from morality - the act of valuing or 'signification' which would explain the 'Sixth Sense' idea of a moral compass.

Claiming "the cosmos originated from morality" reveals either 1) a bizarre misconception of what morality is, or 2) an attempt to re-define the word "morality." Claiming that the "cosmos" originated from some set of rules devised by humans for regulating their conduct, especially in social settings, is absurd.

As for "moral compasses" --- that may be a useful metaphor for someone's "private morality," but you can be sure that everyone's "compass" points in a different direction.

[Sy Borg]

In the end, it comes down to cutting sentient others a little slack, to go easy on them, with our wants tempered by empathy.

[value]

So what is the "cosmos", and whereabouts in it might we discover morality?

The argument is that signification or 'the act of valuing' - the logical origin of value - is vitally morality (moral valuing) although morality itself is a humanly concept.

So we agree that morality is a human invention.

Not a loose invention but a concept applicable to a human context while its fundamental nature (the act of valuing) would correspond with what would lay at the root of the cosmos.

And yet you don't say what you mean by the "cosmos", and you seem to admit that morality may NOT be found in "the cosmos", contrary to your claim(s). Beyond these suppositions, you have said little that is easily understood (by me). To assign moral values, one would first need morality, and if morality is a human invention, then only a human can/could assign moral values to things. This 'valuation' is also not part of "the cosmos", but is merely an idea associated with humanity.

I'm afraid I find the claims you make to be confused and wrong.

The idea that valuation is merely 'an idea associated with humanity' is absurd. Valuation is not about making a choice but about valuing which requires a good that cannot be valued itself. This is simple logic.

Do you see how the following citation by 🕮 Immanuel Kant is applicable to your perspective on morality?

"We cannot too much or too often repeat our warning against this lax and even mean habit of thought which seeks for its principle amongst empirical motives and laws; for human reason in its weariness is glad to rest on this pillow, and in a dream of sweet illusions (in which, instead of Juno, it embraces a cloud) it [empirical] substitutes for morality a bastard patched up from limbs of various derivation, which looks like anything one chooses to see in it, only not like virtue to one who has once beheld her in her true form.[/i]"

[value]

The argument is that signification or 'the act of valuing' - the logical origin of value - is vitally morality (moral valuing) although morality itself is a humanly concept.

Value has no "logical origin." There is nothing "logical" about assigning a value to something. "Value" is just a term used to quantify someone's desire for or approval of something, so that we can say such things as, "Alfie values his dog more than his car." Value doesn't exist until some sentient creature assigns one to something, which we can determine by observing his behavior with respect to it, and what people value varies widely and wildly from person to person. No doubt there is some complex neurological explanation for why Alfie prefers chocolate to vanilla ice cream --- values it more --- but no "logic" is involved in those subjective responses to things.

No, value is assigned meaning, the result of 'the act of valuing' or signification. A number in mathematics or physics is value, for example.

The slightest departure from pure randomness implies value. That implies that all that can be seen in the world - from the simplest pattern onward - is value.

It turns out that, for life to be possible, the numbers in basic physics – for example, the strength of gravity, or the mass of the electron – must have values falling in a certain range. And that range is an incredibly narrow slice of all the possible values those numbers can have.
https://aeon.co/essays/cosmopsychism-ex ... d-for-life

Moreover, "moral valuing" is a confused concept. It confuses deontology (theories of moral rules) with axiology (theories of value). A morality is a set of rules governing human conduct. "Valuing" is the act of assigning a value to something, i.e., expressing or exhibiting a desire for it.

A 'set of rules' is ethics (which belongs to politics) and not morality. Morality is found in the process of denoting good and bad (an eternal quest for 'good' with value as a result).

That process of morality requires a potential (the potential for moral consideration in the face of an unknown future) and therefore the serving of morality philosophically requires enhancing an intellectual capacity, which could be done for example through ethics (moral theory) and culture.

Rights for Nature would provide a basis for the potential for moral consideration on behalf of animals and eco-systems. That potential can be further developed by legal cases that seek moral arguments to defend nature. Over time, people automatically become culturally more aware of the importance of animals and eco-systems by a developed ability to understand relevant aspects of the importance of their dignity.

Rights for Nature can result in a sort of 'moral light' into the natural world that seeks interests ('good' for nature) that may span thousands of years time - far beyond an individual human's short term self-interest.

What would you say that the difference is between morality and ethics?

Whatever the cosmos is would fundamentally have originated from morality - the act of valuing or 'signification' which would explain the 'Sixth Sense' idea of a moral compass.

Claiming "the cosmos originated from morality" reveals either 1) a bizarre misconception of what morality is, or 2) an attempt to re-define the word "morality." Claiming that the "cosmos" originated from some set of rules devised by humans for regulating their conduct, especially in social settings, is absurd.

As for "moral compasses" --- that may be a useful metaphor for someone's "private morality," but you can be sure that everyone's "compass" points in a different direction.

As mentioned to Pattern-chaser, morality would be a concept applicable to a human context while its fundamental nature (the act of valuing or signification) would correspond with what would lay at the root of the cosmos and thus conscious experience.

Consciousness expresses itself empirically by means of pattern recognition. The recognition of patterns necessarily involves the act of valuing. This would be evidence.

[value]

In the end, it comes down to cutting sentient others a little slack, to go easy on them, with our wants tempered by empathy.

How would your argument fare in the face of trillion USD industry that seeks growth?

Don't you think that something more fundamental is required to create a basis of respect for animals, e.g. a real philosophical plausible consideration of their dignity in the face of an unknown future?

[value]

Thank you for your persistence in addressing the perceived terminology issues. I understand that there might be a real issue since it concerns communication however I still believe that it is justified for me to make a case for the used terminology.

Signification is 'the act of valuing', which is the origin of value (i.e. 'the cosmos').

Not according to any dictionary:

"Signify (tr. verb):

"1a: to be a sign of : MEAN
b: IMPLY
"2: to show especially by a conventional token (such as word, signal, or gesture)"

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/signify

No mention of "valuing" or "the cosmos" there. That's what I meant by your "word salads" --- you use words in ways and in contexts that have no connection to their dictionary meanings.

Value is assigned meaning. The act of valuing is the act of assigning meaning. Signification is a term that denotes the act of assigning meaning.

Definition of signification

1a : the act or process of signifying by signs or other symbolic means
b : a formal notification

2 : purport especially : the meaning that a term, symbol, or character regularly conveys or is intended to convey.

Whatever 'signification' is applicable to would involve the assignment of meaning and the result therefore is 'value' (beholder of meaning).

That act of valuing embodies the essence of moral consideration thus, while morality is a humanly concept, it can be said that what enables the potential for human morality lays at the root of the cosmos and consciousness.

No, no such thing "can be said," at least not meaningfully. That statement is illustrative of the problem: the misuse and misunderstanding of common words. For example, a "potential" is just a name for a possible cause; e.g., a book of matches has the potential to start a fire. The only evidence we have for an X having "the potential" to do Y is past experience, per which we've observed that matches can be used to start fires. You're using "potential" as though it is some sort of mystical, "transcendental" force or presence in the universe, which is nonsense.

Potential is not limited to causality in my opion (i.e. only applicable to causes).

Potential in my opinion starts with the 'why' of existence. When it concerns fundamental philosophy, the potential of existence is applicable as a factor for consideration for example when it concerns morality (the question 'why is morality possible?" would concern a potential).

Morality doesn't need any "potential" in your sense; every society consisting of individuals with differing and sometimes conflicting interests has the "potential" to create a morality; they have it because they'll have a need for one. Nor do you seem to understand what a morality is; it [morality] is simply a set of rules governing human conduct, especially in social settings. It is a similar to a set of traffic laws --- a pragmatic undertaking not at all mysterious, and certainly not "transcendental," and it has nothing to do with "the cosmos," (though it does, of course, require consciousness).

A 'set of rules' is ethics (which belongs to politics) and not morality. Morality is found in the process of denoting good and bad (an eternal quest for 'good' with value as a result).

Do you see how the following citation by 🕮 Immanuel Kant is applicable to your perspective on morality?

"We cannot too much or too often repeat our warning against this lax and even mean habit of thought which seeks for its principle amongst empirical motives and laws; for human reason in its weariness is glad to rest on this pillow, and in a dream of sweet illusions (in which, instead of Juno, it embraces a cloud) it [empirical] substitutes for morality a bastard patched up from limbs of various derivation, which looks like anything one chooses to see in it, only not like virtue to one who has once beheld her in her true form."

Nor does "valuing . . . embody the essence of moral consideration." While the fact that people value things (different people value different things), WHAT they value is irrelevant to morality; all that matters is that they do value those things, and thus need some rules of interaction (in a social setting) which prohibit one person from preventing another from pursuing whatever he values.

As for "essence," metaphysicians toss that word around like confetti; it usually denotes some imaginary property, or just something that thinker perceives as important to his (usually incoherent) theory.

Essence was used to denote that the root of morality would be the act of valuing.

Vitally, a complete organism its body is built up by morality. All parts that are working together do so onbehalf of a good that lays beyond their individual selves.

It is laziness and negligence that would make an individual organism look no further than itself. Morality as a human concept is intended to denote the ability and assumed requirement ('ought') to look for 'good' beyond the individual self.

My argument is that - when the intent is to serve morality - it would be a task for philosophy to spur urgency in enhancing the intellectual capacity for moral consideration, which is a potential that needs to be developed, for example through moral theory and culture crafting.

Rights for Nature is a political initiative that could be an example of a human initiated basis to facilitate the potential for moral consideration on behalf of Nature. Philosophy would be required to create moral theory for Nature that can be used by lawyers and protectors of Nature.

" . . .in renouncing intentionality as a guiding thread toward the eidos [formal structure] of the psyche … our analysis will follow sensibility in its pre-natural signification to the maternal, where, in proximity [to what is not itself], signification signifies before it gets bent into perseverance in being in the midst of a Nature."

Well, that is a doozy of a "word salad." I couldn't cite a quote more illustrative of metaphysical gobbledygook than that one.

I personally find it interesting and matching my own perspective, although it doesn't get into depth with regard a priori signification and 'being in the midst of a Nature'. It merely denotes a priori signification and 'goodness' as conclusive finding by a respected philosopher that dedicated to the subject Being.

"The creation of the world itself should get its meaning starting from goodness."

The creation of the world has no "meaning," and is the wrong type of thing to take that property. Words have meanings, signs have meanings, poems have meanings. Astronomical events do not. Nor is "goodness" an entity, a force, or a starting point for anything. The term just denotes a pseudo-property we apply to something WE deem to be good, that is, which satisfies some desire or purpose of ours (which varies from person to person). It has no existence apart from those designations, and certainly no "cosmic significance." I.e., more gibberish.

Goodness would be the origin of existence and have no existence (i.e. 'value') itself.

The simple logic that value requires the act of valuing and that that act cannot concern a choice between good and bad because if that were to be the case, that good and bad would need to have been valued which would be absurd, the concept 'good that cannot be valued' is evident to be required in my opinion.

The 'goodness' that Levinas argues to lay at the root of the cosmos would be equal to 'good per se'.

Already addressed above. That claim misuses the term "goodness" to make a ridiculous claim about what "lies at the root of the cosmos," which neither Levinas nor anyone can possibly know. or whether it even has a "root," or what such a claim even means.

I beg to differ. Levinas was in search for a meaning that precedes knowledge, so you might be right with regard the inability to 'know' it in a regular sense but that would not prevent Levinas from the ability to acquire a philosophical plausible persective that 'good per se' must lay at the root of the cosmos.

Levinas commentator Giuseppe Lissa provides the following description of Levinas’ project Otherwise than Being (his latest work):

By investigating the depths of consciousness, by comparing its passivity to the process of ageing, Levinas investigates a "reality unknowable, but perhaps interpretable by a thinking that no longer claims to be an exercise in knowledge … because this thinking is engaged in the search for a meaning that precedes all knowledge."

It is simple logic that the act of valuing (signification) requires 'good per se' as a priori factor.

You keep using that expression "simple logic" to characterize claims that involve no logic whatsoever. What someone deems to be good is idiosyncratic, subjective, volatile, and requires no "a priori factor." There is no "logic" involved in deeming something "good," except in the instrumental sense of that word ("A hammer is good for driving nails"). I suppose your claim there relies upon the above discussed notion of "goodness" as some sort of primordial property or presence or force in the universe --- which is nonsense.

*Sigh*. That's enough . . .

Denoting a good by means of valuing cannot be a choice. Do you not agree with this assertion?

[Pattern-chaser]

And yet you don't say what you mean by the "cosmos", and you seem to admit that morality may NOT be found in "the cosmos", contrary to your claim(s). Beyond these suppositions, you have said little that is easily understood (by me). To assign moral values, one would first need morality, and if morality is a human invention, then only a human can/could assign moral values to things. This 'valuation' is also not part of "the cosmos", but is merely an idea associated with humanity.

I'm afraid I find the claims you make to be confused and wrong.

The idea that valuation is merely 'an idea associated with humanity' is absurd. Valuation is not about making a choice but about valuing which requires a good that cannot be valued itself. This is simple logic.

No, it isn't logic at all; I'm sorry, but it's nonsense.

Valuation is an act of judgment, which is certainly a "choice". "Valuing" is judging, nothing more. It does not seem to require an external "good that cannot be valued itself". Human value judgments are not necessarily subject to external constraints, not even logic or reason. Simple empirical observation serves to confirm this.

[Pattern-chaser]

Don't you think that something more fundamental is required to create a basis of respect for animals, e.g. a real philosophical plausible consideration of their dignity in the face of an unknown future?

Yes, indeed, but it will never happen. It will not be permitted to happen. Animals are owned; they are property, nothing more. So it's a nice idea, but it's just pie in the sky; wishful thinking. Which is a great shame, IMO, but it is what it is.

[value]

The idea that valuation is merely 'an idea associated with humanity' is absurd. Valuation is not about making a choice but about valuing which requires a good that cannot be valued itself. This is simple logic.

No, it isn't logic at all; I'm sorry, but it's nonsense.

Let's wait and see what GE Morton has to say about this.

Valuation is an act of judgment, which is certainly a "choice". "Valuing" is judging, nothing more. It does not seem to require an external "good that cannot be valued itself". Human value judgments are not necessarily subject to external constraints, not even logic or reason. Simple empirical observation serves to confirm this.

The indicated 'good per se' would lay 'within' (not external in the sense of 'in the cosmos'). The term external would become applicable only because it is a factor that precedes conscious experience so that the core requirement for valuing should be considered external from the human.

In my opinion it is simple logic that sensing precedes conscious experience which would imply that when one is to consider the 'chicken vs egg' question (what came first, the chicken or the egg) when it concerns sensing and the sensible world (physical reality) that that which underlays the potential for sensing must have come first.

It would imply that the complete human body, including the brain and sensing organisms, are a product of sensing. It would imply that the root of sensing (valuing) underlays physical reality and that sensing itself is to have a non-subjective origin or nature (cannot originate in an organism).

The sense-paradox provides evidence.

Sense Paradox

Subjective experience cannot have preceded the sense-data and that means that sensing must be primary.

It causes a paradox because when it concerns sensing, it concerns an aspect that provides any potential sense-data that can be used to facilitate subjective experience but sensing itself requires subjectivity, for example attention for an 'outer world' (attention for an 'other').

A thought experiment shows the paradox: how is it possible envision yourself (as a subjective experience) in complete darkness (nothingness) to then all of the sudden to become motivated to 'explore an outer world'? The subjective experience that is required at the root of life wouldn't have any ground to be subjective of.

Thus it is seen that sensing requires something that cannot originate on a subjective level. The origin of life therefore, cannot be subjective of nature.

[GE Morton]

No, value is assigned meaning, the result of 'the act of valuing' or signification. A number in mathematics or physics is value, for example.

Well, you're using a term, "value," whose meaning you don't understand (or have re-defined) and then attempting to define it using another term, "meaning," whose meaning you also don't understand. Assigning a value to something has nothing to do with any "meanings." Meanings are the referents of words, signs, symbols, etc. The term is not applicable to value assignments. Value is term for quantifying the strength or priority order of someone's desire for something. It also has another meaning, where it denotes a numerical quantity or a substitution instance for some variable ("The value of pi is 3.1416 . . ."). You seem to be confounding those two meanings above.

The slightest departure from pure randomness implies value.

Value to whom? Which sense of "value" are you using there? Randomness has nothing to do with value, in either sense, and certainly doesn't imply it. That claim of yours is incoherent. Propositions asserting "value," BTW, in the strength-of-desire sense, requires that a valuer be specified in order to be meaningful. If they don't they will be non-cognitive (lacking any determinable truth value).

Moreover, "moral valuing" is a confused concept. It confuses deontology (theories of moral rules) with axiology (theories of value). A morality is a set of rules governing human conduct. "Valuing" is the act of assigning a value to something, i.e., expressing or exhibiting a desire for it.

A 'set of rules' is ethics (which belongs to politics) and not morality. Morality is found in the process of denoting good and bad (an eternal quest for 'good' with value as a result).

Ethics and morality are one and the same thing (in the history of philosophy). And, no, morality is not "the process of denoting good and bad." It is a set of principles and rules governing human behavior. "Good" and "bad" are terms for indicating our approval or disapproval of something, or denoting our belief that something is harmful or beneficial. We may deem a human behavior "bad" if we disapprove of it, or deem it to be harmful. And what is this "eternal quest for good"? Whose quest is that? And if that "quest" were successful, what would be found?

That process of morality requires a potential . . .

Morality is not a "process" of any kind (see definition above), though the effort to develop a set of rules governing human behavior may be a process, of course. And (as I said before) the only way we have of knowing whether any X has a potential for producing Y is our past experience with X. Also, any claim that for an existing X "there was a potential for X" would be an truism, and thus uninformative.

Rights for Nature would provide a basis for the potential for moral consideration on behalf of animals and eco-systems.

Those would be legal rights, which may or may not be morally defensible.

What would you say that the difference is between morality and ethics?

In the history of moral philosophy there is none; the terms are interchangeable. In common speech there is some difference, with "ethics" denoting various codified sets of rules governing a particular activity ("legal ethics," "medical ethics," etc.).

As mentioned to @Pattern-chaser, morality would be a concept applicable to a human context while its fundamental nature (the act of valuing or signification) would correspond with what would lay at the root of the cosmos and thus conscious experience.

Well, there is that "word salad" again. The "fundamental nature" of morality is the "nature" I gave above. "Metaphysicians" constantly make claims about the "fundamental nature" of this or that, which claims are totally baseless and usually presume some sort of "transcendental reality" inaccessible to observation, thus rendering those claims unfalsifiable and unconfirmable --- i.e., vacuous. Likewise with any claims regarding what may lie at the "root of the cosmos." What lies at the "root" of conscious experience is a certain type of physical nervous system.

The recognition of patterns necessarily involves the act of valuing. This would be evidence.

That is another misuse of terms. Pattern recognition has nothing whatever to do with values, or valuing.

[Sy Borg]

In the end, it comes down to cutting sentient others a little slack, to go easy on them, with our wants tempered by empathy.

How would your argument fare in the face of trillion USD industry that seeks growth?

Don't you think that something more fundamental is required to create a basis of respect for animals, e.g. a real philosophical plausible consideration of their dignity in the face of an unknown future?

I think my argument would fare about as well as yours, or any other, argument. A trillion-dollar industry responds to only one thing - existential threats - and, even then, their first response would be to dig in. If you stand in front of a high speed train with a placard, do you think it will stop? Do you think it can stop?

Having said that, I admire your aims and intent. The treatment of many animals has been deeply morally repugnant, unrestrained bullying and heartlessness, but I have no answer for it, other than refraining from making meat meals.

[value]

In the end, it comes down to cutting sentient others a little slack, to go easy on them, with our wants tempered by empathy.

How would your argument fare in the face of trillion USD industry that seeks growth?

Don't you think that something more fundamental is required to create a basis of respect for animals, e.g. a real philosophical plausible consideration of their dignity in the face of an unknown future?

I think my argument would fare about as well as yours, or any other, argument. A trillion-dollar industry responds to only one thing - existential threats - and, even then, their first response would be to dig in. If you stand in front of a high speed train with a placard, do you think it will stop? Do you think it can stop?

Having said that, I admire your aims and intent. The treatment of many animals has been deeply morally repugnant, unrestrained bullying and heartlessness, but I have no answer for it, other than refraining from making meat meals.

I believe that philosophy can provide an answer. It is only when humans become able to recognize the importance of the dignity of animals (i.e. have moral consideration potential, which is an intellectual capacity) that they can be held responsible in the face of their own dignity.

Philosopher Henry David Thoreau once said the following humanity's gradual moral improvement:

"Whatever my own practice may be, I have no doubt that it is a part of the destiny of the human race, in its gradual moral improvement, to leave off eating animals, as surely as the savage tribes have left off eating each other when they came in contact with the more civilized."

Morality is about serving the purpose of life - good - in the best (wisest) way. When humanity is to secure its future and to achieve an optimal path, it would be case that humanity is set to enhance its moral consideration potential with everlasting urgency to be certain that whatever path it has chosen, has been given the right chance to have been the right path.

The problem at hand is not an answer to morality (theory or ethics), but an answer to the potential required for moral consideration (what is required to create a moral culture - the foundation for an moral intellectual capacity - that enables humans to provide adequate care for animals).

Rights for Nature is likely to have a strong effect on human culture and a cultural demand can be a very strong demand. Philosophy would have as task to provide the theory required to achieve progress for the protection of animals.