Universe Isn't Locally Real - Nobel Prize in Physics 2022

[value]

...

Everything in nature works according to laws.

What would be your opinion about this fundamental statement that seems to underlay the whole theory of Emmanuel Kant which would include the apodictical certainty (apodiktische Gewißheit) - the belief in the realness (non-disputableness) of space and time - that would form the basis of the idea that reality is 'really real'?

Kant's self-proclaimed achievement is the second main step in his effort to answer the question: “How are synthetic a priori judgments possible?” The first step was the argument offered in the Transcendental Aesthetic, to the effect that space and time are a priori forms of intuition. As such, Kant argued, they make possible judgments (propositions) whose claim to truth is justified a priori by the universal features of our intuitions. Such propositions are thus both synthetic and a priori. Kant's definition of apodictical certainty (apodiktische Gewißheit) is the certainty of a knowledge (Erkenntnis) in connection with the consciousness of its necessity.

I did not find a reference in Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals that would indicate that the mentioned intuition would find its origin in instinct - a physical origin in the brain. Do you have a reference for that idea?

[GE Morton]

...

Everything in nature works according to laws.

What would be your opinion about this fundamental statement that seems to underlay the whole theory of Emmanuel Kant which would include the apodictical certainty (apodiktische Gewißheit) - the belief in the realness (non-disputableness) of space and time - that would form the basis of the idea that reality is 'really real'?

Yes, that is a basic postulate of scientific theorizing/reasoning. Without it, you can't construct a coherent theory of "reality."

Kant's self-proclaimed achievement is the second main step in his effort to answer the question: “How are synthetic a priori judgments possible?” The first step was the argument offered in the Transcendental Aesthetic, to the effect that space and time are a priori forms of intuition. As such, Kant argued, they make possible judgments (propositions) whose claim to truth is justified a priori by the universal features of our intuitions. Such propositions are thus both synthetic and a priori. Kant's definition of apodictical certainty (apodiktische Gewißheit) is the certainty of a knowledge (Erkenntnis) in connection with the consciousness of its necessity.

I did not find a reference in Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals that would indicate that the mentioned intuition would find its origin in instinct - a physical origin in the brain. Do you have a reference for that idea?

No, there isn't one. Kant didn't delve into the physiological explanations for the categories; it wasn't necessary to his project. But were he alive today I'm sure he would have accepted that there must be one.

[value]

...

Everything in nature works according to laws.

What would be your opinion about this fundamental statement that seems to underlay the whole theory of Emmanuel Kant which would include the apodictical certainty (apodiktische Gewißheit) - the belief in the realness (non-disputableness) of space and time - that would form the basis of the idea that reality is 'really real'?

Yes, that is a basic postulate of scientific theorizing/reasoning. Without it, you can't construct a coherent theory of "reality."

It is a belief in uniformitarianism - the dogmatic belief that the facts of science are valid without philosophy. That belief is a fallacy in my opinion.

Why would one assume the idea of 'law as such' merely by 'looking at' repeatability in nature?

Kant's apodictical certainty is essentially an example. The a priori forms of intuition space and time is equal to the idea of repeatability.

"Kant's definition of apodictical certainty (apodiktische Gewißheit) is the certainty of a knowledge (Erkenntnis) in connection with the consciousness of its necessity."

It is nonsensical in my opinion to consider repeatable nature to be a necessity. It would only be so in the form of value (words) but not IN experience.

Besides this, I cannot see a reason to neglect the why question of the intuition and the concepts space and time, which implies that certainty cannot be established in my opinion.

[GE Morton]

...

Everything in nature works according to laws.

What would be your opinion about this fundamental statement that seems to underlay the whole theory of Emmanuel Kant which would include the apodictical certainty (apodiktische Gewißheit) - the belief in the realness (non-disputableness) of space and time - that would form the basis of the idea that reality is 'really real'?

Yes, that is a basic postulate of scientific theorizing/reasoning. Without it, you can't construct a coherent theory of "reality."

It is a belief in uniformitarianism - the dogmatic belief that the facts of science are valid without philosophy. That belief is a fallacy in my opinion.

Well, uniformitarianism is the belief that the universe is "law governed" --- i.e., that it evolves in obedience to certain universal laws. Those "laws" are just regularities discerned by observation and for which no exceptions are known. And, yes, the facts of science are "valid without philosophy." They don't depend upon any philosophy, but only upon observation.

Every theory must begin from certain postulates, or axioms --- propositions which are self-evident, and may be accepted without proof (otherwise you embark upon an infinite regress). For the sciences those are the physical constants --- the speed of light in a vacuum, Planck's constant, the gravitational constant, the charge constant, etc., and certain regularities and equivalencies for which no exceptions are known, such as the laws of motion, the law of entropy, etc. Postulates cannot be "fallacies." A fallacy is an error in reasoning, in drawing a conclusion from a set of premises in violation of some logical rule. Postulates can be false, but not "fallacious." Which scientific postulates do you think are false? Keep in mind that to falsify it, you need an empirical, publicly-verifiable counter-example --- not some nebulous "metaphysical" speculation.

Why would one assume the idea of 'law as such' merely by 'looking at' repeatability in nature?

Because that is all that a scientific law is --- a regularity readily observable and for which no exceptions are known. (Don't confuse scientific laws with legislative laws --- the latter presume a law-giver; the former do not).

Kant's apodictical certainty is essentially an example. The a priori forms of intuition space and time is equal to the idea of repeatability.

No, it isn't. For Kant, the categories are "built-in" to our cognitive apparatus. They are not acquired through experience ("repeatability").

It is nonsensical in my opinion to consider repeatable nature to be a necessity. It would only be so in the form of value (words) but not IN experience.

It isn't logically necessary. It is only instrumentally necessary for devising scientific theories. There could be no theory of a chaotic, unpredictable universe consisting of random phenomena, where every moment you're confronted with entities and events no one has ever seen before, and may never see again. You can only devise theories for coherent, law-governed systems that behave in predictable ways. And since science has been very successful in describing the universe and predicting much of its behavior, we can take that uniformitarian postulate as confirmed.

[Pattern-chaser]

Why would one assume the idea of 'law as such' merely by 'looking at' repeatability in nature?

One would not assume it, one would derive it inductively from empirical observation. This is central to how science works. It cannot work otherwise, for purely practical reasons. It has to start with the specific — actual, real-world observations — and grope blindly for the general. This is why repeatability and continuous testing are also so central to science. These precautions attempt to reduce the uncertainty that is the well-known weakness of inductive reasoning.

So I suppose one answer to your question could be something like "One would assume such a thing in the practice of science, and thereby the search for knowledge and understanding". Or is your question intended to, er, question the use and value of practising science?

[value]

Well, uniformitarianism is the belief that the universe is "law governed" --- i.e., that it evolves in obedience to certain universal laws. Those "laws" are just regularities discerned by observation and for which no exceptions are known. And, yes, the facts of science are "valid without philosophy." They don't depend upon any philosophy, but only upon observation.

Every theory must begin from certain postulates, or axioms --- propositions which are self-evident, and may be accepted without proof (otherwise you embark upon an infinite regress). For the sciences those are the physical constants --- the speed of light in a vacuum, Planck's constant, the gravitational constant, the charge constant, etc., and certain regularities and equivalencies for which no exceptions are known, such as the laws of motion, the law of entropy, etc. Postulates cannot be "fallacies." A fallacy is an error in reasoning, in drawing a conclusion from a set of premises in violation of some logical rule. Postulates can be false, but not "fallacious." Which scientific postulates do you think are false? Keep in mind that to falsify it, you need an empirical, publicly-verifiable counter-example --- not some nebulous "metaphysical" speculation.

I believe that that reasoning is wrong. The supposed 'postulates' are not postulates but are assumptions. What is neglected is an unforeseeable future - a fundamental uncertainty.

Scientists often respond to that uncertainty by adopting a 'humble' subjective position in the face of (the act of) observation but that does nothing to confirm the certainty required for a belief in uniformitarianism.

A scientist on a science forum of Cambridge, UK described it as following:

"You may describe philosophy as a search for knowledge and truth. That is indeed vanity. Science is about the acquisition of knowledge, and most scientists avoid the use of “truth”, preferring “repeatability” as more in line with our requisite humility in the face of observation."

If it cannot be said that any 'law' of nature remains the same in time, why call it a postulation? Utilitarian grounds provide no justification in my opinion.

Why would one assume the idea of 'law as such' merely by 'looking at' repeatability in nature?

Because that is all that a scientific law is --- a regularity readily observable and for which no exceptions are known. (Don't confuse scientific laws with legislative laws --- the latter presume a law-giver; the former do not).

My argument is that such a postulation is at most utilitarian of nature and cannot provide a basis for fundamental theory.

Kant's apodictical certainty is essentially an example. The a priori forms of intuition space and time is equal to the idea of repeatability.

No, it isn't. For Kant, the categories are "built-in" to our cognitive apparatus. They are not acquired through experience ("repeatability").

But isn't that what space and time amounts to, repeatability?

It is nonsensical in my opinion to consider repeatable nature to be a necessity. It would only be so in the form of value (words) but not IN experience.

It isn't logically necessary. It is only instrumentally necessary for devising scientific theories. There could be no theory of a chaotic, unpredictable universe consisting of random phenomena, where every moment you're confronted with entities and events no one has ever seen before, and may never see again. You can only devise theories for coherent, law-governed systems that behave in predictable ways. And since science has been very successful in describing the universe and predicting much of its behavior, we can take that uniformitarian postulate as confirmed.

One would not be obligated to assume randomness or chaos when causality isn't grounded in certainty.

Success of science is no ground for the assumption that uniformitarianism is true. While repeatability of science provides what can be considered certainty within the scope of a human perspective which value can be made evident by the success of science, that does not imply fundamental certainty and when the idea is not accurate on a fundamental level then that has profound implications.

[value]

Why would one assume the idea of 'law as such' merely by 'looking at' repeatability in nature?

One would not assume it, one would derive it inductively from empirical observation. This is central to how science works. It cannot work otherwise, for purely practical reasons. It has to start with the specific — actual, real-world observations — and grope blindly for the general. This is why repeatability and continuous testing are also so central to science. These precautions attempt to reduce the uncertainty that is the well-known weakness of inductive reasoning.

So I suppose one answer to your question could be something like "One would assume such a thing in the practice of science, and thereby the search for knowledge and understanding". Or is your question intended to, er, question the use and value of practising science?

I see no ground for the idea 'law as such' based on your defence. Repeatability - repeatable nature - is time bound and involves an unforeseeable future - a fundamental uncertainty that is opposed to the idea of law as such (intrinsic existence or uniformitarianism).

In my opinion it is not justified to 'assume' uniformitarianism by observing repeatability in nature.

While as seen from an utilitarian value perspective one could argue that a 'certainty factor' isn't at question, when it concerns the usage of the idea as a guiding principle, it would become important.

A quote of philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) in Beyond Good and Evil (Chapter 6 – We Scholars) explains what I mean:

"The declaration of independence of the scientific man, his emancipation from philosophy, is one of the subtler after-effects of democratic organization and disorganization: the self- glorification and self-conceitedness of the learned man is now everywhere in full bloom, and in its best springtime – which does not mean to imply that in this case self-praise smells sweet. Here also the instinct of the populace cries, “Freedom from all masters!” and after science has, with the happiest results, resisted theology, whose “hand-maid” it had been too long, it now proposes in its wantonness and indiscretion to lay down laws for philosophy, and in its turn to play the “master” – what am I saying! to play the PHILOSOPHER on its own account."

Science has been attempting to rid itself of philosophy. The dogmatic belief in uniformitarianism - the idea that the facts of science are valid without philosophy - results in the ideal to abolish morality.

(2018) Immoral advances: Is science out of control?
To many scientists, moral objections to their work are not valid: science, by definition, is morally neutral, so any moral judgement on it simply reflects scientific illiteracy.
https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg ... f-control/

The belief in law as such - intrinsic existence - can have profound implications. Scientific exploration is a moral practice in my opinion but one must realize that it addresses a small part of the spectrum of meaningful relevance and that morality (the question "What is good?") cannot be 'abolished'.