You've said that moral judgments are "subjective value judgments." What is a subjective value judgment, other than an expression of a personal sentiment?Peter Holmes wrote: ↑March 26th, 2020, 1:19 pmI've never said subjectivity is to do with personal sentiments. What a ridiculous straw man.
Perhaps we have different understandings of the concept of "value." To say that someone values something is to say that he desires it, and would give up something to obtain it or preserve it. It's value (to him) is whatever he would give up to obtain it or preserve it. A value judgment is an assignment of value to something, a declaration by an agent of what he would give to obtain that thing he desires. Are desires not personal sentiments?
If you have some different understanding of "value," please set it forth.
A person may disapprove of slavery and desire that it be abolished and prohibited. That would indeed be a value judgment on his part. But that Alfie disapproves of slavery doesn't make it immoral, any more than his approval of it would make it moral.
When people declare some act or practice or policy to be immoral, they don't believe they are merely voicing their personal sentiments --- they believe they are invoking some overriding, universal, binding principle, one that transcends their personal feelings. The job of moral philosophy is to elucidate and set forth those principles, if there are any.
There are no "facts" which can justify value judgments. Nor do they need any justification. A value judgment is merely an expression of the strength of someone's desire for something. But rational moral judgments are not value judgments. They do not express anyone's feelings or desires regarding, say, slavery. They declare that slavery is inconsistent with some overriding, universal moral principle.Whatever facts we deploy to justify that value-judgement, it remains a value-judgement, and can never magically become a factual assertion. You're just wrong about this.
A goal, not being a proposition, has no truth value. It merely has to exist. Axioms are propositions, and do have truth values. An axiom is a proposition whose truth is self-evident.Wake up. An 'accepted moral goal or axiom' isn't and can't be true or false.
To say that X is "right" or "wrong" JUST MEANS that X is inconsistent with a sound moral theory. There is no "moral meaning" of those terms beyond that, and it certainly doesn't mean, "I approve/disapprove of X." An act is morally wrong if it is prohibited by a sound moral theory, just as a left turn is wrong if it is prohibited by a valid traffic law.Wrong. 'X is inconsistent with a moral theory' ('soundness' is irrelevant) is NOT a moral assertion. Moral assertions contains words such as 'right', 'wrong', 'good', 'bad', 'should' or 'ought to'. Look at what you're saying. It's just wrong.