Consideration of "Panpsychism, Intuitions, and the Great Chain of Being"

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Consideration of "Panpsychism, Intuitions, and the Great Chain of Being"

Post by anonymous66 » March 15th, 2020, 8:02 pm

The paper is by Luke Roelofs and Jed Buchanan

The authors pose the questions- isn't it just crazy to believe that things like trees or rocks could be conscious? and - That's what panpsychism implies- so panpsychism must be untenable, right? The paper considers what is called "The Great Chain of Being intuition". The authors suggest that in addition to the options of just rejecting panpsychism, or just rejecting our intuition that some things just can't be conscious- there may be other ways to resolve this tension between the two positions.

Philosophers often find themselves being compelled to advocate views that some believe are counter-intuitive in the extreme. How should we react to the idea that consciousness is present much more widely than we might think? Some even argue that all fundamental physical entities are conscious. If one believes that morality should be extended to all conscious entities, then how would that change one's view of morality?

In section 1 the authors will describe panpsychism and the motivations behind the idea. In section 2 they will articulate the intuitions with which the theory conflicts. In sections 3 and 4 they will explore the conflict and consider different approaches to resolve that conflict. In section 5 they will consider dismissing the intuitions (they reject that option). In sections 6 and 7 they will outline their favored approaches. In section 8 they will consider what panpsychism might mean for veganism and vegetarianism.

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Re: Consideration of "Panpsychism, Intuitions, and the Great Chain of Being"

Post by Papus79 » March 16th, 2020, 12:00 am

I don't think it's bad for people to suggest outlines for hypothesis formation but I'm really starting to think that the scientific community needs a different circuit for what are really editorials and commentary rather than hard research.

Past that I don't think this is going to move the ball much farther than a few more people signalling that the ball game should start. We'll have to see, from there, if they're actually able to get under consciousness at all. My best guess at this point (only a guess) - there won't be much of anything that can be done unless a) something is uncovered in studying anaesthesia that can be extrapolated to potentially non-neurological systems or b) something like Elon Musk's Neuralink allows for electrical information processing connection to non-neurological entities in such a way as is able to offer the user something really akin to tasting the subjective wiring or whatever's being touched, or by similar methods one is able to move their consciousness out onto some sort of rigging and in some way prove that it was outside of the body on wires rather than simply utilizing that rigging from the brain.

Whatever happens it will, I'm guessing, probably offend everyone's sensibilities and be both too wild and too tame all the same time. Such situations tend not to rely much on our intuitions and that's probably what we're set to meet.
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Re: Consideration of "Panpsychism, Intuitions, and the Great Chain of Being"

Post by chewybrian » March 16th, 2020, 6:20 am

anonymous66 wrote:
March 15th, 2020, 8:02 pm
The authors pose the questions- isn't it just crazy to believe that things like trees or rocks could be conscious?
I don't see any reason to presume that a rock is conscious, any more than a dead body would be. However, it seems quite reasonable to think that every form of life contains a form of consciousness. It may be quite different than our own consciousness, but the requirements and experience of their lives would be very different from ours. I think you have to concede that my dog is conscious, and so is an elephant or a bear. It's easy to see that some forms of consciousness are much more simple, yet it's difficult to draw a clear line and say that consciousness, for example, is present in a shark but not a crab, or wherever you think that line might be.

The simpler the life form, the more its decisions are based on instinct rather than analysis, yet there are still decisions being made, and almost all life reacts to its environment for its own benefit. A rock will not. A tree, however, will bend towards the light, grow more roots in the direction of a better supply of water, etc. Decisions are made by the tree, but not the rock. I say the tree is conscious, yet it is nothing like our consciousness.
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Re: Consideration of "Panpsychism, Intuitions, and the Great Chain of Being"

Post by Consul » March 16th, 2020, 9:57 am

anonymous66 wrote:
March 15th, 2020, 8:02 pm
The paper is by Luke Roelofs and Jed Buchanan
Here's the whole paper: Panpsychism, Intuitions, and the Great Chain of Being
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Re: Consideration of "Panpsychism, Intuitions, and the Great Chain of Being"

Post by Consul » March 16th, 2020, 2:50 pm

Unless indicated otherwise, all following quotes are from this paper:

* Roelofs, Luke, and Jed Buchanan. "Panpsychism, Intuitions, and the Great chain of Being." Philosophical Studies 176 (2019): 2991–3017.

"On the semantic reading, what matters is how the term ‘consciousness’ has its reference fixed."

"…[P]anpsychists can reply that this misunderstands the semantics of the term ‘consciousness’. We are directly acquainted with conscious states in our own case, and can straightforwardly define the term ‘consciousness’ as meaning ‘having states like this’ (…). This gives us a grip on what ‘conscious’ means that is independent of who or what else is conscious. If this is how we fix the meaning of the term ‘consciousness’, then the semantic reading of the tension between panpsychism and the GCOB intuition fails."

"[T]his is to the advantage of panpsychists, for all they need is a sense of ‘consciousness’ that is not semantically dependent on the structure of contrasts expressed by the GCOB intuition. And if there is any such sense, it is very plausible that ‘phenomenal consciousness’, the ‘raw feel’ of having a subjective point of view at all, would be it. Since it is ‘phenomenal consciousness’ that panpsychists generally talk about, they are well-placed to resist the semantic reading of their problem."

I agree that the reference of "phenomenal consciousness" is fixed through introspective ostension: Phenomenally conscious states are states with subjective experiential contents like these.

"The concept of phenomenal consciousness is given to us through our introspective first-person awareness of our own mental states. And it seems, then, that anything we are introspectively aware of (provided it has fine-grained nonconceptual content) is a definite instance of that concept. This is a claim that will prove important when turn to consider phenomenal consciousness in other species."

(Carruthers, Peter. Human and Animal Minds: The Consciousness Questions Laid to Rest. New York: Oxford University Press, 2019. p. 23)

"'Ostensive definition' may be defined as 'any process by which a person is taught to understand a word otherwise than by the use of other words'."

(Russell, Bertrand. Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits. 1948. Reprint, Abingdon: Routledge, 2009. p. 61)

"The core idea of our final proposal is simple: our intuitions about consciousness are not tracking consciousness per se, but rather a particular type of consciousness. Our sense that consciousness belongs definitely to humans, probably to various animals, and definitely not to plants and rocks accurately reflects something, namely that a certain type of consciousness belongs definitely to humans, probably to various animals, and definitely not to plants and rocks.

This is not the blanket anti-intuition proposal discussed in Sect. 4: because the GCOB intuition tracks a certain type of consciousness, the attributions it generates are reliable when they are positive. Having some particular type of consciousness entails being conscious, so if some being seems conscious to us (due, by hypothesis, to its having a particular type of consciousness), it is reasonable to think it really is conscious. But when something intuitively seems non-conscious to us, that intuition should not be trusted: it might be non-conscious, or it might simply have consciousness of a sort we are not equipped to detect. We may express this more explicitly thus:

Asymmetry principle: Our ‘positive’ intuitions (that something is definitely or probably conscious) are generally reliable, but our ‘negative’ intuitions (that something is definitely or probably not conscious) are generally unreliable.

This proposal needs to be fleshed out. It is easy to say that our intuitions track only a particular type of consciousness, but we need to say what type that is, and why our intuitions track it alone. We believe that the best thing to say is that our intuitions are not tied to any pre-set type of consciousness, but rather to experiences that are, to a greater or lesser extent, familiar to us from our own case. We can intuitively recognize something as experiencing things like pain, attention, contentment, anxiety, desire, and so on, because we have ourselves undergone such experiences. But the outward signs of a completely unfamiliar experience will not be registered by our intuitions. Call this the ‘Invisibility of Unfamiliar States’:

Invisibility of unfamiliar states (IUS): Our intuitions about consciousness in other beings are sensitive only to conscious states of types we are personally familiar with."


"Let us call experiences that are completely unfamiliar to us, in every respect but their being conscious at all, ‘alien’ experiences. IUS then suggests that our intuitive faculties for detecting conscious states will not register alien experiences at all, even when something’s behaviour is manifesting them right in front of us. Let us call a conscious being all of whose experiences are ‘alien’, in this sense, an ‘alien being’. IUS says our intuitions are no use for identifying what an alien being is experiencing."

"So the second step in panpsychism’s defence is to deny a faculty for detecting consciousness independently of particular experiences; call this denial ‘epistemic atomism’:

Epistemic atomism (EA): Our intuitions about consciousness in other beings arise primarily from detecting particular experiences, and only on that basis infering the presence or absence of consciousness per se."


"If IUS and EA are accepted, then the Asymmetry Principle follows. An alien being will (by IUS) not intuitively seem to us to have any particular conscious states, and will therefore (by EA) not intuitively seem to us to be conscious at all. Since both non-conscious beings and alien conscious beings will fail to register as intuitively conscious, our negative intuitions about a creature’s consciousness are not a reliable sign of its lack of consciousness.

On this proposal, the GCOB intuition is a decent guide to something, but not the presence and absence of consciousness: rather, it tracks how far a being’s consciousness resembles our own, and how likely a being is to have consciousness like ours. It is trustworthy, but only if we paraphrase it into saying something other than what it seems to say. Thus understood, it is no threat to panpsychism: panpsychists can agree that a fly’s consciousness is probably more different from ours than a cat’s, but more similar to ours than a plant’s, and that for any given familiar mental state we undergo, it is (other things being equal) more likely that cats share it with us than that flies do, but more likely that flies share it with us than that plants do. This is compatible with believing, on theoretical grounds, that cats, flies, plants, and everything else is conscious in some fashion."


Given that the very concept of phenomenal consciousness (aka subjective experience) is basically defined through introspective ostension, there is still a semantic problem which threatens to undermine the panpsychistic concept of unfamiliar or alien experiences (or "alien subjectivities" – Colin McGinn). For if those alien experiences are so utterly alien to human experiences that they don't resemble, aren't similar to my/our kinds or experiences in any way, then alien kinds of experiences are no kinds of experiences at all. That is, if phenomenally conscious states are ostensively defined as states with subjective experiential contents like these, like the ones I/we undergo, then a state totally unlike like these, totally unlike the ones I/we undergo is not a phenomenally conscious state at all.

Therefore, if the panpsychistic ascription of alien experiences to nonhuman entities is not to be self-undermining, they may be partially but not totally dissimilar from the kinds of experiences we humans have. There must be some qualitative similarities or resemblances between (the experiential contents of) nonhuman phenomenal consciousnesses and (the experiential contents of) human phenomenal consciousness.

Of course, some animal species have sense organs that homo sapiens lacks (See this!); and if the corresponding sensory perceptions involve subjective sensations, these are unfamiliar or alien to us. However, as I said, they must still be somehow similar to the kinds of sensations we are familiar with; for otherwise they aren't subjective sensations at all—given that the reference of the very concept of a phenomenally conscious state is determined through introspective ostension in terms of resemblance with or similarity to human phenomenally conscious states.

Therefore, the following statement is false and cannot be used in defense of panpsychism, because to track "how far a being’s consciousness resembles our own, and how likely a being is to have consciousness like ours" is to track "the presence and absence of consciousness" or "consciousness per se"; so our intuitions about the presence or absence, especially the absence, of consciousness in nonhuman entities are not generally unreliable:

"[T]he GCOB intuition is a decent guide to something, but not the presence and absence of consciousness: rather, it tracks how far a being’s consciousness resembles our own, and how likely a being is to have consciousness like ours."

That said, there is still the problem of vagueness and the question of how similar to a human experiential state a state of a nonhuman entity has to be in order to be an experiential state.

"[R]esemblance in practice seems a messy and inexact notion."

(Armstrong, D. M. Sketch for a Systematic Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. p. 10)

The semantic problem and the vagueness problem have led Peter Carruthers (in his new book Human and Animal Minds) to the pessimistic conclusion that there is no objective fact of the matter as to whether there are phenomenally conscious nonhuman beings. For his line of argumentation, see this series of blog posts:

1. http://philosophyofbrains.com/2020/01/1 ... blems.aspx
2. http://philosophyofbrains.com/2020/01/1 ... space.aspx
3. http://philosophyofbrains.com/2020/01/1 ... menal.aspx
4. http://philosophyofbrains.com/2020/01/1 ... ument.aspx
5. http://philosophyofbrains.com/2020/01/1 ... ument.aspx
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Re: Consideration of "Panpsychism, Intuitions, and the Great Chain of Being"

Post by Terrapin Station » March 17th, 2020, 8:49 am

anonymous66 wrote:
March 15th, 2020, 8:02 pm
How should we react to the idea that consciousness is present much more widely than we might think?
By acknowledging that it's possible, but possibility isn't sufficient for belief. There need to be good reasons to believe one possibility over the alternate possibility, and in the case of something like this, those reasons would have to include empirical reasons/empirical evidence plausibly supporting the belief.

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Re: Consideration of "Panpsychism, Intuitions, and the Great Chain of Being"

Post by Terrapin Station » March 17th, 2020, 8:54 am

A good reason to NOT believe the claim that "trees are conscious" is that the only cases of consciousness that we can be sure about are cases where consciousness is a property of human brains. So far there's no good reason to buy substratum independence, no good reason to buy functionalism. We can reasonably conclude that the closer a brain is to human brains, the greater likelihood of there being consciousness of some sort. So as we move towards less similar brains--cockroach brains, say, there's less reason to assume consciousness.

Of course, things like trees do not even have brains, so there's no reason to assume that they're conscious.

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Re: Consideration of "Panpsychism, Intuitions, and the Great Chain of Being"

Post by Atla » March 17th, 2020, 2:26 pm

anonymous66 wrote:
March 15th, 2020, 8:02 pm
How should we react to the idea that consciousness is present much more widely than we might think?
It's a fact that 'physical' = 'mental', unless proven otherwise. In other words everything that can be seen as physical structure, can also be seen as qualia with an absolute first-person-view, and vica versa. It makes no sense to talk about two things here.

Most of philosophy is concerned with talking about two things, which is a totally random fantasy unless proven otherwise, in other words most philosophy is insane unless proven otherwise. Physicalism and idealism are also wrong since they start with two things, and then see one of them as fundamental, or as the only one existing.

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Re: Consideration of "Panpsychism, Intuitions, and the Great Chain of Being"

Post by TimesParadigm » March 17th, 2020, 6:05 pm

I must agree with a whole host of the replies so far. To resolve a conundrum one has to start at the beginning, and the beginning in my view here is "What is consciousness?"
Too often we humans subjectively impose reason on subjects such as consciousness or the passage of time, because we are aware. So what does being conscious really entail? Sensory deprivation renders the human mind incapable of reason, to extremes where hallucinations often result. In my view, simple reflexes automated by small celled invertebrates is not consciousness, but just up the ladder from them come organisms that have memories and recall, conditioned reflexes and consideration. It is clear that a fine line exists between consciousness and inanimation.
To be conscious requires the ability to interact with time, otherwise no such contemplation would occur. One does not need mobility to prove consciousness, as temporal cognition can proliferate internally (comatose patients). But, unless being aware comes with some benefit it could be considered that such a state is not worthy of being classed as "conscious". Who are we to judge such benefits?

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Re: Consideration of "Panpsychism, Intuitions, and the Great Chain of Being"

Post by anonymous66 » March 17th, 2020, 8:26 pm

Section 1- Panpsychism

The authors consider panpsychism to be a starting point- not a conclusion.
The definition they consider in this paper is this: panpsychism- all fundamental physical entities are conscious, and complex physical things like humans have whatever consciousness they have in virtue of their fundamental parts being conscious (possibly together with other factors). They are considering a form of panpsychism that suggests that matter is inherently conscious- and that we humans are conscious because we are made of conscious matter. It is up to physicists to determine what the most fundamental physical things are... whatever it is that those fundamental physical things are- if panpsychism (at least the form they are considering), then those things are conscious. Consciousness, as the authors take it to be, is the "something it is likeness" to be that entity.

Panpsychists need not believe that literally everything is conscious- non-fundamental things need not be conscious. Which things are claimed to be conscious depends on which version of panpsychism we are talking about. In what might be thought of as "universalist" panpsychists, all composites of conscious parts are conscious because they are made up of conscious parts, in the "restrictive" version of panpsychism, only a restricted subset of composites are conscious. "The aim of either case is a theory which, though it posits many more conscious entities than rival theories, nevertheless aims to derive their existence from the simplest possible set of fundamental rules."

The authors explain that the most influential argument for panpsychism is the idea that it can explain some things that competing theories cannot. If one were to reject that matter is conscious, then there is an "explanatory gap" between physics and consciousness- if there is no way to close that gap, then we rightly should think of consciousness as a fundamental property in addition to the fundamental physical properties. "But then how is this fundamental property [of consciousness] distributed? It seems more parsimonious for it to be systematically correlated with the fundamental physical properties, and thus omnipresent, or nearly so, than for it to be correlated only with the specific kind of complexity that characteristics particular organs of particular organisms. Panpsychists suggest we should prefer fundamental laws that are simple and general, generating a variety of forms out of the same few basic elements, over ones that link one basic element to a specific structure."

Some of the other arguments for panpsychism are: Chalmers- theories that involve panpsychism are better-placed to account for mental causation than any other non-physicalist view. Strawson & Seager- physical descriptions fail to say anything about the "intrinsic nature" of physical objects- they believe that the most parsimonious view of physical objects is that they also have the same subjective experiences that we do.

"An argument for panpsychism that is especially pertinent to this paper is the 'continuity' argument." The argument points out that there is nothing particularly special about humans- we are part of nature. If panpsychism were false, the argument goes, then "there should be a moment when the 'most advanced' non-conscious thing was succeeded by the 'least advanced' conscious thing, a moment when the 'lights turn on'. {I hope Greta reads this} Yet human evolution and foetal growth are so gradual that no candidate for such a discontinuous moment seems plausible."

This paper focuses on panpsychism, but the issues raised can be dealt with by other theories... theories like Integrated Information Theory (IIT)- it suggests that almost all free-floating atoms and molecules are conscious, but the component parts of the human brain are not. It also suggests that certain simple grids of logic gate are "more" conscious, in some sense, than human beings. Strawson's "micropsychism" suggests that everything made out of normal matter is conscious but everything made out of anti-matter, even structural copies of us, are not. "If some aggressively 'chauvinistic' version of the mind-brain identity theory is true, it might follow that aliens or androids with different physiology to ours would not be conscious, even those that are equally behaviorally complex- it might imply this for animals with very different brains, like cephalopods, or even birds. In essence, any theory which does not make functional structure wholly or partly constitutive of consciousness will either imply, or at least make a live possibility, that consciousness is present in things we would normally think conscious, or absent in things which we would normally assume were conscious." The authors ask- what exactly are the intuitions that make panpsychism so unpalatable?

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Re: Consideration of "Panpsychism, Intuitions, and the Great Chain of Being"

Post by Consul » March 17th, 2020, 10:44 pm

anonymous66 wrote:
March 17th, 2020, 8:26 pm
The authors consider panpsychism to be a starting point- not a conclusion.
The definition they consider in this paper is this: panpsychism- all fundamental physical entities are conscious, and complex physical things like humans have whatever consciousness they have in virtue of their fundamental parts being conscious (possibly together with other factors).
Chalmers defines panpsychism as "the thesis that some fundamental physical entities have mental states." No matter whether all or only some kinds of fundamental physical entities are subjects of mentality/experientiality, this view had better be called fundamental-property dualism or "elemental-property dualism" (Paul Churchland).
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Re: Consideration of "Panpsychism, Intuitions, and the Great Chain of Being"

Post by Consul » March 18th, 2020, 12:19 pm

Consul wrote:
March 17th, 2020, 10:44 pm
Chalmers defines panpsychism as "the thesis that some fundamental physical entities have mental states."
If panpsychists don't ascribe mental/experiential states to all kinds of elementary particles but only to some of them, they have no means whatsoever of identifying the one(s) with mental/experiential properties.

Another point is that the elementary particles in the current standard model of physics might not be the truly fundamental ones. For example, quarks are not known to have any substructure, but they are not known not to have any substructure either.

Furthermore, the truly fundamental physical entities might not be elementary particles, because these might be nothing but spatially compresent complexes of physical quantities inhering in regions of space(time) or a cosmic aether, with space(time) or the cosmic aether being the only substance and the only fundamental physical entity.
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Re: Consideration of "Panpsychism, Intuitions, and the Great Chain of Being"

Post by Consul » March 18th, 2020, 1:11 pm

If all or some kinds of elementary particles enjoy sensory qualia, these are arguably epiphenomenal, because their absence or presence makes no difference to the fundamental interactions of the elementary particles in the standard model, which are successfully physically explainable without any appeal to sensory qualia.

QUOTE>
"[T]he hypothesis that qualia or qualia-like intrinsic properties underlie the structural and dispositional facts of basic physics doesn’t do any real explanatory work. It doesn’t add anything to the physics we already have—no new predictions or empirical results are forthcoming. And it can't explain the dispositional properties in question either, such as whether a given elementary particle is spin-up or spin-down. Nor can it even explain the difference between the circumstances in which a physical disposition becomes actualized and those in which it doesn’t. This is in marked contrast with cases where categorical properties actually succeed in explaining something (at least in outline)—such as explaining the brittleness of a glass (its disposition to break when struck with a certain force), or explaining why the glass did actually break, in terms of its molecular structure."

(Carruthers, Peter. Human and Animal Minds: The Consciousness Questions Laid to Rest. New York: Oxford University Press, 2019. p. 9)
<QUOTE
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Re: Consideration of "Panpsychism, Intuitions, and the Great Chain of Being"

Post by Atla » March 18th, 2020, 1:29 pm

TimesParadigm wrote:
March 17th, 2020, 6:05 pm
I must agree with a whole host of the replies so far. To resolve a conundrum one has to start at the beginning, and the beginning in my view here is "What is consciousness?"
Too often we humans subjectively impose reason on subjects such as consciousness or the passage of time, because we are aware. So what does being conscious really entail? Sensory deprivation renders the human mind incapable of reason, to extremes where hallucinations often result. In my view, simple reflexes automated by small celled invertebrates is not consciousness, but just up the ladder from them come organisms that have memories and recall, conditioned reflexes and consideration. It is clear that a fine line exists between consciousness and inanimation.
To be conscious requires the ability to interact with time, otherwise no such contemplation would occur. One does not need mobility to prove consciousness, as temporal cognition can proliferate internally (comatose patients). But, unless being aware comes with some benefit it could be considered that such a state is not worthy of being classed as "conscious". Who are we to judge such benefits?
Consciousness is 1 word for about 2-4 different things. The kind of consciousness you described (the individual consciousness of an advanced organism) is not the kind of consciousness that is relevant to panpsychism.

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Re: Consideration of "Panpsychism, Intuitions, and the Great Chain of Being"

Post by anonymous66 » March 18th, 2020, 2:42 pm

So what exactly is this "great chain of being" intuition?

"The intuitions that panpsychism conflicts with are most vividly illustrated when philosophers deny consciousness to some physical entities right as they introduce the term consciousness"

The intuition is expressed by these quotes:
"There is something it is like for me as I look at the bricks in the wall; there is nothing it is like to be a brick."
"An organism, such as a bat, is conscious if it is able to experience the outer world... There is... something it is like to be a conscious creature whereas there is nothing it is like to be, for example, a table or a tree."
"the defining mark of a conscious organism is that 'there is something that it is like to be that organism...' There is something it is like to be a human being; you are experiencing it right now... By contrast, rocks, table, and chairs lack consciousness. There is nothing it is like to be such an entity."
"What I mean by 'consciousness' can be best illustrated by examples. When I wake up from a dreamless sleep, I enter a state of consciousness, a state that continues for as long as I am awake. When I go to sleep or am put under general anaesthetic or die, my consciousness states cease."
"Everybody knows what consciousness is: it is what vanishes every night when we fall into dreamless sleep and reappears when we wake up or when we dream."

The authors explain that a primary intuitive judgment is one which appears plausible even before any further evidence or argument has been supplied to support it (it could also be there case that there actually is a lot of evidence to support any specific intuition) - they just strike us as being true even if we cannot produce any evidence or an argument. The authors speculate that perhaps we find these intuitions to be plausible because there actually is some evidence or argument that we understand implicitly- and when that evidence or argument is supplied to us- we think "yeah, that's what I meant!". What makes an intuition an intuition is that we do not find it necessary to wait for the actual evidence or argument before judging it to be plausible.

The authors argue that it is not clear if the above claims about trees, rocks, or walls are actually primary intuitions. We have good reasons for thinking that bricks are not conscious- it's not merely a prejudice. Rocks, after all, don't move, respond to their environment, learn from the past, etc. Humans, cats, bats, rats, etc. do exhibit evidence that they are conscious- and when they stop exhibiting that evidence, we don't attribute consciousness to them. So we can articulate the reasons for why it is that we attribute consciousness to some things but not others. "But if we took one of those reasons- e.g. 'cats are probably conscious because they do X'- and asked 'why is doing X good evidence for consciousness?', the typical answer would simply be 'the things I think are conscious tend to do X, and things I think aren't don't.' That is, the principles implicit in the reasons for our attributions are themselves dependent on the attributions, in that they are rendered plausible by their fitting those attributions. Perhaps some more fundamental justification is actually at work, and perhaps neurological research could provide independent evidence, but we can reasonably accept the general principal in advance of articulating that justification or discovering that evidence, just because it fits with the attributions we are inclined to make." The authors call these kinds of attributions "secondary intuitive judgments" - by which they mean that they seem plausible in light of reasons that are themselves plausible in light of fitting enough of the secondary intuitive judgments. "Each judgment by itself can be backed up by compelling reasons, but the overall set of judgments, though it hangs together, has the characteristic unsupported-plausibility of an intuition." When we speak of the intuition that conflicts with panpsychism, what we mean is the pattern of such judgments- each of which can be supported by reference to others. "This pattern of evidence seems to be challenged by panpsychism, among other theories, in a way that must be addressed by supporters of those theories."

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