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[Pattern-chaser]

There is no "Rule" that can be composed in advance, that will guarantee your conduct is always moral if you follow it. Morality isn't like that. Real life isn't like that.

I've indicated what I think is wrong with your version. Which I understand to be some mix of "Platinum rule" and "act decently".

Perhaps you could say what you think is wrong with my (Kantian) version ?

You have written that you are seeking a reliable rule, code, or the like, that allows you trouble-free judgement of these moral matters. And that's what's wrong with your version. There are no criteria for objective moral judgements, because "moral" and "objective" are mutually contradictory and incompatible. You can have one or the other, perhaps, but never both. Morality is not objective, even when we use the mildest-possible interpretation of "objective".

So when Kant says

“I ought never to act except in such a way that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law”.

is your objection that he is not moral or not objective ?

I think that, because Kant has achieved some degree of objectivity here, that his comment has little or nothing to do with morals and morality, which openly mock objectivity. Morality follows 'rules' that emerge from culture, not reason or logic. Culture makes and follows its own rules, and those rules are established independently of reason and logic.

That's not to say that reason and logic are never involved. Rather, it is to say that morality is not bound or constrained by reason or logic, if cultural prerogatives point in a different direction.

[Good_Egg]

I think that, because Kant has achieved some degree of objectivity here, that his comment has little or nothing to do with morals and morality, which openly mock objectivity. Morality follows 'rules' that emerge from culture, not reason or logic. Culture makes and follows its own rules, and those rules are established independently of reason and logic.

That's not to say that reason and logic are never involved. Rather, it is to say that morality is not bound or constrained by reason or logic, if cultural prerogatives point in a different direction.

I agree that Kant has achieved a degree of objectivity in his rule. And agree that culture is a source of rules.

There is a difficulty about language - about how we use the word "moral" and its derivatives. Can we meaningfully discuss whether Kant's rule of conduct is a moral rule and whether cultural rules are moral rules ? It seems to me that there is a real question there. Masked by a question of terminology.

Seem like you think that there is nothing higher than culture. That a culture's rules cannot be immoral, because the only standard of morality that can apply in any culture are the standards of that culture. If you hold that view, then I can see you might want to use "moral" to mean something like "culturally-approved".

But I think that position is better expressed by saying that morality doesn't exist. That "ought" (in the absolute rather than the conditional sense) is meaningless.

Or are you arguing that these are different positions ?

[Lagayascienza]

"Ought" carries no real meaning. We only "ought" to do what we feel is morally right, which is tautologous.. Our subjective feelings are all we have. There is no objective standard, no moral-ometer against which we can measure actions.

[Pattern-chaser]

I think that, because Kant has achieved some degree of objectivity here, that his comment has little or nothing to do with morals and morality, which openly mock objectivity. Morality follows 'rules' that emerge from culture, not reason or logic. Culture makes and follows its own rules, and those rules are established independently of reason and logic.

That's not to say that reason and logic are never involved. Rather, it is to say that morality is not bound or constrained by reason or logic, if cultural prerogatives point in a different direction.

I agree that Kant has achieved a degree of objectivity in his rule. And agree that culture is a source of rules.

Personally, I don't really think Kant meaningfully approached objectivity, but that is highly dependent on one's working definition of "objectivity", so let's let that one go?

And yes, culture is the "source of rules", but maybe "rules" is a bad term to use, as it seems to imply logic and reason (exclusively), as other 'rules' do. With the Golden Rule, or morality (which is much the same thing, in this context), the 'rules' emerge from sociocultural priorities, and may not have anything at all to do with reason and logic.

There is a difficulty about language - about how we use the word "moral" and its derivatives. Can we meaningfully discuss whether Kant's rule of conduct is a moral rule and whether cultural rules are moral rules ? It seems to me that there is a real question there. Masked by a question of terminology.

Yes, terminology is so often an issue for philosophers.

Seem like you think that there is nothing higher than culture. That a culture's rules cannot be immoral, because the only standard of morality that can apply in any culture are the standards of that culture. If you hold that view, then I can see you might want to use "moral" to mean something like "culturally-approved".

I wouldn't've said "higher", as that carries with it many positive implications, and this is much less than that. I simply recognise what seems to me to be what the real world is showing me. Pragmatism.

Cultures and societies, pretty much synonymous for our purposes here, are the biggest kids in the playground, and they always get their own way, because they're the biggest and toughest kids around. They acknowledge no rules, and just do what they want. That would seem to be a simple fact, according to empirical observation(s).

So yes, "morality" does mean "something like "culturally-approved"", although I would not choose it to be so, if I had the choice (which I don't). Empirical observation says that's how it is, and I have no grounds on which to contradict the real world. I would also observe, in your words, that a culture's rules cannot be immoral, because the only standard of morality that can apply in any culture are the standards of that culture.

But I think that position is better expressed by saying that morality doesn't exist. That "ought" (in the absolute rather than the conditional sense) is meaningless.

Or are you arguing that these are different positions ?

I think these are valid perspectives on what we are discussing. They are not necessarily my opinions, or aspirations; they are what they are. I think I am simply reflecting the real world here, not interpreting it, or wishing for something different ("ought").

[Good_Egg]

And yes, culture is the "source of rules", but maybe "rules" is a bad term to use, as it seems to imply logic and reason (exclusively), as other 'rules' do. With the Golden Rule, or morality (which is much the same thing, in this context), the 'rules' emerge from sociocultural priorities, and may not have anything at all to do with reason and logic...

...So yes, "morality" does mean "something like "culturally-approved"", although I would not choose it to be so, if I had the choice (which I don't). Empirical observation says that's how it is...

Culture isn't the source of anything. Individual minds are the source of ideas. Culture is a medium, a mechanism for transmission, which works to spread some ideas and suppress others.

Empirical observation can inform us as to whether descriptive propositions are true or false. It cannot tell us whether a prescriptive proposition is true; only whether people say that it is, or act as if they believe it is.

I'm making the distinction between
- the idea that "ought" statements are meaningless (and therefore any colour of rule of conduct is meaningless)
- the idea that "ought" statements are meaningful but we cannot know whether they are true
- the idea that being socially-approved in some particular culture makes such statements true (so that we can know their truth by looking at what other people say or do).

[Pattern-chaser]

Culture isn't the source of anything. Individual minds are the source of ideas. Culture is a medium, a mechanism for transmission, which works to spread some ideas and suppress others.

No, thank you. I don't care to do the Libertarian Dance at the moment, thank you. Groups, societies, and cultures exist, and they *ACT* as though they are/were entities in their own right, whether they are or not.

I'm making the distinction between
- the idea that "ought" statements are meaningless (and therefore any colour of rule of conduct is meaningless)
- the idea that "ought" statements are meaningful but we cannot know whether they are true
- the idea that being socially-approved in some particular culture makes such statements true (so that we can know their truth by looking at what other people say or do).

Why are you offering this distinction? What is gained? All I see is that a core idea is hidden by the above — that there are no objective foundations on which we can/could build Objective Morality. Thus truth becomes almost irrelevant to our immediate discussion, yes?

[Good_Egg]

Culture isn't the source of anything. Individual minds are the source of ideas. Culture is a medium, a mechanism for transmission, which works to spread some ideas and suppress others.

Groups, societies, and cultures exist, and they *ACT* as though they are/were entities in their own right, whether they are or not.

Is that a good argument ? Is the fact that in some ways groups act as if each group has a group-mind sufficient justification for asserting as a fact that they have ? If I were to say that "in some ways humans act as if murder and robbery are objectively wrong, so we can assert as a fact that they are" would you be convinced ?

I'm making the distinction between
- the idea that "ought" statements are meaningless (and therefore any colour of rule of conduct is meaningless)
- the idea that "ought" statements are meaningful but we cannot know whether they are true
- the idea that being socially-approved in some particular culture makes such statements true (so that we can know their truth by looking at what other people say or do).

Why are you offering this distinction?

Because I genuinely don't know what you are arguing for (and I suspect you don't either)

- is it a form of moral relativism ? that there is no basis for moral objection to genocide or anything else, so we should drop the meaningless word "ought" from our lexicon ?
And just accept that other people do stuff that we don't like ?

- Is it merely that you think ethics is pointless ? That we should continue to act as if other people mattered (or truth mattered or something else mattered) even though there is no basis for thinking so ? All virtue is heroic in a meaningless world ? Existentialism ?

- or is that you want to suppress dissent from the majority position ? Thinking that what the group-majority want is by definition what is moral for all group-members to do and immoral to refuse to do or otherwise dissent from ?

- or "any of the above", asserting that all such positions are equally valid ?

I see.. ...a core idea... ...that there are no objective foundations on which we can/could build Objective Morality.

Have I parsed that correctly ?

So what follows ?

Because if one can logically derive unacceptable conclusions from such a statement then it's a good indication that maybe there's something wrong with it....

[Pattern-chaser]

Culture isn't the source of anything. Individual minds are the source of ideas. Culture is a medium, a mechanism for transmission, which works to spread some ideas and suppress others.

Groups, societies, and cultures exist, and they *ACT* as though they are/were entities in their own right, whether they are or not.

Is that a good argument ? Is the fact that in some ways groups act as if each group has a group-mind sufficient justification for asserting as a fact that they have ? If I were to say that "in some ways humans act as if murder and robbery are objectively wrong, so we can assert as a fact that they are" would you be convinced ?

I'm sorry, but here I see only confusion. From your words, we could say that "in some ways humans act as if murder and robbery are objectively wrong, so we can hypothesise that these humans believe they are" As you know, belief and knowledge are often confused, as has happened here. Your words tell us that the beliefs of these humans are factual and objective, whereas the truth is that they believe some stuff without justification.

...

I'm running out of steam here, and it's often better to answer one question per post, for clarity. So I'll stop here.

[Good_Egg]

...we could say that "in some ways humans act as if murder and robbery are objectively wrong, so we can hypothesise that these humans believe they are..."

And you believe that those humans are mistaken ?

Notice that your statement starts with what purports to be a partial description of the behaviour of humans in general. And then twists that to treat it as a description of the behaviour of some humans. So as to infer that those particular humans, but not others, hold some belief. Looks like a (relatively subtle) example of the all/some fallacy. A common- enough logical error.

But this links to the other half (which you didn't feel up to tackling today, and yes I feel like that sometimes too). How does a human who believes your "core idea" behave ?

[Pattern-chaser]

...we could say that "in some ways humans act as if murder and robbery are objectively wrong, so we can hypothesise that these humans believe they are..."

And you believe that those humans are mistaken ?

Not necessarily. My comment arises because I don't know if those humans are correct or not, when the judgement claims objectivity: "in some ways humans act as if murder and robbery are objectively wrong...". Personally, I believe they are morally wrong.

But I would never claim objectivity for anything at all, with the One and Only Exception: Objective Reality exists, and I am all or part of it. I know of no other claim to which a human can knowingly and correctly assign objectivity.

How does a human who believes your "core idea" behave ?

Good question. I'm not quite sure what my "core idea" is, though. I think the answer to your question might be, with an open mind. Is that any good?

[Good_Egg]

I think the answer to your question might be, with an open mind. Is that any good?

...we could say that "in some ways humans act as if murder and robbery are objectively wrong...
... I don't know if those humans are correct or not, when the judgement claims objectivity.... ...Personally, I believe they are morally wrong.

So how does the behaviour of your good self , and those who think as you do - personally believing that murder and robbery are morally wrong but open-minded to the possibility that they are not - differ from the behaviour of those humans who think it an objective fact that they are morally wrong ?

Do you behave exactly as they do, for now,
pending further information that casts doubt on your personal belief ?

Or do you hold yourself to that standard of behaviour but decline to hold others to it ?
E.g freely hanging out with murderers and robbers ? Happily voting them into public office ? Respecting them equally ?

[Pattern-chaser]

I think the answer to your question might be, with an open mind. Is that any good?

...we could say that "in some ways humans act as if murder and robbery are objectively wrong...
... I don't know if those humans are correct or not, when the judgement claims objectivity.... ...Personally, I believe they are morally wrong.

So how does the behaviour of your good self , and those who think as you do - personally believing that murder and robbery are morally wrong but open-minded to the possibility that they are not - differ from the behaviour of those humans who think it an objective fact that they are morally wrong ?

How do we differ? Not in any obvious or superficial way. But we differ nonetheless. The differences are in our world-views, I think. I have respect for the (misleading) term "objective", and seek never to employ it. I always seek to use a term that honestly and clearly describes what I mean.

In this case, that means that I acknowledge that my own views are not based on solid deductive logic, but on morality, which strays often from reason and logic, and acts according to other (social and cultural) criteria. So I could be wrong. Those who hold different views may feel they *are* correct, and will not consider any alternative viewpoint.

Or do you hold yourself to that standard of behaviour but decline to hold others to it ?
E.g freely hanging out with murderers and robbers ? Happily voting them into public office ? Respecting them equally ?

I decline to hold others to my own views, mainly because I know I could be wrong. But your final line ... is unexpected and misguided. I do not choose to (knowingly) "hang out" with murderers or robbers. I personally would not vote for someone I consider immoral. That's as it should be, isn't it? I use my vote as I see fit, and you use yours the same way, yes? Respect is earned...

[Sy Borg]

Unlike Pattern-Chaser, I would absolutely (knowingly) vote for someone who was immoral. It's not easy to vote for someone who is moral because the act of reaching the top in a ruthlessly competitive field like politics requires dirty deeds. No one in politics is playing Marquess of Queensberry rules, so to speak. Those who did play by the rules would have been metaphorically been kicked in the nether regions, and when they fell, they were swarmed and kicked into submission ... again, metaphorically haha

That's why the golden rule is so good, it covers a lot of ground with very little prior knowledge needed and it's catchy, which aids in adoption. There is no expectation of perfection, no purity test. While obviously imperfect, it's a generally positive idea that aids in peace and societal cohesion. If we accept the imperfections of the world, imperfections that have existed basically forever, everything makes a whole lot more sense. Once could live by that one credo and be a pretty good person.

[Good_Egg]

I decline to hold others to my own views, mainly because I know I could be wrong.

Do you hold others to any standard at all ? If you had reason to believe that your neighbour had murdered someone, would you turn them in to the police ? Testify in court as to what you knew ? Or would your philosophical doubt as to the possible wrongness of your personal belief that murder is wrong prevent you doing anything to bring about their punishment for wrongdoing ?

Or is that you wouldn't impose or enforce your standards of conduct but you would hold others to society's standards ? The law of the land ?

And if that law compels you to inform on them for sonething you personally consider harmless or meritorious ( ? harbouring Jews ? Speaking a truth that has been criminalized as "hate speech") ?

[Pattern-chaser]

Unlike Pattern-Chaser, I would absolutely (knowingly) vote for someone who was immoral. It's not easy to vote for someone who is moral because the act of reaching the top in a ruthlessly competitive field like politics requires dirty deeds.

If so, then hasn't politics failed us? Hasn't it gone so far beyond failing us, that there is no possibility of remedy or recovery? What must we put in its place, I wonder...?